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THE IMPACT OF DISCLOSURE OF ACCOUNTING INFORMATION
UPON ASPECTS OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
Philip Douglass Johnson
This thesis  is primarily concerned with epistemological issues 
in connection with the  disclosure of accounting information in 
industrial relations contexts. As such it largely arose out 
of a dissatisfaction with the  orientation of much of the  c u r re n t  
academic lite ra tu re  th a t  deals with th is  area. Essentially,
th is  lite ra ture  is characterised  by both a deterministic policy 
science approach th a t  ignores the  mediation of such processes 
by recipients ' subjectivity  and a modernist d iscourse th a t  
perceives accounting information as an artefact th a t  neutrally  
a rb itra te s  the  financial "reality" facing s takeholders , th a t  
thereby  constrains the ir  p u rsu it  of sectional in te re s t ,  and 
hence enables optimal decision making. The la tter
characteris tic  has resulted  in a post modern concern, in th is  
research , to explore aspects  of the  epistemological basis of 
p resen t accounting practices - an inquiry grounded in prior 
consideration of the  sociological na tu re  of what is taken to be 
w arranted knowledge/science. From th is  epistemological 
analysis th is  research  then proceeds to an ethnographical 
investigation, entailing analytic induction, of how particu lar  
recipients perceive and in te rp re t  disclosed accounting 
information and the reby  mediate its effects . This thesis  then 
concludes by conjecturing about the  potential for the  
development of employee derived heterodox modes of engagement 
and the ir  eventual confrontation with modern accounting 
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N.B. The notes and references for each chapter are given at the end of the appropriate 
Chapter.
INTRODUCTION
In 1969 Trevor Gambling described accounting, in essence, as the presentation of complex 
economic situations or histories in the form of "conventional mathematical models"; indeed 
the accountant’s skill lay in the mastery of this "symbolic model-making". Often 
commentators invest such processes with ontological privilege by attributing to accountancy 
the status of an objective, value-free, technical enterprise (see Morgan, 1988). When left at 
that level of understanding there is a tendency to ignore the social, political and behaviourial 
context of accounting -  a context that, for some contemporary scholars (e.g. Arrington and 
Francis, 1989; Tinker, 1985), not only conditions the specific form that accounting adopts, 
but which in turn is conditioned by the impact of those accounting schemata and practices.
The intervening twenty years has witnessed significant developments in accounting research 
concerning these formerly ignored issues. Yet concurrently it is increasingly evident that 
accountancy has gained social and political prominence as a means of monitoring and 
regulating many aspects of our everyday lives. Perhaps it is possible to speculate that this has 
occurred due to the sheer size, complexity and diversity of contemporary public and ^ private 
enterprises, as well as the advent of economic crises that have lead to some degree of financial 
austerity and the upsurge of particular political dogmas (see Miller and Rose, 1988, p. 173). 
But regardless of the veracity of these speculations, it is apparent that due to accounting’s 
modern social and political significance,its behaviourial, political and social ramifications 
ought to be of even greater concern to a wider audience. Primarily it was out of such a 
concern that this thesis was originally undertaken.
At the time of writing this thesis, accounting remains a socially sanctioned source of cognitive 
competence and authority widely accepted and trusted, yet rarely fully understood by the 
non-professional. In this it is often conceived as a legitimate and objective means of 
isomorphically representing and monitoring the financial aspects of everyday affairs and, 
importantly, as a vehicle for guiding intervention into these economic transactions with the 
professed objective of improving "efficiency". As such accountancy might be conceived as
a repository of theories, empirical findings, received traditions, conventions, techniques and 
procedures that increasingly impact upon our everyday lives through expert intervention and 
consultation; as well as more indirectly, but with equal significance, through its interaction 
with the affairs of the institutions that constitute society.
Indeed accounting is increasingly becoming part of our verbal culture as it penetrates many 
aspects of our lives through its colonisation and bureaucratization (Storey, 1983, p. 141) of 
the administrative apparatus of new substantive domains and arenas for decision-making; 
areas in which its intervention had previously been though to be inapplicable. The ostensible 
rationale behind this diaspora appears to be derived from the perception that accounting’s 
apparent effectiveness in the "business world", where its experts and technocrats had launched 
"bureaucracy into a fundamentally new phase in its organisational evolution" (Gouldner, 1976, 
p. 253), legitimates the inference that this expertise is readily transferable to new "problems" 
and domains which are seen to be in need of greater efficiency and rationalisation - 
objectives achievable through the introduction of impersonal "market" control through 
accounting procedures (see Gordon, 1964, p. 196). An aspect to this rationale is an increasing 
reliance upon the knowledge and competence of the accountant whose submissions are 
accorded an aura of expertise, objectivity and credibility by institutional audiences. For some 
observers, the very sustenance of this "myth" of impartiality and objectivity serves to 
legitimise decisions and policies that are ultimately partisan through enabling a technocratic 
sublimination of bias (see Boland, 1982).
The most recent and perhaps most controversial example of this colonisation process is 
provided by the proposed use of accounting techniques and criteria to "discipline" the 
National Health Service in the U.K. Although this innovation has many facets, the most 
topical at this time is contained in the Conservative Government’s recent White Paper - 
"Working for Patients" (HMSO, 1989). Amongst its key proposals is the idea that general 
practitioners should be allocated budgets. It is proposed that all 32,500 general practitioners 
in their 11,000 practices will have a "drugs budget"; in addition the 1,000 largest practices 
with over 11,000 patients will be offered a "practice budget"; with which they will be able to
purchase hospital care from private or NHS hospitals. The Government’s rationale behind 
these proposals was explained by Kenneth Clarke . . .
. .  Giving the G.P.’s the resources to finance services for their own patients 
will provide a real incentive to hospitals to improve the service they offer .
. Money would follow the patient to where the work could best be done . .
(Guardian, 1/2/89, p. 1)
However these proposals caused Robin Cook, the Labour Party Health Spokesman, to 
comment that they constituted . . .
" . . .  A prescription for a Health Service run by accountants for civil servants 
and written by people who will always put a healthy balance sheet before 
healthy patients . . ."
(Guardian, ibid.)
The impact of such financial controls upon the NHS is not the immediate concern of this 
work. Rather the point of the above example is that it illustrates the current spread of 
accounting practices and conventions into various aspects of our lives. The full implications 
of that dispersal are as yet unclear, but it is evident that this form of control makes particular 
aspects of reality visible and knowable and therefore manageable. Yet this very act of 
illuminating particular social phenomena might well make other aspects of reality 
penumbranic and less important in the eye of the beholder -  apparent financial efficiency 
might mask poor medical treatment from the point of view of the patient: a situation 
exacerbated by the tendency for financial indicators of performance to drive out non- 
financial measures (Munro and Cooper, 1989).
However this thesis is concerned with only one particular area into which accounting 
information has intervened - industrial relations. In this it is concerned with some of the 
implications of the disclosure of accounting information in industrial relations contexts. In 
my approach to this endeavour I attempt to apply a consciously sociological perspective both 
in terms of a consideration of the socio-historical processes that influence the constitution of 
knowledge/science and the investigation of certain actors’ mediation of the disclosure of a
particular kind of knowledge, accounting information, in the social milieux of industrial 
relations. While my approach reflects my increasing interest in the "sociology of knowledge" 
(Berger and Luckmann, 1967, p. 26), it also developed out of my concern about the apparent 
diffusion of accounting derived practices throughout society’s institutions as well as a 
dissatisfaction with dominant orientation adopted by researchers interested in this particular 
substantive domain. Specifically the text proceeds as follows.
In Chapter I I begin by reviewing and evaluating the debate, regarding the disclosure of 
accounting information in industrial relations contexts, that has taken place in the academic 
literature. Arising out of this critique I identify two interrelated lacunae that constitute two 
of the main themes for the remainder of this work. Firstly I consider that there is a need to 
develop a more thorough understanding of the nature of the social phenomena that are being 
disclosed, i.e. accounting information. This entails an avoidance of the "modernist" 
orientation of much prior research that assumes accounting data to neutrally arbitrate the 
financial reality confronting stakeholders. As with other "modernist" accounting discourses 
they . . .
". . . deny their discursive textuality, deny their constructivist origins, and
present themselves as originating outside themselves mimetically re -presenting
"nature"."
(Arrington and Francis, 1989, p. 7)
Secondly I consider that this debate, for various reasons, has been characterised by a 
deterministic perspective that by ignoring recipients’ subjectivity has produced an inadequate 
and partial understanding of the effects of the disclosure of accounting information. So any 
mediation of the disclosure process by the knowledgeable agents who receive transmitted 
accounting information remains, in effect, uninvestigated. Thus, how those members 
perceive, interpret and act upon such information, and thereby mediate its effects in 
industrial relations contexts, constitutes an important focus for this research.
Therefore these two lacunae necessarily lead to a confrontation with awesome epistemological 
and methodological issues. It is with these issues that Chapters II, III and IV are primarily
concerned and which prepare an overall framework within which the ensuing inquiry is 
conducted by elaborating an epistemology and methodology. In essence the resultant 
framework eschews the objectivism and logocentrism characteristic of "modernism" by 
pointing to the interest-laden role of the epistemic subject in the social construction of 
knowledge/science and thereby develops Sayer’s notion of "practical adequacy" (1984, pp. 62- 
73) as a theory of truth. In this way I attempt to develop an epistemology and methodology 
which not only allows for the deconstruction of accounting knowledge but also which 
proffers guidelines, for the investigation of recipients’ phenomenological worlds, in regard 
to the process of achieving that aim and the status of any ensuing knowledge appertaining to 
those phenomena.
In Chapter V the insights developed in regard to these issues are then applied to an analysis 
of the epistemological basis of accounting. In this I examine modern accounting as a "mode 
of engagement" (Morgan, 1983) that constructs realities in a manner that is infused with 
unexamined commitments to particular partisan moral and social orders. It is the nature of 
this subliminated partiality that I attempt to reveal through a socio-historical analysis of the 
development of modern accountancy. The implications of this analysis for our understanding 
of the processes of accounting information disclosure in industrial relations contexts are then 
considered in Chapter VI, particularly in terms of creating labour tractability through 
engendering ideological recruitment.
Chapters VII and VIII largely involve an investigation of "accounting in action" (Colville, 
1981; Hopwood, 1979) by examining, from the point of view of 22 senior shop stewards, the 
significance of disclosed accounting information in their constructions of organisational 
reality. A further concern in these chapters is to tentatively delineate some of the influences 
upon subjects’ propensities to allude to particular orientations towards accounting 
information.
Finally Chapter VIII, the concluding chapter of this thesis, is also concerned with a 
reconsideration of the disclosure of accounting information in the light of my findings. In
vi
this it also attempts to identify directions for further research and considers the need for 
employees to begin to develop their own "modes of engagement" by which they might 
apprehend organisational reality and counter the hegemony of current accounting orthodoxy.
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CHAPTER 1
The Disclosure of Accounting Information in Industrial Relations Contexts:
A Review and Critique
"The days of authoritarian and secretive rule are on their way out . . . 
(companies) . . . will be bound to declare their interests and to share . . . 
(accounting). . .  information with the representatives of those who work for and with them . .
(Janner, 1977 p.88)
Introduction
The above declaration by Janner illustrates the contention of many commentators that the 
Disclosure of Accounting Information (D.A.I.) in Industrial Relations contexts constituted a 
portent of an era of democracy in work organisations. While such a perception might be 
easily questioned, particularly from the vantage point of twelve years on, it does illustrate the 
strong link between some of the D.A.I. literature and an undercurrent of concern, arising 
from a variety of pressures (see Jones, 1986), to widen both the content of, and audience, for, 
accounting reports beyond traditional practices. Unfortunately such literature is replete with 
ambiguous and unelaborated usage of the term "disclosure". Despite this proliferation I shall 
use the term disclosure, or D.A.I., to refer to both the unilateral and voluntary, as well as the 
legally sanctioned, provision of financial information by management to employees and to the 
extraction of such information, from a recalcitrant management, by employees. Having said 
this, the tenor of much of the literature that I shall review is one that concentrates upon 
management’s proactivity in these affairs - a stance which might reflect employees’ apparent 
disinterest in D.A.I. (Dair and Reeves, 1979; Jackson-Cox et al., 1984) regardless of the 
T.U.C.’s public enthusiasm (Owen and Broad, 1983)
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The D.A.I. Debate
The past 20 years have seen much research and debate regarding the Disclosure of 
Accounting Information in Industrial Relations contexts. This area of concern is, however, 
by no means a phenomenon of the post 1970 period; indeed there has been fluctuating 
interest in the area for at least 70 years, particularly in the U.S.A. (Lewis et al., 1984) and 
moreover, the practice of interweaving accounting with industrial relations process has a long 
history (see Bougen, 1989). However several inter-related factors seem to have stimulated 
renewed and greater interest, particularly in the United Kingdom, which emerged in the 
1970’s as an important location for much published research (Lewis et al., ibid., p. 285).
During this period much interest was probably initiated by the Disclosure Provisions 
embodied in U.K. legislation, particularly the Conservative Industrial Relations Act (1971) 
and Labour’s Employment Protection Act (1975) with their respective attendant Codes of 
Practice (C.I.R., 1972; A.C.A.S., 1977). An important similarity between these documents 
was that they were all based upon the consensual premise that relationships between 
employees and management could be "improved" (e.g. C.I.R., ibid., p. 21) if  companies 
provided more information, financial or otherwise, to employees for general purposes and 
particularly for Collective Bargaining (Marsh and Rosewell, 1976, p. 192). The 1977 Code 
of Practice elaborated this theme by providing a "shopping list" (Cooper and Essex, 1977; 
Gospel, 1978) of the types of information that could be relevant in particular collective 
bargaining situations. As Gospel (1978, p. 18) points out,the legislation was enacted against 
a background in which Governments’ incomes policies were aimed at encouraging 
productivity bargaining - a process which necessitated greater disclosure by companies to 
trade unions.
The Conservative Employment Act (1982), through amendment by the House of Lords, also 
recognised the employees’ right to be informed by placing a statutory obligation upon 
companies employing more than 250 persons to state in their directors’ report the actions that 
have been undertaken during the financial year to introduce, maintain, or develop
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arrangements aimed at:
"a) providing employees systematically with information on matters of
concern to them as employees;
b) consulting employees or their representatives on a regular basis so that 
the views of employees can be taken into account in making decisions 
which are likely to affect their interests;
c) encouraging the involvement of employees in the company’s 
performance through an employee^ share scheme or by some other 
means;
d) achieving a common awareness on the part of employees of the 
financial and economic factors affecting the performance of the 
company.”
Clearly the assumptions and intentions underpinning this legislation are similar to those 
expressed by earlier statutes; but as with prior legislation, the variable constraints deriving 
from different kinds of company structure and forms of negotiating procedures are ignored - 
issues that constructed important foci for published research.
Further stimuli that focused attention specifically upon D.A.I. perhaps derived from the 
publication by the Accounting Standards Steering Committee of the "Corporate Report" 
(1975) and the later publication of the Board of Trade Consultative Document, "The Aims 
and Scope of Company Reports" (1976). In these documents several distinct domains for 
"corporate disclosure" were identified, e.g. to shareholders, to the government, to individual 
employees and their representatives. At the time Cuthbert and Whitaker pointed out that it 
was the latter that had aroused:
" . . .  the greatest management indignation and pressure, much of it apparently
successful".
(1977, p. 373)
However this view needs to be qualified since some evidence suggests that a number of 
organizations were to go beyond the minima regarding disclosure set by regulatory and 
legislative requirements (Incomes Data Services, 1979) even though the impact of legislation 
and codes of practice upon actual disclosure practice has been limited(Gospel, 1983).
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These varied influences, together with the impact of the Bullock Report (1977) and the 
apparently increasing interest displayed by the Trade Union Movement to extend collective 
bargaining to areas of managerial prerogative (see for example G.M.W.U., 1978; T.U.C., 
1974, p. 44; T.U.C., 1977, p.15; G.M.W.U., 1978), such as strategic corporate decision­
making (Ogden, 1982; T.U.C. - Labour Party Liaison Committee, 1982, p. 10), focused the 
attention of researchers upon the use of accounting information particularly in Collective 
Bargaining situations (e.g. Craft, 1981; Cooperand Essex, 1977; Cuthbert and Whitaker, 1977; 
Dair and Reeves, 1976; Foley and Maunders, 1973, 1977, 1984; Mitchell, 1980; Palmer, 1977; 
Pope and Peel 1981a, 1981b; Reeves, 1980; Towers and Wright, 1983a, 1983b).
Essentially this research has pursued two main themes.
Theme I
A significant thrust has been to concentrate upon how parties in collective bargaining may 
obtain or provide financial data and the uses to which that data may be put. Therefore, there 
has been a preoccupation with the definition of "user needs" making for an emphasis upon 
the creation of prescriptions regarding the preparation of data for disclosure so that they may 
satisfy those needs. Associated with these orientations is a concern with "user-training" so 
as to enable users to "understand" and not "misuse" such disclosed data. In this context, for 
example, Cuthbert and Whitaker (1977) claim that managerial policies regarding D.A.I. in 
Collective Bargaining were orientated too much towards disclosing historical financial 
accounting data instead of management accounting data, the latter being of much more use 
to employee representatives as it provides more detailed data regarding plant and workshop 
performance. For Foley and Maunders (1977) the problems associated with this "lack of 
relevance" arose because, historically, the primary orientation of financial reporting has been 
to the shareholder and therefore
". . . disclosure for employees or unions should be designed differently in
order to minimise misunderstanding." (p. 29)
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In order to overcome the problem of relevancy, Cuthbert and Whitaker draw up a list (op. cit. 
p. 376) of management accounting data that would be useful to the shop steward. This list 
includes such items as details of costing processes, budgets and variances, transfer pricing 
systems, stock levels and the state of the order book etc. Armed with this list they also 
discuss problems regarding how this data should be presented by management and draw 
attention to the issue of shop steward training. This concern with employee representatives’ 
lack of expertise and training in accounting appears to be underpinned by the fear that those 
deficiencies could lead to "misunderstanding" of disclosed data and thereby "damage" the 
bargaining process (see for example: Dair and Reeves, 1976; Mitchell, 1980; Reeves, 1980). 
This fear is often implicitly combined with the perceived danger that trade union power in 
collective bargaining may be enhanced by disclosure. For instance, Cuthbert and Whitaker 
draw attention to the possibility that management accounting information could extend the 
scope of joint regulation and control of industry since these data are
". . . essential elements in the structure of management control and 
prerogatives in the work place . . . should management for whatever reasons 
begin to disclose such internal accounting information, it could greatly 
increase the bargaining strength of shop stewards", (op. cit., p. 376-7)
This kind of concern perhaps led the C.B.I. (1974) to produce lists of information which 
companies should not be obliged to disclose to employees, although the rationale behind these 
lists, at the level of public testimony, was framed in regard to the needs for commercial 
secrecy and cost.
Cooper and Essex (1977) also pursue the issue that if  data is to be valuable, it must be 
relevant; but in doing this they work from within a very different perspective. They argue 
that the issue of relevancy has led to the development of a "shopping list" or "consumer 
sovereignty" approach that involves
" . . .  asking the consumer, in this case, the employees or their representatives, 
what information he would find useful", (ibid., p. 202)
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They argue that there is an alternative interpretation of the concept of relevance, this 
alternative they term a "decision orientated" approach (ibid. p. 202). They adopt the latter 
in preference to the former because it enables identification of the information users would 
need if they acted in accordance with a theoretically correct decision model, while the former 
usually relies upon asking users what they want, or, assumes what they want. From this 
perspective they argue that what is important in judging "relevance" is to take into 
consideration the decisions and problems for which the information is intended to be used. 
Therefore, meeting user requirements involves providing the information that is required by 
the decision-maker, individual or organisation, which
". . . enables a decision-maker to satisfy his goals and result in an 
improvement in his welfare". (Ibid., p. 203)
From this position Cooper and Essex go on to analyse the information needs of shop stewards 
and differentiate themselves further from such previous work by supporting their interest in 
shop stewards through reference to an overtly moral argument regarding employee rights. 
Thus, Cooper and Essex develop a decision model, based upon empirical research, that 
describes how shop stewards seem to make decisions and from that model attempt to identify 
the information relevant to shop stewards in the performance of their roles.
Theme 2
A second important theme running through the research and literature pertaining to D.A.I. 
focuses more directly upon D.A.I. as a panacea for industrial relations "problems". In this 
sense it maintains the same premises that underpinned much legislation. For instance, Palmer 
(1977), Foley and Maunders (1973, 1977) and Pope andBeel (1981a, 1981b) all argue in their 
respective work, that out of self interest, management should disclose accounting information 
to trade unions for collective bargaining purposes.
This position is perhaps best illustrated by Foley and Maunders’ conclusion (albeit tentative) 
to their discussion of a hypothetical example of how D.A.I., through encouraging trust etc., 
could widen management discretion by enabling more effective collective bargaining.
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"Compare, for example, the attitude to manpower utilisation before and after 
a productivity agreement. The existence of restrictive practices and non-co- 
operation clearly reduces managerial control. Anything which tends to loosen 
up this structure by encouraging deeper trust and confidence can only help 
to enlarge the area of managerial authority." (1973, p. 121).
While, at this point, it is important to note that the above position is perhaps based upon 
Neo-Human Relations assumptions that may be traced to Mayo’s (1949) Durkheimian analysis 
of industrial civilisation; the basic argument for the more D.A.I., put forward by the writers 
previously cited, revolves around the following points.
Firstly, they argue that increased D.A.I. is consistent with the growing body of legislation 
pertaining to Industrial Relations. Secondly, they argue that increased D.A.I. would lead to 
more "efficient" "distributive bargaining".1 Presumably this is because they consider that 
the disclosed accounting data enables neutral arbitration of the organisational financial reality 
confronting stakeholders, while allowing for increased "integrative bargaining"2 by improving 
trust and openness between parties. Finally, many of these writers proffer the idea that 
increased disclosure is consistent with the growing demand for more consultative and 
participative management of industrial enterprises.
Thus, more D.A.I. not only aids the management of conflict in organisations, it also 
"improves" organisational "ecology" (Handy, 1981, p. 236) since it can remove some of the 
causes of conflict, especially those that
". . . result from differential information sets".
(Pope and Peel, 1981b, p. 143)
Craft (1981) attacks such normative conclusions (of Foley and Maunders, Palmer etc.) by 
proposing a contingency view of disclosure that derives from his initial premise that
". . . more consideration needs to be given to the organisational and 
behavioural factors that can influence the desirability of and approach to 
financial disclosure to unions", (ibid., p. 98)
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Craft goes on to discuss in detail the actual strategies available to management regarding 
how much information they should "share" with trade unions. This analysis culminates with 
the provision of a taxonomy of strategies involving the degree and kind of disclosure 
management ought to employ, given particular contextual variables. He concludes that
". . . a firm ’s disclosure policy must be determined by a number of factors 
including management’s perceptions of disclosure impact upon its 
responsibilities to maintain the organisational coalition, the relative bargaining 
power of the union and management, the independence of the firm  in 
collective bargaining decision-making, the nature of union-management 
relationship, and the characteristics of the union. In anv particular case, the 
disclosure decision must be necessarily a contingency decision." (my emphasis) 
(ibid., p. 103)
In their reply to Craft, Foley and Maunders (1984) delineate their own version of a 
Contingency Approach to the issue of disclosure. Essentially, by referring to Walton and 
McKersie’s (1965) spectrum of labour-management relations (that runs from conflict, through 
accommodation to co-operation/collusion) they propose that
". . . the potential pay off to management from information disclosure 
(through inter alia, the encouragement of integrative bargaining) will be 
contingent upon the place which an organisation occupies on this spectrum." 
(ibid., p. 104)
They consider that this justifies and reinforces Craft’s own position. However, as with 
Craft’s analysis it lacks a
". . . dynamic view of the effects of disclosure. For this we have to turn to 
the potential use of voluntary information disclosure as an attitudinal 
restructuring tool which, if effective, can lead to shifts in the labour- 
management relationship." (ibid., p. 104)
Thus, they draw attention to how D.A.I. in itself can, through restructuring employees’ and 
their representatives’ attitudes, move an organisation’s industrial relations scenario from one 
(characterised in Walton and McKersie’s terms) of "distributive bargaining", to one of 
"integrative bargaining". Indeed, they conclude
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. . increased disclosure of information may be a necessary condition for 
integrative bargaining and effective attitude restructuring, and so can lead to 
positive managerial pay offs." (ibid., p. 105)
Thus, the debates regarding D.A.I. to employees and/or their representatives have focused 
upon several inter-related issues: whether or not to disclose, what, how much and to whom? 
And these discussions lead to analysis of the contextual variables that should influence such 
decisions. While clearly there is some disagreement over some of these issues, most writers 
generally agree that there should indeed be some disclosure of corporate accounting 
information and tend to accept that the accountant should play an increasingly important role 
in industrial relations activity. As Cuthbert and Whitaker point out
". . . no longer will it be possible for the accountant to remain relatively 
insular ignoring the Industrial Relations consequences of his work. Indeed, 
his links with the company Industrial Relations function are likely to grow".
(1977, p. 377)
Critique
Unfortunately, several levels of criticism are evident in evaluating this body of work. Ogden 
and Bougen (1985) draw attention to the issue that many of the debates concerning D.A.I. in 
industrial relations contexts have been implicitly conducted within a "Unitary", or a "Pluralist" 
frame of reference (Fox, 1966). Notable occupants of the former are, for Ogden and Bougen, 
Craft (1981) and Palmer (1977). Thus, their perception of D.A.I. is predicated by a 
consensual and co-operative Weltanschauung, the assumptions of which are not overtly 
articulated. However, deriving from these "common sense assumptions" (Hooker, 1973); 
management, the nervous system of the body corporate, become perceived as arbiters 
(Zeitlin, 1974) of members’ interests and exercise legitimate custodial prerogative in seeking 
optimal solutions to unambiguous "organisational goals". Within the pluralist frame of 
reference, Ogden and Bougen locate Foley and Maunders (1977) and Pope and Peel (1981b). 
Their particular unarticulated Weltanschauung leads to an understanding of work
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organisations in which such entities are perceived to be constituted by diverse socio-economic 
groups whose pursuit of sectional interests inevitably produces some manifestation of 
conflict. From this conceptualisation of organisational reality, the accounting content of 
disclosed information is assumed to aid the "institutionalisation" of conflict - the process in 
which specialised institutions develop to regulate conflict between management and 
employees and thereby enable the reconciliation of grievances and the management of 
discontent. Such aid is forthcoming since accounting information is assumed to provide a 
neutral database that arbitrates the financial reality faced by stakeholders and thereby 
constrains their pursuit of sectional interest, and thus enables the negotiation of compromises 
that ensure "mutual survival" by contributing to "attitudinal structuring" appropriate to 
"integrative bargaining". The application of the Unitary Frame of Reference to various 
substantive areas relating to "work organisations" has been widely criticised elsewhere (e.g. 
Fox, 1971, 1974; Hyman, 1975; Palmer, 1983), especially in regard to its lack of descriptive 
accuracy and normative connotations. Alternatively, the main thrust of criticisms of the 
Pluralist Frame of Reference has been to point to its inadequate conceptualisation of power 
(e.g. Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; Brown, 1978; Clegg, 1979; Lukes, 1974). However, Ogden 
and Bougen’s characterisation of Craft and Palmer’s work as Unitary is rather misleading as 
it allows for a somewhat artificial separation of their work, in critique, from that typified as 
pluralist. While it is apparent that many aspects of their work do indeed take on a unitary 
aura, often, the general tenor ambiguously implies a more pluralistic stakeholder view, with 
senior management being assigned the strategic role of scarce resource allocation among the 
various (often conflicting) stakeholder groups, so as to retain their contribution to the 
enterprise. In particular, Craft does accord some legitimacy to trade unions as bargaining 
agents for employees. This implies some recognition of the inevitability of some degree of 
conflict in organisations and the consequent need to develop regulative procedures - a 
perspective more typical of a pluralist, rather than a unitary position.
However, both Craft and Palmer overtly conduct their analyses from within a "managerial 
problematic". This general orientation provides common "ground" between them and other 
writers, classified by Ogden and Bougen as pluralist, as well as uniting them with other
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pluralists working in different substantive domains. This is because it is rare for pluralists 
to move beyond analyses that incorporate a managerial problematic since pluralism is often 
based upon the assumption that there exists overriding corporate goals to which all 
stakeholders may subscribe (Hyman, 1978). Indeed, although originally
". . . radical in orientation, or at least associated with reformist strategies 
designed to advance workers’ material interests, pluralist ideas have 
increasingly tended to serve as a conservative legitimation of established 
institutions and ultimately as a cloak for essentially repressive programmes".
(ibid., p. 35)
It is in regard to this issue of managerial bias, which is a major theme in much of research 
and literature reviewed here (although there are notable exceptions, e.g. Cooper and Essex, 
1977), that an initial important level of criticism is evident.
Craft (1981) in his critique of Foley and Maunders’ work, descriptively delineates contingent 
factors that affect management’s choice to disclose accounting information,and the extent 
of that disclosure, in collective bargaining. In this Craft advises that the "desirability" of 
disclosure policies requires "careful judgement and discretion" in their selection. These 
prescriptions beg the question, "desirable for whom?". However, Craft has already answered 
this question:
"When making any decision, including disclosure of financial and other 
information, management must assess the potential impact on resource 
allocation, coalition stability, and management’s own objectives", (ibid., p.
98)
Thus, Craft works within a managerial problematic characteristic of Albrow’s understanding 
of organisation theory (as opposed to organisational sociology)
". . . which aims to systematise, supplement and advance knowledge . . .  in 
order to help managers and administrators to make better decisions". (1968, 
p. 399)
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Such a Weltanschauung is tied to prescribing managerial strategies such as "contingent 
disclosure" (Craft, 1981 p. 103) whereby through the exercise of legitimate 
legerdemain,management seek to make employees tractable.
Foley and Maunders (1984) in their reply to Craft, commence by castigating him for his 
"managerial" and "partial" analysis of disclosure, yet it soon becomes clear that they too are 
working within a similar perspective. In particular they extol the "positive" managerial pay­
offs available though the attitudinal change, encouraged amongst employees by D.A.I., that 
enables more "integrative bargaining". It almost appears that although their analysis tends to 
be relatively more informed by a pluralist standpoint, their intent is to aid management to 
build the Unitary Organisation through the "trust" encouraged by "maximum disclosure". In 
this fashion they implicitly invoke Mayo’s vision of an ideal-end-state of social solidarity 
that might be engendered by unitary belief systems dominating modern organisations, and 
thus replace anomie with social harmony.
A similar managerial orientation is pursued by Pope and Peel (1981a). They suggest
". . . that in many cases information . . . could in fact be made available 
without the firm being seriously disadvantaged . . . .  In general we would 
suggest that management should evaluate the costs and benefits associated 
with disclosure . . ." (p. 376)
Here it is possible to see the inextricable association between the managerial problematic that 
underpins much research regarding D.A.I. and the reificatory tendencies of that perspective. 
By attributing concrete reality, particularly the power of thought and action to social 
constructs (see Silverman, 1970 p. 9) such as "organisations" often by investing such constructs 
with "goals" or "interests" (e.g. Foley and Maunders, 1973, p. 115) and by eliding concepts 
such as "firm" and "it" (e.g. Craft, 1981, p. 99) such writers begin to effectively mask the 
orientation of their work with an aura of technical neutrality. Perhaps, on the one hand, such 
reifications as "organisational goal", signify sets of beliefs about the consensual nature of 
organisations and thus help to create a modern myth or code that obscures the possibility of 
a threatening reality - that organisations are not consensual. Despite the possible utility of
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such a "cultural paradigm" for "anxiety reduction" (see Schein, 1984) it must be noted that, 
on the other hand, the outcome of the application of reificatory concepts, such as 
organisation goal, may lead people to be incapable of seeing human relationships other than 
as relationships between things (i.e. fetishes). The effects are to change social relationships 
and activities into things that seem to exist independently of the actors engaged in their 
production and reproduction, as well as to transform what is historical and relative into 
something that appears immutable and absolute. In this way, what Lukacs (1971) calls a 
"ghostly objectivity" is created - this promotes a deceptive aura of neutrality to prescriptions 
about these practices and relationships. Indeed as Gellner (1970) argues, the force of such 
concepts in society lies in their ambiguity and deceptiveness, and their effect is to reinforce 
power structures through legitimation of the status quo. So as Gouldner points out:
". . . an organisation as such cannot be said to be orientated towards a goal.
A statement that an organisation is orientated towards certain goals often
means no more than these are the goals of its top administrators". (1959, p.
420)
In a similar vein Morgan (1983, 1986) notes that particular figurative and metaphorical 
locutionary forms convey particular images of organisations which presuppose particular 
views and hence shape what is seen in an a priori fashion. As such, language might be 
considered in its role as a medium of domination and social power that serves to legitimate 
particular relations (see Schwartz, 1981) and through its symbolism dull critical faculties 
(Pfeffer, 1981 p. 193).
Thus, through reification,the organisation takes on the appearance of a rational entity often 
attempting to survive environmental exigencies. This imagery is tempered by the masked 
elision of the concept of organisation with the perceived activities and problematic of owners 
and their agents (management). In regard to D.A.I. this problematic pertains mainly to the 
issue of making labour tractable. In this fashion the assumed goals and intentions of 
management are accorded priority in the concerns of the social scientist. Through the 
creation of a descriptive and analytical language based upon reification, an aura of scientific 
neutrality is created and maintained in discourse that subliminates partiality and enables the
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specification of prescriptions to "correct" members’ behaviour that is considered 
"dysfunctional" to what is "best" for the organisation in some reified sense. Indeed, such 
reification and consequent treatment of organisations as gestaltic "entities" enables discourse 
to take on the appearance of scientific knowledge regarding a thing, an "it-being" (see Laing, 
1967). Therefore, ironically, through this mode of locution, researchers’ inquiry into 
organisations renders the subject matter an appearance similar to that of physical/natural but 
sentient phenomena. Inquiry in the domain of the natural/physical sciences has enabled, to 
some degree, explanation and prediction of "nature". This, in turn, has enabled the increasing 
technical control of human beings over "nature". Reification, enables the transposition of 
such concerns to the realm of human affairs while preserving symbolically an aspect of 
scientific neutrality by providing a suitable language that mystifies the underlying 
problematic. Thus the coupling of explanation, prediction and technical control over nature 
embodied in natural/physical scientists’ endeavours is implicitly transposed to reified 
organisations, and the partisan nature and outcomes of such a perspective are effectively 
subliminated. In social scientific practice therefore, the technical solution of what are 
managerial control problems, through the improvement of the technical content of managerial 
practice, become the warranted concern of the social scientist.
This approach shares numerous similarities with Popper’s Comtean quest to demonstrate that 
social scientific knowledge can form the basis of, and be developed by, "social engineering"
". . . the planning and construction of institutions with the aim, perhaps, of
arresting or of controlling or quickening social developments". (1967, p. 44- 
5)
This involves the use of "technological predictions" (which Popper differentiates from 
"prophetic predictions") which through experimental testing would enable human intervention 
to manipulate social processes, in accordance with their intentions, so as to solve the 
"practical questions of the day" (ibid. p. 58-9).
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"Social Engineering" for Popper should be "piecemeal", since
. . piecemeal tinkering . . .  combined with critical analysis is the main way 
to achieve practical results in the social as well as the natural sciences". (Ibid., p. 58)
Popper’s conception of "Social Engineering" is clearly similar to the social science practice 
referred to by Fay as "Policy Science", which is that
". . . set of procedures which enables one to determine the technically best 
course of action to adopt in order to implement a decision or achieve a goal". (1975, p. 14)
Such "Policy Science" according to Fay reduces the social scientist to a social engineer who 
recommends the most efficient means to instrumentally achieve certain goals. However, 
while Fay goes on to explore the ideological nature of "Policy Science" Popper does not. 
Essentially Popper maintains silence regarding the nature of the social institutions through 
which Popperian social engineering would be implemented and ignores the issue of whose 
definitions of an urgent "question" or "problem" is the scientist to apply him /herself to in the 
development of solutions. As Benton demonstrates, for such social reforms to serve as a test 
for theories:
"there must be an identity between, on the one hand, the political problems 
of those who have the power to implement reforms as a means of solving these 
problems and, on the other hand, the theoretical problems of the sociological 
theorist. To advocate that sociological theory be, in this respect, an 
articulation of the political problems of a ruling group is to accede to a 
conception of sociology as a ruling ideology or as a variant of such a ruling 
ideology".
(1977, pp. 40-1)
Thus the "Social Engineering" perspective adopted by many contributors to the D.A.I. debate 
may indeed reflect an underlying Hobbesean desire to scientise politics so that the conditions 
for the "correct" order of society could be established and technically applied. But rather 
than to scientise politics, all such an approach appears to do is to mystify normative stand­
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points under the cloak of reification that in turn enables the adoption of the guise of value 
freedom.
It is hardly surprising that Social Scientists adopting this perspective in Organisational 
Analysis have been attacked for their "sublimination of partiality" (Reed, 1985, p. 45) and 
have been criticised for being "servants of power" (Baritz, 1960) manipulating the human side 
of the enterprise. Indeed, it would appear that researchers adopting, implicitly or explicitly, 
an approach within a managerial problematic, may be criticised for sustaining their enterprise
". . . by colluding with . . . those to whom they need to make their activities 
rationally accountable".
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 273)
Moreover the uncritical acceptance of the status quo (Ramos, 1981) implicit in such a 
technocratic perspective has, according to Clegg and Dunkerley (1977, p.6), created an 
unresponsiveness to debates ongoing outside "organisational analysis" but within "social 
theory". As I shall attempt to show at a later juncture, this has lead to an implicit and 
unrecognised determinism.
Thus, many writers tend to conceptualise D.A.I. from within frameworks which incorporate 
a managerial problematic. As I have tried to argue, this often results in a debate over the 
strategic choice facing management when deciding whether or not to disclose and what 
should be disclosed, given particular contextual variables.
These issues lead to another level of criticism. Although many writers echo the Corporate 
Report (1975) in their concern to distinguish between the processes of disclosure to broad 
sections of the workforce as opposed to employee representatives (e.g. Reeves, 1980; Pope 
and Peel, 1981a; Mitchell et al., 1982); it is apparent that this concern has not led to 
significant empirical and theoretical attention to the issue of how such recipients might 
perceive and understand the disclosed information, and the very act of disclosure itself. 
Surely such sense-making activities and the emergent impact of cultural phenomena must
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mediate the role that accounting information plays in Industrial Relations contexts.
Instead those studies that have investigated the recipients of D.A.I. have usually focused 
upon employees’ comprehension of financial information, with the intent of identifying and 
correcting what is characterised as misapprehension by suggesting remedial lines of action,
i.e. training (e.g. Taylor, 1975; Mitchell et al., 1980; Hussey, 1981). In this there has been 
little concern with understanding the perspectives and attitudes of recipients on their own 
terms. Indeed it might appear to a sceptical observer that for these scholars to try to 
penetrate the phenomenological worlds of recipients and to entertain explanations of these 
phenomena beyond those of ignorance and training needs, would be for them to enter the 
realm of recipients* irrationality or wilfulness -  a realm that has caused financial statements 
to appear to be "intuitively alien" (Mitchell, et al., 1980).
Thus in much of the D.A.I. literature there seems to be the "hidden hand" of an 
ethnocentrism derived from ontological privilege. This creates a tendency to treat recipients 
as Plato’s cave dwellers - in need of "training" so as to correct the falsehood of their common 
sense worlds. Thus rarely has attention been focused upon these common sense worlds and 
their proactive status in mediating the effects of D.A.I., or training.
This incipient but pervasive determinism, that often umproblematically treats employees as 
some amorphus and homogeneous mass of "passive recipients" (Moore, 1980, p. 34) of 
managerial strategies regarding information provision and training etc., is most clearly 
pronounced amongst the managerialist "policy science" approaches to D.A.I. which were 
previously reviewed. It is in these approaches that the full implications of such a perspective 
are most apparent.
Although this determinism is sometimes tempered by "warnings" regarding the potential for 
"misuse" of disclosed information, particularly by trade unions (C.I.R., 1971; Craft, 1981), 
this orientation implicitly emphasises the causal priority, power and explanatory sufficiency 
of structural variables in the analysis of employees’ behaviour. Rubinstein (1986) argues that
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such an approach in sociology is fuelled by the twin ambitions of establishing a nomothetic 
predictive social science and is uniquely suited to a programme of social engineering. Clearly 
these objectives are firmly grounded in a Platonic Realism that accords the social scientist an 
ontologically privileged position vis a vis social actors. These concerns and philosophical 
position lead to the denial, often through omission, of the importance of the influence of 
cultural phenomena upon members’ behaviour. Particularly, this is because general laws 
require "objective” identification of explanatory variables that are applicable regardless of 
historical epoch or cultural context. These variables must be defined independently of 
specific cultures since cultural variables are inherently idiographic and thus if incorporated 
as explanatory variables, inevitably reduce the generalisability of theoretical propositions. 
Typically these desires are imbued with the purpose of replicating natural science formats 
in the social sciences particularly in regard to the aim of securing prediction and thereby 
potentially control over subjects; and as we have seen, reification enables the transposition 
of an aura of scientific neutrality to social science endeavours through the locutionary forms 
it endows upon discourse. Thus the deterministic emphasis of much of the research reviewed 
here is a product of a positivistic orientation as well as emanating from implicit social 
engineering priorities. Indeed, as Rubinstein claims, the conviction of human malleability 
originally deriving from the Enlightenment, together with the perceived determinative power 
of structural variables, are uniquely suited to social engineering.
"If human action and belief are epiphenomenal, if they are constrained by 
structural arrangements* then modification of those arrangements becomes a 
lever with which action and belief can be manipulated. The structural 
perspective is uniquely suited to an engineering impulse because it promises 
a form of social change that can be indifferent to culture since culture is 
conceived as manipulable ‘emination’. The ordinary person cherishes culture, 
but is ignorant of its ‘causes’, which the social science expert knows how to 
manipulate".
(ibid., p. 92)
Paradoxically the focus of Enlightenment upon human emancipation by the reform of 
consciousness through education, and the consequent overthrowal of the dogma of theological 
and metaphysical illusion (Marcuse, 1954), has often been displaced by a technicist concern 
to manipulate more readily changeable structures. These technologically orientated
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"practitioners" of social science de-emphasise the significance of actors’ subjectivity upon 
their construction of action. Such determinism renders human action to necessary responses 
to external, measurable and changeable stimuli. Ultimately this orientation therefore makes 
the mistake of thus treating actors as "cultural dopes" (Garfinkel, 1967) and ignores the 
probability that
". . . interpretation is a formative or creative process in its own right. It 
constructs meanings which, as I have said, are not predetermined or 
determined by the independent variable".
(Blumer, 1967, p. 90)
This may inevitably lead to the failure of such engineering programmes.
"The failure . . .  to reduce culture to successfully explained dependent 
variables, and to identify the structural variables through which it can be 
manipulated, is paralleled by a failure of the programme to change persons by 
changing circumstances. . . .  a greater respect for the integrity of culture 
might be an antidote for both the theoretical extravagance of structural 
sociology and the arrogance of the social engineer."
(Rubinstein, 1986, pp. 93-4)
Clearly these points are particularly apposite in considering research regarding D.A.I., for it 
implies that recipient^ interpretive processes must be a focus for research in order to have an 
adequate understanding of the impact of D.A.I. in Collective Bargaining. Naturally this begs 
the question: who are the recipients, whom, implicitly through exclusion, have, perhaps, 
been often reduced in previous research to little more than "Pavlovian Dogs"?
Who are the subjects?
Given that my research interest primarily pertains to Industrial Relations contexts such as 
collective bargaining and joint consultation,this suggests a focus upon disclosure to narrower 
sub-groups of employee representatives who are interposed between management and the 
workforce by fulfilling their incumbencies, rather than the more legally prescribed "general 
employee" reporting (Pope and Peel, 1981a, p. 376). However, this raises the issue of the
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popular assertion that the 1980 s have witnessed a weakening of workplace trade union 
organisation to the extent that they are now marginal to managerial strategies in industrial 
relations. I shall now proceed to consider this claim, and evaluate the extent and nature of 
shop steward involvement and autonomy in collective bargaining and joint consultation, and 
by implication D.A.I.
Considerable evidence from research in Industrial Relations points to the significant role 
played by ‘employee representatives’ - shop stewards - in Collective Bargaining and Joint 
Consultation. For instance survey work covering the public service sector (Somerton, 1977; 
Terry, 1982), the private service sector (Hawes and Smith, 1981) and private sector 
manufacturing (Brown 1981; Brown et al., 1978) all point to the increased importance of the 
shop steward and shop stewards’ organisations, especially during the late 1970’s. This 
primarily has been related to the growth of domestic collective bargaining (Brown et al., 
1981; Marchington, 1982) together with the exigencies created by domestic "multi-unionism" 
(Goodman and Whittingham, 1973; Brown et al., 1978). Furthermore, the importance of shop 
stewards and their organisations has often been encouraged by management (Goodman, 1984; 
Winch, 1980) and has been positively reinforced by managerial attitudes, strategies and 
organisational prescriptions (Brown, 1973; Hyman, 1979). Indeed these tendencies are further 
compounded by situations in which
" .. .  it is quite usual for convenors or senior stewards in large plants to operate 
very independently of the unions to which they belong; due to insufficient 
union resources and a lack of full time officials, the latter are often happy to 
let the experienced stewards in well organised plants to operate very much 
upon their own since this allows the officials to concentrate their efforts on 
those workplaces where unionism is weaker or less stable (Marchington, 1982,
P. 75).
While those senior shop stewards (defined by Batstone (1988, p.80) as representatives of a 
collectivity of stewards) appeared to have developed a strategic position in collective 
bargaining because of the inability of the external trade union(s) to cope with industrial 
relations issues at an organisational level it appears that such shop stewards were proactive 
in maintaining this autonomy. For instance Boraston et al. (1975) found that even where
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full-tim e officials are available for more involvement in workplace activities, they may be 
kept out by the determination of shop stewards to retain their independent status.
Thus it would seem that during the 1970s shop stewards had acquired, for various reasons, 
a great deal of autonomy in their dealings with management; in that they had gained the 
authority to reach agreements over various issues, on a regular basis, without reference to the 
relevant external full-tim e trade union officials.
Indeed Terry (1983) notes that the period of 1968 to 1979 was characterised by the rapid 
spread of shop stewards’ organisations, a phenomenon facilitated by union confidence and 
aggression, as well as by a supportive climate of managerial and government opinion and 
practice. However since 1979 there has been a reduction in the number of "full-time" shop 
stewards. This decline is to some extent explicable in terms of effects of the economic 
recession of the early 1980s, and particularly its disproportionate impact upon traditional 
trade union strongholds, particularly heavy engineering (Edmunds, 1984). But Terry also 
argues that this decline in full-time shop stewards is also a result of managerial efforts to 
reduce their numbers. For Terry, what is most significant about this kind of managerial 
strategy is that generally it is associated with the attempts of management, in some 
companies, to reduce the role and authority of shop stewards. But these managerial strategies
. . have not simply been directed at the general reduction of shop steward 
authority, rather they have been concerned to channel it into new activities
II
(Terry, ibid., p. 55)
According to Terry, these developments involve managerial concerns to move towards 
increased Joint Consultation so as to reduce the power wielded by shop stewards through 
Collective Bargaining. In part, this strategy
" . . .  is an intention to involve shop stewards (and through them the 
workforce) more closely in an understanding of the problems and issues 
confronting the company and hence of the logic and inescapability of the 
conclusions and policies proposed by management. But it is important to note 
that the logic of this strategy rests upon the maintenance of the representative
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structure of the workforce, and of its authority and legitimacy, rather than upon their destruction”.
(Terry, ibid., p. 56)
Therefore the impact of the recession upon the significance of senior shop stewards in 
Industrial Relations has not been to remove that significance but rather to change its nature. 
As Terry concludes
". . . since 1979, far from using their greater power to destroy or ignore shop 
steward organisation, management have continued to influence both the shape 
of that organisation and the role it performs . . .  managers remain wedded to 
the principle of the ‘collectivised* workforce represented through Trade Union 
structures such as shop stewards organisations, to facilitate the handling of 
relationships between management and workers".
(ibid., p. 57)
However many arguments have been put forward that suggest that since 1979 Trade Unions 
have become considerably weakened. These arguments usually rely upon evidence derived 
from national statistics that indicate trends such as declining membership levels (e.g. Massey 
and Miles, 1984). But as Terry (1986) point out, it is not possible to automatically assert, 
from such "global" statistical data, that Trade Union organisation at the level of the individual 
plant or company is ipso facto now weaker in its dealings with management. Although he 
concedes that there may be a relationship between the strength of plant-based shop steward^ 
organisations and the wider health of the Trade Union Movement, Terry adopts a "plant or 
company-level" focus to investigate whether or not there has been a decline in shop steward 
influence on behalf of their constituents. In this project Terry reviews evidence deriving 
from surveys using operationalised indices in attempts to measure variation in shop floor 
union power. Two types of indicators, "substantive" (e.g. Edwards, 1984) and 
"organisationist" (e.g. Batstone, 1984)3, have been used, however as Terry concludes, from 
either kind of data it is very difficult to draw any firm conclusions, either because the 
evidence that is produced is contradictory, or because few firm conclusions may be drawn 
from operationalisations that are ambiguous and perhaps inappropriate. However in his 
review of case study evidence (e.g. Chadwick, 1983), although sparse, Terry suggests that it 
is probable that shop steward^ organisations indeed have been weakened, but management
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. . are providing them with continuing support in order to maintain the 
benefits of managing the workforce through elected representatives. .
(1986, p. 175)
Therefore despite the probability that shop stewards and their organisations have had their 
power and influence undermined since 1979, their significance in collective bargaining and 
joint consultation remains, although the impact of the recession and managerial strategies 
may have moved the shop steward’s representative function more towards the arena of the 
latter, away from the former (Terry 1983, 1986).
In answer to the original question, it would appear that in collective bargaining and joint 
consultations, it is the senior shop stewards who are the most likely recipients of any 
disclosed accounting information as they
. .  assume something of the role of buffer between employer and operatives
If
(Turner et al., 1967, p. 222)
Moreover recent research (Jackson-Cox et al., 1987) supports Turner’s view by noting the 
strategic role of the senior shop steward in both transcending occupational and work group 
segmentation in the identification of collective trade union issues (ibid., p. 176) and their 
exercise of control over the communication network with the union membership (ibid., 
p. 188). Indeed there seems little reason to suspect that Danniel’s findings in 1976 no longer 
hold. He had demonstrated the importance and relative autonomy of workplace negotiations 
when he found that plant level collective bargaining was the most important type of 
bargaining throughout the U.K., at least as far as manual workers were concerned. Within 
this scenario, Daniel found that the predominant participants representing employees at this 
level tended to be "lay" shop stewards, with full-tim e external officials only being "brought 
in when there was dead lock" (Ibid., p. 12). The continued existence of this situation is 
further supported by case studies such as those of Spencer (1985) and Chadwick (1983).
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As such, D.A.I.’s role in, and effects upon, collective bargaining and joint consultation, will 
be mediated by how such senior shop stewards interpret and attach meaning to that data. 
This area for investigation constitutes a major lacuna in research regarding D.A.I., a lacuna 
that is possibly an outcome of the predominant orientation of much of that work. In order 
to overcome this deficiency, it is necessary on the one hand, to adopt an approach to research 
that eschews the determinism that renders recipients down to "it-beings" (Laing, 1967, p. 
33) through an insensitivity to human subjectivity which likens society-individual 
relationships to "puppet theatres" (Berger, 1966), and on the other hand, to adopt an approach 
that re-establishes, as a focus for attention, actors’ subjective interpretive procedures in 
everyday social practice. So there is a clear need to investigate, through hermeneutic 
penetration, a "form of life" (Giddens 1976, p. 159). In other words, in order to understand 
the impact of D.A.I. upon collective bargaining and joint consultation it is necessary to 
investigate how such senior shop stewards perceive and attach meaning to disclosure data and 
processes thus mediating their influence and effects.
It also implies a need to investigate the factors that influence those interpretive procedures 
as well as those factors that may influence how the senior shop steward perceives his/her role 
vis a vis constituents since those constellations of perceived duties and obligations may endow 
variable propensities to transmit to, reconstitute for or withhold from, constituents, 
accounting information that has been disclosed in collective bargaining and joint consultation 
processes. Indeed some evidence suggests that such shop stewards, who were elected by a 
wide constituency of shop stewards, formed a "quasi-elite" (Batstone et al., 1977) who had the 
opportunity to proactively shape, identify and avoid issues.
But the above implicitly raises a further issue: what is the epistemological status of the 
accounting information that is disclosed to senior shop stewards in collective bargaining? As 
I shall demonstrate, this issue not only constitutes an important focus for research it also 
provides a further level of critique of the extant research pertaining to D.A.I.
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As stated previously, much of the cited research assumes the accounting content of disclosed 
information to be a neutral body of "facts" that aid coalitions of interest to arrive at 
negotiated compromise by arbitrating the financial reality confronting those stakeholders and 
thereby constrains their pursuit of sectional interest and enables "mutual survival". Thus, 
through the "circulation of the facts" (see Reeves, 1980, p. 37; Mitchell, et al., 1980, p. 61) 
that portray an unambiguous organisational reality, the capacity for "optimal decision­
making" (Palmer, 1977, p. 2) is created. Furthermore, many researchers echo the T.U.C. 
policy statement of 1974 by linking the disclosure of information, accounting or otherwise, 
to prerequisites for industrial democracy. That is, disclosure
". . . on the operations of an enterprise - whether public or private - to 
employees and their representatives is an essential background against which 
Industrial Democracy can occur on a rational and informed basis".
(T.U.C., 1974)
Clearly such perceptions of Accounting Information are predicated by Functionalist views of 
the Accounting Profession. In this way understanding is impregnated with technological 
determinist assumptions which relate the growth and development of the Accounting 
Profession to the monopolisation of an esoteric body of knowledge and technique that is 
neutrally functional to the imperatives confronting work organisations and society in general. 
As with any Functionalist Sociology of the Professions (e.g. Barber, 1963; Hughes, 1963; 
Parsons, 1954) this approach makes the mistake
" . . .  of studying professions on their own terms as politically and ideologically 
neutral groups whose sole purpose is to offer important services which society 
needs as efficiently as possible. The mistake in accepting this self definition 
. . . (results in a ) . .  . failure to realise that though containing many elements 
of truth, it is in fact not the description of an empirical phenomenon, or the 
ideal type of a profession, but essentially the basis of a legitimating doctrine 
of the privileged social, economic and legal status of the professions. The 
failure to realise this (or at all events to incorporate it systematically into 
analytical frameworks) has lead sociology into a dead-end street". 
(Gyarmati, 1975, p. 649)
Gyarmati’s critique is particularly apposite in regard to much of the literature upon D.A.I. 
reviewed here. This is because such literature shares elements of a Weltanschauung that
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ideologically embraces the symbolism of neutrality, scientificity and expertise, which are 
elements of the self-definitions propagated by any "profession" and elements in what 
McKinlay calls the "mythology of professionalism"
. . by which professionals have become generalised wise men."
(1973, p. 77)
In this manner, these self-definitions have become the "back-ground expectancies" (Giddens, 
1976) philosophically underpinning research, rather than the object of research.
For instance, Towers and Wright (1983a, 1983b) although clearly working within a 
managerialist problematic4 question the neutrality of accounting information. However, this 
position is not based upon an analysis of the epistemological basis of such information or 
upon an abrogation of the profession’s claim to intimate arcana. Rather it is derived from 
drawing attention to the possibility of intra organisational filtration processes during the 
preparation of information for disclosure, as information is passed up an organisational 
hierarchy. While their hypothesis thus fails to direct attention to epistemological issues and 
the problematic nature of professions, it does draw attention to the important issue of the 
influence of the organisational context of accounting practices: social contexts that may 
influence the actual nature of those practices (Burchell et al., 1980; Pfeffer, 1981).
Therefore, research regarding D.A.I. in industrial relations contexts has usually failed to 
systematically incorporate in its analyses an adequate conceptualisation of accounting 
information and the accounting profession(s). This has resulted in, on the one hand, a lack 
of attention to the organisational and socio-historical context of the development of 
accounting knowledge and, on the other hand, has rendered the epistemological basis of 
accounting information unproblematical. In regard to those points, perhaps it is worth noting 
Tinker’s view that accounting may be seen
". . . not just as a mechanical bookkeeping of events and transactions, but as 
a logic for appropriating material production through economic exchanges.
As such accounting is reflective of the ideology prevailing in each historical 
period. It is ultimately ideological because it facilitates the appropriation of
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surplus value, a process that has no ultimate logical foundation. Without such 
a logical foundation, accounting is exposed as an ideology, a way of 
rationalising . . .  ultimately the role of accounting remains. . .  an intellectual 
and pragmatic tool for social domination".
(Tinker, 1985, p. 100)
So perhaps research into D.A.I. in Collective Bargaining should begin to consider what it is 
that is being disclosed; perhaps accounting data are, as Tinker claims, like any other social 
belief
" . . .  not merely a passive representation of reality . . .  ( bu t ) . . .  is an agent in 
changing or perpetuating a reality . . .  it is ideological in so far as it 
misconstrues circumstances and events in order to promote certain partisan 
interests . . ..
(ibid., p. 11)
It is evident that the above lacunae and deficiencies in research may only be eschewed 
through prior analysis of the socio-historical (Clegg and Dunkerley, 1980; p. 501-3) context 
in which accounting, as a substantive domain, has developed and is operating. This analysis 
in turn must be related to the epistemologic basis of accounting. In other words, it is 
necessary to arrive at some analysis of the interaction between what Toulmin (1972) has 
termed "socio-historical processes" and "intellectual and disciplinary procedures".
Conclusion
Therefore,in conclusion to this review and critique of some of the themes evident in the 
research and literature pertaining to D.A.I., it is necessary to summarise the following points. 
Firstly, there is a need for a significant reorientation in research away from the perspectives 
that attempt to concoct managerial recipes from a social engineering standpoint. As I have 
tried to illustrate, such an orientation has often resulted in determinism that produces an 
inadequate and partial understanding of D.A.I. in Collective Bargaining. Part of the 
resolution of these problems must be a focus upon human subjectivity - the creative activity 
by which versions of reality, upon which action is founded, are constructed by individuals
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and groups (Lefebvre, 1972). This necessarily leads to a need in research for hermeneutical 
penetration of a "form of life" (Giddens, 1976, p. 159), i.e. an analysis of how particular 
recipients perceive and interpret disclosed accounting data, as well as a delineation of the 
influences upon those interpretive processes. Finally, it is evident that there is a need to 
develop a more thorough conceptualisation of the nature of the social phenomena that are 
being disclosed - i.e. accounting data. This perhaps may only be achieved by prior analysis 
of the socio-historical context(s) in which accounting, as a substantive domain, has developed 
and is operating. This analysis, in turn, might be related to the epistemological basis of 
accounting.
Thus it becomes necessary to investigate those processes through which accounting has 
become socially established and legitimised as a body of knowledge that represents reality, 
while taking account of the impact, upon such institutionalisation, of differential power 
distribution within society that may enable particular groups’ definitions of reality to become 
pervasive. However in this, it must be remembered that it is quite possible for a body of 
knowledge to attain a great deal of autonomy from its social base (Berger and Luckmann, 
1967). These necessary concerns inevitably lead to a confrontation with awesome 
epistemological issues. Specifically, those of overcoming the subjective-objective dualism 
(Giddens 1984, p. xx-xxi) that have plagued much of social science (Abrams, 1982; Reed, 
1985) and has often resulted in the deterministic and reificatory excesses of "objectivism" or 
a flight into "relativism" and ultimate solipsism of "subjectivism" as a knee-jerk solution.
With the above in mind, I shall have a concern in this research to develop an epistemology 
that not only allows for my investigation of the epistemological basis of accounting 
knowledge but which also proffers guidelines regarding the status of my own research and 
accounts. It will be the concern of the following three chapters to develop an epistemology 
appropriate to these tasks before attempting to investigate the phenomenological worlds of 
those exposed to disclosed accounting information.
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NOTES
1. According to Walton and McKersie (1965) the function of distributive bargaining is 
to resolve pure conflicts of interest.
2. According to Walton and McKersie (1965) the function of integrative bargaining is 
to find common or complementary interests and solve problems confronting both 
parties.
3. For Terry (1986, pp. 171-4) "organisational indices" include questions about trade 
union organisation such as union density, existence of a closed shop, size of 
constituencies etc.; while "substantive indices" pertain to statistics such as figures of 
strikes and other industrial criteria, particularly unofficial strikes.
4. For example, this is illustrated by their conclusion that their case study demonstrates 
that:
". . . the disclosure of financial information by employers at 
arbitration is something that needs careful consideration if  it 
is not to damage the employers’ case".
(1983b, p. 83).
29
REFERENCES TO CHAPTER I
Abrams, P. (1982), "Historical Sociology". Somerset, Open Books.
A.C.A.S. (1977) "Code of Practice 2: Disclosure of Information to Trade Unions for
Collective Bargaining Purposes". H.M.S.O.
Accounting Standards Steering Committee (1975), "The Corporate Report". London.
Albrow, M. C. (1968), "The Study of Organisations - Objectivity or Bias?", in Salaman, G. 
and Thompson, K. (1973), "People and Organisations". London, Longman.
Bachrach, P. and Baratz, M. S. (1962), "Two faces of Power", American Political Science 
Review. 56, pp. 947-52.
Barber, B., (1963), "Some Problems inthe Sociology of the Professions", Daedalus. Fall pp. 
669-88.
Baritz, L. (1960), "Servants of Power". New York, Wiley.
Batstone, E. (1984), "Working Order". Oxford, Blackwell.
Batspie, E. (1988) "The Reform of Worksolace Industrial Relations". Oxford, Clarendon 
Press.
Batstone, E., et al., (1977) "Shop Stewards in Action". Oxford, Blackwell.
Benton, T. (1977) "Philosophical Foundations of the Three Sociologies". London, Routledge 
and Kegan Paul.
30
Berger, P. L. (1966), "Invitation to Sociology". Harmondsworth, Penguin.
Berger, P. L. and Luckmann, T. (1967) "The Social Construction of Reality". Harmondsworth, 
Penguin.
Blumer, H. (1967), "Symbolic Interactionism". Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall.
Board of Trade (1976) "The Aims and Scope of Company Reports". H.M.S.O.
Boraston, I.; Clegg, H. and Rimmer, M. (1975) "Workplace and Union". London, Heineman.
Bougen, P. D. (1989) "The Emergence, Roles and Consequences of an Accounting-Industrial 
Relations Interaction", Accounting Organisations and Society. Vol. 14, No. 3, pp.203- 
234.
Brown, R. K. (1978), "Work", in Abrams, P. (ed) "Work. Urbanism and Inequality". London, 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
Brown, W. (1973), "Piecework Bargaining". London, Heinemann.
Brown, W., et al. (1978), "Factors Shaping Shop Steward Organisations in Britain", British 
Journal of Industrial Relations. Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 139-159.
Brown, W., ed. (1981), "The Changing Contours of British Industrial Relations". Blackwell.
Bullock Report (1977), "Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Industrial Democracy", 
H.M.S.O.
Burchell, S. et al. (1980), "The Role of Accounting in Organisations and Society", Accounting, 
Organisations and Society. Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 5-27.
31
Burrell, G. and Morgan, G. (1979), "Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis" 
London, Heinemann Education Book.
Chadwick, M. (1983) "The Recession and Industrial Relations: A Factory Approach".
Employee Relations, Volume 5, No. 5.
Child, J. (1981), "Professions in the Corporate World: Values. Interests and Control". The 
University of Aston Management Centre, Working Paper, No. 227.
Clegg, S., (1979) "The Theory of Power and Organisation". London, Routledge and Kegan 
Paul.
Clegg, S. and Dunkerley, D. (eds), (1977), "Critical Issues in Organisations". London, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Clegg, S. and Dunkerley, D. (1980), "Organisation. Class and Control". London, Routledge 
and Kegan Paul.
Colville, I. (1980), "Reconstructing Behavioural Accounting", Accounting Organisations and 
Society. Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 119-132.
Commission on Industrial Relations (1972), Report No. 31, "Disclosure of Information", 
H.M.S.O.
Confederation of British Industry (1974), "The Provision of Information to Employees: 
Guidelines for Action". London, C.B.I.
Cooper, D. and Essex, S. (1977), "Accounting Information and Employee Decision-Making", 
Accounting. Organisations and Society. Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 201-217.
32
Craft, J. A. (1981), "Information Disclosure and the Role of the Accountant in Collective 
Bargaining", Accounting Organisations and Society. Vol. 6, No. 1., pp. 97-107.
Cuthbert, S. A. and McDonough, J. J. (1980), "The Invisible War: Pursuing Self Interests at 
Work". New York, Wiley.
Cuthbert, H. N. and Whitaker, A. (1977), "Disclosure of Information and Collective 
Bargaining: A Re-examination", Journal of Business Finance and Accounting. Vol. 
4, No. 3, pp. 373-378.
Dair, P. and Reeves, T. K. (1976), "Why Disclosure Could be a Non-event", Personnel 
Management. Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 24-27.
Edmunds, J. (1984), "The Decline of the Big Battalions", Personnel Management. Vol. 19, No.
3.
Edwards, R. (1979), "Contested Terrain". London, Heineman.
England, J. (1981), "Shop Stewards in Transport House: a comment upon the incorporation 
of the rank and file", Industrial Relations Journal. Vol. 12, No. 5, pp 16-29.
Fay, B. (1975), "Social Theory and Political Practice". London, Allen and Unwin.
Foley, B. and Maunders, K. (1973), "Accounting Information, Employees and Collective 
Bargaining", Journal of Business Finance and Accounting. Vol. 1., No. 1, pp. 107- 
127.
Foley, B. and Maunders, K. (1977), "Accounting Information Disclosure and Collective 
Bargaining". London, Macmillan.
33
Foley, B. and Maunders, K. (1984) "Information Disclosure and the Role of the Accountant 
in Collective Bargaining - Some Comments", Accounting. Organisations and Society. 
Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 99-106.
Fox, A. (1966) "Industrial Sociology and Industrial Relations" Research Paper No. 3, Royal 
Commission on Trade Unions and Employers Associations, H.M.S.O.
Fox, A. (1974), "A Sociology of Work in Industry". London, Collier/Macmillan.
Fox, A. (1974), "Bevond Contract. Work Power and Trust Relations". London, Faber.
Friedmann, A. (1977), "Industry and Labour". London, Macmillan.
Garfinkel, M. (1967), "Studies in Ethnomethodologv". Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall.
Geertz, C. (1973), "The Interpretation of Cultures". New York, Basic Books.
Gellner, E. (1970), "Concepts and Society" in Emmet, D. and MacIntyre, A. (eds.), 
"Sociological Theory and Philosophical Analysis". London, Macmillan.
Giddens, A. (1976), New Rules of Sociological Method. London, Hutchinson.
Giddens, A. (1984), "The Construction of Society". London Policy Press.
G.M.W.U. (1978) "Disclosure of Information": G.M.W.U. Guide, G.M.W.U.
Goodman, J. (1984) "Employment Relations in Industrial Society" Beddington, Philip Allen.
Goodman, J. F. B. and Whittingham, T. G. (1973), "Shoo Stewards". London, Pan.
Gospel, H. F. (1978), "The Disclosure of Information to Trade Unions: Approaches and 
Problems", Industrial Relations Journal. Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 18-26.
Gospel, H. F. (1983), "The Role of Codes in Labour Relations: The Case of Disclosure", 
Industrial Relations Journal. Vol. 14, No. 4., pp. 76-82.
Gouldner, A. W. (1959), "Organisational Analysis" in Merton, R. K. (ed.) "Sociology Today". 
New York, Basic Books.
Gyarmati, G., (1975), "Ideologies, Roles and Aspirations. The Doctrine of the Professions: 
basis of a power structure", International Social Science Journal. Vol. XXVII, No. 4.
Handy, C. B. (1981), 2nd Edn. "Understanding Organisations". Harmondsworth, Penguin.
Hawes, W. R. and Smith, D. (1981), "Employee Involvement Outside Manufacturing", 
Employment Gazette. LXXXIX.
Hill, S. (1981), "Competition and Control at Work". London, Heinemann.
Hooker, C. A. (1973), "Empiricism, Perception and Conceptual Change", Canadian Journal 
of Philosophy. 3, pp. 59-75.
Hughes, E. C., (1963), "Professions" in Elsland G., et al (1975), "People and Work" Holmes 
McDougall/The Open University Press
Hyman, R., (1975), "Strikes". London, Fontana.
Hyman, R. (1978), "Pluralism, Procedural Concensus and Collective Bargaining", British 
Journal of Industrial Relations. Vol. 16, No. 1., pp. 16-40.
35
Hyman, R. (1979), "The Politics of Workplace Trade Unionism. Recent tendencies and some 
problems for Theory", Capital and Class. No. 8.
K err, C. & Siegal, A. J., (1954), "The Inter Industry propensity to Strike" in Kornhauser et 
al "Industrial Conflict".
Jackson-Cox, J. et al. (1984), "The Disclosure of Company Information to Trade Unions", 
Accounting Organisations and Society pp 253-273.
Jackson-Cox, J. et al. (1987) "Strategies. Issues and Events in Industrial Relations: Disclosure 
of Information in Context". Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
Janner, G. (1977), "Disclosure of Information to Unions", "Accountancy". June, pp. 86-8.
Jones, C. (1986), "Corporate Social Accounting". Bristol Polytechnic, Occasional Paper in 
Sociology, No. 3.
Laing, R. D. (1967), "The Politics of Experience and The Bird of Paradise". Harmondsworth, 
Penguin.
Lefebvre, H. (1972), "The Sociology of Marx". Harmondsworth, Penguin.
Lewis, N. R. et al (1984), "Financial Reporting to Employees: The pattern of Development, 
1919 to 1979", Accounting Organisations and Society. Vol. 9, No. 3/4, pp. 275-289.
Lichtman, R. (1970), "Symbolic Interactionism and Social Reality: Some Marxist Queries", 
Berkeley Journal of Sociology. Vol. 15.
36
Littler, C. (1982), "The Development of the Labour Process in Capitalist Societies”. London, 
Heinemann.
Lukacs, G. (1971), "History and Class Consciousness". London, Merlin.
Lukes, S. (1974), "Power: A Radical View". London, Macmillan.
Mannheim, K. (1936), "Ideology and utopia". London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Marcuse, H. (1954), "Reason and Revolution". New York, Humanities Press.
Marchington, M. (1982), "Managing Industrial Relations". London, McGraw Hill.
Marsh, A. and Rosewall, R. (1976), "A question of Disclosure", Industrial Relations Journal. 
Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 185-209.
Massey, D. and Miles, N. (1984), "Mapping Out the Unions", Marxism Today. May.
Mayo, E., (1949), "The Social Problems of Industrial Civilisation", London, Routledge and 
Kegan Paul.
McKinlay, J. B. (1973), "On the Professional Regulation Change", in Halmos, P. (ed.), 
"Professionalisation and Social Change". University of Keele Monograph, No. 20.
Mitchell, F. (1980), "Disclosure of Information: Some Evidence from Case Studies",
Industrial Relations Journal. Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 53-62.
Moore, R. (1980), "Information to Unions: Use or Abuse?" Personnel Management, May pp. 
34-8.
37
Morgan, G. (1983), "More on Metaphor: why we cannot control Tropes in Administrative 
Science", Administrative Science Quarterly. Vol. 28, pp. 601-7.
Morgan, G. (1986), "Images of Organisation". London, Sage.
Nicholaus, M. (1972), "The Professional Organisation of Sociology: A View from Below", 
in Blackburn, R. (ed.), "Ideology in Social Science", London, Fontana/Collins.
Ogden, S. G., (1982), "Trade Unions, Industrial Democracy and Collective Bargaining", 
Sociology. 16, No. 4, pp. 544-63.
Ogden, S. and Bougen, P. (1985), "A Radical Perspective on the Disclosure of Accounting 
Information to Trade Unions", Accounting. Organisations and Society. Vol. 10, No. 
2, pp. 211-224.
Owen, D. and Broad, G. (1983), "Information Disclosure: Views from the Shop Floor", 
Personal Review. 5,3 pp. 28-32.
Palmer, G. (1983), "British Industrial Relations". London, George Allen and Unwin.
Palmer, J. R., (1977), "Use of Accounting Information in Labour Negotiations". National 
Association of Accountants, New York.
Parsons, T. (1954), "The Professions in the Social Structure", in "Essavs in Sociological 
Theory". New York, Free Press.
Pope, P. F. and Peel, D. A. (1981a) "A Fresh Look at Employee Disclosure Policy", The 
Accountants1 Magazine. November, pp. 376-80.
38
Pope, P. F. and Peel, D. A. (1981b), "Information Disclosure to Employees and Rational 
Expectations", Journal of Business Finance and Accounting. Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 139- 
46.
Popper, K. (1967), "The Poverty of Historicism". London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Pfeffer, J. (1981), "Power in Organisations". Marshfield, Pitman.
Ramos, A. G. (1981), "The New Science of Organisations". University of Toronto Press.
Reeves, T. K. (1980), "Information Disclosure in Employee Relations", Employee Relations. 
Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 1-39.
Reed, M. (1985), "Redirections in Organisational Analysis". London, Tavistock.
Rubinstein, D. (1986), "The Concept of Structure in Sociology" in Wardell, M. L. and Turner,
S. P. (eds.), "Sociological Theory in Transition". London, Allen and Unwin.
Schein, E. H. (1984), "Coming to a new awareness of organisational culture", Sloan 
Management Review, pp. 3-16.
Schwartz, R. D., (1981), "Habermas and the Politics of Discourse", Canadian Journal of 
Political and Social Theory. Vol. 5, pp. 45-68.
Silverman, D. (1970), "The Theory of Organisations". Heineman Education Books.
Spencer, B. (1985), "Shop Steward Resistance in the Recession", Employee Relations. Vol. 7, 
No. 5, pp. 22-25.
39
Taylor, A. H., "The Presentation of Financial Information to Employees", Managerial 
Finance. Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 14-23.
Terry, M. (1983), "Shop Stewards Through Expansion and Recession", Industrial Relations 
Journal. Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 49-58.
Terry, M. (1986), "How do we know if Shop Stewards are Getting Weaker?" British Industrial 
Relations Journal. Vol. 24, No. 2, July pp. 169-179.
Tinker, A. M. (1985), "Paper Prophets". Holt Reinhart & Winston, London.
Towers, B. and Wright, M. (1983a) "The Disclosure of Financial Information in Pay 
References at Arbitration", Industrial Relations Journal. Vol. 14, No. 3.
Towers, B. and Wright, M. (1983b) "Pay Reference Arbitration and the Disclosure of 
Information", Industrial Relations Journal, vol. 14, No. 4.
Toulmin, S. (1972), "Human Understanding". Vol. 1, Princeton University Press.
T.U.C. (1974), "Industrial Democracy". London, T.U.C.
T.U.C. (1977), "Guide to the Bullock Report on Industrial Democracy". London, T.U.C.
T.U.C.-Labour Party Liaison Committee (1982), "Economic Planning and Industrial 
Democracy". London, Labour Party.




Walton, R. E.and McKersie, R. B. (1965), "A Behavioural Theory of Labour Negotiations". 
London, McGraw-Hill.
Wrong, D. H. (1979), 'Tower - Its Use and Abuse". Oxford, Blackwell.
Zeitlin, M. (1974), "Corporate Ownership and Control: The Large Corporations and




"The object of knowledge is alwayspreinterpreted, situated in a scheme, part 
of a text . . . .  On the other hand, the subject of knowledge belongs to the 
very world it wishes to in te rp re t. . .."
(Baynes, et al., 1987, p. 5)
Introduction
Many popular texts, that have an explicit concern with the philosophy of the social sciences 
(e.g. Anderson et al., 1986; Lessnoff, 1974; Pratt, 1978; Ryan, 1970), rarely attempt to create 
any direct linkages between philosophical issues and their expression in empirical social 
science research methodologies.1 Conversely, many methodological texts (e.g. McCall and 
Simmons, 1969; Moser and Kalton, 1971; Rose, 1982; Smith 1975) tend to reciprocate this 
lack of interest2, by often remaining hermetically sealed off from philosophical 
debates,making methodologies appear to be philosophically expurgated techniques, especially 
in regard to "questions of epistemology, of truth" (see Douglas, 1976, p. 3). Therefore both 
groups of writers often fail to realise, or at least fail to make explicit, that empirical research 
methodologies are where philosophical concepts "get their hands dirty" (Douglas, ibid.) since 
their ability to do the tasks asked of them by researchers depends in its turn upon the 
researcher’s own commitment to, and choice of, a particular philosophy of social knowledge. 
This apparent lack of mutual interest, between philosophers of science and empirical 
methodologists, may be explicable in regard to the latter in terms of the dominance of 
positivism in methodological discourse; for as Habermas contends,
" . . .  by making a dogma of the sciences’ belief in themselves, positivism 
assures the prohibitive function of protecting scientific inquiry from 
epistemological self-reflection. Positivism is only philosophical in so far as 
it is necessary for the immunisation of the sciences against philosophy."
(1972, p. 67)
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However this tendency to sever philosophy from methodology has been transposed to work, 
concerned with particular substantive domains, for which a positivist epithet is inappropriate. 
An example of non-positivist work which to some extent displays this type of problem is 
provided by Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) seminal work, "Sociological Paradigms and 
Organisational Analysis". At this juncture it is important to note that Burrell and Morgan, 
despite the importance of their contribution to Organisational Sociology, have been subject 
to some criticism. Particularly it is argued (e.g. Chua, 1986b) that their framework of 
sociological paradigms is characterised by "latent relativism" in which "truth" is purely relative 
to one’s paradigm for which no independent set of evaluative criteria exist. The 
"disorientation and epistemological shock" (Barnes, 1974, p. 21) created by such relativism 
perhaps has had the effect of, on the one hand, debilitating researchers’ confidence in the 
utility of any kind of empirical research and thus has often driven them into "theoretical and 
philosophical introspection" (Sayer, 1984, p. 48), or on the other hand, has encouraged a 
suppression of philosophical issues with a concomitant flight into a rather naive and 
unreflective empiricism. Perhaps it is the latter course that may be the most worrying, for 
as Giddens comments,
" . . .  the social sciences are lost if  they are not directly related to philosophical
problems by those who practice them".
(1984, p. XVIII)
However, the main criticism of Burrell and Morgan’s work to be levelled here concerns their 
rather superficial treatment of research methodology. In a sense they reproduce the lack of 
mutual interest that characterises philosophers of science and "methodologists" by failing to 
analyse the variety of research methodologies available, and the relationships of these 
methodologies to metatheoretical assumptions regarding ontology and epistemology. 
Philosophical questions and assumptions about "what are we studying?" (i.e. ontology) are 
logical preconditions (see Hindess, 1977, p.6) for any attempt at engaging, via methodology, 
with the "world". Our solutions to ontological questions therefore influence our selection of 
what are perceived as epistemologically warranted methodological engagements that make 
research "problems" tractable, as well as influencing how we apply and use those
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methodologies and, importantly, our understanding of the "problem" in the first place (see 
Fay, 1987, p. 42).
Therefore research methodology is not the discriminatory factor between paradigms as 
Burrell and Morgan seem to imply, rather it is a product of paradigmatic location, since 
questions of method cannot be answered without prior consideration of ontology and 
epistemology.
This leads to a failure to analyse the interrelationships between these metatheoretical 
assumptions and how these interrelationships become embedded in methodological 
prescriptions, proscriptions, and habitues. In particular they do not overtly explore the 
interaction of assumptions regarding the nature of social reality and assumptions regarding 
the nature of human action/behaviour, in determining the researcher’s choice and application 
of the various methodologies available. Indeed it is the intention of this chapter to attempt 
to explore these very issues and by doing so it is hoped that the "primrose path to relativism 
. . .  paved with plausible assumptions" (Hollis and Lukes, 1982, p. 1) that for Chua (ibid.), is 
immanent in Burrell and Morgan, will be eschewed.
Here, in order to make a point3 I have been somewhat unfair to Burrell and Morgan. While 
"Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis" does not explicitly tackle the 
relationships between ontology, epistemology and method, later work, especially by Morgan 
(Morgan and Smirich, 1980; Morgan, 1983) represent an awareness of, and attempts at dealing 
with, these lacunae. For instance Morgan writes of a desire to produce "a volume that would 
stand as a methodological equivalent to Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis" 
(1983, p. 14), defining methodologies as linking . . .
". . . the researchers to the situation being studied in terms of rules, 
procedures, and general protocol that operationalise the network of 




In many respects it is unclear as to the extent Morgan achieves this objective; indeed he 
implies that it was frustrated as the project gained a momentum of its own (ibid., pp. 14- 
18) and as such the interaction of researcher’s paradigmatic assumptions regarding the 
ontological status of social reality and "human nature" (Morgan’s "constitutive assumptions" 
(ibid., p. 21), with what Morgan depicts as Methodology, remains somewhat opaque.
It is Morgan’s process of "operationalisation" that I wish to explore through a analysis of the 
interaction of varying constitutive assumptions and their expression at the methodological 
level in terms of variable applications and combinations of research styles or techniques in 
particular "modes of engagement". The intention is to "map" different "methodological 
subcultures" each being, »
". . . justified and explained by an ideology or philosophy of science which 
specifies the goals of science, the available and permissible means, the 
impermissible errors, the proper subject matters, the heroic exemplars, the 
unfortunate failures or pseudoscientific villains".
(Diesing, 1972, p. 18)
To begin this project it is useful to commence with Burrell and Morgan’s approach in 
Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis.
Essentially Burrell and Morgan posit a methodological dichotomy. This appears to be derived 
from Windelband’s assertion (1901) of a separation between the natural and cultural sciences 
and that the former should be characterised by nomothetic methodology while the latter 
should be characterised by idiographic methodology. Windelband’s prescription for such a 
separation is also reproduced by Rickert’s notion (1962) that there are two modes of 
representing reality - the "generalising" and the "individualising". Thus Burrell and Morgan 
appear to follow the orientation of Rickert and Windelband as they firstly identify 
nomothetic methodology, which . . .
"lays emphasis on the importance of basing research upon systematic protocol 
and technique. It is epitomised in the approach and methods employed in the 
natural sciences, which focus upon the process of testing hypotheses in 
accordance with the cannons of scientific rigour . . .  surveys, questionnaires, 
personality tests and standardised research instruments of all kinds are
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prom inent among the tools which comprise nomothetic methodology . . (1979, pp. 6-7)
Secondly the identify  identify  idiographic methodology which . . .
"emphasises the analysis of subjective accounts which one generates by ‘getting inside’ situations and involving oneself in the everyday flow of life by such encounters with one’s subject and the insights revealed in impressionistic accounts found in diaries, biographies and journalistic records".(1979, p.6)
Methodological Pluralism
A lthough arm ed with this dichotom y4 Burrell and Morgan fail to explore the complex of 
relationships that exist between these apparently polar opposites and elaborate upon the 
em pirical techniques and logics "typical" of each "position". Indeed it would appear that such 
a view of methodology, in terms of a dichotom y, is fundam entally flaw ed, fo r what it ignores 
is the adoption of what may be term ed a "methodologically pluralist" position. Such a 
position is, for instance, articulated by Trow when he proposes that . . .
". . . d ifferen t kinds of inform ation about man and society are gathered most fully and economically in d ifferen t ways, and the problem  under investigation properly dictates the methods of investigation . . .. This view seems to be im plied in the commonly used m etaphor of the social scientists "kit o f tools" to which he turns to find the methods and techniques most useful to the problems at hand"(Trow, 1957, p. 33)
The above position obviously implies the possibility of rapprochem ent between idiographic 
and nom othetic research methodologies as articulated, for example, by McCall and Simmons 
(1969). From this stance the d ifference between the methods available to the social scientist 
are perceived as being ones of "trade o ff ' around reliability, internal and external validity, 
and their appropriateness to the research problem. In this context Zelditch (1962) discusses 
"inform ation adequacy and efficiency" as a criteria by which to judge the appropriateness of
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a method for a particular purpose and which should govern the researcher’s choice of method. 
A lternatively, what has been term ed "methodological pluralism" may be based upon the 
conception, dem onstrated by Smith (1975), that d ifferen t kinds of com plem entary data about 
a "problem" may be acquired by using d ifferen t research techniques in the same empirical 
study. This "methodological triangulation" is thought to overcome the bias inherent in a 
single method approach (Denzin, 1970, p. 313), since, according to Smith it illuminates 
d ifferen t aspects of a problem. Therefore,
"we are really like blind men led into an arena and asked to identify  an entity (say an elephant) by touching one part o f that entity(say a leg). Certainly we m ight make better guesses if we could pool the inform ation of all the blind men, each o f whom has touched a d ifferen t part of the elephant"(Smith, 1975, p. 273)
It would appear im plicitly that many of the researchers working w ithin this kind of approach 
would accept K an t’s (1950) argum ent that scholars who pursue the "principle o f homogeneity" 
and those who pursue that of "specification" are not in conflict. That is, the hom ogeneity - 
specification debate (i.e. nom othetic - idiographic) does not necessarily reflect a fundam ental 
ontological conflict, rather it reflects d ifferen t interests which are reconcilable. However it 
shall be argued that this rapprochem ent is only tenable w ithin certain nexuses of ontological 
assumptions. Particularly it appears that such"pluralism" is founded upon what Burrell and 
M organ term  "realist" assumptions about the ontological status of social reality which 
postulate that the social world is . . .
"a real world made up of hard, tangible and relatively im m utable structures. W hether or not we label and perceive these structures the realists m aintain, they still exist as em pirical entities. We may not even be aware of the existence of certain crucial structures and therefore have no "names" or concepts to articulate them. For the realist, the social world exists independently of an individuals appreciation of it. The individual is seen as being born into and living within a social world which has a reality - it exists ‘out there’, ontologically it is prior to the existence and consciousness of any single human being. For the realist, the social world has an existence which is hard and concrete as the natural world"(Burrell and M organ, 1979, p.4)
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Thus social reality has a "real" concrete existence independent of hum an consciousness and 
cognition which is in many respects em pirically identifiable and presum ably measurable in 
some way. Therefore the experim ental or analytical survey researcher may legitimately 
impose their operationalisations of social reality upon their subjects, which become measured 
stim uli to which subjects’ responses are also measured in some fashion. Indeed 
operationalisation and measurement of social reality (stimuli) and action (responses) become 
the key activity in scientific enquiry and clearly is underpinned by the assum ption that we 
all live in the same independent and external social world (G ouldner, 1970); a reality about 
which the scientist is more aware of, and more com petent at analysing, than the lay-actor. 
However the methodological pluralist position is d ifferen tiated  from , what shall be term ed, 
a realist "methodologically ethnocentric" position (which denies the relevance of idiographic 
methodologies) by a tacit recognition of the im portance of hum an subjectivity  in 
understanding and explaining actors’ responses to external stim uli - an im portance 
sum m arised by Laing’s statem ent that there is. . .
"an ontological discontinuity between human beings and it-beings . . ..Persons are distinguished from  things in that persons experience the worldwhereas things behave . . ."(1967, p. 53)
Here Laing is attacking the positivist contention that social phenom ena are analogous to the 
"it-beings" or "things" of nature and thereby are amenable to a similar type of causal analysis 
in which hum an beings are reduced to entities that autom atically react to external stim uli in 
the same fashion as inanim ate phenomena behave. In this Laing is attem pting to restablish 
D ilthey’s distinction (1976) between the study of nature - "naturwissenschaften" and society 
"geisteswissenschaften"; a distinction grounded upon the essential d ifferences in the subject 
m atter of the two. As with Laing, Dilthey considers that this distinction arises because 
hum an life is an expression of subjectivity and hence cannot be treated as, or explained in 
a sim ilar fashion as, "it-beings" - the subject m atter o f the natural sciences (i.e. as the 
outcome of causal connections). Rather there is the necessity for "verstehen" - sym pathetic 
understanding.
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In the methodological pluralist position outlined here, the acceptance of the im portance of 
subjectivity leads to a conception of social science practice that implies that for such practice 
to be adequate, attention must be given, in some form , to the interpretive understanding of 
human subjectivity  - this understanding is not a luxury but a necessity since hum an action 
cannot be conceived in terms of automatic responses to external stim uli unm ediated by 
interpretive processes. However,in this pluralists tend to follow Weber, rather than Dilthey, 
in the respect that while Weber (1949, pp. 50-112) accepts R ickert and W indelband’s 
separation of the natural and cultural sciences, he rejects their prescription that these sciences 
should be characterised by d ifferen t methods. Essentially Weber argues that either scientific 
domain can and does use both the nom othetic and the idiographic. For instance, Weber’s 
exposition of the method of verstehen takes it to be a tool that facilitates the in terpretation  
of subjective attitudes through the em pathetic reliving of social acts. But alone it does not 
suffice as an in ter-subjectively  valid scientific explanation. His concern appears to be 
reconcile and integrate interpretive understanding with an objective and em pirically 
verifiable fram ew ork (see 1969, pp. 107-109). This he attem pts to achieve by arguing that 
all phenom ena, no m atter how idiographic, are caused by external antecedent conditions. 
Thus he puts forw ard the case that explanations of social behaviour must be both causally 
adequate through revealing aspects of external conditions that predict particular consequences 
in a probabilistic fashion; and m eaningfully adequate by revealing the experienced subjective 
meaning of the actor(s). Therefore by eschewing determ inism  and com bining voluntarism  
with realist assumptions the methodological pluralist position is form ulated out o f the 
recognition of the im portance of human subjectivity and the "fact" that hum an action has an 
internal logic, for human beings have been freed from  the "reflexive arc" (M ead, 1934). It 
therefore creates a perceived necessity to explore the meanings which people attach to that 
all em bracing scientifically identifiable concrete social reality, meanings integral to the 
construction of "responses", i.e. action. Idiographic methods that enable "verstehen", such as 
ethnography, are for the pluralist, the methods appropriate for fulfilling their com m itm ent 
to exploration of actors’ phenomenological worlds. Therefore in the methodological pluralist 
subculture, ethnography takes its place w ithin a version of "variable analysis" (Blumer, 1967) 
in which stimuli (social reality as measured and defined by the social scientist) and responses
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(hum an actions as m easured and defined by the social scientist) are m ediated by the actors 
subjective processes of attaching meaning to and interpreting stimuli. For example, within 
this epistemological stance, the experim ental and survey researcher can legitim ately follow 
their "crafts" by imposing operationalisations of their versions of social reality upon subjects 
and subsequent data through highly structured research strategies; often investigating the 
relationship between stim uli and responses while taking into account (or controlling for) the 
creative processes of interpretation and meaning construction by subjects, w ith some kind of 
explicit, or im plicit, idiographic analysis which is aimed at ruling out com peting hypotheses 
to the results o f the research. In other words, pluralists would attem pt to increase the internal 
and ecological validity of their findings by attem pting to "control" for the indexicality of 
their experim ent or survey by using the research methods most suitable for this "problem".
However w ithin this pluralist position, idiographic methodology is not purely used within a 
hypothetico-deductive fram ew ork to control extraneous variables deriving from  indexicality. 
A lternatively methodological pluralism may arise from  a com m itm ent to linking micro 
analyses of individual or group action(s) with a m acro -struc tu ra l analysis of society.5 This 
somewhat d ifferen t version of methodological pluralism is perhaps illustrated by the concerns 
laid down by Parsons in his work "The Structure of Social Action", (1968).
Parsons’ work is im portant because the orientation he articulates, in his systematic analysis 
of action and the nature of society, might be interpreted as a guide to a particular version of 
methodological pluralism  in which all methods would be of equal relevance in em pirical 
work, in order for that work to be adequate. It is for this illustrative purpose that his work 
will be briefly  reviewed here, rather than for any substantive theoretical conclusions which 
he arrived at, particularly in regard to the nature of society.
As Johnson et al (1984) argue; im portant in Parsons is his ambiguous relationship w ith the 
philosophical traditions of Germ an Idealism. U ndoubtedly he welcomes Idealism ’s notion of 
social order as an outcome of the m eaningful choices of subjective actors - a process in which 
values are a crucial element. But on the other hand he rejects the im plicit denial o f the
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material conditions of action that come from Idealism’s assumptions regarding the ontological 
status of social reality (which are to all intents and purposes "nominalist" - see pg^f). This 
rejection by Parsons occurs because the idealist view of social reality undermines the aspect 
of the positivist tradition which Parsons acclaims - the possibility and necessity of an 
nomothetic and objective social science - a project that demands realism.
These tensions lead Parsons to distil a Theory of Action which is founded upon the view that 
action is the outcome of subjective actors’ meaningful choices, choices that at the same time 
are constrained by material conditions. In this fashion Parsons attempts to combine 
positivism and Idealism into an all embracing analytical scheme. However this fusion is 
enabled through Parsons’ adoption of a "non-reductionist utilitarianism" that posits the 
existence of a common value system that maintains social order through "direction of action". 
Thus the voluntaristic aspect of subjective choice in action is effectively delimited and 
thereby enables Parsons to conceptually leap to analysis of emergent social structures - the 
coalescence, stabilisation, patterning and hence systematisation of actors’ choices (see 
Heritage, 1984). Therefore, for Parsons, human subjectivity is crucial to explaining actions, 
however the nature of that subjectivity is itself subordinate to the control of the culture 
internalised by actors.
Although Parsons did little primary empirical work himself, the methodological implications 
of his implicit recognition of "Laing’s ontological discontinuity" combined with realism seem 
evident. His delineation of a "grand scheme" can be seen to lead to a version of the 
sociological enterprise in which methodological pluralism is the order of the day. For 
instance in order to analyse whether or not cultural artefacts do indeed contribute to 
"integration", it would initially be necessary to come to a description of the nature of those 
values etc. The methods most appropriate to this "problem" would be those that enable 
verstehen, e.g. ethnography. However, to be able to move beyond description, so as to test 
out the nature of such artefacts’ contribution to integration, and enable generalisability at the 
same time, some form of hypothetico-deductive approach with inherent population validity 
would be necessary, such as analytical survey methodology (see Moser and Kalton, 1971) or
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quasi experimentation (see Campbell, 1969).6
Such a conception of the complementary nature of methodologies within similar theoretical 
and ontological preoccupations is by no means something that arose with advent of Parsonian 
structural functionalism. For instance, the general view in the 1920’s and 30’s amongst 
members of the Chicago School (e.g. Palmer, 1928), a sociological school usually associated 
with ethnography, was that qualitative "case study" methods were complementary to 
"statistical" research. Although demarcations were later drawn through attacks upon survey 
methods, by for instance Blumer (1967), it is perhaps useful to note at this point, that the 
latter day progenies of the Chicago School, "symbolic interactionists", in many respects 
complement, and are by no means inconsistent to, Parsonian structural functionalism (see 
Johnson et al., 1984, p. 106-108). This state of affairs is perhaps a product of symbolic 
interactionism’s assumption that society is made possible through the existence of universal 
shared symbols, as well as the view of the social scientist as ontologically privileged. 
Assumptions such as these are consistent with those of Parsons, and thus the analyses of 
symbolic interactionists, such as that of Goffman (1971), can complement the Parsonian 
project by aiding cultural analysis.
In summary, the methodological pluralist position suggests that not only are different 
idiographic and nomothetic methodologies suitable for different kinds of problem (e.g. Trow, 
1957) they also complement one another in a variety of ways that add to the credibility of a 
study by providing an internal cross-checking or monitoring device during the research 
process (e.g. McCall and Simmons, 1968; Smith, 1975; Denzin, 1978), as well as constituting 
aids for the spanning of the macro-micro divide (see Fielding, 1988; Godsland and Fielding 
1985).
Therefore recognition of Laing’s "ontological discontinuity" within realist assumptions about 
the ontological status of social reality (Laing’s "world") leads to a methodological pluralist 
position which eschews the positing of an epistemological break between qualitative and 
quantitative research methodologies (i.e. between Burrell and Morgan’s idiographic and
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nom othetic). This position is often promulgated through attempts at providing what Fay has 
terms "quasi-causal accounts" (1975, p. 84). In clarifying what he means by this term , Fay 
states that,
". . . in these sorts of conditionship relations, consciousness functions as a m ediator between the determ ining antecedent factors and the subsequent actions, in other words, men act in terms of their interpretations of, and intentions toward, their external conditions, rather than being governed directly by them , and therefore these conditions must be understood not as causes but as w arranting conditions which make a particular action or belief more ‘reasonable’, or ‘justified ’, or ‘appropriate’, given the desires, beliefs and expectations of the actors."(pp. 84-85)





RECOGNITION OF LAING'S ONTOLOGICAL DISCONTINUITY
(a)Stimuli




Consequent human action only explicable in terms of both (a) and (b).
Above characterised by:
(1) Relationship between subject and object conceived of as a dualism, i.e., characterised by privileged status of observers’ accounts, and the belief that the subject (knower) and the object (known) can be effectively separated by adoption of methodologically "scientific" procedures. However the pluralist position also entails a subject -  subject dualism because part o f the "known" is a phenomenon that entails subjectiv ity , i.e. communities or groups of individual "knower(s)".
(2) Theory of Truth: correspondence enabled by a theory neutral observational language7 that assumes passivity on the part of the researcher in regard to resultant knowledge - a "tabula rasa" metaphor.
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Methodological Ethnocentrism I
Within a realist ensemble of constitutive assumptions, as the"ontological discontinuity" of 
Laing is relaxed or dismissed, an increasingly "methodologically ethnocentric" orientation is 
adopted. This occurs often because human subjective processes are perceived as being an 
inappropriate subject matter for the realm of "science" or as being irrelevant to investigating 
human behaviour.
For instance such a position may be advanced from within a positivistic concern to prevent 
a divorce of social from natural science; attempts at such a severance being perceived as a 
result of the "residues of theology" (Neurath, 1959, p. 295). Alternatively such a concern may 
be expressed as a desire to achieve the apparent operational successes of the natural sciences, 
which have served . . .
" . . .  to persuade sociologists of the desirability, efficacy and validity of their 
methods with the result that the goal of sociological investigation seems to 
have become the mathematization of the social world and the extension of 
social control."
(Smart, 1975, p. 158)
In order to adopt what is taken to be natural science methodology, human action necessarily 
must be conceptually rendered to a status similar to that of Laing’s "it-beings’" behaviour. 
This denial of importance of human subjectivity, by these positivistically inclined 
sociologists, is usually further supported by methodological criteria. As Giddens points out
" . . .  the specific ‘unreliability’ of the interpretation of consciousness, indeed 
whether by self or by an observer, has always been the principle rationale for 
the rejection of verstehen by such schools. The intuitive or empathic grasp 
of consciousness is regarded by them merely as a possible source of hypotheses 
of human conduct."
(1976, p. 19)
Thus most positivists (e.g. Abel, 1958; Nagel, 1953) have attacked the idea that interpretive 
understanding may be used in the social sciences. While they see that it may be used as a
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source of hypotheses about conduct, such hypotheses have to be tested by other, less 
impressionistic, descriptions of human behaviour, that involve using precise, quantitative, 
methods. As Anderson et al., point out, in essence . . .
". . . the Positivistic position comes down to the uncompromising view that 
unless something can be stated in mathematical or logical symbolism it is virtually not worth saying . . .".
(1985, p. 142)
In this way, a realist version of "methodological ethnocentrism" emerges, which conceptualises 
human action as being necessary measurable responses to identifiable, operationalisable, 
measurable stimuli. Therefore idiographic methods such as verstehen or ethnography begin 
to be seen as either not having a role in research because the problem to which they are best 
suited to investigate is no longer a problem worth of investigation, and/or they become 
perceived as being inappropriate to "scientific" endeavours because of their lack of precision, 
population validity and reliability. This methodological subculture may be diagrammatically 
represented as below.
Figure II
' NON-RECOGNITION OF LAING'S ONTOLOGICAL DISCONTINUITY
CONSTITUTIVEASSUMPTIONS
(a)Stimuli (b)Realism Response
Ontologically prior social reality as expressed by social scientist's/observer's identification, operationalis­ation and measurement of independent variables.
Human behaviour treated as a measurable dependent variable.
Above characterised by:- 
(1) Subject-object dualism.
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(2) Theory of truth:- correspondence enabled by theory neutral observational language.
Clearly the application of this conception of human action to research issues legitimatises the 
parochial application of laboratory experiments, or experimentally derived methodologies that 
take the logic of the experiment out of the laboratory into the field (e.g. analytical surveys 
or quasi experiments).
From the above discussion it is evident that positivism entails an empiricist denial of the 
metaphysical; this, together with its ensuing phenomenalism, propounds a conception of valid 
knowledge that is limited to what are considered unproblematically observable "sensory 
givens" (see Mattick, 1986, p. 26). While certain implications of this allusion to a theory - 
neutral observational language will be considered later, at this juncture it is important to 
point out that such anepistemology is internally incoherent. This is because it precludes, from 
what is taken to be warranted discourse, the metaphysical - that is it rejects as meaningless 
the very knowledge of subject-object relations upon which any epistemology, including its 
own, is ultimately based. In this contradictory fashion, positivism ignores t h a t . . .
. . epistemology confronts a fundamental problem of circularity in that its 
theory of knowledge presupposes a knowledge of the conditions in which 
knowledge takes place, that is, of the terms of the opposition, subject and 
object, and of the character of the relationship between them".
(Hindess, 1977, p. 134).
Because of this, the validity of positivism’s
" . . .  doctrine of the conditions of valid knowledge depends on the validity of 
its own presuppositions. If they are not knowledge then positivist 
epistemology is at best an empty dogmatism."
(ibid., p. 135)
Thus if positivism is to justify epistemologically what it considers to be objectively valid, it 
must be able to account for itself on its own terms. As Hindess demonstrates, it patently 
cannot. Gorman (1977) makes a similar point.
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. .  What is the objective rationale for our accepting the naturalist belief that 
scientific method includes professionally accepted, impersonal and objective, 
inter-subjectively verifiable (by means of empirical sense-data) criteria of 
validity? . . .  If naturalism is to be epistemologically valid . . .  it must 
elucidate the subjective process of our consciously experiencing the criteria 
. . .  It assumes there is a social world where scientist and philosophers share 
intersubjective methods of communication, but is powerless to study the actual 
nature of this world or critically evaluate social criteria of objectivity."
(P. 124)
It follows that there appears to be a fundamental contradiction within positivism. As such 
it is necessary to follow Hindess in his rejection of positivist epistemology and its secondary 
(methodological) discourse as "logically incoherent and rationally indefensible" (op cit., p. 
135) since they are based upon an inevitably metaphysical ontology and epistemology that are 
meaningless in terms of their own criteria of validity.
However this phenomenalism of positivism leads to further, related, criticisms. For instance, 
the ethnocentricity of many positivists is in part derived from their denial of the importance 
of meaning in actors’ construction of action. But to ultimately claim that interpretive 
procedures play no part in influencing what actors do is absurd since it implies that 
knowledge is divorced from practice. As Sayer (1984, p. 24) points out in his critique of the 
radical behaviourists, this claim raises the question of how such researchers view their own 
actions - have their own ideas nothing to do with what they do? Essentially this type of 
methodological ethnocentrism, based upon a rejection of Laing’s ontological discontinuity and 
thereby allowing for an unproblematic unity of method between the natural and social 
sciences, is untenable. In the natural world, it is assumed that inanimate objects, "it-beings", 
do not think about their own behaviour - but human beings self evidently do. Therefore, in 
this respect, there is no equivalence between the behaviour of it-beings and the action(s) of 
human beings. As Johnson et al (1984) point out, there is no equivalence between the way 
in which actors comply with the laws of the state and the way in which a thrown stone 
complies with the laws of gravity. This however is,
". . . not to suggest that you are free to disobey state law, while the stone 
cannot disobey gravity. It means that you can think about whether to obey 
the state or not, and in doing so you interpret what the law of the state is, and 
what likely future consequences of such actions might be."
(ibid., p. 14)
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However, due to its realism, the foregoing methodological orientation shares with the pluralist 
a perspective that assigns a privileged status to "social scientists’" accounts. This derives from 
the exercise of "Platonic" realism - a concern to reveal the reality behind the observable 
"shadows in the cave". This provides the social scientist with the role as arbiter of the reality 
that the metaphorical "cave-dweller" is unable to see beyond the shadows in the cave, that 
constitute the falsehood of his/her common sense. Therefore objective analyses of reality, 
enabled by a putative theory-neutral observational language can only be attained by those in 
specially privileged positions of detachment:- a view remarkable similar to Mannheim’s 
contention that a truly objective standpoint can only be achieved by "intellectuals" in that
". . . only a state of mind that has been sociologically fully clarified operates 
with situationally congruous ideas and motives".
(1960, p. 175)
Such a contention is also somewhat paralleled in Lenin’s prescriptions (1973a) for the role of 
the revolutionary party vis a vis proletariat!
But perhaps there is no neutral "Archimedian" point from which to stand back and perceive 
the social world objectively and independently of the observer - that the privileged status of 
social scientific accounts awarded by pluralists and positivists is problematic, for
"There is no absolutely "objective" analysis . . .  of ‘social phenomena’ 
independent of special and one sided viewpoints according to which - 
expressly or tacitly, consciously or subconsciously - they are selected and 
organised for expository purposes . . .. All knowledge . . .  is always 
knowledge from particular points of view".
(Weber, 1949, p. 72-81)
Perhaps both the pluralist and the ethnocentric positions are susceptible to McHugh’s (1971, 
p. 320) accusation, aimed specifically at the inadequacy of positivism, of being asocial and 
romantic in that they expect truth to be found in the private sense data of some observer. 
In other words they are based upon the maintenance of a subject-object dualism (positivism),
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or subject-object/subject dualisms (pluralism) derived from the assumed possibility of a 
theory-neutral observational language.
Methodological Ethnocentrism II
Ironically McHugh’s observation is particularly apposite when we turn to the next 
methodological subculture. This position may be identified when Laing’s "ontological 
discontinuity" is not discounted, but rather a realist ontology questioned, and the possibility 
of a nominalist conception of the ontological status of social reality embraced. Nominalism
"sees the social world as an emergent social process which is created by the 
individuals concerned. Social reality in so far as it is recognised to have any 
existence outside the consciousness of any single individual, is regarded as 
being little more than a network of assumptions and inter-subjectively shared 
meanings. The ontological status of the social world is viewed as extremely 
questionable and problematic . . ."
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 30-31)
Armed with this ontology the position of methodological pluralism again becomes 
increasingly problematic. This is because-the implicit acceptance of a realist position is 
necessary in all versions of experimental and survey research methodologies. The 
operationalisation of theoretical concepts, the measurement of those concepts, the assignation 
of explanatory or independent variables, dependent variables and extraneous variables, imply 
"this is the concrete social reality" - the stimuli which either people interpret in their 
construction of action, or alternatively, the stimuli which cause action. This is apparent in 
the positivistic surveys and experiments of methodological ethnocentrism, and the 
methodologically pluralist surveys and experiments which accept Laing’s "ontological 
discontinuity", for the latter posit the discontinuity within a stimulus response relationship, 
or a macro-micro duality, which are inevitably based upon realist ontological assumptions. 
Once nominalism is accepted, methodological pluralism becomes inappropriate.
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In regard to experimental and survey forms of social enquiry, what happens in nominalist 
terms is that "scientists" are imposing their shared versions of social reality upon subjects 
before data collection begins, therefore giving their version of social reality an unwarranted 
superior status (i.e. privileged) to that of subjects. However idiographic methodology, such 
as ethnography, with its usual commitment to induction as well as explanation by 
understanding actors’ phenomenological world, can avoid this problem and therefore becomes 
the only appropriate method of social enquiry to the nominalist. Thus another version of 
methodological ethnocentrism emerges.
An example of an approach that attempts to embrace nominalist assumptions regarding the 
ontological status of social reality is to be found in the work of Schutz. In his critique of 
Weber, Schutz (1964, 1966, 1967) puts forward the view that verstehen is not a method of 
sociology, rather verstehen is what sociology should be studying. This contention is a direct 
outcome of Schutz’s nominalist assumptions. For Schutz, social structure is not some external 
reality, rather it is a particular way in which actors interpret their experiences in that social 
world; it is the objectified product of the subjective experiences of the actor that is taken for 
granted as a shared external reality - a factual reality that Schutz calls a "commonsense 
knowledge of the world". From this, Schutz considers that the main focus of attention for 
sociology should be the "natural attitude" (which he sometimes terms the "common sense 
world" or "the world of daily life") that characterises our unquestioning acceptance of social 
values in Husserl’s "Lebenswelt".
For Schutz we each have a unique biographical situation, that is, we experience the world 
differently and act from a different definition of the world that derives from the particular 
beliefs, values and aspirations etc. that we have assimilated from our surroundings. An 
important aspect of this is the "stock of knowledge at hand" (1970, pp. 82-84) that constitutes 
the unique way by which new experiences are assimilated. These "stocks of knowledge" 
consist of classifications or "typifications" of the"common sense world" assembled from prior 
experience and accumulated throughout our lives. These help us categorise and organise, in 
anticipation, future experience. That is, the outer world . . .
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". . . is not experienced as an arrangement of individual unique objects, 
dispersed in time and space, but as ‘mountains’, ‘trees’, ‘animals’, and ‘fellow 
men’ . . ." (1976, pp. 7-8)
Therefore, for Schutz, reality is not external to the individual, rather it is embedded in the 
individual’s personal and unique perception of experience. Here Schutz is confronted with 
a problem. He clearly is concerned to integrate phenomenological concepts, deriving from 
Husserl, with a framework that enables an empirically verifiable and generalisable sociology. 
At the same time he wants to eschew Husserl’s concept of the "transcendental ego" (pure 
epistemic consciousness) which for Husserl was available through phenomenological reduction 
and which constituted apoditic knowledge. But for Schutz, from this position, if 
generalisation in sociology is to be valid, it would need to reflect each individual 
interpretation of the world and these may not necessarily coincide. Therefore Schutz had to 
modify his concept of "typification" by emphasising that although "typifications" are 
expressed individually, according to biography, they derive from a shared social structure. 
Therefore, the knowledge that we use to interpret our experience of the world,
" . . .  as to its content and particular forms of typification under which it is 
organised, is socially derived, and this in socially approved terms . . ."
(1967, p. 61)
So according to Schutz, while we are all unique actors, the knowledge we employ to give 
meaning to our experience consists of socially derived and approved recipes, typical of our 
cultural milieux, that prescribe correct modes of behaving in each typical context that is 
experienced and enable the world to appear everyday and ordinary. From this, Schutz 
considers that the assumption made by positivists, of an external social reality, creates a 
subject-object dualism that misses the "real" subject matter of sociology -  actor’s mundane 
common sense understanding of their social worlds. The task of sociology is therefore to 
understand the social world from the point of view of the actors’ phenomenological worlds 
by teasing-out the taken-for-granted features of everyday life, their definitions of the 
situation, their subjective typifications of themselves and the interpretive procedures and
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rules involved in social practices. Hence the sociologist must make constructs (his/her 
typifications) of actors’ constructs formed in common sense thinking (1967, pp. 62-63), 
through an inductive compilation of empirical "facts” (1966, pp. 112-114), that are . . .
". . . understandable for the actor himself as well as for his fellow men in
terms of common sense interpretations of everyday life . . . "
(1967, p. 44)
So the sociologist’s constructs must be consistent with the constructs of common sense 
experience of social reality (1967, p. 44) employed by actors. Therefore the sociologist’s 
constructs and accounts must appear plausible and understandable to subjects; this implies 
that the veracity of a sociological account is only determinable through consensus.
Thus due to his nominalism, Schutz argues that the observer must discard his/her 
ontologically privileged position vis-a-vis conditions of action unacknowledged by the 
actor(s), for sociology must not, and cannot, go beyond the common sense and intersubjective 
sense of common (i.e. actors’ "reciprocity of perspectives") - the sole subject matter of 
sociology.
An attempt to "operationalise" Schutz’s ideas is, perhaps, to be found in the work of 
"ethnomethodologists"; Garfinkel (1967) who coined the term, attempted to critique and 
radicalise Parsons through the application of Schutz’s philosophy. In this Garfinkel 
demonstrates how it is the concern of ethnomethodology to seek to understand how 
individuals make sense of their activities, both to themselves and to others, i.e., how do 
members of a group sustain taken-for-granted assumptions about social life - how do they 
"accomplish" reality? This accomplishment requires much "sense-making work" by members 
to produce a taken-for-granted world due to the "indexical" nature of the meanings in use. 
Thus particular accomplishments of reality are only available to members of particular 
worlds. In putting forward how Garkinkel’s ethnomethodological programme may be 
implemented, two British Ethnomethodologists argue the following . . .
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"If one aims to look clearly, and without prejudice at the phenomenon then 
one seeks to describe as accurately as one can what one sees. It is the 
appearance of the phenomenon which is to dictate what is reported, not any 
preconceptions about how things should be reported and described. Here is 
a deep difference between ethnomethodologists and others. The latter are apt 
to think that there are rules which should dictate how description is done, that 
there are rules of scientific inquiry which require that descriptions of 
phenomena should take a certain form. The conception that they have is very 
often one that involves the idea that things should be described in quantitative 
terms . . .  That these ideas are often derived from positivist philosophy is not 
the issue. The issue is, rather, that these ideas are derived, they are taken up 
before and set the conditions for the description of the phenomena, and this 
means that, if we attempt to follow them through, we begin by looking at the 
phenomena through a grid that we have imposed upon it. Whatever 
justification and value there might be for doing that, it obviously does not fit 
with the phenomenologically-inspired idea of looking at the phenomena 
independently of all these preconceptions we can possible dispense . . .. 
Descriptions are not to be constrained by some pre-given conception of the 
form description ought to take but, instead, by whatever considerations are 
necessary to portray the phenomena as exactly as we can."
(Sharrock and Hughes, 1986, p. 40-41) (my emphasis)
For Sharrock and Hughes, these considerations do not lead to methodological laxity rather it 
is meant to impose a stringent discipline that originates with the phenomenon rather than 
with a set of received rules. Indeed, the . . .
" .. . description is supposed to develop from the most careful observation of 
the phenomena and to report what was observed as meticulously as that can 
be done."
(ibid.)
Therefore in order for enthnomethodologists to be able to constitute the world in the same 
way as members; that is to provide Schutz’s "first order constructs" (1967) - member’s 
commonsense theories of the reality of daily life which determine their actions; they must 
cast off the methodological and theoretical concerns of social science and enter into the daily 
life of members and investigate the inner "contours of consciousness" (Freeman, 1980). Thus 
to overcome the problems of reflexivity and indexicality ethnomethodologists argue for an 
ethnography that entails going beyond Gold’s field role of "complete participant" (1959, p. 33) 
to one of "going native" in member’s lebenswelt and thus "becoming the phenomenon . . . 
doing reality as its members do" (Mehan and Wood, 1975, pp. 226-228). Thus, since . . .
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. . social order, including all its symbols and meanings, exists not only 
precariously but has no existence at all independent of members’ accounting 
and describing practices . . . ”
(Dreitzel, 1970, p. XV)
. . . ethnomethodologists seek to explicate how social reality is subjectively constructed and
experienced in interaction settings by their own immersion in those settings, (see Bittner,
1973). In this they reject the rapprochement other "interpretive" approaches have made with
realism. For instance, much of Symbolic Interactionism is rejected due to the ontologically
privileged status symbolic interactionists accord to their own accounts (see Hunt, 1984), that
distances researchers from the phenomena due to a lack of commitment to the "setting"
(Bittner, 1973, p. 121). The privileged status that symbolic interactionists accord their
accounts in some respects is derived from their view of society as an ongoing process of
symbolic interaction in which universal symbols exist as a cultural resource. Indeed such
implicit rejection of indexicality has enabled symbolic interactionists to complement much
of Structural Functionalism. However for the ethnomethodologist, the indexicality of action
and accounts renders any such nomothetical aspirations to mistaken distortions. Indeed
ethnomethodologists would consider that such distortions are founded upon the maintenance
of a subject-object dualism (see Mehan and Wood, 1975) - a chimera enabled through appeal
to the possibility of a theory-neutral observation language, but an appeal that remains latent
in notionally subjectivist approaches such as Symbolic Interactionism. It is this latter
consideration which will be found to be particularly ironic in the ensuing evaluation of
Ethnomethodology.
The constitutive assumptions upon which Ethnomethodology is grounded leads to what may
be classified asa"consensus" or "conventionalist" theory of truth. In this Ethnomethodologists
appear to be attempting to follow Schutz’s prescriptions (1976, pp. 44-64) that the constructs
and accounts employed by sociologists must appear plausible and understandable to subjects
and that sociologists must eschew any approach that entails the assumption of an ontologically
privileged position. Therefore the veracity of an ethnomethodologist’s account is
" . . .  not tested against the corpus of scientific knowledge. It is tested against 
the everyday experience of a community of people . . .. When members’
‘moral facts’ become their moral facts, researchers will know they have 
become members."
(Mehan and Wood, 1975, p. 228)
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Thus the truth claims of ethnomethodological accounts are validated by agreement with, or 
consensus with, subjects; either by the "feeding back" of accounts to subjects (see Cicourel, 
1964; Douglas, 1967; Garfinkel, et al., 1981) or as the above quote would imply, by "going 
native". Alternatively some would argue that the veracity of accounts might be established 
through agreement with "colleagues" (see McHugh, 1971).





RECOGNITION OF LAtNG'S ONTOLOGICAL DISCONTINUITY
Phenomenological Worlds -^  Action
Members socially constructed Members constructionrealities and meanings - of meaningfulthe lebenswelt action.
Characterised by:-
(1) Consensus/conventionalist theory of truth enabled usually by "member-validation", 
or sometimes "colleague-validation", i.e., through agreement.
It is possible to identify several "levels" of criticism regarding ethnomethodology; those 
relating to its desirability, and those relating to its practicality and possibility. Firstly it is 
necessary to question the extent to which the ethnomethodological project is possible - 
particularly the espoused need for the observer to "bracket" their own tacit assumptions about 
the world (see for instance Sharrock and Hughes, 1986, p. 9-10). This desire illustrates 
ethnomethodologist’s debt, which is shared by Schutz, to Husserl. As Douglas (1976, p. 52)
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points out, Ethnomethodologists have always remained committed, in varying ways, to the 
search for Husserl’s "transcendental-ego", more commonly called the "invariant properties of 
cognition or symbolic thought".
By drawing upon Brentano’s idea of'intentionality" (the focusing of consciousness upon an
object), Husserl (1970) contends that the objects of human consciousness do not exist
separately from that of consciousness, as the natural sciences imply. Indeed, for Husserl,
positivism is unaware t h a t . . .
". . . the nature in its proper scientific sense is the product of the spirit that 
investigates nature, and thus the science of nature presupposes the science of 
the spirit."
(1965, p. 189)
Husserl considers that our awareness of objects is the unity of what he terms "noesis" and 
"noema". The latter refers to the intentional object, while the former is the act of intending 
itself - the subjective process of experiencing. Therefore our perceptions of noema, and 
changes in those perceptions, derive in the process of noesis and in the noema itself. For 
instance, the noema itself may have spatial or temporal characteristics which have not been 
previously perceived, while our perception of the noema is affected by our attitudes and 
desires etc. So Husserl argues that how objects are perceived are not primordially initiated 
rather they come from accepted patterns of social meaning expressed as values and customs. 
Husserl suggests that explanations of actors’ behaviour are to be found in the individuals 
"pure epistemic consciousness" (- the transcendental ego) and in the examination of the"pure 
essences" of the phenomena the individual experiences. To get to these "pure essences" the 
phenomenologist must put the world in brackets (epoche) and suspend judgement on the 
veracity of experience and his/her complicity and participation in the "natural attitude". This 
phenomenological reduction is done so that it may be possible to concentrate on revealing the 
stream of consciousness which makes up the world. As Giddens comments,
". . .  from this refuge, armed with the means of looking at existence in its most 
essential aspects, and free from bias, we are then able to re-emerge to conquer 




Douglas (1976) argues that ethnomethodologists consider that the invariant properties of 
cognition operate to constitute all the observed features of the social world. Thus they 
conclude that scientific activity . . .
". . . is simply a search for the constitutive properties of the mind (or 
intersubjectivity) itself. Scientific research, including sociological research, 
is thus seen to be simply a way of ‘displaying’ the constitutive features of 
mind . . . .  By displaying these captured or recorded presentations, and 
illustrating how the invariant cognitive properties of the mind are constituted 
in concrete presentations, we have documented those invariant properties we 
were seeking and have, thus, accomplished all that any science can do."
(Douglas, 1976, p. 52-53)
Regardless of whether or not Douglas’s account is an accurate description of all 
Ethnomethodologists, it would certainly appear that the Ethnomethodological project entails 
the desire to, and necessity of, "bracketing"; even though the terminology used might be 
slightly different (e.g. "becoming", or "doing reality as members do", or "dispensing with 
preconceptions" or "providing first-order constructs", etc.)
However the necessity to "bracket" implies an immanent and putative theory-neutral 
observational language, an assumption that leads to a significant internal contradiction - 
almost a Derridean "aporia" (see Caputo, 1987) - within ethnomethodology. Despite the "fact" 
that ethnomethodologists have explicitly attacked the subject-object dualism (e.g. Mehan and 
Wood 1975) that they perceive to characterise much of sociology, their own appeal to the 
possibility of a theory-neutral observational language ironically bases ethnomethodological 
accounts upon a latent acceptance of the privileged status of the observer expressed as what 
might be termed a "subject-subject dualism". Such a dualism enables Ethnomethodologists, 
such as Garfinkel (1967) to talk of providing "pure" descriptions of "individual expressions". 
As such the process of "experiencing the experience of another" (Laing, 1967) is treated as 
relatively unproblematic by latent appeal to the possibility of a theory-neutral observational 
language. Thus they fail to acknowledge the "hermeneutic circle" - that no "pure" description 
free from interpretation based on presuppositions is possible. Inevitably the observer
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explicitly or implicitly, imposes his/her own "version of reality" upon sense-data through 
common-sense (Hooker, 1973), or theoretical (Quine, 1960; Hanson 1958; Habermas, 1974), 
or paradigmatic (Kuhn, 1970) assumptions and background expectancies (Giddens, 1976): 
cognitive phenomena to which the researchers may be emotionally committed (M itroff, 1974) 
and whose nature is highly influenced by social factors (Barnes, 1974, 1977; Bloor, 1976). 
Indeed as Gadamer (1975) in his critique of Dilthey argues, the idea of a neutral detached 
observer is a myth, interpretations cannot escape background preconceptions embedded in 
the language and life contexts of authors.
Generally it would appear that the possibility of a theory-neutral observational language, 
upon which both ethnocentric subcultures as well as the pluralist are in may respects 
anchored, is untenable. This is because they consider observation unproblematically as the 
passive registration and organisation of "sensory givens" (see Mattick, 1986, p. 26): in this 
fashion they neglect the importance of the influence of socio-cultural factors upon sensory 
experience. As a result any consideration of the effects of the epistemic subject upon the 
"material" of research, through the projection of categories, is effectively subliminated.
In regard to ethnomethodology, even if it were possible to ignore, in evaluation, the above 
inconsistencies and contradictions, it is apparent that ethnomethodologists have severe 
problems in trying to "bracket" in empirical research. As such their maintenance of a 
nominalist ontology is threatened as they appear unable to divest themselves of an emergent 
"realism".
For instance, as Burrell and Morgan (1979) point out, Bittner’s explicitly ethnomethodological 
analysis of "Skid Row" (1967) relies upon implicit use of a realist ontology. His application 
of concepts such as "normality", "external control", etc, suggest that a reality exists, 
independently of those negotiating reality and which impacts upon those negotiations. Thus 
it would appear that ethnomethodology, if it is to avoid the subjective relativism of solipsism 
implicit in the maintenance of a "nominalist" ontology in "doing" empirical research, and, if 
it is to be able to explain individuals’ behaviour, it inevitably introduces "structural" or
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"organisational" features into that explanation, features that imply "realism". For example 
Silverman and Jones (1976) stress that while they follow an ethnomethodological approach 
they do not
"accept a continual state of flux in regard to organisational reality, still less to 
engage in a solipsistic denial of the factual character of organisational 
structures . . .  if we act as if (the organisational wold) were "unreal" (for 
instance by refusing to recognise a hierarchical relationship which any 
member might see as "obvious") sanctions will routinely be exercised upon us". 
(1976, p.20)
Burell and Morgan (ibid., p. 270) consider that the acknowledgement of such a view, by 
Silverman and Jones, entails an agreement that a power dimension, which may dominate the 
way in which individuals do make sense of their own sphere of operations, must be 
considered. This discovery of a power relationship "beneath" the ongoing processes whereby 
reality is created and sustained means that to some extent Silverman and Jones, like Bittner, 
are having to move away from a nominalist ontology so as to explain their observations. Thus 
it appears that when ethnomethodologists attempt empirical ethnomethodological research, 
they are inevitably pushed towards a more realist ontology and the admittance of observer- 
derived concepts such as "power", so as to explain their observations and experiences.
Therefore, in the above respects, the ethnomethodological project is seriously flawed, but it 
is also necessary to question its desirability. As Sayer claims
". . . when we reflect upon our beliefs and the concepts we use, we often 
change them in the process: we notice and try to resolve inconsistencies and 
so we come to understand ourselves and the world in a new way or discover 
new "levels" of meanings. And so it is with sciences; indeed, science is 
redundant if it fails to go beyond a common-sense understanding of the 
world. Since social science includes common sense among its objects, it 
cannot avoid a critical relationship with it, for in seeking to understand 
popular consciousness, as it is, in examining what is normally unexamined, 
we cannot help but become aware of its illusions".
(1984, p. 41)
From this it appears that ethnomethodology, due to its nominalism and consequent relativism, 
is in danger of "emasculating" sociology through removal of any "critical" element. Ultimately
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it might have the tendency to cast doubt upon sociology per se. Indeed as Hargreaves points 
out, his "deformed monstrous progeny” of interactionism and phenomenology
. . after committing matricide against interactionism, and not long after 
becoming distinctly ambivalent to Schutz’s fatherhood, proclaimed open war 
against the rest of its sociological kin . . .  [and] . . .  some of ethnomethodogy’s 




Evidently there are serious interrelated problems with ethnomethodology: 
some derive from its internal contradictoriness, others due to its attempted nominalism and 
consequent relativism. But it must be recognised that Ethnomethodology also provides a 
useful and necessary critique of positivism’s deterministic insensitivity to human subjectivity 
which likens society-individual relationships to puppet theatres (Berger, 1966) and which 
implicitly adopts a over socialised conception of man (Wrong, 1961). This deterministic view 
has provided the positivist with the mandate to view human subjectivity as relatively 
unproblematical and consequently results in teleological discourses that encounter a "reef' of 
reification by treating human beings purely as objects through ignoring the constructive and 
meaningful nature of human activity. Thus positivists fail to realise the radical discrepancy 
between the study of human conduct and the occurrence of events in nature. As Dilthey 
(1976) established the former can (and must) be understood in terms of grasping the 
subjective consciousness of that conduct, while the latter can be only causally explained from 
the outside. Therefore the difference between the social and natural world
"is that the latter does not constitute itself as ‘meaningful’: the meanings it has 
are produced by men in the course of their practical life, and as a consequence 
of their endeavours to explain it for themselves. Social life - of which these 
endeavours are part - on the other hand, is produced by its component actors, 
precisely in terms of their active constitution and reconstitution of frames of 
meaning whereby they organise their experience."
(Giddens, 1976, p. 79)
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So the question arises, where do these considerations leave me? While I have argued that 
recognition of what has been termed "Laing’s Ontological Discontinuity", the subject-subject 
nature of social science research, is a necessary precondition for an epistemologically 
adequate social science, this cannot be expressed as a dualism for it implies and assumes the 
possibility of a theory-neutral observational language. On similar grounds a nominalist 
solution has been rejected as untenable in practice. Also realism, whether or not combined 
Laing’s considerations, has been rejected on the grounds that it also usually entails a dualism 
grounded upon a putative theory-neutral observation language that ignores the "hermeneutical 
circle". This now leaves me with the task of exploring a 4th "methodological subculture" 
which arises out of these foregoing dialogues. This alternative will be the subject of Chapter 
III.
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Notes to Chapter II
1. My use of the term  "methodology" here is similar to M organ’s (1983) usage in that it 
refers to various attem pts to create a system of "rules and protocols" for the 
form ulation of "valid" knowledge (ibid., p. 21-23).
2. There are of course exceptions to this, notably Douglas (1976), Fielding and Fielding 
(1986) and Sayer (1984).
3. Perhaps the most significant issue is that the understandable popularity of Burrell and 
M organ’s original text (1979) as a heuristic and analytical tool has led to its relatively 
uncritical application to other substantive areas; such as M anagem ent Accounting 
(Hopper and Powell, 1985), and Personnel M anagement (Gowler and Legge, 1986), 
and hence the exaggeration of these problems.
4. Burrell and M organ’s methodological dichotom y appears to be sim ilar to Douglas’s 
view that it is possible to some extent to distinguish between two m ajor 
methodological orientations to social research - that of "controlled experim ental 
quantitative procedures" and those of "fieldwork" (1976, p. 3) or "natural direct 
observation" (ibid., p. 11). Elaborating upon Burrell and M organ’s dichotom y and to 
some extent following Douglas (ibid., p. 15) it is probably more appropriate to 










Exploration via analysis of
causal relationships and
Explanation by "Covering Laws" (etic)
Generation and use of quantitative 
data.
Use of various controls so as to rule 







Exploration of subjective meaning 
systems and explanation by "understanding" 
(emic)
Generation and use of qualitative data.
Commitment to ‘naturalism’ to minimise 
reactivity of subjects to research 
procedures.
Highly structured research methodology 
Method adopts a variable position on continuum according to its emphasis upon above characteristics: e.g.
Minimum structure to ensure 2, 3 and 4 
(and as a result o f 1)
A. Laboratory Experiments C. Analytical Surveys
B. Quasi Experiments/ Action Research
D. Ethnography
5. A recent example of an attempt to span the structural-interpretational or macro­
micro divide, through the application of a multi method approach, is provided by 
Godsland and Fielding (1985) in their study of children convicted of "grave crimes". 
In this they attempted to choose a method suitable for exploring the structural aspects 
of the problem and another for capturing the elements of meaning to those involved. 
Therefore they used observation and in-depth interviewing with subjects as well as 
quantitative analysis of a larger sample taken over a larger period of time so as to 
analyse the structural context of the phenomenon. In a more recent text Fielding and 
Fielding (1986) argue that such a "dualist" view
"if not full-blown ‘triangulation’, is to be recommended, in order to 
meet the need to describe the detail of the foreground against the 
design of the background".
(P. 35).
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6. In many respects an example of this kind of concern may be found in the Plowden 
Commission (1967), particularly in regard to their analysis of the role of parental 
values in education, and the socio-economic context of that role.-
7. As shall be shown, the assumption of the possibility of a theory-neutral observational 
language is crucial both to a pluralist and a positivistic research programme. As 
Hindess points out:
". . . it makes possible a very precise conception of the testing of 
theory against observation. The testing of theory against irreducible 
statements of observation is equivalent to a direct comparison between 
theory and the real. If they fail to correspond then the theory is false 
and therefore may be rejected."
(1977, p. 18)
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"The only real guarantee we have against licentious thinking is the 
circumspressure of reality itself, which gets us sick of concrete errors, 
whether there be a trans-empirical reality or not".
(James, 1909, p. 72)
Introduction
Throughout Chapter II I have attempted to elucidate the ontological and epistemological 
parameters of three distinctive "methodological subcultures". Each has been found to be 
unacceptable on various different grounds while each shares one unacceptable theme; the 
implicit or explicit presupposition of a theory-neutral observational language. As I have 
argued, since all observation is imbued with the theories and values of the observer (see 
Fleck, 1935) by the action of our "cognitive processing mechanism" (Unwin, 1986 p. 300) and 
thereby is "theory-laden" (Hanson, 1958) and "perceptually relative" (Johannson, 1987), this 
can only lead to the consideration that any notion of Cartesian certainty is chimerical (see 
Mulkay, 1979). But where does this "Hansonism" (Phillips, 1987), or postmodernism 
(Lyotard, 1984), leave me? Does it create a relativistic position that concludes, with 
Cartesian anxiety (Bernstein, 1983), that there are no good reasons for preferring one theory 
to another? A position that paradoxically cannot cope with its own critique of itself 
(Johannson, ibid., p. 14) and thereby, lapses into an incoherence, in a similar manner to 
positivism, as demonstrated by Hindess (1977). To consider this apparent impasse it is 
necessary to return to some of the issues raised by Burrell and Morgan (1979) regarding 
ontology.
Burrell and Morgan (ibid) appear to agree with Dummett’s (1978, p. 17) proposal, that 
inquiry entails a choice between the incommensurable alternatives of "realism" or "anti­
realism", in their dichotomisation of assumptions about the ontological status of social reality
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into realism and nominalism. Thus one might interpret this as meaning that if nominalism 
(anti-realism) is rejected as untenable the only alternative ontological stance is that of 
realism, and vice versa. But this would be too simplistic for it ignores what might be seen 
as intermediate position which might provide an escape from the immanent problems of 
relativism while eschewing the essentialist belief that, whatever difficulty there might be, the 
world is cognitively transparent, or representable in schema, and hence proposes a claim to 
the possibility of foundationalist knowledge about the world.
A 4th Methodological Subculture?
The version of realism described by Burrell and Morgan relies upon the unproblematic 
existence of a theory neutral observational language. Allied to this is the assumption that 
sociological knowledge had advanced, and will continue to advance, by closer approximation 
to the "real" i.e. that different theories may be evaluated in terms of whether they match the 
"facts". This implies a correspondence theory of "truth" - that we can rely upon direct 
sensory experience to unproblematically mediate our relationship with the empirical world 
and thereby provide the foundations of knowledge of that world. In this fashion "truth" is 
established by confrontation with empirical world, a confrontation enabled by the 
operationalisation of theoretical concepts into rules or indicators that enable observation.1
But Husserl (1965; 1970) in his critique of positivism, while by no means denying the 
existence of a world prior to consciousness, focuses attention upon how statements about 
external social reality (the act of knowing and the objects that are known) are products of 
human consciousness that can never escape that consciousness. Thus realists who posit a 
theory neutral observational language are indeed mistaken, in that their own knowing what 
reality is, is in many respects an outcome of their own subjectivity. Thus they tend to 
confuse their own taken-for-granted conceptions of reality with reality itself. Indeed their 
whole premise that reality is an observable set of facts that may be neutrally investigated via 
a correspondence understanding of truth, is itself a theoretical postulate. Indeed it is a
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theoretical postulate derived from the maintenance of a dualism between subject and object, 
of observer and reality - a consideration that has been increasingly questioned, not just in the 
social sciences but also, in such fields as biology (see Dean 1979) and quantum mechanics (see 
d’Espagnat, 1971; Heitler, 1965; Wheeler, 1974). This in turn has led to speculation about 
classical physics’ assumptions about the independence of reality.
For instance Gribbin (1985) demonstrates how conceptions of physical reality are the 
artefacts of observation and measurement procedures; hence . . .
". . . the electron is created by our process of experimental probing . . .  no 
elementary phenomenon is a phenomenon until it is a recorded phenomenon 
. . ." (ibid., p. 210).
In a similar vein Barnes (1974) disputes notions of scientific objectivity as he focuses upon 
how science is a social activity and that particular communities of scientists work within 
particular accepted wisdoms and rules which influence not only how they engage with the 
"world" but also inevitably influence the criteria by which scientific statements are evaluated; 
for
". . . ‘true’ like ‘good’ is an institutionalised label used in sifting belief or 
action according to socially established criteria."
(1974, p. 66)
Thus reality, and how we come to know it, has to be taken to be problematic. But this does 
not inevitably lead us to a nominalist ontology, or, necessarily to Husserl’s advocation of 
suspension of belief in reality through "phenomenological reduction". Rather it can lead us 
to a version of realism (which shall be termed "problematical Realism" for want of a better 
terminology) that is significantly different from the polarity defined by Burrell and Morgan 
(which hence forward will be termed naive objectivism).
This intermediate position is considered by Margolis (1986). Following Putnam (1981) he 
considers that there is a clear connection between "metaphysical realism" - that the structures
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of the world do not depend upon the cognitive structures of human investigators - and 
"epistemological realism" - the view that such structures are cognitively accessible to those 
investigators. For Margolis much of realism embraces both aspects and hence anti-realism 
remains incommensurable, as presupposed by Dummett (ibid.) and latent in Burrell and 
Morgan (ibid). But despite this traditional interweaving of metaphysical and epistemological 
realism, and although the latter necessitates prior acceptance of the former, the acceptance 
of the former does not necessarily entail the latter. As Margolis points o u t . . .
" . . .  We must see that there is no difficulty in admitting a mind-independent 
world while at the same time admitting that our cognitive powers extend only 
to a ‘textualised’ world . . ."
(ibid., p. 283)
So for Margolis it is entirely possible to consistently consider that there are mind- 
independent objects b u t . . .
". . . the question of what ‘objects does the world consist oF can only be 
meaningfully asked within a theory or description".
(ibid., p. 282)
Thus, while K ant’s noumena remain" unknowable, since we cannot make the world "in itselF 
cognitively transparent,
"we are nevertheless able to formulate a valid description of the w orld-as-it- 
impinges-on-us"
(ibid., p. 214)
This theme is taken up by Sayer in his critique of idealism as he attempts to describe this 
median position between naive objectivism and nominalism (his idealism):
" . . .  the common experience of being taken by surprise by what we see given 
us reasonable grounds for supposing that the world is not our own invention, 
even though the concept ‘world’ undoubtedly is. Whenever we open our eyes, 
the objects before us are not thereby pre-determined, although the way they 
are seen is certainly conceptually (and physiologically) mediated. Like naive 
objectivism, idealism collapses thought and its objectives together, only the 
direction of its reduction is different."
(1984, p. 65)
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This leads Sayer to consider that, strictly speaking, we can never justifiably claim to have 
discovered "absolute" truth about matters of fact and hence our knowledge must be admitted 
to be fallible. However in debating naive objectivism Sayer points out that it is important 
not to be drawn into relativism since . . .
. .  knowledge and the material world are different kinds of thing it does not 
follow that there can be no relationship between them; and . . .  the admission 
that all knowledge is fallible does not mean that all knowledge is equally 
fallible"
(ibid, p. 65)
Through rejecting an absolute correspondence theory of truth, Sayer inevitably raises the 
question of how we make some accommodation between notions of degrees of fallibility and 
truth? That is, how do we know that some knowledge is less fallible than other knowledge? 
In dealing with this problem Sayer rejects the inherent relativism of a consensual or 
conventionalist route typical of ethnomethodology, for the error of conventionalism is
. . to ignore practice and the structure of the world. By default, the 
apparently fickle, haphazard character of knowledge and truth as matters for 
convention that can be changed at (the collective) will is projected on to the 
object of knowledge which then assumes a structureless, entirely malleable 
character. Not only is knowledge apparently whatever we care to make it, the 
world is too."
(ibid., p. 66)
Rather he replaces the correspondence and conventionalist theories of truth with that of 
"practical adequacy"
"To be practically adequate, knowledge must generate expectations about the 
world and about the results of our actions which are actually realised . . .. 
These expectations in turn are realised because the nature of the associated 
material interventions . . . and of their material contexts. In other words, 
although nature of objects and processes (including human behaviour) does 
not uniquely determine the content of human knowledge, it does determine 
their cognitive and practical possibilities for us".
(ibid., p. 66)
This does not however lead to a correspondence notion of truth - for this ignores the crucial
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distinction between "thought objects and real objects" (ibid., p. 67). As Sayer concludes
". . . the world can only be understood in terms of available conceptual 
resources, but the latter do not determine the structure of the world itself. 
And despite our entrapment within our conceptual systems, it is still possible 
to differentiate between more and less practically-adequate beliefs about the 
material world. Observation is neither theory-neutral nor theory-determined, 
but theory laden. Truth is neither absolute nor purely conventional and 
relative, but a matter of practical adequacy . . . .  Theory does not order given 
observations or data but negotiates their conceptualisation, even as 
observations."
(ibid., p. 78)
Therefore by adopting a "problematical realist" position regarding the ontological status of 
social reality, as well as embracing Laing’s ontological discontinuity, a new methodological 
subculture rises. This involves commitment to explanations that include reference to 
conditions of action, such as material resources or social structures that members recreate 
through everyday activity - however such recreation is by no means automatic, but rather a 
creative process whereby historically specific structures that constrain and enable action are 
reproduced or accomplished albeit rarely intentionally. A position accepted by Sayer -
". . . although, in everyday life, we can get by without being aware of these 
necessary structural conditions and their historically specific and hence 
transformable characters, we can hardly ignore them if we want to penetrate 
beyond the limited horizons of common sense."
(ibid., p. 102)
Therefore, explanations of events must include analysis of the "necessary" conditions (i.e. 
structures) for action as well as the immediate causes of events, such as actors reasoning and 
interpretive procedures, if they are to avoid, on the one hand, relativism and ultimately 
solipsism, or determinism and reification on the other. It follows that by adopting a 
"problematical realist" position any ensuing research eschews firstly, the methodological 
ethnocentrisms of both positivism and ethnomethodology, and secondly, any version of 
methodological pluralism grounded in naive objectivism. Although the rejections of the 
former are based upon several criteria relevant to each orientation, including tendencies 
either for determinism and reification or relativism, an underlying rejection may be 
discerned that relates to both the latter and the former: the implicit or explicit assumption
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of an ontologically privileged position expressed in terms of a possibility of a theory neutral 
observational language. Essentially the position adopted here is that it is impossible for the 
sociologist to avoid imposing his/her own "version of reality", in some way, upon his/her own 
observations.
To recapitulate, the methodological orientation arising out of the tensions created by what 
is considered to be unwarranted in the three orientations perviously discussed would concur 
with Rorty’s position which he explicates through his metaphor of the "Eye of the Mind" 
(1979, p. 46). Here he implies that a correspondence theory of truth relies upon the putative 
wisdom that the truth of competing theories may be judged through criteria that appeal to 
the accuracy of their correspondence with the "facts" of an external objective reality mirrored 
in our own "Glassy Essence". However the assumed dualism between, or separation of, 
subject and object,and the consequent assumed independence of the external world, may be 
questioned by drawing attention to the influence of the epistemic subject upon what is seen 
and known. Accordingly, the possibility of a neutral observational language through which 
we may engage with the world, as well as any foundationalist aspiration to the possibility of 
absolute objective knowledge, must be open to question. This inevitably leads to an anti 
foundationalist conception of knowledge - that all knowledge is socially constructed and it 
is by no means unambiguously determined by "nature".2 Clearly the recognition of this 
awesome epistemological issue may result in various attempted solutions.
One course, as with ethnomethodology, is to retreat into the relativism of a consensus theory 
of truth. As I have attempted to show, the irony of such a project is that this in turn depends 
upon a latent appeal to the possibility of "pure description" of subjects’ constructions of the 
"external world", presumably enabled by the observer’s capacity to become some kind of 
neutral vessel of cultural experience. In other words the ethnomethodological project is in 
many respects dependent upon the possibility of a neutral observational language enabled 
by "bracketing" and hence, in its own terms, is contradictory. An alternative course for anti 
foundationalism leads to the relativism of Feyerabend’s "anything goes" (1975). However, 
an escape from this relativistic abyss, of Feyerabend’s methodological anarchism, is provided
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by Sayer’s notion of "practical adequacy".
A practically adequate theory of truth is clearly derived from the American Pragmatist3 
Tradition as illustrated by the prior quote from James (1909), and as articulated by Dewey 
(1929, 1938) as well as to some extent by Pierce (1931-58).4 This is particularly in respect 
of the consideration that what is taken to be knowledge is a socially constructed artefact 
created so as to aid humans in their practical endeavours of "settling" (Dewey, 1938) 
problematic situations. In regard to this, Dewey related inquiry to problem solving and since 
the goal of inquiry may be a transformed situation, rather than an abstract truth, he 
abandoned the concept of truth for the concept of "warranted assertibility". Indeed, for many 
pragmatists, to talk of a "pragmatist notion of truth" is somewhat of a misnomer because they 
associate the term "truth" with correspondence theory. As noted by Law and Lodge (1984, 
p. 71), perhaps in a pragmatist context it is better to talk of the "workability" of knowledge, 
but as they go onto point out, this is a bit of a verbal quibble - it is appropriate to talk of 
truth in the pragmatist tradition provided that it is clear that truth implies "workability" and 
not correspondence. Thus the pragmatist concept of truth implies that the testing of a theory 
pertains in some respects to ascertaining the theory’s practical relevance in leading to the 
resolution of human problems as well as enabling the pursuit of human purposes. From this, 
it follows that practical adequacy, with its attempt at self-conscious integration of theory and 
practice, correlates with Fay’s (1975) conception of a "critical social science" . . .
". . . that arises out of the problems of everyday life and is constructed with 
an eye towards solving them . . . while taking explicit cognisance of its 
political ramifications"
(pp. 109-110)
For Fay, a critical social science has the following characteristics (ibid., pp. 93-95). Firstly 
it has a commitment to an interpretive stance regarding the importance of human 
subjectivity. Secondly it is committed to uncovering the "system of social relationships" that 
constrain and enable action. Finally it is built upon the view that what is to count as truth 
is related to how well theory informs practical interventions and actions.
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However included in the notion practical adequacy is the fallibilism of Pierce that contends 
that since knowledge cannot be created to mirror reality, the possibility of error can never 
be ruled out. More recently a similar point has been articulated by Verges.
". . . If there is no Archimedean Fulcrum outside of language, culture and 
history, this is not to imply that rationality is to be replaced by propaganda 
and brute force. It is rather to recognise that epistemic authority, like moral 
authority, is entirely embedded within historically conditioned communities 
of language-users. To be sure once we set aside the need to hypostatise an 
extra-human metaphysical presence against which to match up truth 
claims,the resulting conception of rationality will be fallibilist to its core." 
(Verges, 1987, p. 322)
Therefore knowledge can only help humans "deal" with the exigencies they experience and 
in this it is inevitably fallible. The acceptance of fallibility by Sayer and the American 
Pragmatists is remarkably similar to Lenin’s (1973b) contention that knowledge at any 
instance is only an approximate reflection of an independent objective world. At the same 
time Lenin also considered that absolute truth was possible and that scientific progress could 
be seen as socially determined, relative and approximate milestones on the road to knowledge 
of nature. This in many respects parallels Pierce’s conception of the ultimate "final 
agreement" and likewise is rather inconsistent with the notion of fallibility. However the 
similarities between branches of "Marxist" thought and American Pragmatism, and by 
implication, practical adequacy, are not surprising for
". . . Marx was much closer to the American Pragmatist thinkers than to his 
European predecessors, what he represented may be described as a political 
pragmatism - in order to discover whether our ideas are true, we must act on 
them"
(Remmling, 1973, p. 143)
Here Remmling is articulating a particular interpretation of Marx in regard to truth. Indeed 
it is possible to identify several different interpretations of Marx in a debate which 
encompasses many of the issues discussed in this work. For instance Binns (1973), in posing 
the question "what sort of thing is truth for Marxist theory? and in what way is Marxist 
theory true?", constructs a taxonomy of Marxist answers to these questions.
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Firstly he identifies the solution of "Positivistic Marxism". This Binns associates with the 2nd 
International and thinks that it originated in the work of Engels, Plekanov, Bukharin as well 
as in aspects of Lenin. In this Marxism is exempted from relativism as it is considered as a 
means for acquiring objective knowledge which occurs as an undistorted reflection of reality. 
As such it is on par with Newton’s and Darwin’s science, sharing with them the same 
criterion of truth - correspondence with an as yet uncategorised ‘nature’ through the "usual 
experimental testing" (ibid., p. 3). Such a perspective is clearly articulated by Engels . . .
" . . .  just as Darwin discovered the law of organic nature, so Marx discovered 
the law of development of human history . . . Marx also discovered the 
special law of motion governing the present-day capitalist mode of production 
and the bourgeois society that this mode of production has created . .  .. Such 
was the Man of Science."
(1968, p. 429)
Therefore this solution asserts the ontological and epistemological primacy of matter/concrete 
materiality and
". . . in doing so it has to cite methodological procedures such as verification 
or falsification according to which Marxism is scientific."
(ibid., p. 8)
Secondly Binns identifies "Structural Marxism". Again this to some extent originates with 
Engels and has, in its present form, taken on the methodological features of writers such as 
Levi-Straus. But for Binns it is Althusser who most clearly articulates a "structural Marxism" 
in which
". . . Marxism is thought of as being true in virtue simply of its 
comprehensiveness and lack of contradictions in respect of its though and 
structure alone."
(ibid., p. 4)
Sayer (1981, p.6) comments that the above position is an outcome of the "shattering of 
innocence" that has arisen through the radical undermining of empiricism by the rejection of 
the doctrine of the theory neutrality of observation. This has often produced in radical
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circles a move towards idealism in the form of conventionalism in that the
..  abandonment of the dangerous innocence of certainty in knowledge based 
on experience has given way to possibly more dangerous views in which 
knowledge is believed not to be subject to any extra-discursive checks . . (ibid., p. 6)
Thirdly Binns identifies "Practical/Interventionist Marxism”.5 Unlike "positivist" and 
"Structuralist" Marxism, which accept the possibility of a neutral scientific explanation of 
external reality, this solution considers Marxist theory to be scientific due to its capacity to 
enable us to interact with world in ways hitherto unknown to us. Thus
"an idea is material not because it is about atoms and physically, but because 
. . . of . .  . its actual power to influence, change and control social behaviour 
absolutely irrespective of the content of the idea."
(ibid., p.5)
For Binns, within this position . . .
" . . .  objective truths are not uncovered so much as created. It is in the act of 
us making them that they become revealed. To attempt to reveal them first 
and only later to act is to remove practice from where it belongs - within the 
theory of knowledge."
(ibid., p.5)
The above view is based upon a conception of the external world that avoids . . .
". . . a superficial or unscientific view of the external world, which is taken 
to be a given . . . reality is infinitely richer than this . . . reality contains 
alongside the existants, coexisting in time, the world of potentials . . . [this] 
. . . provides the ontology for a world in which practice dominates and 
determines reality".
(ibid., p. 5)
The above is the position adopted by Binns and clearly is one close to the position being 
developed in this work. As such it is worth exploring further by reference to the position 
adopted by Kolakowski (1969). Kolakowski distinguishes between "Positivist Marxism" and 
an alternative orientation to truth that is highfy influenced by the American Pragmatist 
Tradition. However, unlike Binns, Kolakowski considers Positivist Marxism to be practice
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orientated as it involves
. . the effectiveness of human actions as a criterion with whose help it is 
possible and justifiably to verify the knowledge we need to undertake any sort 
of activity."
(ibid., p. 59)
But human practical activity does not create truth but merely ascertains its occurrence. This 
is because Positivist Marxism treats truth as a
". .. relation between a judgement or a sentence and the reality to which it 
refers; at the same time this relation is independent of man’s knowledge of it", 
(ibid., p. 59)
The alternative "Pragmatic Marxism" is much more anthropocentric and thus idealist in that 
ultimate appeal to reality is excluded in that "usefulness" actually creates truth rather than 
being a tool for establishing truth.
Kolakowski attempts a synthesis of those two approaches to truth by an appeal to Marx’s 
epistemological writing in the "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts". For Kolakowski 
there is an external reality independent of and resistant to human activity. But this is a 
"thing in itse lf  that remains unknowable. Such "things in themselves" do not have conceptual 
counterparts, rather our objects of knowledge - "things for us" - are constituted by
" . . .  active contact with the resistance of nature . . .  [ that] . . .  creates knowing 
man and nature and his object at one and the same time . . ."
(ibid., p. 75)
In other words, "things for us" are constructed by human practical considerations and to
search the Transcendental Ego is a pointless occupation. As Kolakowski states,
" . . .  to ask how the world would be seen by an observer whose essence was 
pure thinking and whose consciousness was defined exclusively by a 
disinterested cognitive effort, is to ask a barren question, for all consciousness 
is actually born of practical needs, and the act of cognition itself is a tool 
designed to satisfy these needs".
(ibid., pp. 64-65)
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So it follows that the truth or falsity of beliefs cannot be determined in abstraction from the 
relationship to human needs. However it is important in developing this ontological and 
epistemological position, to clearly differentiate this orientation from conventionalism and 
its ensuing relativism. As Kolakowski’s synthesis implies, while reality does exist, we can 
never ultimately know it because of our lack of a theory neutral observational language; but 
this is not to say that our engagements with the external world are completely determined by 
us - that observation and reality are theory determined and hence the criteria of truth is 
consensus about the theory. Rather as Margolis (1986) recognises, there are features of an 
experienced world that,
". . . however affected by our diachronic effort to understand and influence 
the nature of things, are . . . so robust that theory cannot ignore them and 
cannot erase them . . .  as mere artifacts of itself'.
(ibid., p. 5)
So we might say that our inevitably fallible understanding of the world may be in many 
respects largely up to us, but this understanding is bounded by the tolerance of reality (see 
also Collier, 1979): as such, as far as the content of the understanding, anything does not go.
The implications of this issue are further elaborated by Arbib and Hesse (1986). As implied 
by Margolis (ibid) and Kolakowski (ibid), they argue that the constraints and tolerance of 
spatio-temporal reality provide a feedback procedure that enables evaluation of the pragmatic 
success of our "cognitive systems" and "networks of schemas". This pragmatic criterion 
prevents "science" becoming purely an intersubjective representation of, and consensus about, 
social realities (ibid., p. 8). These schemas allow people to make sense of the world - a world 
so complex that it is amenable to many interpretations. Indeed our values, needs and social 
arrangements influence our selection from the myriad of interpretations possible and those 
selected become ideologically constituted as taken-for-granted conceptions of 
society/nature that guide and direct further inquiry. These recipes of knowledge become 
reified and perceived as independent of the producer (£). Such a state of affairs appears to
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have implicitly caused Levi-Strauss to comment that,
"Every civilisation tends to over-estimate the objective nature of its own 
thought and this tendency is never absent."
(1966, p. 3)
For Arbib and Hesse (ibid) while such schemas are not individualistic but are socially shaped 
and constructed, they are not socially determined (ibid., p. 128): obviously this would lead 
us back to the relativism of conventionalism. Rather since such schemas are guides for 
action, the pragmatic criterion operates consciously and unconsciously as people adjust and 
reject schemas when the expectations they support are violated (see also Barnes, 1977). Thus 
schemas are ideological, pragmatic and interest-laden in the sense that they are enmeshed 
with our knowledge of how to interact with the world, and such knowledge of ‘how to’ is,
" .. . intertwined with our knowledge (not necessarily conscious) of our goals 
and what we wish to achieve through our actions".
(Arbib and Hesse, 1986, p. 129)
Law and Lodge (1984) attempt to further investigate these social processes through the notion 
of "workability" which is derived from Hesse’s "network" theory of knowledge. In this they 
argue that if a theory/network allows people to interact satisfactorily with their environment 
it is then reinforced, but if, from the stance of the theory, their environments become 
unpredictable and uncontrollable then the theory is undermined and is likely to change, 
(ibid., p. 125).6 Therefore they argue that the workability of a theory is a function of the 
purposes to which it is used. Analytically they distinguish two main purposes for which 
knowledge is constructed. Firstly there is an interest in "natural" accounting: the prediction 
and control of inanimate, animate and social phenomena. This practical knowledge,
" . . .  may be used to describe, account for and explain events with the aim of 
interacting more satisfactorily with the natural and social worlds".
(ibid., p. 131)
97
Secondly there is an interest in social control and legitimation - this knowledge is used 
retrospectively after an event, it justifies and defends actions and presents them as necessary 
or natural outcomes of particular contingencies. As such,
. . it may be used for social advantage; to defend, legitimate or rationalise 
a general social position which is advantageous to the person deploying or the 
audience using the knowledge . .
(ibid., p. 131)
But for Law and Lodge all knowledge has implications for both of these spheres in that,
". . . knowledge directed primarily by an interest in social control and 
legitimation normally achieves its aim in part by successful prediction, 
accounting, or control . . . [whereas] . . . knowledge directed by a primary 
concern with prospective accounting has additional social implications." 
(ibid., p. 131)
This brings us to an important point; that from a practically adequate orientation, all
knowledge is interest laden, and ultimately is tied to the fate and status of the carrier
group(s): this includes one’s own and not just other members’ knowledge of which one
happens to disapprove. Now this raises a crucial issue alluded to by Arbib and Hesse, and
by Law and Lodge. Essentially a practically adequate theory of truth does not imply some
kind of, what Horkheimer (1974) would term, "instrumentalism"; which refers to the
adequacy of specified means for the attainment of predetermined ends and in so doing
precludes any reference to those ends. Instrumentalism, with its variants, such as Popperian
"social engineering" (Popper, 1967, p. 445), or what Fay has categorised as "policy science"
(1975, p. 14), are evidently based upon a latent ideological identification with the problematic
of those with the power to implement prescriptions or "reforms" (see Benton, 1977, pp. 40-
41). Such "sublimation of bias" (Reed, 1985, p. 45) would be eschewed for
" . . .  there would be no question of impartially acting in terms of the necessary 
conditions of social life, or letting ‘the truth’ about a social order determine 
political actions; of neutrally seeking what is the case and structuring social 
life in accordance with it, in just the way that men build bridges in terms of 
the ‘givens* of the natural world as revealed by natural science . . . Instead, 
there would be at least the implicit recognition that choosing to act in 
accordance with the basic structural components of one’s society was itself an 
act of at least implicit political evaluation."
(Fay, 1975, p. 106)
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But perhaps the commitment of a practically adequate approach, to an open recognition of 
the role of the epistemic subject and the consequent socially constructed nature of 
knowledge, should lead to more than Fay’s minima of "implicit recognition" of "implicit 
political evaluation". Rather practical adequacy should follow Morgan’s (1983) consideration 
that since the pursuit of knowledge is a particular form of human action that has an 
essentially social nature
". . . it must be understood as being as much an ethical, moral, ideological 
and political activity as it is an epistemological one".
(ibid., p. 393)
Therefore if  there are any criteria available for evaluating knowledge, they do not relate to 
some quest for absolute knowledge rather than they relate to
"the way knowledge serves to guide and shape ourselves as human beings - to 
the consequences of knowledge, in the sense of what knowledge does to and 
for humans".
(ibid., p. 393)
Therefore practical adequacy’s commitment to avoiding a naive objectivism, the latter being 
an outcome of the maintenance of a subject-object dualism, necessarily leads to explicit 
consideration of how different socially constructed bodies of knowledge, including its own 
theoretical schemata, are practically adequate in terms of varying, implicit and explicit, 
ethical, moral, ideological and political purposes.
It follows that research embracing practical adequacy maintains the necessity of reflexivity 
on the part of the researcher, as well as through fallibilism, uncertainty. Knowledge, as such, 
is evaluated in terms of how successfully it may guide action towards the realisation of 
particular objectives which are the expressions of particular interests. This necessarily leads 
the researcher to reflect upon the partisan nature of his/her research with regard to its human 
consequences; this, as Carchedi (1983) argues, inevitably involves questions such as, for 
whom and for what does the resultant construction of reality proffer aid? Therefore, social
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scientists should accept their (albeit fallible) role as that of partisan participant in interest­
laden dispute and divest themselves of allusions to the role of detached observer (see Chubin 
and Restivo, 1983) occupying an ontologically privileged Archimedian position.
Clearly there is now a need to fully explore the methodological implications of the ontology 
and epistemology that has been laid out in this Chapter.
A Fourth Methodological Subculture
This orientation arises out of the tensions that have been created by the foregoing dialogue 
with, and rejection of, elements of the other three approaches. In this it emphasises the 
following issues. Observation is neither theory neutral nor theory determined, rather it is 
theory-laden. It follows that an appeal to a correspondence theory of truth and any notion 
of science as a passive isomorphic representation of reality, must be rejected. This does not 
entail a flight into a consensus or conventionalist position. The latter is rejected on two 
grounds. Firstly, its preclusion of extra-discursive criteria of truth leads to relativism, and 
thereby nihilism (Hesse, 1980); secondly, in some contexts, such as ethnomethodology, the 
underlying the form that conventionalism takes entails a putative theory neutral observational 
language that enables the search for Husserl’s transcendental ego. This, expressed as 
"bracketing", ironically, leads the researcher to assume an ontologically privileged position vis 
a vis subjects.
Instead, what is promoted is a "problematic realist" position with an emphasis upon the 
importance of subjectivity (i.e. recognition of Laing’s ontological discontinuity). Thus there 
is a necessary focus upon what has been called the precategorical foundation of social life 
in terms of the socio-historical "concreteness" in which humans act out their lives 
(Lichtmann, 1970, p. 77) which provides some "feedback" correction (Barnes, 1977, p. 10) 
from our encounters with the tolerance of reality. A second focus is upon human 
subjectivity - the creative activity of human beings in which versions of reality upon which
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action is founded are constructed by individuals and groups (Levebvre, 1972). In this way,
". . . we are led to confront the enormity of scope of the dialectical relation 
between human beings and the social world. Human beings are active beings 
situated in a world which is not only economically structured but also socially, 
politically and intellectually structured. We receive, interpret and internalise 
a language and culture, are constrained by, construct and re-act back upon an 
objectified social world".
(Smart, 1976, p. 63)
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However, because of the lack of a theory neutral observational language,others’ subjectivity 
and the pre-categorical foundations of social life as "things in themselves", remain ultimately 
unknowable - for actors or researchers - as objects of knowledge they are "things for us". 
It follows that any appeal to the ontological privilege of Platonic Realism is unwarranted for 
there is no epistemological break between common sense knowledge, reason, and science (see 
Barnes, 1977, pp. 24-25) -  all are pragmatic and deal with the phenomena within the 
"shadows of the cave". Indeed occupants of this "subculture" would concur with K rohn’s 
observation that the separation of science and everyday common sense is probably a social 
and institutional artefact
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. .  cultivated by an intellectual priesthood with an interest in obscurity and 
in prestige . .
(1977, p. 84)
Thus the only criterion for assessing that knowledge and reason is their practical adequacy. 
The question now is, what status does this position accord to the different research 
methodologies - and how does it influence their application?
The Status of Verstehen
A critical element in this orientation to empirical research is that the
"observing social scientist has to be able first to . . .  penetrate hermeneutically 
the form of life whose features he wishes to analyse and explain"
(Giddens, 1976, p. 158-159)
Therefore methods that enable immersion of an observer in a form of life (ibid., p. 149) and 
thereby allow for such penetration become vital in enabling research. As such, ethnography 
necessarily has a central role in this orientation.
However within this methodological orientation verstehen through ethnography is not about 
the observer getting inside actor’s subjective experience and thereby in some fashion 
"intuiting the essences and essential relations" therein (Bruyn, 1970, p. 285). As has been 
shown, because of the lack of a theory neutral observational language, it is, as Laing (1967) 
would say, impossible to fully experience the experience of another without disturbing the 
other’s original perceptions. Rather, the best that might be achieved is a "second order" 
description. That is, as Geertz (1973) points out, only the subject his/herself can make a 
"first order" description, observers’ descriptions are inevitably "second order" in that they are 
cast in terms of the constructions "we imagine", the actors we study, place upon what they 
live through (see also, Agar, 1986). For Poggi (1983) these second order descriptions enable
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the interpreter to "make sense" of the subject’s actions. Therefore as Geertz suggests, if the 
researcher is to generate a description he/she must begin with his/her own interpretations of 
what actors are "up to" and then systematise those interpretations. Thus observers’ accounts 
of subjects’ phenomenological worlds are attained
" . . .  through logical analysis, not psychological empathy and as such they are 
imputed to actors rather than ‘discovered’ in their consciousness"(Bauman, 1984, p. 17)
These accounts are therefore not re-statements of social meanings, rather they are 
imputations placed and expressed within the context of the logic of an academic discipline - 
Sociology (Silverman, 1970, p. 223). These conceptual schemes therefore express a "double 
hermeneutic"
"relating to both entering and grasping the frames of meaning involved in the 
production of social life by actors, and reconstructing those within new frames 
of meaning involved in technical and conceptual schemes".
(Giddens, 1976, p. 79).
The Status of Nomothetic Methodologies
From this point of view the nomothetic methodologies that have been "borrowed" primarily 
from the natural sciences, such as laboratory experiments, analytic surveys and quasi 
experiments that attempt to take the logic of experimentation out of the laboratory (Diesing, 
1972; Douglas, 1976, p. 19) have a problematic status. This is because .those methods have 
been developed in accord with evaluate criteria that emphasise detachment, objectivity, 
systematic data collection and reporting, and in which control over independent, dependent 
and extraneous variables is demanded. As Burgess comments . . .




While the possibility of "full encapsulation" for any methodology is exceedingly questionable, 
the basic point made by Burgess is apposite - for if one evaluates social science research 
methods in terms of criteria derived from the extent they allow immersion of the observers 
in a "form of life" (Giddens, 1976, p. 149), that is . . .
. . when one’s concern is the experience of people, the way they feel, think 
and act, the most fruitful, reliable, complete and simple way of getting that 
information is to share their experience. All other methods are indirect and 
are therefore compromises, to be accepted only when made necessary by 
practical constraints."
(Douglas, 1976, p. 112)
However this is just to evaluate nomothetic methodologies in terms of their appropriateness 
to uncovering actors’ subjectivity and it begs the question - what of their appropriateness to 
investigating the "necessary conditions" of action - Lichtmann’s socio-historical 
"concreteness"? For notional researchers working within this methodological orientation the 
most significant problem in using many of the nomothetic methodologies (e.g. analytical 
surveys) to investigate this domain is their frequent reliance upon quantification through the 
use of statistical procedures to test theoretical propositions. Usually the application of 
quantitative procedures is taken to be unproblematic - this is particularly the case with 
positivism.
For the Positivist, the whole point of selecting theoretical concepts, operationalising them and 
thereby often measuring the ensuing variables, is to enable the hypothetico-deductive testing 
of the casual imputation in the theory through confrontation with empirical observables, 
often in a probabilistic fashion and usually, though not necessarily, involving Popperian 
falsificationism. Usually this project will entail the mathematization of theoretical concepts 
during the operationalisation process. This is particularly important in the analytical survey. 
This is because mathematization not only enables the researcher to establish the existence or 
not of statistically significant covariance between the notional dependent and independent 
variables, but also it enables the statistical "control" of theoretically extraneous variables that 
constitute rival hypotheses to the one(s) under test. Thus in the analytical survey, statistical 
"controls" and manipulation replace the physical "controls" of "ideal" experiment. In the case
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of the latter, experimental and control groups allow for the ruling out of rival hypotheses, 
while the actions and interventions of the researcher enable analysis of the relationship 
between the notional dependent and independent variables. Therefore in the analytical 
survey statistical "controls" are developed so as to maintain the logic of experimentation in 
research where the "ideal" experiment is either impossible or undesirable.
At this juncture it is necessary to point out that from the point of view of this fourth 
methodological orientation, because it is based upon the rejection of the possibility of a 
theory neutral observation language, it questions the positivists’ correspondence assumptions 
regarding the outcomes enabled by quantification. However rather than ruling out these 
endeavours per se it asks whether or not the knowledge produced through quantification is 
practically adequate? As Sayer demands (1984, p. 159), what must objects and processes be 
like for mathematical representations of them to be practically adequate? '
In order for inferential statistics, such as multiple regression, to be used in theory testing, 
ratio, or at the very least interval scales of measurement must be applied to the "objects" and 
processes of interest. But meaningful ratio/interval scales can only be developed for "objects" 
and processes that are "qualitatively invariant", that is
" . . .  they can be split up and combined without changing their nature. We can 
measure them at different times or places in different conditions and know 
that we are not measuring different things."
(ibid., pp. 159-160)
Therefore where it cannot be assumed that isomorphism between the structure of 
mathematics and the objects/processes of interest exists, because of the latters’ qualitative 
variance (due, for instance, to their context dependence), such phenomena are not suitable 
for quantification. Hence quantification may involve such severe data degradation that the 
"subject" may be lost and practical adequacy consequently threatened. This is demonstrated 
by Sayer in a discussion of the quantitative analysis of processes.
Sayer (1984, pp. 159-161) argues that whether or not a process may be adequately represented
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mathematically depends upon the type of change involved. In this Sayer distinguishes 
between three types of change: the purely quantitative, that reducible to movement of 
qualitatively unchanging entities, and finally that which is irreducibly qualitative. According 
to Sayer, the first and second types may be mathematicized since the change involved affects 
only the external relations between objects and mathematical operations can 
unproblematically model such physical changes. In the case of the third type, quantitative 
measurement would not be practically adequate because mathematical operations such as 
subtraction or addition might destroy or create "emergent powers" in the processes: powers 
that cannot be reduced to the constituent elements in a phenomena. (Sayer in this context 
refers to the example of the ability of water to put out fire [ibid., p. 109] even though the 
constituent elements are flammable).
However, even if  it were possible to assume that quantification of our objects of interest 
were possible there are another set of problems that make methodologies reliant upon 
quantification problematic. In order for theories to be practically adequate they must be a 
guide for action. In order to be guides for action they must explicate causal relations. But 
mathematical modelling is essentially acausal in that it can only identify measurable change 
and not causation. It can only identify covariances between variables - insufficient grounds 
for assigning a causal relationship. In order to avoid the possibility of a spurious correlation 
and thus to provide descriptive meaning so as to explain the causal mechanism (and to 
provide the direction of causation between correlated variables), qualitative analysis is 
necessary. For Sayer mathematical models are therefore implicitly based upon a conventional 
theory of causation that focuses only upon regular sequences of events and does not attempt 
to reveal causal mechanisms. This state of affairs might be adequate when research is 
undertaken embracing correspondence criteria, however when practical criteria are 
important, explication of causal mechanisms must be available and this is a qualitative 
domain.
Essentially causal inference is beyond the domain of statistical or mathematical technique. 
Fundamentally, methodologies involving such techniques provide no means of rejecting,
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including or explaining, correlated variables in a causal model without recourse to an appeal 
to theory and "logic". Ultimately they depend upon qualitative analysis through the act of 
interpretation that involves much sense-making on the part of the researcher: sense- 
making that cannot be included in the empirical testing format (see Gadamer, 1976, p. 11).
At the level of description, descriptive statistics might offer some limited supplementation 
to qualitative analysis - however when this concerns subjectivity serious problems arise. As 
Psathas (1973) contends, because first-order (everyday) conceptualisations are inexact and 
non mathematical then second order (sociological) conceptualisations should be affected . .
". . .  we cannot expect to quantify and mathematise our descriptions of social 
phenomena if their nature (essence) is qualitative and non-mathematical".
(ibid., p. 10)
Indeed, there is the likelihood that in attempting to create mathematical second order 
conceptualisations of reflective human consciousness, sociologists could distort actors’ 
subjectivity to the extent it becomes objectified, its subjective quality abandoned, and thus 
produce reification and not understanding, and hence ultimately deny its importance.
A New form of Methodological Pluralism
Thus a new version of methodological pluralism arises where methods that allow for "second 
order" hermeneutic penetration are accorded greater centrality in the research process, rather 
than their often peripheral role (as demonstrated in the earlier discussion of the first kind of 
methodological pluralism) of controlling human subjectivity as an extraneous variable. The 
form that nomothetic methodology takes, changes. Firstly it has the main role of 
investigating "necessary conditions" of action. But its utility when used without hermeneutic 
penetration via idiographic methodology would be disputed since it would reify action. 
Secondly quantification is taken to be problematic. From this perspective notional adherents
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would probably agree with Whitley’s contention (1977) that "mathematical analysis and modes 
of expression" have become an "epistemic standard" for many sciences because of their desire 
to emulate physics which due to its apparent operational success has been seen to be the 
"exemplar of scientificity". This has encouraged particular styles of work into which 
neophytes are inducted through training and socialisation. But from the orientation of this 
version of "methodological pluralism", instead of a lack of quantification being taken to 
signify epistemological and theoretical immaturity (as positivists might claim) its utility for 
social science is questioned. Therefore nomothetical methods that do not depend upon 
quantification, but which attempt to maintain the logic of causal analysis that underlies 
experimentation, would be deemed appropriate for analysis of the necessary conditions that 
constrain or enable action.
For instance, quasi or field experimentation when combined with ethnography would be 
considered suitable as a means of developing theory that explicates causal mechanisms while 
giving due significance to actors’ subjectivity.
An example of this kind of approach, though not couched in these terms, is provided by 
Schein (1987). Although expressed in terms of consultant-client relationships and action 
research, Schein articulates an approach to organisational analysis that is primarily qualitative 
and quasi-experimental. This he terms the "clinical approach" and compares it with 
ethnography (ibid., pp. 51-54). In doing so he argues for criteria of validity that are similar 
to practical adequacy. For instance, he argues that rather than basing criteria of validity 
upon member validation as in some forms of ethnography, the "clinicians" ultimate validation 
test is whether or not they can predict the results of a "constructive" or "facilitative" 
intervention. Where Schein and practical adequacy appear to part company is around Schein’s 
apparent lack of consideration of the interest-laden and partisan nature of the "clinician’s" 
endeavours.
Alternatively, theory might be developed through a primary empirical focus upon 
hermeneutical penetration through appropriate idiographic methodology, with causal analysis
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using secondary data sources, or "unobtrusive measures" (see Webb et al., 1966), being applied 
to "uncover" the socio-historical circumstances that might constrain or enable actors’ 
meaningful construction of action. In either approach, the intention would be to provide a 
theoretical account that is adequate both at the level of meaning and at the level of causality. 
However the test of the "truthfulness" of this account would ultimately be only available 
through practice. It follows that within this account there must be explicit attention to 
providing an emergent guide to practical action that enables the pursuit of particular interest­
laden human purposes through active intervention in the social world (see Figure II). 
Therefore, as Fay comments, there is an
". . . explicit recognition that social theory is interconnected with social 
practice such that what is to count as truth is partially determined by the 
specific ways in which scientific theory is supposed to relate to practical 
action . . . Thus the theories of such a science will necessarily be composed 
of, among other things, an account of how such theories are translatable into 
action . . ."
(1975, p. 94-95)
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FigurellI
Summary: 4 Methodological Subcultures
KNOWLEDGECONSTITUTINGASSUMPTIONS
NON-RECOGNITION OF LAING'S ONTOLOGICAL DISCONTINUITY
RECOGNITION OF LAING'S ONTOLOGICAL DISCONTINUITY
NaiveObjectivism 1Methodological Ethnocentrism 1 e.g. Positivism
2
Methodological Pluralism 1 e.g. Structural Functionalism
1 Subject-Object dualism 1 Subject-Object and Subject- Subject dualisms
2 Correspondence Theory of Truth(Foundat i onalist)
2 Correspondence Theory of Truth (Foundationalist)
3 Only Experimental and Experimentally derived methods appropriate
3 All research methods have their particular uses
ProblematicRealism 3Methodological Pluralism IIe.g.: Critical Social Science
1 Subject-Subject duality
2 Practical Adequacy or work­ability as a theory of truth
3 All methods appropriate, but a qualitative emphasis
Nominalism 4Methodological Ethnocentrism II e.g. Ethnomethodology
1 Subject-Subject dualism
2 Consensus/Convent i onalist theory of truth. (Sometimes a hidden foundational ism through a subliminated correspondence theory)
3 Only Methods enabling verstehen appropriate e.g. certain forms of ethnography
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Conclusion
In this and the prior chapter I have attempted to identify four distinctive methodological 
subcultures. Each is characterised by a commonly held fabric of knowledge - constituting 
interpretive systems involving shared metatheoretical assumptions that encompass particular 
values, beliefs and mores. This endeavour parallels Barnes’ (1977) contention that science is 
a collection of subcultures which modify and influence the perceptions and judgements of 
members through their socialisation into habitual cognitive orientations that are derived from 
metatheoretical assumptions upon which members rarely reflect. In two senses this lack of 
reflection may be supportive of a subculture. Firstly, such a process might serve to lower the 
status and credibility of the knowledge in question. Secondly scientific practice might be 
paralysed if researchers were continually reflecting upon the various assumptions etc. that 
were embedded in the epistemology of their disciplinary matrix. However this lack of 
philosophical awareness and introspection can also incapacitate a defense of the scientific 
subculture when faced with an attack that exposes its subliminated constitutive assumptions 
and values: as illustrated by Nelkin’s (1977) example of the "creationist's" foray against the 
"evolutionisms" banner of value freedom. Perhaps it is the last subculture identified in this 
chapter that is most capable of weathering such a storm.
Thus each subculture has its own procedural cannon of rules through which ascriptions of 
truth are accorded -  indeed the truth produced within each position perhaps has
" . . .  no status apart from the ways it can be achieved by being intelligible
according to some rule guided way of looking . . ."
(McHugh, 1971, p. 321)
These various methodological subcultures and their various philosophical positions are 
illustrated in Figure III. The 4 methodological subcultures are grounded upon different 
ontological assumptions and perhaps should be seen as attempted methodological solutions to 
the tensions arising out of competing answers to questions about what are we studying? As 
such, the 4 subcultures that are identified are by no means an exhaustive taxonomy of
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possible solutions. For instance, a different version of realism could be identified, such as 
"transcendental realism" (Bhaskar, 1979) - that would lead to further subcultures. 
Alternatively, the consideration that it is impossible to have a theory-independent 
apprehension of reality might not necessarily lead to a practically adequate theory of truth; 
rather, as Rescher (1973) points out, it might lead to advocation of a coherence theory of 
truth. This position, clearly much more anthropocentric than practical adequacy, argues that 
ultimately all that can be achieved is the construction of a coherent and systematised 
conceptual and theoretical scheme about reality.
It follows that the scheme, represented by Figure III, should be seen as an heuristic device 
that helps us understand why particular methodological strategies are adopted. These 
considerations illustrate how empirical research is not simply a choice about method alone, 
rather as Morgan points out, research is a "mode of engagement" that is part of a wider 
process.
". . .  that constitutes and renders a subject amenable to study in a distinctive 
way. The selection of method implies some view of the situation being 
studied, for any decision on how to study a phenomenon carries with it certain 
assumptions, or explicit answers to the question ‘what is being studied?’"
(1983, p. 19)
Morgan’s conceptualisation of research as a "mode of engagement" is clearly illustrated by the 
variety of ways in which ethnography is used to investigate the social world (see Hammersley 
and Atkinson, 1983, p. 1) that rather than existing as a predefined methodology of
". . . establishing rapport, selecting informants, transcribing texts, taking 
genealogies, mapping fields, keeping a diary and so on . . .  it is not these 
things, techniques and received procedures that define the enterprise. What 
defines it is the kind of intellectual effort it is."
(Geertz, 1973, p. 6)
In these two chapters I have not been primarily interested in merely reproducing the self- 
justificating assumptions of these subcultures. Instead I have overtly argued a case for the 
adoption of subculture 3 (see figureHl), an argument that undoubtedly is fallible, but, as has
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been argued, all knowledge is fallible. In many respects, subculture 3, and my argument for 
it, arises out of the tensions created by a dialogue with, and rejection of, some of the 
particular solutions adopted by other identified subcultures. Morgan’s notion of "modes of 
engagement" with the world imply choice from alternatives by the "engager". In this respect 
the strategy adopted only makes sense in terms of what the engager considers acceptable or 
unacceptable in those alternatives. Hence choice of mode of engagement may be seen as an 
outcome of the foregoing dialogues with the possible alternatives - a dialogue that often 
remains tacit or latent in many researchers’ accounts. The objective of these chapters has 
been therefore to make this dialogue explicit and thereby epistemologically contextualise the 
ensuing theoretical and empirical research.
Thus to summarise, I have now developed:
1. an ontology, epistemology and methodology that will guide my "mode of engagement" 
with shop steward subjects;
2. from that ontology and epistemology I have developed a way of "looking" at and 
understanding commonsense knowledge and knowledge that advocates for itself the 
award of scientific status, e.g. accounting.
It is however necessary, before proceeding with (1) and (2), to further develop my 
perspective regarding knowledge/science by consideration of aspects of the historical 
development of western science and western scientific rationality. Hopefully this will serve 
to historically contextualise accounting knowledge and its consequent role(s) in disclosure. 
But at the same time it is necessary to consider the immanent critique and elaboration of my 
pragmatist perspective that derives from the work of Jurgen Habermas.
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Notes ,to Chapter III
1. Here I have only alluded to the verificationist format for correspondence theory. 
However there is an alternative that derived from Popper’s (1972 a) concept of 
falsificationism which attempted to bypass the problem of induction (see also 
Lessnoff, (1974) who adopts a similar position). Although Popper argues against the 
possibility of verification and consequent absolute or universal knowledge he shares 
many of the problems associated with verification, especially the assumption of a 
theory neutral observational language. Essentially Popper’s position leads to an 
epistemological Darwinism in which the "fitness" of an hypothesis to survive a test is 
an indicator of its acceptability. In this way Popper puts forward an inverted form 
of correspondence theory which depends upon testing a theory so as to see the extent 
it does not fit the facts. Therefore, despite his denial, Popper’s falsification still 
depends upon the possibility of putative, though refined (see Mulkay, 1979, p. 54) 
‘theory neutral observational language (see; Giddens, 1976, pp. 140-141) and 
therefore shares with verificationists the problems identified earlier, particularly the 
problem of epistemological incoherence and self-refutation (see Hindess, 1977, 
Chapter 6).
2. For instance, following Law and Lodge (1984), the notion of a theory neutral 
observational language is impossible precisely because of the operation of "coherence 
conditions" - the modes and means by which people perceive and classify phenomena 
- some of which are culturally transmitted (ibid., p. 75) through socialisation.
3. In most respects, pragmatist thought might be traced back to Ancient Greece; 
especially the criticisms of the Sceptical School of Plato’s distinction between 
"episteme" (genuine knowledge) and "doxa" (knowledge only suitable for the conduct 
of everyday practical affairs). Particularly Carneades (213-129 BC) argued that 
Plato’s quest for a foundationalist episteme was an unrealisable Chimera because of 
the inherent fallibility of sense-experience and considered that all that might be
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achieved was knowledge that might guide human practice and purposes. (See Rescher 
(1977) for a fuller debate).
4. Essentially Peirce is ambiguous over these issues. According to Rescher (1978), 
although Peirce is a pragmatist he varies in his theory of truth. It appears that at times 
he implies that truth is an outcome of pragmatic efficiency but at other times he 
appears to put forward almost a mixture of correspondence theory and consensus 
theory. The latter two, and their tensions, are illustrated by Peirce’s conception of 
the "final agreement" or the "final irreversible opinion". This concept implies an 
accretional view of scientific progress that is for the Rescher "Proto-Popperian" (ibid., 
p. 52) in its epistemological Darwinism. In this, scientific inquiry converges upon the 
"final irreversible opinion" as it exhaustively accumulates additive knowledge of a 
finite substantivtdomain. This is illustrated by the following . . .
"Reality, the fact that there is such a thing as a true answer to a 
question, consists in this, that human inquiries, human reasoning and 
observation, - tend toward the settlement of disputes and ultimate 
agreement in definite conclusions which are independent of the 
particular standpoints from which the different inquirers may have set 
out; so that the real is that which any man would believe in and be 
ready to act upon, if his investigations were pushed sufficiently far." 
(Peirce, Collected Papers, Vol. 8, p. 41: Quoted in R e|her, 1978, p. 20)
However Rescher (having noted the popularity of the above view in Peirce’s day), 
argues through reference to Kuhn, that such a view is untenable and must be 
abandoned. This is because science progresses not just "additively" but in large also 
"subtractively" (ibid., p. 29). Hence . . .
" . . .  progress lies not in monotonic accretion of more information but 
in superior performance in prediction and control over nature", 
(ibid., pp. 29-30)
Indeed as Rescher points out, it appears that Peirce, in latter life, called into question 
and abandoned his earlier view of accretional scientific progress and the possibility 
of final agreem ent. . .
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. .  if we think that some questions are never going to get settled, we 
ought to admit that our conception of nature as absolutely real is only 
partially correct. Still, we shall have to be governed by it practically; 
because there is nothing to distinguish the unanswerable questions 
from answerable ones . .
(Peirce, Collected papers Vol. 8, p. 43: Quoted in Resher, 1978, p. 38)
As Rescher comments, this admission opens
". . .  a gap between empirical and noumenal ‘reality’ that reopens the 
Kantian issue that Peirce’s theory of truth was designed to close", 
(ibid., p. 39)
5. Binns also distinguishes a fourth "solution which he terms "Totalistic Marxism". This 
derives from Lukacs and stands half-way between the notions of structure and 
practice, in that one of its most important premises is t h a t . . .
". . . contradictions or antimonies of thought are the most crucial 
instances necessary reflections of a contradictory life being lived by 
the thinker of these contradictions rather than his contingent inability 
to find the ‘right ’ way of thinking. Hence the need for action, for to 
eliminate the unsatisfactory thoughts, one must first change the 
unsatisfactory life in which they are embedded."
(1973, p. 6)
Thus "truth" is only available in potential, and realisation only, after unsatisfactory 
life (capitalism) is eliminated, in and by the proletariat after world socialist 
revolution. This conception of knowledge according to Barnes (1977) is particularly 
problematic since in order to evaluate existing knowledge Lukacs was obliged to 
delineate how it deviated from the future ideal form. But from his own account 
Lukacs could not trust his own consciousness to do this comparison or to hope to have 
access to "ideal forms" so as to know them: - to do this he has to have become an 
oracle and we have no reason to think that he did.
6. See also Schein (1984) for an example of this process in the establishment, and change 
of, organizational subcultures.
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A PRAGMATIST INTERPRETATION 
OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF KNOWLEDGE/SCIENCE
"It is by witness of works, rather than by logic or even observation, that truth 
is revealed and established. Whence it follows that the improvement of man’s 
mind and the improvement of his lot are one and the same thing."
(Francis Bacon, quoted in Farrington, 1964, p. 93)
The systematic and mathematical expression of Aristotelian geocentrism to be found in 
Ptolemy’s "Almagest" did not prevent the paradigmatic revolution which occurred with the 
advent of Copernican heliocentrism (Kuhn, 1957). This eventual supercedence is not 
however readily explicable in terms of empiricist refutational criteria (see: Hanson, 1958). 
Such change might not be conceived as the defeat of religious dogma, with its Inquisition to 
enforce compliance, by the "progressive" forces of the new "rational science". Indeed Galileo, 
when forced to recant his public adherence to Copernican astronomy in 1633, had in 
empiricist terms made dubious extrapolations from the available data to support his 
heliocentric "violation of the senses" (Galileo, 1953, p. 328). Also as Feyerabend’s (1975) 
examination of Galileo’s arguments in defence of Copernicus demonstrates, the latter’s 
success did not depend upon "rationalism" but upon a cornucopia of subterfuge and 
propaganda. Rather the demise of Aristotelian ideas appears to be more related to the 
declining utility of his teleological explanation of nature (in terms of natural order) due to 
the changing intellectual, social and economic conditions of 16th and 17th century Europe 
(Doyat and Harris, 1986, p. 30).
Aristotle’s conception of "natural order" endowed a passivity and submissiveness on the part 
of "man" to nature’s vagaries. But the new science, as for instance advocated by Bacon, 
entailed within it a moral imperative that "man" must recover his dominion over nature which 
he had lost in the "Fall". This involved a divorce of science from the teleology of much 
theology. While Bacon perceived his scientific enterprises as constituting the truest form of 
religious worship, he considered that it had to be conducted in a way that excluded the 
mixing of secular and religious knowledge - that path led to errors in philosophy on the one
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hand, and the other, heresy (see Rattansi, 1972 pp. 13-14). But Bacon’s moral outrage in 
regard to Aristotle’s philosophy was in many respects a result of his consideration that its 
teleological basis prevented practical application of new ideas to the benefit of humanity 
(Farrington, 1964, p. 30). Therefore Bacon’s emphasis on the necessity for science to provide 
knowledge for the control of nature stands in sharp contrast to Aristotle’s position, that 
knowledge of nature was an end in itself. This new science of Bacon . . .
" .. . prefigured in the new astrology and magic of Renaissance magi seeks to 
shift the primary focus of scientific attention away from contemplatively 
perceived truth to the goal of mastery over nature. The pursuit of truth is no 
longer disinterested; the interest is in increasing man’s ability to dominate and 
control. Knowledge is sought and valued to the extent it confers this ability."
(Tiles, 1987, p. 301).
For Tiles (ibid.) this interest in prediction and control confers knowledge that is primarily 
knowledge of "laws of action". It demands a move away from Aristotelian knowledge 
expressed in terms of immutable dispositions and tendencies to a knowledge base derived 
from the discovery of the physical regularities which notionally determine events in nature 
and this in turn allows for the prediction of, as well as active intervention in and 
manipulation of, those events, epistemologically and methodologically expressed as 
experimentation and the rejection Of prior mystical and magical traditions. In sum Bacon 
argued for a rigid separation of religious and secular knowledge with a Hermetic insistence, 
suitably expurgated of magical elements, upon the importance of experience and 
experimentation for the study of nature. Thus Bacon’s desire for "dominion over things" was 
the basis of the new science. For Mendelsohn (1977) it was to replace truth by authority and 
relevation with truth from experience and experimentation. This would enable the 
uncovering of "laws of action" and "primary elements of nature" (Rattansi, 1972 pp. 16-17) 
and entailed explaining and acting upon nature.
Tiles proceeds to argue that two important value-laden components heralded this birth of 
modern science. Firstly there was a re-orientation from disinterested contemplation of the 
cosmos to active involvement with the world - a concern for material well-being no longer 
being despised but rather being perceived as expressive of human dignity. Secondly, through
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engagement with the world "man" can demonstrate how "he" is set apart from it by virtue of 
an intellect that transcends it. Thus a subject-object dualism that distances "man" from "his" 
object of manipulation is invoked. As Tiles points out,
". . . it is this which continued to feed the conception of the objectivity of 
scientific knowledge as consisting in disengagement, as being disinterested, 
not materially conditioned, and hence as value free . . ."
(ibid., p. 306)
Thus arose an empiricist maxim, suitably articulated by Bacon in the Novum Organum, that 
demanded that all preconceived notions and opinions
" . . .  be abjured and renounced with firm  and solemn resolution, and the 
understanding must be completely freed and cleared of them, so that access 
to the kingdom of man, which is founded on the sciences, may resemble that 
to the kingdom of heaven, where no admission is conceded, except to children
ti
(Bacon, quoted in Feyerabend, 1975, p. 46)
Paradoxically, in this way, the intellectual conceit and illusion of what is now termed a 
subject-object dualism was born out of the interest-laden concern for power over nature.
For Ratansi (1972) it was mainly after Bacon’s death that his ideas began to have an impact, 
albeit in a modified form. For instance, Boyle, while sharing both Bacon’s desire to recover 
the power over nature that had been lost in the "fall" and his commitment to empiricism, 
eschewed the residues of animism in Bacon’s programme by drawing upon a mechanical 
conception of nature derived principally from Descartes and Gassendi.
At this juncture it is interesting to conjecture that perhaps some impetus to the proliferation 
of the "new science" epitomised by Bacon’s attacks upon Aritotelean teleology came from or 
gleaned support from, the spread of certain forms of protestantism, particularly Calvinism. 
Perhaps the Calvinist theology of the "predestined elect", which lead to an almost neurotic 
striving to demonstrate that one had God’s "grace" through worldly success on the part of the 
believer (see Antony, 1977; Weber, 1967), could only help to provide a fertile ideological
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milieu for the propagation of a science based upon active intervention in the world, while 
conversely engendering a rejection of science based upon "natural order" (see Jones, 1965). 
Also since the new science, because of its anti-authoritarian and anti-elitist features (Van 
Den Daek, 1977), constituted a challenge to established secular and religious authority, it 
might have consequently appealed to marginal religious and social groups in whose interests 
such change might operate. Concurrently, the social, cultural and political ramifications of 
the Reformation perhaps encouraged
". . . the growth of the secular sphere of life and the legitimation of its 
concerns, combined with the breaking of the clerical monopoly of intellectual 
roles [which] promoted a practical orientation unfavourable to the 
contemplative rationalism enshrined in Aristotelianism."
(Rattansi, ibid., p. 6)
Moreover as Mendelsohn (1977) observes, the positions of the new science come from similar 
segments of society as the nascent capitalist class. Indeed . . .
". . . the vision they proposed of achieving human dominion over nature and 
mastery over things was in perfect harmony with the needs of the new 
capitalism and nascent industrialism."
(ibid., p. 16)
However this is not to imply a determinist or a functionalist relationship between the needs 
of capitalism and the development of the "new science". The relationship is much more 
complex. According to Mathias (1972) it is evident that a link existed between scientific 
innovation and technical application at the "level of intention". He argues that professional 
scientists (e.g. Boyle, Wilkins, Richardson and Babbage) acknowledged that at least part of 
their role was to aid industry where possible. Accordingly the draft preamble to the statutes 
of the Royal Society ran:
"The Business of the Royal Society is to improve the knowledge of natural 
things, and all useful arts . . .  by experiment."
(Quoted in Mathias, 1972, p. 61)
For Mathias it is not just at this level of intention at which a link might be perceived, but
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also in the actual innovations that took place particularly in medicine, ballistics, navigation, 
distilling, and textiles technology. However through reference to cross-cultural comparisons, 
particularly with China, Mathias points out that while scientific knowledge might constitute 
a precondition for technical advance, it does not necessarily provide an "operational impetus" 
(ibid, p. 67). Other non-technical factors - social, political, economic, legal and 
entrepreneurial, influence whether or not scientific knowledge becomes translated into 
practical technologies. However, despite this complexity, Mathias concludes that a link did 
exist but it was in the form of a reciprocal relationship . . .
". . . the developing Baconian tradition of the experimental science, the 
tradition of research based upon systematic experimentation . . . had closer 
links with the process of innovation than did advances in cosmology, 
mechanics or physics in the seventeenth century. And in such linkages science 
probably learned as much from technology as technology from science until 
the nineteenth century: scientists were much concerned with trying to answer 
questions suggested from industrial techniques."
(ibid, pp. 79-80)
However there is another aspect to these complex relationships, that has a bearing upon the 
form manifested by the "new science", that demands attention because of its ideological 
implications. This issue is elucidated by Merton (1970, pp. 136-138) when he argues that 
Puritan values that emphasised utility, rationality, empiricism and worldly asceticism 
contributed significantly to the rise of modern science in England. He considers that the over 
representation of Puritans amongst the founding membership of the Royal Society proffers 
evidence of the link between Puritanism and the modern scientific community. For Merton 
these values become embodied in the "Ethos of Modern Science", which, though now severed 
from the religious commitments of its "founding fathers", provides evaluative criteria 
essential for the production of "logically consistent statements of regularities", i.e. predictions 
(1973, p. 270). According to Merton these predictions are neutral and produce an objectivity 
the "precludes particularism" (ibid., p. 20).
Thus science is now guided by secularised evaluative criteria originally deriving from 
religious commitments which enable production and arbitration of knowledge claims when 
rigorously applied. This "ethos of modern science" is composed of four sets of "institutional
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imperatives": "Universalism", the principle that scientific truth is dependent upon pre- 
established impersonal criteria; "communism", scientific truth is the product of social and 
international collaboration; and "disinterestedness" and "organised scepticism", that activities 
of scientists are subject to rigorous policing against fraudulent contributions.
Now while Merton might be criticised for being ambiguous about which historical period he 
is studying in elucidating his thesis, it is also possible to discern a more fundamental problem. 
Merton appears to be arguing that while modern scientific methodology and epistemology is 
in many respects an historical evolution of particular religious values, these values are 
functional to the advancement of science - they aid the search for "truth". Thus as he gives 
credence to the view that religious change ushered in a new scientific paradigm and thereby 
he accords science some socio-cultural status, Merton also proceeds to accord science an 
extra-socio-cultural status by implying that such values enable it to develop to a level that 
transcends social influences. This is because of the protection afforded by the originally 
value-derived standards now embraced by the scientific community.
As does Durkheim’s account (1938), as well as accounts stemming from particular positivistic 
interpretations of Marx (e.g. Rose and Rose, 1976), Merton’s account renders scientific 
activities as sociologically unproblematic, impervious to sociological critique and functional 
to the advancement of warranted knowledge. In this way he effectively "de-socialises" 
science despite starting from a socio-historical standpoint. However Merton’s 
characterisation of scientific activity seems to be based upon the depersonalised accounts of 
their own scientific practice produced by scientists at the level of public testimony, i.e. 
publication. These sanitised impersonal representations produced for public consumption not 
only "conceal but actively misrepresent" (Medawar, 1969, p. 169) the norms and processes 
actually involved in scientific practice. For instance Mulkay (1969) not only failed to find 
a strong commitment amongst scientists to a "scientific ethos", he also found an overt-flouting 
of Mertonian norms in practice, without sanction. This has led him to suggest that in 
practice such norms do not exist.
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Alternatively, M itroff (1974) in this study of "moon scientists" produces empirical evidence 
that suggests that scientists do indeed attempt to apply variants of the norms of the "scientific 
ethos" as standards for evaluating peers’ activity and as prescriptions for scientific practice. 
But M itroff also found that there exists "counter norms" which are applied in practice and 
which are essential to and functional to the furtherance of science (e.g. emotional 
commitment as opposed to emotional neutrality in regard to one’s own empirical research).
Generally it appears that Merton’s functionalist view of science demonstrates that he has been 
"duped" by scientists into accepting their interest-laden accounts of their own activities and 
has along with other sociologists, legitimised and scientised an ideology (Blume, 1974), thus 
protecting it from sociological analysis (Mendelsohn, 1977). At the same time perhaps 
Merton’s approach derived from, and is a means of defending, his own positivistic 
epistemology (Whitley, 1972). However this does not necessarily entail hypocrisy on the part 
of the scientist, rather, as Mulkay argues (1979, p. 72), the "norms of science" should not be 
seen as defining clear "social obligations" to which scientists conform. Rather these norms 
are . . .
". . . flexible vocabularies employed by participants in their attempts to 
negotiate suitable meanings fo r their own and others’ acts in various social 
contexts."
(ibid., p. 72)
Mulkay attempts to construct a sociological analysis of science. In thus attempting this 
project he demonstrates that in scientific practice scientists draw upon flexible symbolic 
resources that combine to create a variety of interpretations of "problems". However this 
variety is bounded and delimited by the social and technical culture that is shared by a 
particular problem-centred scientific community (ibid., p. 78). While the unorthodox might 
not be allowed a public forum for debate since their substantive and epistemological 
assertions are not perceived to be embraced by the accepted repertoire, the precise meaning 
of the orthodoxy has to be reestablished through symbolic negotiation particularly when new 
domains or problems emerge (ibid., pp. 78-95).
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Therefore it is necessary to replace the functionalism endemic in Merton’s thesis, by which 
he gives unwarranted status to scientists’ rationalised public renditions of their own practice, 
with a sociological perspective that does not take such accounts for granted. This perspective 
would reinforce the initially sociological orientation taken by Merton in his purported 
association between modern scientific and Puritan values by considering science as a socially 
contingent cultural product inseparable from the socio-historical milieux in  which it is 
generated - an orientation similar to that taken by Marx in the Grundrisse (1973, pp. 408- 
10).
Given the epistemological considerations I put forward in Chapters II and III, it is evident 
that while the tolerance of the "external" world exerts some constraint upon the conclusions 
and content of knowledge claims, it is apparent that there is no alternative but to consider 
that any body of knowledge, whether it has, or not, allusions to scientific status proclaimed 
within it, is conditioned by the social and historical contexts in which it arises (see Barnes, 
1974; Bloor, 1976). In these respects it acts as a cultural resource that enables the pragmatic 
and interest-laden interaction of humans with their "external" worlds. Despite the evident 
under determination by empirical observation, this cultural resource is often instrumentally 
progressive (see Hesse, 1980, p. xi).
In these respects, accounting as a constituted body of knowledge and received wisdoms into 
which practitioners are socialised, is not an exception. However before proceeding to 
"deconstruct" accounting in social, historical and epistemological aspects, it is necessary to 
further elaborate the interaction between human interests and knowledge so as to 




A review of the work of Jurgen Habermas is important since it appears to have a somewhat 
paradoxical relationship to the orientation developed so far in this thesis. As I shall attempt 
to demonstrate, Habermas’s approach might be interpreted as being supportive of this 
pragmatist account of the development of knowledge/science. Yet, concurrently, some 
aspects of his perspective and how he copes with particular epistemological issues, leads him 
to a position that is incommensurable with my pragmatism. Hence it is necessary to consider 
and evaluate the implications of this immanent critique for the position I have been 
attempting to develop thus far.
Habermas, reputedly the "principal architect of neo-critical theory" (Bottomore, 1984 p. 55), 
formulates a theory of knowledge mainly in his work "Knowledge and Human Interests" 
(1972) and "Theory and Practice" (1974a). For Burrell and Morgan(1979) this work is posited 
within the "Radical Humanist Paradigm" which expresses a concern
"with what may be described as the ‘pathology of consciousness’ by which men 
come to see themselves trapped within a mode of social organisation which 
they both create and sustain in their everyday lives. Radical Humanists are 
concerned with understanding the manner in which this occurs, with a view 
to setting human consciousness or spirit free and thus facilitating the growth 
and development of human potentiality."
(ibid., p. 306)
It is perhaps in this context that Habermas’s concern, to "counter the hegemony of science" 
(McCarthy, 1978, p. 1), should be located. Although Habermas’s theory is, on his own 
admission, incomplete, programmatic, fragmentary and provisional; and has been subject to 
much criticism (e.g. McCarthy, 1978; Keat, 1981; Craib, 1984); it is possible to distinguish 
elements conceptually useful to a discussion of the epistemology and history of accounting. 
Indeed its contribution to this endeavour may be all the more significant, since, generally the 
perspective articulated by critical theorists is by no means antithetical to the perspective I 
have embraced earlier, although it does contain incommensurable elements which are by 
implication a source of critique. Furthermore, as Smart (1976, p. 153-4) summarises, critical
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theory avoids reducing humans to object-like victims of externally constraining historical 
social facts, structures, or systems, while eschewing the limitations of subjectivist denial of 
the role of historical social factors and structures.
In "Knowledge and Human Interests" Habermas articulates a particular interpretation of Marx 
which, through reference to Marx’s consideration that "there will be a single science", infers 
that Marx’s work contains positivistic elements, and "scientistic misunderstanding"; 
specifically the intent to reduce the human sciences to natural science. Such an intent is 
considered by Habermas to be "astonishing",
". . . the natural sciences are subject to the transcendental conditions of the 
system of social labour, whose structural change is supposed to be what the 
critique of political economy as the science of man, reflects on." (1972, p. 46)
In this fashion, Habermas follows earlier members of the Frankfurt School (e.g. Marcuse) 
in considering that the potential of Marx’s work has been somewhat stultified by incipient 
positivism and that this derives from Marx’s exclusive emphasis upon work/labour as the 
distinguishing human characteristic.
From this portrayal of Marx’s epistemology, Habermas legitimises his concern to develop 
Marxism from a critique of political economy into critique of "scientism" (the reduction of 
knowledge, that is considered legitimate, to science (ibid, p. 4). This project includes a 
rejection of positivism in social science since positivism
" . . .  stands or falls with the principle of scientism, that is that the meaning of 
knowledge is defined by what the sciences do and can thus be explicated 
through the methodological analysis of scientific procedures." (ibid., p. 67)
Although Habermas’s rather deterministic interpretation of Marx is problematical (see O’Neil 
1972, p. 247 and Held, 1980, p. 391-2), his critique of the scientistic position and consequent 
exposition of his own theory of knowledge, that is the basis of this critique, are important to 
my purposes here. This is especially relevant because Habermas considers that the scientistic
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position largely arises from a correspondence theory of truth that obfuscates the relationship 
between "knowledge" and "interest" and presupposes the possibility of a theory-neutral 
observational language that reconstitutes an unproblematic reality for examination. These 
assumptions are usually inextricably linked to phenomenalism (e.g. Ayer 1946) which limited 
the objective-domain of sciences to entities that were immediately available to sensory 
experience. Such a conception of what constituted science flourished during the 
"Enlightenment" so as to expurgate metaphysical and religious "dogmas" from the realm of 
science. In some respects therefore, according to Habermas, they were to be welcomed, 
however they also created serious problems.
Initially it is important to note that, according to Habermas, knowledge is contaminated at
source. That is, positivism’s presupposition of a theory-neutral observational language
wneglects the influence of socio-cultural factors upon sensory experience. As a result positjsm 
lost any understanding of the effects of the epistemic subject upon what is known. 
Furthermore, this neglect allows positivists to attempt a separation of the normative, value­
laden and ideological from description of "what is". But
" .. . even the simplest perception is not only performed pre-categorically by 
physiological apparatus - it is just as determined by previous experience 
through what has been handed down and through what has been learned as by 
what is anticipated through the horizon of expectations".
(Habermas, 1974b, p. 199)
The above is intimately tied to Habermas’s theory of "knowledge-constitutive interests" which
" . . .  is an attempt to radicalise epistemology by unearthing the roots of 
knowledge in life."
(McCarthy, 1978, p. 55)
This project is based upon a rejection of the "objectivist illusion" which conceives the world 
as composed of facts independent of the subject. In many respects Habermas’s theory arises 
out of his critique of K ant’s (1972, Ch. 1-3) epistemology, in which he attempts to purge the 
Kantian concept of a transcendental subject and replace it with the object-constituting
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activity of epistemic human subjects. But on the other hand, Habermas contends that since 
Kant, because of the advent of scientism, epistemology as a critique of the meaning of 
knowledge had increasingly become considered
. . irrational in the name of rigorous knowledge".
(1972, p. 69)
His concern therefore is to overcome such "objectivist illusions" that conceal the processes 
by which knowledge is constituted. In this he attempts to reveal how human interests 
influence the subjects’ cognitive strategies and thus how reality is constituted and becomes 
an object of human action.
Essentially Habermas accepts the existence of a reality that is autonomous of human 
subjectivity and whose factual character imposes limitations upon human endeavours. But 
this "externality" can only become an object of human knowledge through the subject’s 
imposition of object-constituting epistemological "categories" (1974a, p.8), one of which 
expresses a fundamental interest in control. For Habermas, it is only through reference to 
fundamental interests that it becomes possible to understand, firstly, the criteria which are 
applied in considering what is to be taken to be "real" - objects about which propositions may 
then be constructed, and secondly, the criteria by which the validity of such propositions may 
be evaluated.
According to Habermas, an interest in control is rooted in a specifically human activity - our 
creative interplay with, and attempted control over, the natural, environment, i.e. 
labour/work. This is
". . . not only a fundamental category of human existence but also an 
epistemological category . . .. The category of man as a tool making animal 
signifies a schema both of action and apprehending the world."
(1972, p. 28)
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Again, Habermas is putting forward a particular interpretation of Marx’s epistemology, an 
interpretation that is commensurable with my own position. From this, he considers Marx 
to have identified only one possible dimension of the "conditions of the possible reproduction 
of human life" (ibid., p. 28), the other being language and communicative interaction. Thus 
Habermas breaks Marx’s conception of "sensuous human activity" (ibid., p. 26), (through 
which subjects regulate their material exchange will nature and thereby constitute a world) 
into two analytically distinct, but in practice interdependent, (i.e. Praxis, 1973, p. 186) 
components - labour/work and communications/social interaction. Therefore it is not 
labour/work alone that differentiates between animals and human beings, rather language and 
communication present further decisive distinguishing characteristics.
Hence Habermas identifies two "object constituting" epistemological categories, each of which 
involve specific interests and constitute the object-domains of two forms of knowledge.
"In the functional sphere of instrumental action we encounter objects of the 
type of moving bodies; here we experience things, events, and conditions 
which are, in principle, capable of being manipulated. In interaction(or at the 
level of possible inter-subjective communication) we encounter objects of the 
typeef speaking and acting subjects; here we experience persons, utterances 
and conditions which in principle are structured and understood symbolically."
(1974a, p. 8)
Therefore, deriving from specific human interests that developed contingently in the natural 
evolution of humanity, two forms of knowledge/science with their attendant object-domains 
(ontologies) may be identified. The first of these, empirical-analytical science, emphasises 
the interest of technical control grounded in material needs and labour, i.e. the "behavioural 
system of instrumental action" in which people encounter things etc. capable of manipulation. 
This interest in technical control over nature sets limits upon the epistemological/categorical 
framework and upon how nature is constituted as an object by the human species, and 
thereby places parameters upon the theoretical concepts of empirical analytical sciences. The 
second form of knowledge/science distinguished by Habermas is termed historical- 
hermeneutical science. This emphasises the "practical interest" of interpretation and the 
development of inter-subjective consensus and communicative understanding which are
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grounded in the ''species-universal" characteristic of language. This practical interest arises 
from the imperative of inter-subjective communication in which humans encounter other 
speaking and acting subjects, events etc. which have to be understood symbolically.
As stated, Habermas’s notions of practical and technical interests may be traced back to his 
dichotomisation of "sensuous human activity" as such, they are fundamentally related. For 
instance . . .
". . . hermeneutic understanding is designed to guarantee, within cultural 
traditions, the possible action-orienting self understanding of individuals and 
groups as well as reciprocal understanding between different individuals and 
groups . . .. When these communication flows break off and the inter­
subjectivity of mutual understanding is either rigidified or falls apart, a 
condition of survival is disturbed, one that is as elementary as the 
complementary condition of the success of instrumental action . . ."
(1972, p. 176)
Therefore technical and practical interests are crucial to species survival and are bound to the 
imperatives of human existence. However these cognitive interests
" . . .  determine the aspects under which reality is objectified and can thus be 
made accessible to experience to begin with. They are conditions which are 
necessary in order that subjects capable of speech and action may have 
experience which can lay claim to objectivity."
(1974a, p. 9)
Central to Habermas’s discussion of empirical-analytical science and its relationship to 
technical interest is an attempt at demonstrating the relationship between human activity and 
science. In this he largely follows Peirce’s notion that science formalises procedures necessary 
for understanding particular activities. Accordingly the knowledge generated by empirical- 
analytical science is a refined and systematised reconstruction of the learning processes 
relevant to purposive attempts at control over nature (i.e. instrumental action). This 
necessarily entails attempts at prediction and feedback control together with the subsumption 
of experienced phenomena under causal hypotheses. Therefore, in the empirical-analytical 
sciences
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. .  the frame of reference that prejudges the meaning of possible statements 
establishes rules both for the construction of theories and their critical testing. 
Theories comprise hypothetico-deductive connections of propositions, which 
permit the deduction of law-like hypotheses with empirical content. The 
latter can be interpreted as statements about the covariance of observable 
events; given a set of initial conditions, they make predictions possible."(1972, p. 308)
So for Habermas, empirical analytical science is orientated towards the production of data 
that is useful for the technical control of nature and "warranted" scientific knowledge 
becomes restricted to procedures that enable causal nomological statements. In a similar way 
Habermas attempts to reveal the relationship between historical-hermeneutical science(s) and 
practical interests in that they are structured so as to apprehend the meanings of actions and 
communications. The two object-domains which constitute empirical-analytical and 
historical-hermeneutical science are thus derived from objectifications of reality which
" . . .  we undertake daily from the point of view of either technical control or 
intersubjective communication" (1974a, p. 8)
Therefore, to summarise, Habermas considers that though there exists a subject-independent 
reality, this externally only becomes constituted as an object of knowledge for subjects when 
mediated by the "anthropologically deep seated interests" which determine the categories of 
the subject. These categories are thus generated out of the fundamental features of the 
human species. In other words, the object domains of the empirical-analytical and historical 
hermeneutical sciences are based upon regularly undertaken objectifications of reality which 
are determined by the technical interests of control and the practical interests of 
intersubjective communication. Through such objectifications external reality becomes 
accessible to the experience of subjects and "known". So far, the account articulated by 
Habermas reinforces and elaborates my own pragmatist position.
However Habermas presents a third form of knowledge/science to add to his taxonomy of 
knowledge/sciences derived from the cognitive interests shared by all by virtue of their 
being members of society. This is "critical science" which emphasises the liberation of 
humanity from natural and historical determination and dominance which prevent "rational"
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self-conscious reasoning and decision-making. This liberation apparently may/will occur 
through theoretical and practical enlightenment. In some respects, Habermas’s notion of 
critical science is illustrated by his dialogue with, and critique of, Gadamer (e.g. Habermas; 
1977).
Gadamer (1975) rejects, as mythological, the possibility of an ahistorical Archimedean 
position on the part of the observer/interpreter. He argues that any attempt at assuming the 
possibility of an "infinite, intellect" or "transcendental" position devoid of our own historicity, 
are self-delusions. Instead he articulates what amounts to a conventionalist view of 
truth/knowledge, as such, he considers understanding to be socio-historically context-bound. 
What Habermas specifically objects to in Gadmer’s perspective is the necessary outcome of 
his conventionalism that produces the contention that there is no independent ground from 
which it is possible to criticise on-going tradition. Habermas clearly thinks that this 
relativism leads to uncritical acceptance of the underlying consensus of tradition and 
consequently of repressive authority and power relations. This leads Habermas to reject a 
purely interpretive social science since it cannot critically grasp the power relations that are 
embodied in communicative processes and constitute the authority basis of tradition. Rather, 
what is required is an approach that neither reifies social action, due to a naturalistic 
reduction of action to responses "excited" by stimuli, nor which succumbs to relativism and 
through idealism and thereby sublimates "social processes to cultural tradition" (1977, p. 361). 
What must be added to Gadamer is critique! Unfortunately it is the nature of this critique 
that I find serious problems.
Critical science derives from an emancipatory interest that seeks to free people from 
fundamental domination - the systematic distortion of interaction and communication. This 
emancipation is achievable through self-understanding and self reflection. Therefore in 
order to liberate these rational capabilities, a particular type of knowledge, critical science, 
becomes necessary. The form of knowledge for this project is self-knowledge and 
understanding generated through self-reflection. This accomplished self-reflection
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. .  leads to insight due to the fact that what has previously been unconscious 
is made conscious in a manner rich in consequences: analytic insightsintervene in life . . ."
(1974a, p. 23)
In self reflection, knowledge for the sake of knowledge comes to coincide with the interest 
in autonomy and responsibility, indeed according to Habermas the pursuit of reflection 
knows itself as a movement of emancipation. Therefore, this knowledge demystifies 
previously unacknowledged distortion and enables an awareness to the link between 
knowledge and interest.
Unfortunately, Habermas is somewhat ambiguous in his exposition of the notion of 
emancipatory interest. Sometimes, as with practical and technical interest, he accords 
fundamental anthropological status to the emancipatory in that he considers it to take form 
in the medium of power along side the other interests’ formation in the mediums of work 
and language (1972, p. 313). Generally however, it appears that he considers the 
emancipatory interest to be "derivative" in that it can only exist under conditions of 
repression and ideological distortion. So while technical and practical interests are grounded 
in structures of action and experience; and as such arise necessarily form "invariant" 
imperatives of a socio-cultural life form dependent upon labour and language; in comparison, 
the emancipatory interest is derivative in that the actual historical form it takes is influenced 
by the stage of development of technical activities and by the conditions of symbolic 
interaction (1972, p. 211-12). Thus the emancipatory interest in knowledge:
" . . .  guarantees the connection between theoretical knowledge and an ‘object 
domain’ of practical life which comes into existence as a result of 
systematically distorted communication and thinly legitimated repression. The 
type of action and experience corresponding to this object domain is, 
therefore, also derivative."
(1973, p. 176).
For Habermas, the emancipatory interest can only develop to the degree that
". . .  repressive force, in the form of the normative exercise of power, presents 
itself permanently in structures of distorted communication - that is, to the 
extent that domination is institutionalised."
(1974a, p. 22)
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Thus critical science arises from an emancipatory interest and constitutes knowledge that 
seeks to free people from overt and covert forms of repression and distorted communication. 
In this, critical science unites aspects of the empirical analytical and historical hermeneutical 
sciences in that it has an interest in both nomological and interpretive knowledge within a 
project that enables self-reflective understanding. The product, critical theory, must be overt 
about its concern with emancipatory interests, where as the technical and practical interests 
in the other two categories of knowledge usually remain subliminated and hence unexamined.
Habermas considers psychoanalysis to be the only prototype of a science that incorporates the 
self-reflection of critical science(1972, p. 214). This is so because psychoanalysis involves 
"depth hermeneutics" (ibid., p. 218) in which distorted texts of the patients’ behaviour 
become intelligible to him /her through self-reflection. This self-reflection is enabled by the 
analyst’s attempts to interpret the patient’s speech, behaviour and experiences in terms of 
unconscious independent (i.e. causal) variables that are identified through reference to 
Freudian Theory of Neurosis. Through reflection upon the analyst’s interpretations during 
therapy the client may begin to see
". . . himself through the eyes of another and learns to reflect on these
symptoms as o ff shots of his own behaviour".
(ibid., p. 232)
In this fashion, the patient becomes liberated from the terror of his/her own unconscious, as 
previously suppressed and latent determinants of behaviour are revealed to the patient and 
thereby lose their power over his/her behaviour.
Although the accuracy and utility of Habermas’s exegesis of psychoanalysis does not 
specifically concern me here (see Keat, 1981; for a review); it is important to note that as a 
model for critical theory it has been subject to wide criticism. For instance, as Held (1980) 
argues, Habermas’s conception of enlightenment through psychoanalytical dialogue fails to 
specify how this may be transposed to the political and social domain. Specifically it fails to
143
specify how this may be transposed to the political and social domain. Specifically it fails to 
answer the question of what
. . political or social experience can be taken as analogous, on the level of 
social enlightenment, to transference with the psychoanalytical situation?"
(1980, p. 394)
According to Held, Habermas incorrectly elides ideological distortion with neurosis and this 
deflects attention from the specificity of each, that is, it deflects attention on the one hand
. . from the link of neurosis with the dynamic of desire and the necessity 
of repression in the achievement of self-identity, . . . and on the other, the 
connection of ideology with the clash of material interests".
(ibid., p. 394)
Furthermore, Held considers that Habermas ignores a fundamental problem with the 
applicability of the psycho-analytical model: how can a model for the analysis of essentially 
(usually) voluntary relationships between individuals become a methodological model for the 
analysis of relationships between classes and groups characterised by discrepancies in material 
and symbolic power, as well as divergent interests?
Therefore, it appears that Habermas’s consideration of psychoanalysis as a prototype for 
critical science is fundamentally misconceived. However this leads us to a further significant 
problem with Habermas’s work, his underlying conception of what constitutes "truth". 
Ironically it also leads us to some of the most important aspects of Habermas’s work, for the 
project I am undertaking here.
As has been illustrated, Habermas’s theory of knowledge-constitutive interests overtly 
challenges the banner of objectivism paraded by positivists in their articulation of 
"warranted" science and their understanding of the relationship between theoretical 
endeavours and practical application. Essentially Habermas’s challenge is upon two related 
fronts. Firstly it attacks the positivistic conception of a reality existing independently of the 
observers’ epistemology. Secondly it rejects the positivist claim that there exists a logical
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disjunction between judgements of fact - the domain of scientific knowledge, and normative 
predilections - which are confined to the practical application of knowledge. In regard to 
the former, Habermas argues that the object domains of forms of knowledge and their 
criteria of validity are constituted by interest. Therefore the objects themselves and the 
forms of knowledge of those objects that ensue are only knowable through the operation of 
an interest-laden epistemology - they do not represent an independent reality (reality 
inevitably remains mainly unrevealed though it does manifest itself through "the contingency 
of its ultimate constants", 1972, p. 33) and hence are not objective or neutral but rather are 
expressive of interest, an expression obfuscated by appeals to neutrality and value freedom. 
Therefore in regard to Habermas’ second point of attack, possible forms of practical 
application of scientific knowledge are determined by this latent interest-constitution. As 
McCarthy points out (1980, p. 295) there is a danger that, by tying all forms of knowledge 
to the imperatives of human life, Habermas effectively undercuts the notions of truth and 
objectivity and thereby encounters relativism. Therefore
". . . how can Habermas claim anything more than an interest-relative truth
for his own theories?"
(ibid., p. 293)
Habermas attempts to rescue his critique of knowledge as epiphenomena of social and 
historical conditions from the ultimate nihilism of relativism by attempting to find an 
Archimedean point from which critique might be pursued. This is brought about by his 
implicit appeal to Peirce’s idea of a scientific community approaching the "final agreement".
Habermas (1970a, 1970b, 1971) asserts that universal unconstrained consensus is implicit in 
the fact of language. He considers that the ability to linguistically communicate in a fashion 
that satisfies what he refers to as "validity claims" produces "communicative competence". 
The "validity claims" that speakers must meet are: that the sentences they utter are
comprehensive and the propositions contained therein are true, also that their overtly 
expressed intentions are honest and that the norms referred to in speech are correct. 
Habermas considers that without "communicative competence" the ability to communicate
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would be absent and "communicative competence" itself is dependent upon the presence of 
the above "validity claims".
Habermas considers that in everyday communication the validity claims which are inevitably 
made by speakers are usually accepted unquestioningly by hearers. This consensus is 
disturbed either by a misunderstanding or by a challenge to these claims. Such a situation 
might be remedied by clearing away misunderstanding,or by testing out the "validity claims" 
by speakers, and hearers undertaking analysis. Discourse occurs when this analysis is raised 
to a very high level, made explicit and investigation proceeds through the application of 
cannons of argument and evidence with the intention of coming to agreement over "validity 
claims" that have been taken to be problematic.
According to Habermas any communication rests upon the assumption that speakers can 
justify through argument the particular "validity claims" embodied by their utterances. In 
practice such a state of affairs will be a fiction but nevertheless communication must proceed 
as if it were true. Habermas explains this disparity through reference to "systematically 
distorted communication" in which "validity claims" are maintained through the exercise of 
power, thus preventing justification through discourse. The problem for Habermas is to 
elucidate how we might distinguish between "systematically distorted communication" that 
produces a pretence of consensus and a discursively produced "rational consensus".
The resolution of this issue is provided by Habermas by his articulation of the "ideal speech 
situation". According to this a rational consensus is induced when consensus derives from 
argument and analysis without the resort to force, coercion, distortion or duplicity etc. 
Therefore within every act of linguistic communication there lies a possible rational 
consensus achievable in an "ideal speech situation". This situation is characterised by all 
participants having equal chances to initiate and participate in discourse, with all validity 
claims being potentially open to discursive examination as well as there being the opportunity 
for uninhibited discussion, a discussion free from the constraints imposed by domination, 
disparities in power etc. Such a situation is interpreted by McCarthy as freedom from
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internal and external constrain t.
. . that there must be for all participants a symmetrical distribution of 
chances to select and employ speech acts, that is an effective equality of 
chances to assume dialogue roles. If this is not the case, the resultant 
agreement is open to the charge of being less than rational, of being the result 
not of the force of the better argument but, for example, of open or latent 
relations of domination, of conscious or unconscious strategic motivations.
Thus the ideal of truth points ultimately to a form of interaction that is free 
from all distorting influences."
(ibid., p. 308)
It is in this consensus among potential communicants, that is attained through "discursive 
will", that Habermas argues truth is to be found. Although such a consensus is not attained 
in everyday social interaction due to the operation of power and domination, it is 
presupposed in communication. It appears therefore that Habermas considers that the extent 
to which actual speech situations deviate from the ideal, and hence presumably from truth, 
depends upon the degree of repression and domination that characterises society. Therefore 
Habermas appears to follow Lukacs (see Chapter III, note 5) by implying that truth is only 
possible after liberation. Indeed McCarthy interprets Habermas in this fashion when he 
claims that
". . . the goal of critical theory - a form of life free from unnecessary 
domination in all its forms - is inherent in the notion of truth".
(ibid., p. 273)
Furthermore, Habermas considers that the ideal speech situation provides a standard against 
which to assess the extent of systematically distorted communication (1971, p. 61). Since 
presumably from Habermas’s point of view, we do not as yet live in societies free from 
domination, and therefore ideal-speech situations are not yet possible, what status does that 
leave for Habermas’ own work as a dialogue? As I have previously noted in regard to 
Lukacs, is not Habermas in danger of epistemological auto-destruct through positing such a 
theory of truth? Furthermore, Habermas, through positing such a theory of truth, does not 
avoid the problem of relativism. Habermas, in his critique of Gadamer (1977) seems to be 
saying that true consensus is only possible in "ideal speech situations". But how do we know
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how far we are from such a situation, or conversely, how do we know if we have actually 
achieved it, could not such an assumption be in itself a product of ideological distortion? For 
instance, one could be incorrectly convinced that an ideal situation exists since we have no 
criteria to give us an indication of the existence of an "ideal speech situation" that are in 
themselves known to be completely uncontaminatable by ideological distortion. Therefore 
can we ever know that we know truth? Following the outcomes and implications of 
Habermas’ own theory of knowledge, the answer must be no!
While the above in itself creates significant problems for Habermas they are by no means the 
only problems he creates for himself. Having "shattered his own innocence" through drawing 
attention to the role of the epistemic subject and knowledge constituting interests Habermas 
attempts to avoid relativism by the implicit pursuit of Peirce’s "final agreement" in the form 
of the "ideal speech act" - the end result is an idealism that is in contradiction to other aspects 
of his contribution and is incommensurable with my own orientation. His attempt at 
eschewing extra-discursive criteria of truth and the introduction of the possibility of 
universal truth through rational consensus in conditions of "communicative competence" 
arose, for Guess (1981), due to Habermas
"having been frightened by the spectre of relativism and retreated into a kind 
of transcendentalism".
(P. 64)
In accomplishing this retreat Habermas appears to invoke values, presupposed by his notion
of the ideal speech act, that are derived from the Enlightenment tradition, termed by
Habermas "Old European Human Dignity" (1971, p. 143). Given his critique of Gadamer’s
uncritical acceptance of "tradition" and hence repressive authority and power relations
referred to earlier, Habermas appears to be contradicting himself. As Arbib and Hesse point
out in regard to the Enlightenm ent. . .
". . . the liberal values of freedom and equal rights are derived from this 
tradition, as are the norms of participatory democracy and the search for truth 
by means of rational argument. Ideal speech resting on Enlightenment values 




Thus the arguments levelled by Habermas at Gadamer are equally applicable to his own 
notion of the ideal speech act. However he is not only contradictory in this respect.
The transcendental position taken by Habermas violates, and is irreconcilable with, his own 
anthropology of knowledge - a point which Habermas himself implicitly concedes in "Theory 
and Practice". There he argues that if  the interests of knowledge are identified and analysed 
by way of reflection on the logic of inquiry that structures the natural and human sciences
". . . they can claim a ‘transcendental’ status; however as soon as they are
understood in terms of an anthropology . . .  they . . .  cannot . . .  be developed
within a transcendental framework of objectifying science."
(1974a, p. 21)
So orientations which at times Habermas has tried to conceptually distance himself from and 
which he had considered to be conceptually impossible, are paradoxically and incoherently 
embraced through his notion of the "ideal speech act" - a notion that encounters the 
essentialism and foundationalism that along with appeals to epistemic privilege are dismissed 
elsewhere by Habermas as inconsistent with his own praxis-orientated account of knowledge 
and knowledge-constituting interests.
However, the sad irony of the incoherence apparent in Habermas’ work takes a further turn 
when it becomes evident that Habermas’ consensus theory of truth must be based upon a 
putative theory-neutral observation language (see Fay, 1987, pp. 176-90). The belief that 
unequivocal consensus in discourse is possible through the rational deliberations of 
autonomous, emancipated people, ignores the point that observational languages are theory­
laden and therefore theories are underdetermined by the evidence that participants might 
marshall in support or refutation of particular arguments. Therefore unequivocal consensus 
about, for instance, the models which might be invoked so as to explain events etc., might 
not be available to rational investigators nor necessary for them to remain rational, since such
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models are inevitably underdetermined without the availability of a theory-neutral 
observational language. Therefore rational consensus implies the possibility of the neutral 
adjudication of arguments - something which I have argued to be impossible and something 
that Habermas himself has dismissed in his critiques of scientism and positivism. As Fay 
comments
"Theoreticians cannot know for certain whether they have provided the best 
interpretation of their experience -  indeed they cannot even be certain what 
their experience is. There is nothing given to them, neither the meaning of 
their experience, nor what is to count as evidence, nor the relations of this 
evidence to their theories. In a situation of this sort, it is folly to think that 
all competent rational participants must ultimately agree on a particular theory 
as uniquely the best. Rational analysis . . .  will not dictate to them the single 
answer to which any rational agent must necessarily adhere."
(Fay, 1987, p. 178-9)
Such necessity might only be assumed if  we admit the possibility of a theory-neutral 
observational language. Therefore perhaps Habermas’ "ideal speech act" is not so much 
based upon a consensus theory of truth but rather, ultimately, upon a correspondence theory 
of truth! Indeed the comment made by Margolis in regard to Peirce’s "final agreement" might 
equally be applied to Habermas in that he
" . . .  naively restored a kind of first-order privilege by way of a second-order 
argument intended to repudiate all forms of first-order privilege."
(1986, p. 2)
Conclusion
From the foregoing discussion it is evident that many elements of Habermas’ work are 
complementary to,and expand upon,the perspective developed in Chapter 3. Unfortunately, 
other aspects are not.
Particularly the socio-historical and anti-positivist orientation, that forms the initial basis of 
his anthropology of knowledge that enables elaboration of the relationship between technical, 
practical and emancipatory interests and knowledge, must be rescued from the obfuscations
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that arise with Habermas’ introduction of his theory of "communicative competence". 
Essentially it is necessary to eschew the entailed flight into the metaphysical comfort of 
transcendentalism so as to avoid Habermas’ own "scientistic misunderstanding"that arises 
despite his original concern to root out that very tendency in Marxist Tradition. At the same, 
time it is however also necessary to rescue Habermas’ work from the spectre of relativism 
without following Habermas’ own "retreat into transcendentalism" that ultimately has lead to 
hypostatisation of an Archimedean position.
To accomplish the above, and thus preserve the perspective that considers knowledge, to be 
socially and historically contingent in that our understandings and interpretations cannot 
escape from our "hermeneutical horizon" (Bernstein, 1986, p. 78), we must appeal to the 
pragmatist,rather than the transcendental "voice", with which Habermas "speaks".
So to summarise, it becomes important to reconstruct the numerous insights provided by 
Habermas’ theory of knowledge - constituting interests with an alternative, pragmatist, 
theory of truth that avoids the incipient relativism within Habermas’ rendition of critical 
theory, something that he only escapes by positing a transcendental argument. This 
reorientation also leads to a reappraisal of Habermas’ contention that the actual theory of 
truth that underlies the empirical-analytical sciences is not the purported correspondence 
theory but a consensus theory -fo r this raises the question as to whether
" . . .  the truth that is attained by scientific inquiry can properly be conceived 
only as an agreement reached by rational argument; or in other ways, in a 
community of scientists, a closed meaning -  system not involving any 
reference to its correspondence with an external reality."
(Bottomore, 1984, p. 59)
This reconstruction and reappraisal will be undertaken within a theory of truth that depends 
upon pragmatism "practical adequacy" rather than "consensus", and will be undertaken in the 
context of applying the insights of Habermas’ theory of knowledge - constitutive interests 
to interpreting the epistemology and history of accounting. Before embarking upon this 
project it is important to note that according to Keat(1981, p. 73) Habermas has also been
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mistakenly criticised (e.g. by Albert, 1976) for presupposing, in his notion of technical 
interest, an instrumentalist conception of the cognitive status of scientific theories. Clearly 
Habermas himself denies this accusation (e.g. 1973, p. 179-82), however "instrumentalism” 
has a bearing on my discussion of reconstructing Habermas’s theory in the context of a 
different theory of truth for
". . . instrumentalists regard the truth or falsity of scientific theories as 
consisting in their predictive (or manipulative) success or failure. That is they 
adopt a pragmatist theory of truth and regard scientific theories as true only 
in the sense of being useful tools or instruments".
(Keat, 1982, p. 70.)
As I have previously demonstrated, a pragmatist theory of truth is very much associated 
with the work of Peirce (1931-5) which rejects a correspondence theory of truth and stresses 
the connection between truth and practical applicability while allowing for "fallibilism" - that 
the possibility of error can never be completely ruled out. Clearly, as I have argued, such a 
position is similar to the notion of "practical adequacy" articulated in Chapter III - that a 
significant criterion of truth is how well a theory guides practice. At this juncture it is 
however important to reiterate that in re-working Habermas’s knowledge -  constitutive 
interest theory, in the context of "practical adequacy", practical adequacy cannot be divorced 
from interest. Indeed a significant objective will be to relate a specific form of knowledge, 
accountancy, to specific interests, while demonstrating that the form that accounting takes 
is due to its practical adequacy in realising those interests; and that its appeal to 
correspondence theories of truth are ideological mystifications for public consumption so as 
to maintain a professional symbolism. Thus involved in the pragmatist (practically adequate) 
theory of truth put forward in this research is the necessity of articulating overtly the 
emancipatory interest that guides this research and demonstrating the technical and/or 
practical interests that guide other forms of knowledge. Indeed, what fundamentally 
separates the tenor of much of this research from the implicit usage of practical adequacy by 
"social engineers" is that the underlying interest is articulated instead of being subliminated. 
Thus underpinning my approach is the contention that what is practically adequate for the 
pursuit of a particular interest (e.g. technical control) may not be practically adequate for the
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pursuit of another interest (e.g. emancipation). Therefore, different types of knowledge may 
exist side by side with one another along with their different interest-constituted 
epistemologies and purposes. Therefore positivistic theories apparently relying upon 
correspondence theories of truth are not necessarily wrong in some fundamental sense, rather 
their truth can only be judged in terms of their success in realising the particular interests 
that underpin them (however such theories in social science are more likely to be practically 
adequate if they take proper account of human subjectivity) - interests which may be 
antagonistic to the emancipatory interest that leads to knowledge that is practically adequate 
for other purposes.
Thus the epistemological and ontological positions developed in Chapters II and III are 
sufficiently "robust" to "survive" the potential critique deriving from the work of Habermas. 
Indeed this robustness is sufficient to provide a counter critique of Habermas. Therefore out 
of this dialogue with Habermas my own epistemology has emerged relatively intact and as 
such it provides the basis for the ensuing analysis of accounting knowledge and for the 
investigation of shop stewards’ phenomenological worlds. The former provides elements of 
the socio-historical context of D.A.I., which together with latter are aspects that are crucial 
in developing a fuller understanding of the implications of D.A.I. in Industrial Relations 
contexts.
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CHAPTER V 
THE STATUS OF ACCOUNTING KNOWLEDGE
"Under the peculiar logic of accountancy, the men in the nineteenth century 
built slums rather than model cities because slums paid."
(Keynes, 1920)
Introduction
Accounting information might be perceived as vital to the internal monitoring and control 
of an organisation’s activities of production and exchange with the intent of improving 
employee and "organisational" performance. Also it might be considered as important for 
supplying investors and creditors with data pertaining to "organisational" performance so as 
to enable the raising of capital, as well as being potentially utilisable for taxation assessment 
and macro-economic planning. Given such potentialities, it is hardly surprising that in recent 
years numerous commentators have noted the expanding influence of accounting at both an 
organisational (e.g. Bariff and Galbraith, 1978; Chandler and Daems, 1979) and at a societal 
(e.g. Gandhi, 1976; Hopwood et al., 1979) level. This is particularly in the respect that 
increasingly accounting shapes members’ perceptions of, discourse about, and prescriptions 
for, organisational and societal reality (see Burchell et al., 1980; 1985).
In the performance of its various functions, accounting is widely assumed to be a neutral and 
technical activity that unproblematically serves the "public interest" (see: Flint, 1980) by 
occupying a privileged position divorced from any sectional or self-interest (see: Stamp 
1969). So usually accounting is taken to be an instrument that unambiguously arbitrates the 
financial "realities" and exigencies confronting members. This kind of consideration led even 
Proudhon to envisage a suitably reformed accounting becoming a universal tool by which one 
could "observe economic facts and control their course" (Sotto, 1983, p. 61). This immanent 
possibility in accounting could, according to Proudhon, lead to the scientisation of social and 
economic relations since accounting offered a science that was "quantitatively precise and 
accurate" (ibid., p. 66) and thereby "brought to light" (ibid., p. 65) economic phenomena. For 
Sotto, although accounting has not taken the form that Proudhon desired, he points out that
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many commentators consider that it has evolved to such a state of sophistication that
.. independent qualified accountants may represent an external phenomenon 
to which employees as well as management can appeal in case of conflict or 
disagreement concerning the real state of affairs and future prospects of the 
company. It is thought that in such situations the accountant may offer an 
‘objective’ view which does not depend upon the interests of the parties 
involved." (Sotto, 1983, p. 71)
The implicit and explicit conceptualisation of accounting as a vehicle for social justice 
necessarily embraces the assumption of the possibility of a nomothetical science of the 
accounting domain that parallels what is taken to be the situation in natural science. Thus 
"mainstream" or "functionalist" (see: Hopper and Powell, 1985) accounting theory and
research is dominated by a positivist hypothetico-deductive orthodoxy that is grounded upon 
a naive objectivist ontology which allows for a foundationalist approach to truth as expressed 
by correspondence theory (e.g. Abel-Khalik and Ajinka, 1979; Chambers, 1966; and Sterling, 
1972, 1979).
Alternatively some scholars have considered that such an archimedean position is a desirable 
"end-state" that accounting has not, as yet, achieved. For instance Chambers (1980) revises 
his earlier position by expressing a concern to "cleanse" accounting of the incorrigible "myths" 
and "dogma" which make it pre-scientific. Apparently this is to be achieved by replacing the 
residues of "romanticism" in accounting with a "scientific and analytical stance" (ibid., p. 180) 
that tests its knowledge, by confrontation with the empirical world, through experimentation 
(ibid., p. 169). In this way Chambers considers that a unified and complete set of accounting 
principles can be elaborated and discovered. Nowhere does Chambers discuss the problematic 
aspects of this venture, and hence, the possibility of a theory neutral observational language 
enabled by a subject-object dualism is effectively taken for granted.
The above positions evidently share a positivistic epistemology which has, according to Chua 
(1986a, 1986b) albeit often subconsciously, not only delineated definitions of worthwhile 
problems and evaluative criteria, they have also created in accounting an emphasis upon what 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) term a "sociology of regulation". That is there is a perceived need
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to control and correct, through the development of appropriate accounting procedures, what 
is viewed as disfunctional behaviour relative to the objectives of a conceptually reified 
organisation (e.g. Emmanuel and Otley, 1986; Hopwood, 1974; Zimmerman, 1979).
While there may indeed be a dichotomy between the work of accounting scholars and 
everyday accounting practice (see Burchell et al., 1980; Kaplan, 1984), the ideological utility 
of such an epistemology to practitioners who advance professional claims is evident. It allows 
accountants to accord their knowledge and expertise an extra-socio-cultural status that 
transcends interest. This is particularly supportive of their putative professional status in that 
it provides a repertoire that deploys suitable meanings in transactions with various lay 
audiences during practice. Especially it has enabled an allusion to value-neutrality (e.g. 
Beaver and Demski, 1974; Jensen, 1983; Solomons, 1978; Sterling, 1979). For Chua (1986b) 
this is often based upon the claim that accountants only advise upon the means available for 
achieving particular ends and not upon the ends themselves - that they provide 
epistemologically privileged analyses of aspects of the world upon which policy makers might 
act. Thus . . .
". . . it is our job - as accountants - to make the best maps we can. It is for 
others, or for accountants acting in some other capacity, to use those maps to 
steer the economy in the right direction. If the distinction between these two 
tasks is lost sight of, we shall greatly diminish our capacity to serve society .
It
(Solomons, 1978, p. 72)
Hence many accountants propose a means-ends dichotomy that provides a vocabulary which 
morally abrogates themselves from any responsibility for the nature of such "ends” and the 
value judgements inhering therein.1 The accountant’s role is thereby reduced to one of 
providing relevant information that enables the evaluation of options by decision-makers in 
their exercise of rationality in the allocation of scarce resources. Therefore . . .
”. . . questions about the goals of a decision-maker, firm , or society are seen 
as outside the province of the accountant. . . The accountant . . .  is said to 
take a value neutral position by not evaluating these end states. H is/her task 
is simply the provision of relevant financial information on the means to 
achieve these states . . .”.
(Chua, 1986b, p. 610)
160
The status quo, therefore, remains unthreatened and legitimated (Hines, p. 259, 1988).
Thus by deploying a repertoire that, tlfough various procedures, deploys a symbolism of value 
neutrality, accountants strive to buffer themselves from the "taint of politics" (O’Leary, 1985) 
thus gaining legitimacy by an ostentatious display of powerlessness (Boland and Pondy, 1983, 
p. 239). Yet they still maintain a mandate as definers of reality and by claiming such expert 
knowledge enablespursuit of a "strategy of exclusion" (Parkin, 1979) and promote their own 
"distributional advantage" (Lehman and Tinker, 1987).
At this juncture it is important to emphasise that, from the preceding chapters of this work, 
the allusion by many accountants to a "policy science" necessarily based upon a means-ends 
dichotomy is simply not possible. Nor is it possible for accounting knowledge to be 
marshalled by any interest group in the furtherance of their specific aims. Either of these 
avenues would entail some acceptance of the claim for an extra-sociological status for 
accounting knowledge. Rather what is necessary is to attempt to reconceptualise accounting 
knowledge in terms of the sociological insights, developed in prior chapters, regarding any 
body of knowledge. Indeed some scholars have already challenged the received wisdom that 
lays claim to a foundationalism for the accounting project. For instance Burchell et al. argue 
that accounting may no longer be understood as . . .
" . . .  a mere assembly of calculative routines, it now functions as a cohesive 
and influential mechanism for economic and social m anagem ent. . . [yet] . .
. very few attempts have been made to probe into the rationalities for the 
existence and development of accounting itself" (1980, p. 6)
This entails a recognition that although accounting influences social and organisational 
arrangements, it is in turn sociologically derived. That is, accounting both reflects and 
enables the social construction and reproduction of society; or, as Tinker has argued, 
accounting is both "socially conditioned and socially conditioning" (1985, p. 83). Therefore, 
in order to unearth the roots of accounting knowledge and thereby demystify accounting as 
an institution, it is necessary to examine the socio-historical milieux in which "it’s" knowledge
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and practices were generated. In this way it might be possible to reveal how human interests 
have influenced the cognitive strategies and categories that go together to constitute 
accounting and thus uncover aspects of "what” it is that is being disclosed in the processes 
of D.A.I.
Accounting Knowledge: the new heterodoxy
Contrary to the popular view held inside and outside the "accounting community", numerous 
writers have argued that accounting is far from neutral or independent (see Arrington and 
Francis, 1989; Cooper and Sherer, 1984; Merino and Neimark, 1982; Tinker, 1980, 1985; 
Tinker et al., 1982). Usually this contention arises from the argument that accounting, like 
any science, cannot be value free or socially neutral - it cannot assume the possibility of an 
isomorphism between accounting schemata and reality. Thus the phenomenalism and 
empiricism, dominant amongst "mainstream" accountancy, which attempts to maintain 
the"banner" of value freedom, sometimes in the guise of demands for a "positive" as opposed 
to a "normative" science (e.g. Friedmann, 1953; Watts and Zimmerman, 1979, 1986; 
Zimmerman, 1980), have been particular targets for attack. For instance, such positivism 
with its separation of theorising into the descriptive, the positive and the normative is viewed 
as being designed . . .
" . . .  to create an illusion of impartiality and independence to support 
normative policy-type decisions".
(Tinker et al., 1982, p. 172)
In opposition to the apparent orthodoxy in accounting, there has been a growing emphasis 
upon the historical specificity of the roles and forms that accounting practice takes and hence 
its ability as "part of a social ideology" (Tinker et al., ibid., p. 186) to change, reflect or 
exclude (Davis et al., 1982; Lowe et al., 1983) differing interests and concerns along with 
their attendant renditions of reality (see Lehman and Tinker, 1987). Such a stance has led 
Tinker et al (ibid) to eschew the subject-object dualism of accounting orthodoxy by pointing
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to the underdetermined nature of the world. It follows, they contend, that any knowledge 
is an artefact that is invented rather than discovered, albeit often becoming reified and 
thereby appears as external to the theorist or practitioner. In this way, what are essentially 
conventional activities begin to be perceived as if they were natural entities with an existence 
independent of the actors who engage in them (Fay, 1975 pp. 58-9). But once one . . .
". . . treats the picture given in accounts merely as an image, rather than a 
reality, then the inevitably partial, selective and potentially distorted nature 
of the image must be recognised."
(Roberts and Scapens, 1985, p. 454)
By taking an explicitly anti-positivist stance, Tinker (1985) has fundamentally challenged the 
orthodox view of accounting as a value-free technical activity and the accountant as an 
"innocuous book-keeper". In a similar vein Tinker et al (ibid) attempt to delineate a 
"materialist theory of accounting thought" from whose vantage-point financial statements 
might be seen
" . . .  as ‘creatures’ of business reality rather than objective descriptions of 
historical ‘dead facts’ . . ."
(ibid., p. 173)
They consider it crucial to direct attention to the social and historical context of accounting, 
indeed this focus becomes all the more important once it is recognised that when accounting 
has affected the working lives of employees
" . . .  it has done so overwhelmingly on the behalf of corporations and 
employers . . ."
(Ibid., p. 192)
The above considerations have directed attention to how accounting practices effect economic 
exchange transactions,2 as well as to how accounting thought is itself influenced by other 
factors, particularly "value-theory".3 Tinker et al (ibid) argue that "value-theory" is central 
to understanding accounting in that it has provided the logic for exchange relations while
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"accounting has provided the system for measuring and reporting reciprocity 
in exchange."
(ibid., p. 174)
However it is a particular kind of value-theory that has been dominant in accounting: - one 
derived from "utility" that results in
"the relative worth of all goods and services produced in an economy . . . 
[being]. . .  ultimately determined by their relative contribution to the utility 
of consumers."
(ibid., p. 175)
But the above approach to value-theory is not immutable or transcendental, rather it is 
specific to, and influenced by, a variety of factors such as the current legal, religious and 
scientific beliefs hegemonic in capitalism (Tinker, 1985, p. 79; Tinker et al., 1982 pp. 175- 
6). Essentially utility-based value theorists have made the mistake of reifying their own 
approach to value-theory and thus wrongly assume the resultant constructions of reality to 
be "fixed" (see also Hines, 1988).
As Einstein demonstrates, the above reificatory processes are by no means unique to the 
social sciences:
"Out of the multitude of our sense experiences we take, mentally and 
arbitrarily, certain repeated occurring complexes of sense impressions . . .  and 
we correlate them to a concept . . .  [ then]. . .  in our thinking . . .  we attribute 
to this concept a significance . . .. This is what we mean when we attribute 
to the bodily object a ‘real existence’. The justification of such a setting rests 
exclusively on the fact that, by means of such concepts and mental relations 
between them, we are able to orient ourselves in the labyrinth of sense 
impressions. These notions and relations, although free mental creations, 
appear to us stronger and more unalterable than the individual sense 
experience itself . . .."
(1954, p. 291. Quoted in Feyerabend, 1988)
However, for Tinker, the above is not a personal act of creation as Einstein implies, rather 
the former adopts a position closer to that of Feyerabend (1975; 1988) in considering that the 
processes of reification are socially and culturally mediated.
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In demonstrating this Tinker locates the emergence of accounting and value theory in the 
historical transition from "traditional exchange" between communities to "developed 
exchange". This transition involved the regularisation and routinisation of transactions 
between communities that entailed the development of customs and practices for adjudicating 
the appropriate level of "reciprocal payment", i.e. the terms of trade (1985, p. 93). Thus 
accounting
" . . .  as a value rationale, attempts to resolve the degree of reciprocity 
appropriate in an exchange."
(ibid., p. 95)
Tinker, et al. (1982) focus upon the development of and changes in the concept of value from 
the medieval period to modern times. They argue that the transitions they identify cannot 
be explained in terms of an evolution in which greater wisdom and rationality in the 
economic domain was slowly accumulated. Rather they locate the form that specific value 
theories take in the social and economic conditions that are contingent during particular 
epochs. For instance they point out that during medieval times
". . . exchanges took place in quantities that equalised the amount of non­
slave labour time embodied in products transferred."
(ibid., p. 176)
This concept of value was acceptable because trade, during this period, was between small 
independent producers. However the growth of mercantilism initiated a change in the 
concept value from the production-orientated tradition of socially necessary labour time 
expanded on a product, to a new concept of value more consistent with the developing 
mercantile interests. This innovation was based upon
". . .  demand-side influences (utility and the subjective expectations of owners 
and consumers) as determinants and constituents of value."
(ibid., p. 177)
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With the advent of the merchant middleman, interposed between producer and consumer, this 
change was necessitated by the lack of information regarding the labour expended in 
production. Therefore value became dependent upon the subjective utility evaluation of the 
consumer (see Meek, 1975, p. 14) and the necessity for the merchant to maintain a 
differential between what had been paid and what was received for a good. By this 
modification in the concept of value, the merchants were able to strengthen their bargaining 
position relative to primary producers . . .
" . . .  by suggesting that consumers* wishes (not the effort expended) should be 
the ultimate consideration in determining the amount paid to producers by 
merchants."
(ibid., p. 177)
Similarly Mason (1980) argues that a stewardship form of accounting arose as a response to 
the uncertainties provoked by the advent of mercantilism and the necessary entrustment of 
others for transportation of goods. Furthermore, the industrial revolution evolved 
uncertainties and the anxieties due to the concentration of production in large units of 
mechanised continuous production, thus heralding further innovations in accounting practice. 
In this way it is argued that particular concepts of value become dominant because they 
benefited the interests of dominant social groups during a particular epoch.
In pursuing this theme Tinker and his colleagues turn to consideration of the actual value 
basis that socially conditions contemporary accounting. Accordingly it is "marginalism" 
(1985, p. 100) that provides modern accounting with its theory of value - upon which 
accounting is an "intellectual dependent" (1982, p. 184) being little more than an "applied 
marginalism" (1980, p. 149). There are two important themes, identifiable in marginalist 
thought that have dominated modern accounting. Firstly there is an emphasis upon 
individualism. This is expressed either in terms of the individual owner of a corporation or 
as the reification of a corporation in its representation as a legal "person" (1985, p. 107). 
Secondly, there is the concern to present an image of objectivity, independence and 
neutrality . . .
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..  by shunning ‘subjective’ questions of value and confining accounting data 
to ‘objective’ market prices (historical and current)”.
(1985, p. 107)
The above themes are for Tinker expressions of a theory of value based on marginalism that 
itself revolves around two sets of ideas. Firstly that value originates the "subjective 
preferences of consumers", and secondly that the concern of economics is to study "the sphere 
of market exchange" (ibid, p. 159) thus excluding social policy issues. For Tinker, what is 
remarkable is the degree of commitment and unanimity displayed by accountants in regard 
to marginalism; - the attraction apparently lies in its ability to appear to integrate "rational" 
decision-making at various levels, such as at the individual, at the organisational and at the 
societal. Also it appears to enable the evaluation of the social desirability of alternative 
decision options in a neutral fashion (Tinker, 1980). However these emphases upon 
individualism and the pretence of objectivity are seen as ideological because they serve to 
obscure issues such as "market imperfections", unequal distributions of income and other 
injustices embedded in extant systems of property rights (Tinker et al, 1982, p. 191). In other 
words, far from being neutral, accounting is interest-laden in that it serves the interests of 
the dominant classes of capitalism. Thus, in many respects, Tinker is in accord with 
Feyerabend’s understanding of science. For the latter (1988, p. 124), in science, reality once 
defined, is used to annihilate "the more disorderly ingredients of our world" but that defined 
reality "is constantly being redefined to fit the fashion of the day".
Clearly Tinker and his colleagues are concerned to demonstrate how alternative portrayals of
reality may be constructed in accounting by changing the nexuses of assumptions and
concepts, codified into a theory of value, that underpin accounting engagements with reality.
However the assertion that in the present fashion, it is the interests of the classes dominant
in capitalism that are hegemonic in modern accounting representations is in need of further
theconsideration. This is all the more important given^claim by many accounting practitioners 
that accounting is merely a passive technical activity that unproblematically reconstitutes 
reality for financial inspection.
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Given the "pragmatist" approach to epistemology developed in prior chapters such claims by 
"mainstream" accountants must be replaced by a focus upon the ways in which accountants 
as epistemic subjects, far from achieving a technical isomorphism, bring "images" or "sets of 
constructs" (see Davis et al., 1982) to their domain. These processes of "intentionality" 
(Husse4,1970) influence the substantive outcomes of investigation through exerting a decisive 
influence upon interpretive procedures thereby conditioning through noesis what is 
phenomenally perceived and hence the sense that is construed from the complexities that are 
encountered. Essentially the imagery that has informed and shaped modern accounting is 
derived from an abstract numerical view of reality underpinned by marginalism. While this 
might provide a useful basis for understandings and practices orientated towards particular 
purposes -  it is inevitably partial, for it also
". . . serves to constrain these activities, because by defining an area of 
concern in one way, it precludes definition and understanding in others."
(Davis et al., 1982, p. 308)
Thus the partiality of the constructions of reality enabled by the modes of engagement 
hegemonic in accounting, both at the levels of theory and practice, have lead to the 
investigation of the ideological basis of accounting through consideration of the interests 
which are supported, or undermined, by the form that accounting presently adopts.
In pursuit of this theme Cooper and Sherer (1984) consider accounting policy to be political 
in two fundamental aspects. Firstly accounting arises out of political struggle. Secondly its 
outcomes are political in the respect that consistently, if not invariably . . .
" . . .  the mandated use of one accounting measurement system inevitably helps 
to sustain the power of one set of interests over others in society".
(ibid., p. 224)
This contention leads to the necessary appraisal of the ideological role that accounting has 
through closer analysis of the socio-historical processes out of which accounting has arisen 
and in turn has reflexively influenced, as well as the knowledge-constituting interests that
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underpin the superficially neutral conventions that enable and constrain the apparently 
technical constructions of reality proffered by accountants.
A Socio-Historical Analysis of Accounting
By conceiving accounting as a social phenomenon which is an expression of "formal 
rationality" (Weber, 1968), insights about its development and underlying knowledge- 
constituting interests might be revealed. "Formal Rationality" refers to the processes whereby 
human conduct is increasingly subject to, and organised according to, "rationally" calculable 
principles, techniques and rules. According to this Weberian perspective accounting might 
be perceived as an instrumental logic-in-use that attempts to translate all situations and 
decisions into numerically calculable terms, and attempts to subsume them under technical 
rules. Such expressions of "formal rationality" take on the appearance of what Marcuse terms 
"operationalisms" (1972, pp. 23-6) -that is the application of apparently neutral technique to 
social and organisational problems. As previously illustrated, accounting’s "formal rationality" 
is largely maintained through implicit and explicit appeal to a positivist epistemology. As 
Fay contents (1975, 1987) there is a conceptual connection between positivism and technical 
control. Indeed the institutionalisation of natural science arose in the context of a growing 
rationalisation of life precisely because of the promise of the technical control over nature 
that it portended (see Fay, 1975, pp. 44-7). Yet a corollaral observation is apposite regarding 
the social sciences . . .
". . . for they promise to provide the sort of information needed to organise
and administer men participating in the processes of production."
(ibid., p. 45)
As accounting took its place alongside the other social sciences in the above respect (Chua, 
1986a, 1986b), its institutionalisation and formalisation saw the development of an "explicit 
and public rationale" (Burchell et al., 1980, p. 9) as a legitimation of accounting derived 
activities. Burchell et al (1980) argue that the state, the professional institutes and regulatory
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bodies together with those practising accounting, all contributed to the provision of this 
rationale by pointing to accounting’s furtherance of organisational and social efficiency, its 
improvement of the flow of information relevant to shareholders’ investment decisions and 
its relevance to enabling organisational control. Indeed . . .
.. such functional attributes are seen as being fundamental to the accounting 
endeavour. Justifying the existence of the craft, they provide rationales for 
continued accounting action."
(ibid., p. 10)
Underpinning these developments was a growing objectification and abstraction of 
accounting knowledge entailing the characterisation of accounting activities as neutral. While 
such a claim mischaracterises and mystifies accounting activities (see O’Leary, 1985), it serves 
the purpose of subliminating and hiding from inspection the evaluative elements in that 
practice. In effect such aspects are removed from the arena of public discourse and thereby, 
perhaps their continuity is more assured. It follows that it is the term "apparently neutral" 
that must be emphasised. As Weber argued, manifestations of "formal rationality" are 
essentially .ideological in that they express "elective affinity" (1958, pp. 90-2). This refers 
to process whereby "ideas" are selected by people (elective) that are compatible with their 
perceived material interests (affinity). Now it is evident that following the realisation that 
accounting data and controls provided a competitive advantage (Stacey, 1954) accountants and 
other financial specialists have become significant members of the "managerial cadre" 
(Burchell et al., 1980). But this situation does not necessarily entail an acceptance of a 
modern reconstruction of Sombart’s thesis, that systematic accounting is an essential element 
in the "capitalist spirit" (Yamey, 1964). That conclusion mightliwd to the adoption of an overly 
deterministic interpretation of Weber’s notion of "elective affinity" by implying an automatic 
identity between ideas and interests. Nor does it entail acceptance of what Johnson (1984) 
terms the "Littleton School". This and other "official" histories of accounting (e.g. Solomons, 
1968; Sowell, 1973) conceive accounting development in terms of an unproblematical and 
progressive accumulation of epistemologically privileged esoteric knowledge functional to the 
administration of society. Therefore modern accounting practices are seen to have 
"necessarily and inevitably evolved into their present shape" (Johnson, 1984, p. 4). Rather,
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as Armstrong (1985a, 1985b) demonstrates, through reference to a cross-cultural comparison 
of the U.K. and U.S.A. with Japan and West Germany, there is nothing inevitable about 
either of the above scenarios; indeed accounting cannot be simply equated with the 
"maturation of capitalism". For instance, its comparative lack of status in both West Germany 
and France (Batstone, 1984) points to the situation being more complicated.
In countering "internalist" (see Barnes, 1974, 1977) theories of accounting’s historical 
development, Armstrong (ibid) implicitly draws attention to the importance of the "fate" of 
the "carrier group" (see Law and Lodge, 1984) in explaining the variable national importance 
of accounting. His perspective eschews a crudely functionalist explanation of why particular 
control procedures might be adopted, and by implication avoids a deterministic rendition of 
"elective affinity" in favour of the contention that the increasing representation of 
accountants in Anglo-American managerial hierarchies is not an automatic consequence of 
the "objective needs" of capitalism. Rather this phenomenon is the result
" . . .  of efforts by the profession to develop their original techniques into a
system of managerial control in competition with other methods . . .  as a
means of achieving managerial ascendency".
(1985a, p. 145)
In support of Armstrong it is important to note that virtually all cost accounting and internal 
reporting techniques employed by modern enterprises and explicated by today’s accounting 
texts were known by 1925 (see: Johnson, 1978; Kaplan, 1984). While some of these 
techniques, such as "double-entry" originated during medieval times (Hoskin and Macre, 
1986) and some aspects of cost accounting might be traced to Wedgewood’s managerial 
practices (Hopwood, 1987); the majority of present day accounting procedures appear to have 
been developed during the construction and subsequent administration of the North American 
railroads. These techniques were later adopted and elaborated by mass production and 
distribution organisations during the 1880 s (Chandler, 1977).
Important in these developments was the role played by engineers who had graduated from 
Westpoint (Hoskin and Macve, 1986, 1988). These innovators appear to have applied
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disciplinary elements of their own prior pedagogical experiences, into which they had been 
initiated by the tutelage and educational regime of one Sylvanus Thayer, rather than 
"economic rationalism". According to Hoskin and Macve (1988) this nascent managerial 
cadre had internalised, during their education, a new system of "disciplinary organisation and 
human accountability" (ibid., p. 66) which they exported to the world of business through 
their careers particularly in the railroads and armouries. Thus the knowledge of this 
Westpoint influenced embryonic "carrier group", engendered a . . .
" . . .  new form of disciplinary accountability over men and objects within the
factory".
(ibid., p. 66)
Yet despite these North American developments, the utilisation of accounting techniques as 
a means of regulating business was remarkably slow and sporadic (de Roover, 1974; Yamey, 
1977). This is particularly the case in the U.K., where accountants were slow to gain their 
present prominence in managerial hierarchies, and in West Germany where accounting was 
never to gain such an ascendency (see Lawrence, 1980). These events support Armstrong’s 
earlier point in that it tends to deny the possibility of a deterministic relationship between 
the availability of knowledge and its subsequent use. It demands closer inspection of the 
socio-historical context, of particularly the U.K., which confronted accounting knowledge 
and its professional "carrier groups" so as to understand the temporal disparity between the 
intellectual development of many of those ideas and their eventual application in enterprises.
An early impetus to accounting in the U.K. came from the Companies Acts of 1856 and 1862 
which made limited liability available and required such companies to have their accounts 
regularly audited so as to protect the financial interests of the shareholder (Packwood and 
Fielding, 1981 p. 755; Tricker, 1975, p. 5) through the evaluation of the utilisation of their 
capital (see Jones, 1981) by the nascent "managerial class" (Pollard, 1965). Continued pressure 
from groups representing shareholders’ interests culminated with the annual audit becoming 
compulsory in 1900 for all Limited Companies and this enabled the accounting profession to 
virtually secure a monopoly of the "watchdog function" on behalf of shareholders, with the
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tacit role of preventing the separation of ownership and control by monitoring and evaluating 
the "cash nexus" between these elements (Armstrong, 1985b). In this fashion
. . the audit became the condition of access to long term as well as short 
term industrial finance in Great Britain . .
(Armstrong, ibid., p. 18)
It was from this foothold in the activities of British productive enterprises that accountants 
gained a position that enabled them to present their own distinctive interpretation of, and 
solutions to, the problems that began to confront organisations (Armstrong, ibid., pp 10-13), 
in a form legitimate (see Gerforth, 1973) in the eyes of significant others - their "patrons" 
(Johnson, 1972); this allowed for an expansion of the accounting domain.
For instance Loft (1985) considers that a major stimulus to the development of cost and 
management accountancy came as an unintended consequence of government "interference", 
during World War I, in business activities so as to prevent "profiteering" by making costs 
more "visible" (ibid., p. 12) and hence stimulated a new awareness of the potential 
contribution of cost accounting.
According to Loft (ibid.) a further impetus came during the "boom-slump" period 
immediately after the war. During this time prices fluctuated vigorously and entrepreneurs 
imagined that a costing system would aid their production and pricing decisions. 
Concurrently many firms were finding it difficult to remain profitable, again succour was 
sought in costing techniques in the hope that they might identify precisely where profits and 
losses occurred and hence allow for the rationalisation of operations (Tricker, 1975, p. 5). 
These factors combined with continued government interference engendered support amongst 
industrialists for the embryonic I.C.W.A., indeed without that support Loft considers that the 
institute would have not survived (ibid., p. 25). However this newly formed specialised 
accounting body soon began to lay claim to professional status; this involved the development 
and definition of the boundaries of its area of expertise as well as a depoliticisation of its 
role. As Loft comments, both of these developments were intertwined with, and enabled by,
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a discourse around cost accounting .
"which claimed for it the status of science and f a c t . .
(ibid., p. 25)
Thus from its power base established prior to and extended during World War I, the 
accounting profession with its methods of cost identification provided a basis for coping with 
the exigencies, confronting industrialists, created by the inter-war slump. In Hopwood’s 
terms (1984), the crises caused an increased demand for economic calculation, something that 
accountants could provide. But these achievements partly enabled, and were partly enabled 
by, the establishment by the accounting professions of the "myth" that it possessed a special 
wisdom with regard to certain "moral mysteries" (see Boland, 1982) and from that "myth" it 
established its control over a particular domain. But it is important to emphasise that 
accountants were pro-active in extending this domain. For instance, creditors acting on 
information mediated by accountants (Armstrong,. 1985b, p. 13) installed "finance men" onto 
companies’ boards who in turn installed budgetary control systems as "therapies" in response 
to the crisis. Indeed it was the methods of cost accounting, established prior to World War 
I and.derived from tools for investor surveillance, (Armstrong, ibid., p. 14), but ignored in 
practice until the inter-war period, that provided the means of achieving internal corporate 
control through their modified expression as budgetary control systems. These internal 
control systems provided not j u s t . . .
" . . .  a means of immediate management control of the labour process but a 
‘top down’ system of controlling large enterprises, connecting however 
crudely, the apex of the corporate pyramid to the productive process itself.
As such it represents a major incursion by the accountancy profession into the 
extraction of surplus value from the labour process."
(Armstrong, ibid., p. 13)
Miller and O’Leary (1987) also consider the historical emergence of standard costing and 
budgeting during this period. By applying Foucault’s archaeology (1977, 1979) Miller and 
O’Leary relate these accounting phenomena to other calculative social and organisation 
practices (e.g. scientific management) that were entwined with the development of the human
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sciences. The latter elaborated a range of techniques for the administration of people by 
rendering visible aspects of their lives. This entailed a change in the form that knowledge 
adopted due to the development of "disciplinary power" which penetrated into
". . . the very web of social life through a vast series of regulations and tools 
for the administration of entire populations and of the minutiae of people’s 
lives".
(Miller and O’Leary, 1987, p. 258)
Thus the early twentieth century saw a shift from "sovereign power", as the basis of control 
in organisation, (which entailed "direct confrontation between the worker and the boss": see 
Roberts and Scapens, 1985) to "disciplinary power" whereby the employee becomes 
"surrounded by calculative norms and standards" (ibid., p. 239). It is in this reorientation of 
power within enterprise and the administration of social life generally, that Miller and 
O’Leary locate costing and budgeting.
In both the U.S.A. and the U.K. the period 1900-1930 saw the definition of costing recast 
through the development of a concern with the future as well as the past; this allowed the 
analysis of variances in performance from the predicted standards and consequently the 
development of budgetary control whereby individual contributions to collective 
performances were evaluated. Such analysis and evaluation pervaded all levels of the 
productive enterprise such that it
" . . .  made it possible to attach to every individual within the firm  norms and 
standards of behaviour . . . [and]. . . rendered susceptible to a continued 
process of judgement."
(ibid., p. 242)
Hence every member potentially became enmeshed in a "web of calculative practices" (ibid., 
p. 240-1) aimed both at stewardship and efficiency. These innovations are considered by 
Miller and O’Leary as being an important aspect of broader social developments, such as 
"eugenics", that were also concerned to establish norms and standards for the behaviour of 
individuals as well as methods of intervention when deviations were identified.
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Therefore standard costing and budgeting, in alliance with scientific management and 
industrial psychology, were a central element in transposing the objectives of "rationality" and 
"efficiency", through the construction of norms that reflected those aims, to all employees 
through identifying every accountable person’s contribution to and deviation from such ends. 
Thus was created an "epistemic structure" that "enmeshed the factory worker within a calculus 
of efficiency . . .  and . . .  expectations of behaviour" (ibid., pp. 253-4); thereby constructing, 
at least potentially, "the governable person" (ibid., p. 263) through making the subject the 
object of knowledge through "normalising" judgements.
Clearly budgeting is a socially constructed phenomena complicit in the creation and 
purveying, rather than the passive reflection, of social reality. Budgetary dialogue creates 
and expresses expectations encoded into norms or standards, that shape members’ perception 
of what is important and to what they should orientate their effort (Lawler and Rhode, 1976). 
As such, what is "accounted for" (Burchell et al., 1980) purveys a particular version of 
organisational reality amongst members through defining "problems" and their possible modes 
of resolution. In this manner members’ perceptions of events are constrained to particular 
forms of visibility and acceptable forms of organisational practice and discourse delimited 
to those that demonstrate a commitment to a "technical rationality" (Colvaleski and Dirsmith, 
1988). For many scholars the constraints attempted by budgetary control systems 
demonstrates how these systems are vehicles for the articulation of vested interest and help 
maintain inequitable power relations (e.g. Cooper et al., 1981; Hopwood, 1984).
But whose interests are represented by these calculative norms, standards and structures 
purveyed by, and the forms of visibility engendered by, the epistemic structure of accounting 
information? For Johnson (1972) the answer is evident in his notion of "patronage" (ibid., p. 
65). According to Johnson "patronage" arises in circumstances where the consumer is able to 
define his/her own needs and the way in which they are catered for.
"In such cases the members of occupations applying esoteric knowledge are 
themselves clients, having neither exclusive nor final responsibility for their 
services; ultimate authority in the assessment of process and product lies with
176
the patron or patrons. Patronage arises where the dominant effective demand 
for occupational services comes from a powerful unitary clientele."(1972, p. 65)
Johnson proceeds to focus upon how the growing corporations of advanced capitalism 
confront the accounting professions as the only potential buyers of their services. For 
Johnson this "corporate patronage" allows for indirect control over the profession and its 
knowledge base since a major criterion in evaluating knowledge will be its "applicability to 
patron needs" (ibid., pp. 70-71). Thus for Johnson the powerful elites who dominate modern 
enterprises have influenced the organisational and societal role, as well as the epistemic 
nature, of accountancy. In other words the knowledge that accounting purveys is "practically 
adequate" for the pursuit of those interestSj albeit in a fallible way. At the level of public 
testimony this situation is often mystified by accountants’ assumption of a basic harmony of 
interest in society - the arbitration of which is somehow conveniently represented by the 
specific interests of shareholders, which in discourse are reified into "organisational" or 
"national" interests (see Bailey, 1985; Wilmott, 1985). Hence corporate reports, at present, 
passively accept and legitimate the social and political status quo with a predominant 
orientation towards shareholder interests (Cooper and Sherer, 1984, pp. 207-8). For Cherns 
(1978) it thus propagates an ideology consistent with capitalistic objectives to the exclusion 
of other values. Similarly "mainstream" accounting research is primarily concerned with the 
interests and assumed objectives of individual private shareholders, as if they were the only 
extant interest. Therefore there is a desire to aid shareholders’ decision-making (e.g. 
Chambers, 1965; Sterling, 1970; Tweedlie, 1981; Watts and Zimmerman, 1979; 1986), as well 
as a concern to evaluate and improve the extent of shareholder understanding and use of 
corporate reports (e.g. Adelberg, 1979; Gonedes, 1978; Lee and Tweedie, 1977), and improve 
internal control and evaluation of employee performance (e.g. Brownell, 1982; Ronen and 
Livingston, 1975).
Thus by applying the concept of "elective affinity" it appears that the ideas historically 
appropriated by, and institutionalised in, modern accountancy are consonant with those of 
shareholders. But this relationship between accounting’s epistemic structure and shareholders’
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interests is not a simple and direct outcome of the latters’ exercise of choice of ideas 
compatible with their perceived interests - as perhaps Johnson (1972) implies. Rather the 
activities of the "carrier group" in propagandising and aggrandising their knowledge, 
schemata and practice were crucial in facilitating the adoption, by entrepreneurial elites, of 
that knowledge so as to control "their" productive enterprises. This is perhaps further 
illustrated by the events heralded by the further concentration of capital.
Despite the evident reluctance of the part of some entrepreneurs (Stacey, 1954) the 
developing status of accounting was further consolidated by the inter-w ar wave of mergers 
and take-overs that served to increase the size and complexity of productive enterprises and 
heralded the development of the multi-divisional organisation (see Chandler, 1977; Johnson, 
1981; Kaplan, 1984); a process that occurred earlier in the U.S.A. than in the U.K. 
(Armstrong, 1985a, p. 136).
This trend towards the concentration of capital into larger units continued after World War 
II and provided fertile ground for the spread of finance based control systems and financially 
orientated decision-making. But this growth of the giant corporation is in itself insufficient 
to explain the growing ascendency of the accounting profession in managerial hierarchies. 
Again it was crucial that accountants were already represented in those hierarchies of British 
and North American companies . . .
" . . .  at a time of their growing pains so that they could profit by offering 
their characteristic remedies".
(Armstrong, 1985a, p. 136)
Indeed the tendency itself, in the form of the multi-divisional organisation, is according to 
Armstrong (1985b pp. 14-19) a manifestation of financially orientated logic that foreclosed 
alternative possible developments regarding vertical and horizontal differentiation. Thus 
some, if not all, of the imperatives that have influenced accounting’s development have 
emerged from the actual practice of the "craft" (Hopwood, 1987, p. 211). But from this brief 
history, it would also appear that the development of modern accounting is intrinsically
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linked to the pragmatic resolution of the problems experienced by entrepreneurs that derived 
from exigencies arising in the organisation of the means of production. Also, as previously 
noted, accounting is rooted in the epistemological conventions of positivist science and 
thereby constitutes the world from that perspective. Central to positivist epistemology is the 
manipulation of variables in order to predict and thereby cause or prevent the manifestation 
of phenomena; that is, it potentially lays the foundation for "instrumental control" and the 
consequent rationalisation of modern life (see Fay, 1975, pp. 35-44).
In many substantive domains it was precisely because of the conceptual connection between 
positivism and technical control that gained this particular approach to science "institutional 
backing". It promised to provide the information necessary to organise and administer the 
people who participated in the increasingly complex productive enterprises (ibid., pp. 45- 
7). Furthermore, its inherent tendency for reification, that masked the conventional and 
anthropocentric nature of its descriptive, explanative and predictive schemata provided a 
veneer of value neutrality and epistemological privilege to discourse. According to Fay, the 
resultant "policy science" is supportive of those dominant in the status quo since its operation
" . . .  presupposes that those employing this approach, or their agents, have the 
power to manipulate variables to produce the results in the way policy science 
calls for, and thus it is only useful to those who have control over the relevant 
variables".
(ibid., p. 62)
But, as has been argued, a deterministic interpretation of the above must be eschewed for 
there is nothing inevitable about a body of knowledge that displays those characteristics being 
adopted by such elites. Such characteristics may be necessary, but alone they are not 
sufficient. What mediates the eventual outcome is the "fate" of the "carrier-group" (see Law 
and Lodge, 1984).
To summarise in the case of accounting in the U.K., the manner in which accountants
initially gained the power to proffer their distinctive remedies to entrepreneurs was in the
to
sphere of "surplus value allocation" in the form of aiding external sources of capital(find
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productive investments and then monitoring the utilisation of that capital with particular 
regard to evaluating the failure to extract or realise sufficient surplus value, as well as 
developing the means to deal with "dead" capitals (Armstrong, 1985b, p.5). Having secured 
this position of importance within the processes of surplus value allocation accountants were 
then able to propagate solutions to, and definitions of, the problems that assailed business, 
during World War I and its aftermath, that entailed techniques and knowledge that they had 
possessed for sometime but which had been ignored in practice by entrepreneurs. These 
factors enabled the accounting profession to extend its mandate to the sphere of the 
"extraction of surplus value" (Armstrong, ibid., p. 10). In later years the growing adoption 
of the multi-divisional form of organisation to handle the control problems arising from the 
increasing concentration of capital further served to expand and consolidate the domain of 
the accountant in respect of providing a means of internal corporate control. Clearly a vital 
component in the history of British accounting was the seizure by accountants of strategic 
positions from which they could promulgate their definitions of reality and their distinctive 
remedies to consequently identified "problems". This served to extend the application of 
accounting controls as well as increase the presence of accountants in managerial hierarchies 
(Hannah, 1976, p. 88). Accompanying these events was the professionalisation and 
differentiation of accounting into specialist roles regarding the preparation of financial 
accounts, the presentation of internal financial information, and the management of corporate 
liquidity and structure. To some extent these developments provided fertile ground for the 
further development of accounting knowledge. Thus accounting procedures became 
increasingly formalised and codified; with each differentiation, as demonstrated specifically 
in regard to financial accounting by Davis et al (1982), evolving its own imagery that 
reflected its own content and in turn enabled sense to be made of that context as well as 
enabling the reflexive shaping of that context (ibid., p. 316). Embroiled in these 
developments was a growing objectification and abstraction of accounting knowledge. This 
might be conceptualised as a . . .
" . . .  condition for the possibility of the professionalisation of accounting and
that professionalisation in turn changes the conditions underlying the
elaboration and development of accounting knowledge".
(Burchell et al., 1980, p. 8)
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In conclusion it follows that the apparent ascendency in British managerial and administrative 
hierarchies of accountants and their techniques, is by no means an inevitable outcome of the 
development of the British economy, yet neither is it serendipitous. The efficacy of the 
techniques that accountants possess for controlling the allocation, extraction and realisation 
of surplus value in the "Global Function of Capital" (Carchedi, 1977; Johnson, 1980) does not 
in itself explain their hegemony. As argued, crucial was the fate of the "carrier group". In 
the case of accountants in the U.K., their prior establishment of a power-base in the 
processes of surplus value allocation enabled infiltration of other entrepreneurial decision­
making processes. Thus they secured a position from which they could impose their own 
definitions of reality upon entrepreneurial cognitions to the extent that whatever crises 
occurred were interpreted from an accounting orientation and out of these constructs 
accountants were able to sponsor and propagate their own characteristic solutions. Therefore 
accountants were able to impose their own particular "policy science" (and incidentally, a 
"psychic prison") by being able to define problems and objectives in their own distinctive 
fashion and determine desirable technical courses of action to resolve those problems or 
achieve those objectives in a practically adequate yet fallible manner.
As Feyearabend (1988) has observed in regard to natural science, the above might cause ". . 
. citizens to take their cue from experts, not from independent though t.. ." (ibid, p. 11) and 
if so, the effect might be an increasing centralisation of power that ". . . breeds slavery, 
though a slavery packaged in resounding liberation phrases . . . "  (ibid., p. 12). This potential 
is reinforced when, as in accounting, the "expert" lays claim to universally valid and binding 
knowledge.
The dominant perspective in accounting, that of the accountant as impartial purveyor of 
"facts", has arisen thanks to the tendency amongst practitioners and academics to abstract 
their knowledge from its social, economic and institutional contexts (Hopwood, 1985). Such 
an abstraction is often enabled by implicit or explicit invocation of positivist doctrine. 
Indeed accounting shares with other substantive domains, a concern to "improve" business,
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a belief in the efficacy of laboratory derived "scientific methods" for improving management 
performance and enabling the creation of the "professional" expert. These scientistic 
pretensions must be replaced with a recognition that accounting, like any body of knowledge, 
is inextricably infused with "interests", and in its present form represents one of numerous 
possible rationalities for representing situations (see Hines, 1988; Thompson, 1987).
Accounting Knowledge and Interests
Although the work of both Armstrong (1985a; 1985b) and Loft (1985) illustrates an almost 
serendipitous aspect to the success of accountants’ initial penetration of managerial 
hierarchies; it is evident that what was being promulgated by accountants was adopted by 
entrepreneurs because, in the form that it was constituted (i.e. marginalism), it had an 
identity with the protection and furtherance of their perceived interests. Perhaps, as Barnes 
has noted with respect to other substantive domains (1977, p. 29), interests act as a filter upon 
experience - they intensify the investigation of some aspects of social and economic 
relationships yet cause others to be ignored. To some extent this returns this work to a closer 
consideration of the second aspect of Webers’ notion of "elective affinity" - the nature of the 
"ideas" being selected.
As the prior review of Tinker’s work demonstrates, a significant element in modern 
accountings’ epistemological heritage is an adherence to a "marginalist theory of value". This 
provides a "theory of representation" (Thompson, 1987, pp. 532-3) that links the domain of 
value with the domain of money. For Thompson, money is the . . .
" . . .  phenomenal form of value, enabling values to appear and to be realised 
via their monetary price; to be represented".
(ibid, p. 533)
From this perspective Thompson considers that a firm ’s accounts might be seen as a system 
of signs that convey meaning -but they are sources of signifiers that have been "stabilised"
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by being inserted into a particular "gaze" which in turn has been "institutionally set" (ibid., 
p. 534). Thompson demonstrates, through analysis of recent debates regarding inflation 
accounting, how in such "stabilisation" interests play an important role in influencing the 
particular "gaze" that is adopted by directing accounts towards congruence with achievement 
of particular objectives consistent with those interests (ibid., p. 536).
This "gaze" accords prominence and visibility to particular aspects of "organisation life", 
making them available for inspection and evaluation; and thus provide a means by which 
superiors in an organisational hierarchy might discipline and control those in subordinate 
positions. So the gaze adopted defines what is important by promoting particular patterns of 
visibility and hence surveillance (Loft, 1985, p. 6) that embody particular objectives and 
interests while submerging other potential "gazes". Thus for Tinker (1985) while accounting 
is socially conditioned by a theory of value derived from marginalism, accounting is 
reflexively socially conditioning since it restricts reciprocal relationships in exchanges to a 
visibility that incorporates market values.4 Tinker illustrates that there is nothing immutable 
or primordial about accounting by articulating an alternative value basis for accounting 
derived from Marx’s "labour theory of value"; this would result in exchange taking place on 
the basis of exchanged products containing equal amounts of "embodied labour". In turn this 
would create an accounting "gaze" that, far from restricting analysis of financial impact to 
parties immediately concerned with a venture, would . . .
". . . allow us to expand the terrain of analysis to examine alienating and 
appropriative social relations underlying the business enterprise".
(1985), p. 146)
By changing the theory of value that underpins accounting, a new "image" of reality is 
disclosed that would transform what might appear as quite profitable relationships on a 
conventional accounting financial statement to a concern to reveal
". . . whether the underlying transactions represent equal exchanges or 




The thrust of Tinker and his collaborators’ work is that concepts of value are not socially 
neutral, rather they are socially conditioned and conditioning, they promote patterns of 
visibility that are essentially partisan. They therefore attempt to develop a new role for the 
accountant conditioned by a "gaze" derived from an alternative conception of value, that is 
in turn based upon an alternative set of knowledge-constituting interests.
It might be inferred from this work that why Tinker’s "labour theory of value", which in 
Thompson’s terms (1987) would constitute an alternative "theory of representation", has not 
been incorporated into the value basis of accounting is because the form that accounting takes 
is ultimately tied to the social conditions in which it has arisen - in the case of contemporary 
accounting, capitalism. So a "labour theory of value" is not the basis of accounting because; 
labour itself has become a commodity which is bought and sold on the market, also labour 
has lost control over the product of its labour as well as the means of production, and finally 
the "capitalist class" has the power to establish exchange values that are not proportional to 
the amount of embodied labour in the products (see Tinker, 1985, pp. 139-140). Thus the 
social and economic contexts in which modern accounting has arisen are inappropriate for the 
development of this alternative to marginalism. Moreover, the way in which accounting has 
reflexively socially conditioned its milieux denies and prevents alternatives from emerging 
in orthodox accounting practices; alternatives such as a "labour theory of value" are excluded 
or hidden by accounting’s "primary theoretical categories" (Lehman and Tinker, 1987, p. 576), 
yet this evident partiality is achieved in a manner in which the knowledge produced is 
accorded "truth status". Accounting systems and practitioners have acquired the status of 
"truth producers" (Bailey, 1985; Loft, 1985); they provide what is perceived as legitimate 
knowledge about organisational and societal activities untainted by partisan allegiances. It 
is in this appearance wherein lies much of the power of accounting.
The ensuing conduct of the accounting profession has done little to change this situation. In 
particular, the accounting profession has failed to adopt forms of practice that would reveal 
the contradictions and inequities that pervade modern society (Cooper and Sherer, 1984).
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Thus conventional accounting and reporting models are limited to a focus on private costs 
and benefits while social costs and benefits are ignored. As Freedman and Stagliano (1985) 
illustrate, by excluding social costs, such as the harmful psychological and physiological 
effects of production processes upon employees from the enterprise’s reckoning of product 
costs, forms of visibility are engendered that result in employees bearing a disproportionate 
amount of these costs without compensation. At the same time the . . .
"infelicities associated with an inequitable distribution of income are dissolved
in the preparation of accounting statements".
(Bailey, 1985, p. 2)
Yet the profession has contrived to conceal these features through its pretence of serving 
the "public interest" by claiming to provide an impartial and objective portrayal of economic 
reality that renders a "true and fair" view of the enterprise. A claim that, to all intents and 
purposes has evaded public scrutiny (Wilmott 1985a). Indeed for Bailey (ibid) the 
development of accounting, as a battery of techniques that aids entrepreneurs in the conduct 
of their affairs, has resulted in accounting absorbing a "business ethic" that posits an identity 
between the interests of private capital and social welfare. Such an ethic assumes the unitary 
nature of societal interests and that monolith is directly expressed by the concerns and 
interests of the business community (see Wilmott, 1985b, pp. 10-11).
However, it might be unwise to over-deterministically reduce accounting in practice to a 
mere "tool" of the interests hegemonic in modern capitalist society. There are three main 
aspects to this issue.
Firstly it would be inappropriate to propose a relationship between interests and knowledge 
provision of a stimulus-response quality. For instance there may be a dichotomy between the 
provision of appropriate interest-laden "gazes" or "images" by the accounting profession(s) 
and the developing and changing needs and objectives of hegemonic interests. Thus the 
processes of change are mediated by the subjectivity of accounting practitioners and 
consequently their fallible perceptions of current problems, imperatives and their solutions
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(see Gilling, 19786; Wells, 1976) and the pervasive possibility of substantive irrationality 
(Higgins and Clegg, 1988, p. 71).
Secondly, not all aspects of accounting’s epistemic structure are useful to patrons. A recent 
example of this selectivity is to some extent provided by Whitley (1986). Here he investigates 
the dominant characteristics of "financial economics" as an intellectual field and the 
contextual factors that have shaped its recent emergence in accounting. Financial economics 
employs reductionist and utilitarian assumptions, particularly regarding investor behaviour, 
that allow for the generation of idealised models palpably divorced from the results of 
empirical research. In this fashion an analytical cohesion based upon empirical ambiguity 
developed. Despite this dichotomy, the "leaders" of the nascent financial economics managed 
to claim "positive" scientific status for their programme (ibid., pp. 176-188) - rhetoric 
embodying appeals to objectivity, technical competence and independence. Whitley explains 
the successful emergence of financial economics in terms of its evident "usefulness to 
financial institutions" (ibid, p. 188). This usefulness derives from the knowledge and skills 
it imparts in respect of investment analysis and management, skills that could be used 
separately from (and despite) the abstract, empirically vacuous, theories of investor behaviour 
and markets. The latter did however serve to bolster "financial economics" by provision of 
an apparently scientific reputational system.
Finally, it is important to note that both Burchell et al (1980, 1985) and Berry et al (1985) 
have argued that the actual organisational context of accounting practice is complicated by 
the operation of a heterogeneity of economic, social and political interests and influences. 
Burchell et al (ibid) consider accounting judgements to be inherently socially contingent, 
rather than the outcome of an epistemological rationality. This leads them to consider that 
rather . . .
". . . than the consequences of accounting systems being determined by their
mere existence, they are now seen as stemming from those organisational
processes which given them their particular meaning and significance."
(Burchell, et al., 1980, p. 12)
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In a similar vein, the controversial ethnography of Berry et al (ibid.) of the accounting 
practices in an Area of the N.C.B. found those procedures to be highly influenced by the 
culture prepotent in that organisational segment. Essentially this created a situation in which 
management control was "production-led” and finance was reduced mainly to a "clerical" and 
"rationalising" role. Particularly, accounting’s inherent malleability and ambiguity were 
sufficient to enable direction towards ex post facto decision confirmation and legitimation 
(ibid, p. 15) while impressing "external bodies" that accounting norms and conventions were 
being followed (ibid., pp. 22-3). However they conclude that due to a changing government 
philosophy and its consequent intervention in the management structure of the N.B.C., the 
finance function might gain new power and visibility in its relationship to production, 
particularly in regard to justifying and evaluating decisions and policies (ibid., p. 24). Thus 
the inherent ambiguity and malleability of accounting data (see also Cooper et al., 1981) that 
often remains latent beneath a facade of objectivity, not only at the level of public testimony 
but also in the psyche of practitioners, opens up the possibility for manipulation and variable 
interpretation.
Although Burchell et al (1980) admit a lack of knowledge pertaining to the functioning of 
accounting systems in practice, they proceed to theoretically investigate the relationship 
between accounting information and the decision-making contexts in which it is provided. 
They map possible variations in the use of accounting information given combinations of 
contextual variables (specifically degrees of uncertainty of cause and effect and uncertainty 
regarding objectives). In a later paper (Burchell, et al., 1985) this theme is elaborated by 
their consideration that the "accounting constellation" is not monolithic and hence cannot be 
intelligible in terms of an "unambiguous governing principle, role of character" (ibid., p. 402). 
Thus they would agree with Tinker’s (1988) contention that accounting is both "socially 
conditioned and socially conditioning" in t h a t . . .
"the social, or the environmental . . .  passes through accounting. Conversely
accounting ramifies, extends and shapes the social".
(ibid., p. 385)
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But underlying their analysis is the implication that the socio-historical influences upon the 
forms that accounting takes in practice derive from a complex interplay of diverse 
institutions and processes (ibid., p. 408). In this they appear to consider that no one interest 
is paramount and hence a theory, such as that of Tinker, which considers one sectional 
interest to be hegemonic is, ipso facto, incorrect.
Implicit in this argument is the invocation of the following assumptions: firstly, that
accounting data is so malleable it can be marshalled in the service of any perceived interests 
while remaining within generally accepted accounting principles; and secondly, a putative 
pluralist model of society and its institutions underpins their speculations and implies equal 
opportunity and power, amongst societies’ diverse interest groups, to influence not only 
contemporary accounting practices but also the historical formulation of the accounting 
conventions that delimit the contours of practice.
In regard to the second set of assumptions it is important to initially note, even from Burchell 
et als own work, that many groups, because of their horizontal and vertical organisational 
location, are effectively excluded from the opportunity to manipulate accounting data in a 
fashion consonant with their perceived interests. As far as the prime focus of this work is 
concerned, D.A.I., it is unlikely that the information disclosed has been available to the prior 
influence and manipulation of employee interest groups. Rather other organisational interests 
are likely to be prepotent in, and constitute, that information. Thus the importance of the 
malleability of accounting data tends to recede when considering the effects of D.A.I., since 
one party in that interaction is effectively excluded from influencing the version of reality 
that is proposed.
Yet it must be accepted that, at least potentially, there is indeed a heterogeneity of interests 
that might impact upon accounting in its organisational context. However those which have 
the most significant influence, both historically and presently, in terms of the ’’visibility" or 
"gaze" that is "stabilised", will in turn be influenced by the distribution of power in society 
and its institutions. Unless it can be assumed that organisations have a symbiotic relationship
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with a pluralist society, it must be concluded that particular socio-economic groups will have 
a greater degree of influence than others in this knowledge-constituting process, and thereby 
effectively delimiting the kinds of "visibility” that might be engendered.
Now at this point it might be possible to venture into a discourse that questions the veracity 
of a pluralist model of society. But I consider it to be rather fruitless to reproduce the 
essentially irreconcilable pluralist vs. radical debates about the nature of society. These 
debates have always depended upon both "sides" appeal to, implicitly and explicitly, a theory 
neutral observational language. The latter underpins their marshalling of empirical evidence 
in support of their differing propositions about modern society. Such empiricism essentially 
masks what is at issue in that discourse; the differing assumptions about the nature of society 
which the "antagonists" bring to bear in their interpretation of data. As I have consistently 
attempted to argue in this work, the epistemic subject comes to his/her substantive domain 
with a web of assumptions, some of which pertain to the nature of the society in which 
he/she lives (see Burrell and Morgan, 1979, pp. 10-20). In this respect, Burchell, Tinker, and 
myself are no different. To argue that empirically there is more evidence to support a 
Radical view of society, and hence side with Tinker, would be somewhat disloyal to the 
orientation of this work. Rather I side with Tinker because the paradigmatic assumptions 
regarding the nature of society that underpin my mode of engagement are similar to his. 
That is, this thesis is informed by, and rooted in a "sociology of radical change" (see Burrel 
and Morgan, ibid) which perceives society as characterised by deep seated modes of 
domination, exploitation and deprivation resulting in inevitable conflict. Hence it is 
characterised by a concern to explain these modes of domination and exploitation so as to 
enable human emancipation from the conditions which limit and stunt human development 
and potential.
Now, having "laid my cards on the table" and noted the perhaps incommensurable 
paradigmatic "gulf" between this work and that of scholars such as Burchell, it is important 
to draw the reader’s attention to what I consider to be a further problem with Burchell et al’s 
approach.
189
As has been argued throughout this chapter, the contours of accounting’s malleability have 
been historically constituted by an over-arching shareholder interest - the encoding of this 
interest into accounting knowledge effectively stabilises and limits the "gaze" and renditions 
of reality that accounting knowledge and practices might produce. This, of course, does not 
mean that accounting data is the only rationality, or the most effective rationality, for 
controlling productive enterprises in accord with such interests. Alternatives were and are 
available (see Salaman, 1982), but accounting historically "won the battle" with these 
ideological competitors, thus enabling accountants to sponsor their own characteristic means 
of controlling the rest of the managerial hierarchy and ultimately the labour process in accord 
with the shareholder interest, in many organisations in the U.K. and U.S.A. (Armstrong 
1985a; 1985b); though apparently by no means in all (Berry et al., 1985). But this does not 
mean that there is a deterministic one-way relationship between the knowledge-constituting 
interests that underpin accounting knowledge and everyday organisational accounting 
practices. Perhaps such interest-constituted knowledge is best conceived as a cultural 
resource in such practices and not a direct determinant.
Useful in elaborating this conjecture is the application by Roberts and Scapens (1985) of 
Giddens’ concept of "structuration" (1976, 1979) in their analysis of accounting and their 
consequent differentiation of the "system of accounting" from "systems of accountability". 
In this they argue that the "accounting system" is best considered as an "abstract potential", 
as a . . .
". . . body of rules and resources which are drawn upon in the practice of 
accounting. However how and why and in what way they are drawn upon will 
vary over time from situation to situation and from person to person."
(ibid., p. 447)
How this body of rules and resources is used by members, the system "in use" that is 
embodied in organisation practices, is termeithe "system of accountability" by Roberts and 
Scapens. This provides the "binding of organisational time and space" by "dividing the flow 
of organisational life" both temporally and physically. In doing so it draws up and thereby
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reproduces the generative rules and resources of the "accounting system" (ibid, pp. 447-8) in 
a dialectical manner. Thus the relationship between these phenomena is analogous to Giddens 
example of everyday speech and language (1979) in a community of speakers. That is, the 
structural properties of the "accounting system" (language) are both the medium and the 
outcome of the "system of accountability" (everyday speech) in that such practices (everyday 
speech) constitute and are constituted by that "accounting system" (language).
Such structurahproperties can be analytically differentiated into three "fundamental elements" 
(Giddens, 1976, p. 104); meaningfulness (signification), moral order (legitimation) and the 
operation of power relations (domination). Therefore any social interaction can be 
understood as involving members drawing upon and thereby reproducing these elements.
In respect of accounting, its discourse might firstly be regarded as a structure of shared 
meaning which reduces data about a whole variety of organisational situations to a common 
and hence comparative form that "conditions rather than determines" (Roberts and Scapens, 
ibid., p. 451) accounting practices and in that practice the structures of meaning evolve and 
change. Secondly accounting practice involves the communication of a set of values, a moral 
order expressed in terms of norms that enable sense-making of events and which invoke a 
complex system of rights and obligations supported by sanctions. Thus by . . .
". . . providing a common language and a definition of mutual rights and 
obligations, accounting allows for organisation".
(ibid., p. 449)
As Roberts and Scapens demonstrate, this brings us to the third aspect -  that superiors in the 
above relationship seek to dominate subordinates through imposition of their definitions of 
what is expected, and of what has happened, and of whom is responsible. In this way 
systems of accountability work as systems of domination
". . .  through imposing a particular framework of categories upon organisation 
members . . .  the real power of accounting perhaps lies in the way in which, 
as a structure of meaning, it comes to define what shall and shall not count 
as significant within an organisation."
(ibid., p. 450)
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It is evident that accounting practice entails a concern with the technical prediction and 
control of members’ behaviour. How this is achieved involves a dialectical relationships with 
the "abstract potential" of the "accounting system". Whilst those practices are not determined 
by that system, it is that system that might be conceived, given the foregoing socio-historical 
analysis, as having encoded into its generative rules and resources articulations of the 
shareholder or entrepreneurial interest. This conceptualisation allows for some autonomy for 
accounting practice from the "accounting system", as well as for the operation of a more 
heterogeneous set of interests in that practice, given perhaps inevitable dislocations. But just 
as it would be ludicrous to postulate a complete autonomy for everyday speech from 
language, and still expect intersubjectivity, it is equally bizarre to ignore the limits placed 
upon "systems of accountability" by the "accounting system". If there were no such limits to 
practice there would be little to prevent an accounting practitioner to discard the marginalist 
basis of modern accounting and to proceed to present accounting statements for audit derived 
from a labour theory of value. If this were to occur the reaction of the auditor, not to 
mention the employer and the Accounting Standards Steering Committee, would be 
interesting to say the least! The practitioner would have violated the normative limits of 
intelligibility and acceptability deriving from the "accounts system" and it would be doubtful 
that the nomenclature "true and fair" would be forthcoming, nor the future employment 
prospects of the practitioner enhanced! Indeed in a candid articulation of the position of the
I.C.A.E.W., the anonymous author of a 1974 "position paper" stated . . .
"whether he serves management as an accountant or the shareholder as an 
auditor, the accountant accepts the determination of profit as a central core 
around which to hang all accounting concepts . . . few would dispute the 
assertion that when shareholders’ needs and the information requirements of 
others diverge, the needs of the former must take precedence."
(quoted in Jackson-Cox, et al., 1987, p. 31)
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Conclusion
From the foregoing analyses, it becomes apparent that accounting is not a mere assembly of 
calculative routines that neutrally reconstitute reality, rather it appears as a powerful 
mechanism of social and economic management that is inextricably interest-laden. As has 
been demonstrated accounting is mutable; it is an epistemological process contingent upon the 
socio-historical context of its production and assessment and thereby is infused with, and 
serves to operationalise, the economic and social interests hegemonic in any particular epoch. 
This is achieved by the provision of a "symbolic order" that allows for the construction and 
pursuit of those interests through enabling and constraining members* discourse and 
interaction by the encouragement of particular cognitive orders that serve as a means of 
orientation in social and economic management. The ensuing constructions of reality 
provided by accounting discourse masquerade as neutral, a performance facilitated by a 
lexicon that entails reification and promulgates notions of "public interest". This aura of 
facticity that surrounds accounting discourse serves to legitimate that discourse, but when it 
is brought into question it serves to lower the status and credibility of that discourse. Hence 
it is an aura that the profession is concerned to preserve and maintain. However there is 
another aspect to accounting: having priori^ gained phenomenological dominance as a means 
of portraying reality, through its everyday operation it reflexively acts back upon and serves 
to define, articulate, and organise interests - it socially conditions as well as being socially 
conditioning (Tinker, 1985).
In this I would agree with Tinker et al (1987) that accounting "re-presents" the world in a 
manner conducive "to the changing needs of capital accumulation" (ibid., p. 28). It is now 
important to consider the implications of this conclusion for the processes of D.A.I. in 
industrial relations contexts.
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Notes to Chapter V
1. Alternatively value neutrality might be maintained through reification of such goals 
or ends, thus making the goals or ends themselves appear neutral and/or the inevitable 
outcome of external exigencies.
2. Defined as the"transfer of use values i.e. the transfer of the capacity to affect human 
well-being" (Tinker, 1985, p. 82).
3. Defined as a "theory about the terms of exchange between producers under different 
social systems" (Tinker, 1985, p. 84).
4. The effects of and problems created by this restriction are demonstrated by Tinker 
(1985) in a series of case studies of financial scandals (e.g. Slater Walker) and the 
activities of a foreign mining company in an African country (1980).
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CHAPTER VI 
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR D.A.I.
"Colonial officials took it for granted that the natives would either learn the 
Master Language, or could be informed by interpreters . . .. The Master 
Language, applied in situations defined by the Masters, was the official 
medium of formulating, presenting and solving problems. Can we take it for 
granted that using indigenous means of establishing contact, an indigenous 
language and indigenous ways of solving problems would have led to the same 
solutions? To the same problems?
(Feyerabend, 1988, p. 81)
At one level it is evident that Accounting Information is inherently malleable although only 
within particular contours. As has been noted,this immanent potentiality has led many 
scholars to consider that, in practice, Accounting Information might be manipulated to justify 
and rationalise partial and a priori decisions while conferring upon those outcomes, in an ad 
hoc manner, an aura of legitimacy in the perceptions of various audiences (see: Pfeffer, 
1981; Richardson, 1987). Rarely are such portrayals of reality questioned since the imagery 
that is generated is morally congruent with the received virtues of rationality and efficiency. 
Moreover, their credibility is enhanced by its association with the disinterested "objective" 
professional who seemingly is concerned with "autonomous technical matters" (see Ellul, 
1964).
Douglas (1971) demonstrates how the ability to make apparently authoritative statements 
endows significant powers of control. In respect of organisations, such information purveys 
a powerful version of reality that defines members’ lives by making courses of action appear 
as a result of an irresistible logic and yet behind this "front" (Douglas, 1976; G off man, 1969) 
designed "to paint a specific image of itselP (Cicourel, 1958, p. 55) data are brought 
together...
". . . on the basis of characteristics that presumably are relevant to the 
purposes of the people constructing the information . . ."
(Douglas, 1971, p. 53)
For Goffman (ibid.) this "impression management" is maintained by "performers" who collude
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to present to an audience a given definition of the situation. This entails
. . a division into back region, where the performance of a routine is 
prepared, and front region, where the performance is presented. Access to 
these regions is controlled in order to prevent an audience from seeing 
backstage and prevent outsiders from coming into a performance that is not 
addressed to them. Among members of the team we find familiarity prevails, 
solidarity is likely to develop, and that secrets that could give a show away are 
shared and kept."
(ibid., p. 231)
Where "impression management" concerns the disclosure of accounting information to an 
audience, many of the "performers" will have been Ipriorly socialised into a professional 
ideology (accountancy). For Strausset al (1964) "professional ideologies" emerge from two 
processes. Firstly they are built into professional training. This training is never merely 
technical - it also is concerned with the establishment of identity and the acquisition of an 
understanding of what is important in the work setting - "a concept of priorities". Secondly
". . . the later circumstances under which professionals work tend to support 
ideological positions and usually encourage further development of what 
positions they originally held."
(ibid., p. 363)
Thus the accountant is socialised through training and subsequent experience into an ideology 
which has aspirations to facticity and scientificity and which confront the (re)producer as 
independent. It provides him /her with a comprehensive world view that carries its own 
morality and convictions and bestows upon the "world" a feeling of orderliness. For some 
commentators (e.g. Mason, 1980; Schein, 1984) this ideology serves the social purpose of
"abating and objectifying anxiety in a manner similar to the process of 
institutionalisation, rationalisation and the establishment of symbolic order . 
. . the role of the accounting profession in society is to absorb uncertainty 
and abate social anxiety".
(Mason, 1980, p. 29)
From the above it might be possible to conjecture that the socialised professional embroiled 
in the "impression management" of D.A.I. would suffer "cognitive dissonance" (Festinger,
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1957) due to the apparent gap between organisational practices and professional ideology. 
This implies that although "impression management" might occur thanks to the malleability 
of accounting data, the accounting actor generally might have recourse to rationalisation of 
those practices so as to avoid cognitive dissonance and the subsequent subjective feelings of 
ego-diminution. Clearly such a recourse is made available through the often touted notion 
of "professional judgement". The conceptual flexibility enabled by the latter might readily 
allow for accountants’ collusion in manipulating accounting information during "impression 
management" while preserving scientistic pretence and professional ethics.
By applying the above perspective, D.A.I. might be considered as a performance by 
competent actors so as to manipulate the phenomenological worlds of an employee audience 
by influencing the recipes of knowledge and typifications that they invoke in interpreting 
organisational reality and which constitute criteria for identifying and evaluating potential 
courses of action. However this is a performance that might be considered veracious by the 
performers; a technical and neutral history of organisational events that requires application 
of their professional judgement and expertise in its construction due to its complexity.
Again this work must return to the vexed issue of the degree of malleability inherent in 
accounting data. As has been noted, while accounting data are malleable and hence utilisable 
for the construction of "fronts" for "impression management" in D.A.I., the constellation of 
possibilities for the form that these fronts take, and the resultant impressions created, are 
limited. Particularly, accounting performers carry with them set of moral imperatives in the 
form of accounting conventions, into which they have been priorly socialised through a long 
period of training. As Feyerabend, with regard to a different context, comments
" . . .  a well trained rationalist will obey the mental image of his master, he will 
conform to the standards of argumentation he has learned, he will adhere to 
those standards no matter how great the confusion in which he finds himself, 
and he will be quite incapable of realising that what he regards as the voice 
of reason is but a causal after-effect of the training he has received."
(1975, p. 25)
While particular personality variables might increase an individuals’ susceptibility to, and
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suitability for, such "training" (see Adorno, et al., 1950) it is important to emphasise that the 
renditions of reality available in accounting discourse are limited by the knowledge- 
constituting interests that are the basis of accounting knowledge. In the hands of a skilled 
performer accounting information might be crafted to produce different "fronts" depending 
upon various perceived exigencies; but it is not infinitely flexible, rather it might only be 
shaped within the contours of the knowledge-constituting interests that bore on the historical 
genesis and development of modern accountancy. So that a "front" might manifest alternative 
interests, the basis of modern accounting would have to be changed. Indeed in reference to 
some of the D.A.I. research and literature, Tinker et al (1982) comment that albeit well 
intentioned, it needs
" . . .  a unifying and underlying theory of social value to situate the research
in an overall context of social conflict."
(ibid., p. 19)
Movement beyond the bounds set by the "accounting system" requires a fundamental 
reconstruction of, particularly, the value theory foundations of accounting. The resultant 
discourse would be virtually unrecognisable to modern day accounting practitioners. Thus 
whatever the particular impression intended by the performers, regardless of the particular 
nexus of perceived exigencies the performers attempt to accommodate, modern accounting 
conventions set the boundaries to this "creativity". Importantly such conventions set the "gaze" 
and hence define and categorise what is important in organisational reality, e.g. profit, loss, 
debit, credit, asset, liability, etc. (see Hines, 1988). The ensuing socially constructed 
accounting concepts, suitably "externalised" and "objectified" (Berger and Luckmann, 1967, 
pp. 78-9) make only particular aspects of organisation reality visible out of the myriad 
possible (given alternative modes of engagement).
The illumination of these conventionally prescribed segments is achieved at the expense of 
excluding alternatives, which remain invisible or penumbranic and thus unavailable for 
inspection. As such the agenda for discourse and decision-making is narrowed by confining 
it to particular, conventionally determined, issues. Agenda setting by the application of
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conventionally prescribed definitions and categories creates areas of "non-decisions" which 
result in the . . .
". . . suppression or thwarting of a latent or manifest challenge to the values 
or interests of the decision-maker . . ."
(Bachrach and Baratz, 1970, p. 44)
It follows that D.A.I., by setting the decision-making agenda by imposing a compulsory 
visibility on some aspects of organisational reality, while conversely engendering an 
invisibility on others, potentially sets the boundaries for what is negotiable by only making 
those visibilities apprehendable to participants. Thus D.A.I. might contribute to shaping 
participants understanding of what is important. The partiality of these perceptions may 
serve to limit discourse to relatively "safe issues" (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962, p. 948), in 
terms of the interests encoded into accounting, while preserving an appearance of facticity 
and immutability. Conceiving D.A.I. as a vehicle for non-decision making and agenda setting 
directs attention to
". . . the ways in which "issues" are actually constructed in particular settings 
. . .  in terms of the rationality of the setting . . . "
(Clegg, 1975, p. 27)
This leads to a consideration of the "rationality" prepotent in actors’ phenomenological 
worlds, to which they refer and defer in their construction of meaningful action, as well as 
the "structure of domination" that such a construction and orientation reflects (ibid., pp. 56- 
66). Moreover, as Lukes (1974) has argued, the development of ideological hegemony is not 
only achieved by the processes noted by Bachrach and Baratz (1962; 1970). While D.A.I. 
might be seen as attempts, conscious and intended, or otherwise, of agenda setting; it might 
also be considered as a process whereby the very preferences and cognitions of the audience 
are shaped in the first instance. The outcome being that they
". . . accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they can 
see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and 
unchangeable."
(Lukes 1974, p. 24)
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Thus D.A.I. might be considered as another element in the prevalent cultural bias endemic 
in capitalist society (see also Willis, 1977) that engenders an ideology which .. .
. .  cause the employee interests to accept management’s shaping of the main 
structure long before they reach the negotiating table."
(Fox, 1973, p. 219)
In this sense both the performers and the audience contribute to the outcome through their 
interaction. The form that such power takes is essentially "dyadic" in that it invokes . . .
". . . the self-understandings of the powerless as well as the powerful . . ..
Power, like all social interactions of active beings, is rooted in part in the 
reflections and will of those interacting . . ."
(Fay, 1987, p. 130)
It follows that the manifestation of this form of power in the social context of D.A.I. does not 
necessarily have the conspiratorial element often "implicit in G off man’s dramaturgical 
perspective (1969). Rather, as Clegg has also noted (1975) in respect of agenda setting and 
non-decision making, and as argued by Lukes in regard to the "third dimension of power" 
(1974), the . . .
". . . bias of the system can be mobilised and reinforced in ways that are 
neither consciously chosen nor the intended result of particular individuals 
choices . . . "
(Lukes, 1974, p. 21)
Thus D.A.I. might weave into the audience’s consciousness conceptions of the status quo as 
being in some sense rational or inevitable. Particular avenues for discourse and negotiation 
are thereby eliminated and the audience become entrapped within a "psychic prison"(Morgan, 
1986) that takes as legitimate, rather than threatens, the social, political and economic 
interests vested in that status quo. As Fay, in a different but related context, has commented
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. . their language and their understanding of themselves and their society 
would consist of concepts which reflected this illusion, but they would know 
nothing about this because they would have neither the vocabulary nor the 
perspective to discuss the true relationships; they would think their 
relationships ... had to be the way they were, that they were natural and 
‘given’".
(Fay, 1975, pp. 62-3)
Once members accept, in their construction of action, particular modes of rationality that 
makes that action meaningful, they are provided with a rationale for judging why certain 
actions are normal or abnormal, acceptable or unacceptable. In this way hegemonic 
domination is constituted. For Williams such domination might be conceived as . . .
". . . an order in which a certain way of life and thought is diffused 
throughout society in all its institutional and private manifestations, informing 
with all its spirit all taste, morality, customs, relations and political principles, 
particularly in their intellectual and moral connotations."
(1960, p. 587)
By signifying what is normal and routine, hegemony as a subtle form of power, is not 
exercised as such, rather it influences members’ capacity for action - it pervades everyday 
life by being unquestioned and unchallenged (Clegg, 1979, pp. 84-86).
Thus while at one level D.A.I. might be perceived as attempts by skilful performers to dupe 
an audience by "giving ofP  particular signals; at another, related level, D.A.I. might be 
conceived as part of a wider process of hegemonic domination in that it serves to help 
inculcate a particular "way of life and thought". In this, the status quo, or particular 
innovations, become considered as inevitable and necessary rather than conventional and 
mutable. In this respect perhaps Richardson (1987) is correct when he claims that 
accountants, in Gramsci’s terms, might be seen as a group of "traditional intellectuals" 
through whom hegemony is mediated. In a context more specific to D.A.I., Willmott alludes 
to the possible success of these processes. He considers that potentially powerful organised 
interest groups in society such as Trade Unions, seem to have . . .
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" . . .  accepted the received wisdom that accounts are basically ‘technical’ and ‘neutral’ 
and, therefore, have not made a political issue of the scope and content of [. . . 
accounting . . .] standards or of the accountability of their setters . .
(1985b, p. 19)
D.A.I. and Control of Labour
Much of the "Labour Process" literature has had a concern to "correct" or elaborate 
Braverman’s original thesis (1974). This had often created a narrow focus upon scientific 
management, and consequent de-skilling, as the main vehicle for making labour tractable. 
Generally the argument that is pursued contends that prior forms of work organisation, which 
had relied upon internal subcontracting or traditional craft control, failed to enable "the full 
subordination of labour" that is immanent in the advent of scientific management and its de­
skilling dynamic (Braverman, 1974), pp. 63-4). Although the importance of scientific 
management and its various derivatives (see Littler, 1982) should not be underestimated given 
their potential for allowing collection of information on priorly "hidden" elements of work 
processes, thus enabling more intensive employment of labour, "Bravermania" tends to deflect 
attention from possible alternative solutions to control problems (Littler and Salaman, 1982) 
that employers might develop, intentionally or otherwise.
Particularly this preoccupation ignores the importance of "insidious control" (see Blau and 
Schoenherr, 1971) which propagates and reinforces particular value-premises that can shape 
members decision-making (see Hopwood 1974, pp. 24-51). As Anthony (1977) points out, a 
logical extension of control would be to exert influence over the values and beliefs of the 
workforce, so that the
". .. application of authority and power is no longer necessary in the 
achievement of the organisation’s goals, because the goals have been 
internalised by those who are to pursue them".
(1977, p. 258)
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This "ideological recruitment" (Brannen et al., 1976) may be part of a control strategy aimed 
at establishing "Responsible Autonomy". As Friedmann argues
"The responsible autonomy strategy attempts to harness the adaptability of 
labour power by giving workers leeway and by encouraging them to adapt to 
changing situations in a manner beneficial to the firm. To do this, top 
managers give them status, autonomy and responsibility, and trv to win their 
lovaltv to the firms ideals (the competitive struggle) ideologically" (my 
emphasis) (Friedman 1977, p. 5)
Ogden and Bougen draw attention to how accounting information disclosure may be an 
ideological input to such a strategy . . .
"In creating a new basis for managerial authority, management can utilise the 
disclosure of information as a means of emphasising the technical nature of 
problems confronting the organisation and the role of management as technical 
experts seeking technical solutions. Within such a framework the conflict 
inherent in collective bargaining may be dissolved into a search for mutually 
satisfying outcomes in which the only salient imperatives are those of 
efficiency, technology and the market . . .. Thus accounting information 
may be used as a means of socialising Trade Unions into endorsing the 
primacy of market criteria for management decision-making. Disclosure, 
therefore could solve the dual purpose of simultaneously informing and 
manipulating trade unions".
(1985, p. 221)
Indeed some empirical support for Ogden and Bougen’s contentions is provided by Jackson- 
Cox et al (1984) who found that systematic selective disclosure of information to Trade 
Unions was associated with management’s concern to engender in employees and their 
representatives an identification with the company, or some segment of the enterprise, or part 
of its activities (p. 257). Such employee identification was perceived to be important by the 
relevant management because it provided away of transcending sectional interests and of 
providing an alternative to identification with the trade union movement. Thus it aimed to
" . . .  fix employee’s consciousness on the nature of the enterprise, so that they 
are more aware of the vicissitudes of the business situation, and consequently 
will adapt a more ‘co-operative’ and ‘responsible’ attitude to the need for 
changes in technology and working practices, and be more willing to 
relinquish restrictive practices. In this sense, an employee identification 
policy, linked to disclosure of information, could be seen as a stratagem to 
undermine the trade unions, thus effectively trading general class 
identification for identification with enterprise."
(ibid, p. 271)
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From the above it is evident that D.A.I. might be conceived in terms of management 
attempting to maintain ideological hegemony both by "agenda setting" and by influencing the 
preferences and cognitions of hierarchical subordinates. But it is important to avoid 
determinism in this understanding of D.A.I. This point is made by Burrell (1987) in a critique 
of Tinker and Neimark (1987). In this Burrell agrees that accounting information might be 
supportive of particular partisan views; however he argues that Tinker and Neimark assume 
that accountants
" . . .  transmit the encoded message to the audience . . .  as a power play through 
which the recipient, on decoding the message, will become better influenced 
and more controlled".
(ibid., p. 91)
Burrell considers that firstly such information is "self-directed", that is, it is a legitimation 
to the authors of their own actions; secondly, and perhaps even more importantly (from the 
point of view of my work) Burrell implies that the "readership" does not automatically 
respond in the sense of the above quote. To impute such a stimulus-response relationship 
would imply a determinism in the decoding process that is illegitimate. Here it appears that 
Burrell considers that individuals act towards accounting information on the basis of the 
meanings they attach to such a phenomena (see Blumer, 1969). It is these socially mediated 
interpretive processes that led to a variability in outcome that makes the deterministic 
orientation of Tinker and Neimark misconceived.
In the respect of D.A.I., Burrell’s arguments beg several questions, questions f which this 
thesis must now address: who are the interpreters, what kinds of interpretation do they 
construct, what are the influences upon those interpretations and what are the implications 
of these variable constructions for the processes and outcomes of D.A.I.?
In Chapter 11 attempted to deal with the first of the above questions by an analysis of the 
strategic location of senior shop stewards in D.A.I. However the remaining questions raise 
the issue of human subjectivity - the creative activity of human beings by which versions of
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reality, upon which action is founded, are constructed by individuals and groups (see 
Lefebvre, 1972). To deal with this issue it is necessary to consider how I might make this 
"problem" methodologically tractable.
Making the "Problem” Methodologically Tractable
In order to develop practically adequate theory pertaining to the nature of and influences 
upon senior shop stewards’ interpretation of accounting phenomena, the model developed in 
Chapter III will be followed. The starting point for this process is the generation of 
methodologically corroborated theory-laden accounts of those elements of the shop stewards’ 
phenomenological worlds.
In the investigation of multiple meaning systems, or the "counter realities" that may compete 
with one another, Smircich (1983) identifies three main approaches available for eliciting 
what Spradley (1980) terms "cultural knowledge": observation, reports from informants, and 
the researcher’s participation in the setting. These ethnographic techniques, regardless of the 
tactical "field" or "social" role (Junker, 1960) adopted by the researcher exploit . . .
".. . the capacity that any social actor possesses for learning new cultures and 
the objectivity to which this process gives rise. Even where he or she is 
researching a familiar group or setting, the participant observer is required 
to treat it as anthropologically "strange" in an effort to make explicit the 
assumptions he or she takes for granted as a culture member. In this way the 
culture is turned into an object for study"
(Hammersley and Atkinson, p. 8, 1983)
Often it is considered that ethnography has inherent advantages over positivistic research 
methodologies (e.g. laboratory experiments and surveys) which suffer from deficiencies in 
"ecological validity" (Brunswick 1956, Bracht and Glass 1968). That is, ethnographic 
research, unlike the other methodologies available to the researcher, takes place in the 
"natural" setting of the everyday activities of the subjects of investigation; this and the 
research procedures used, reduce contamination of the subjects’ behaviour by the researchers
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themselves and the methods they use for collecting data. Therefore, because of the 
ethnographer’s commitment to "naturalism", problems regarding ecological validity are 
supposedly substantially reduced since there is potentially lower reactivity on the part of the 
subjects to the researcher and the social context of the research. Therefore it is assumed 
that there is greater likelihood that the researcher’s statements about the subject of 
investigation are not artefacts of the methods and techniques used to collect data. It follows 
that in ethnographic research, it is in principle possible
". . . to isolate a body of data uncontaminated by the researcher, either by 
turning him or her into an automaton, or by making him or her a neutral 
vessel of cultural experience . . ."
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983, p. 14)
Thus in many versions of ethnography there is an obsession, similar to that in the nomothetic 
methodologies, to eliminate the effects of the researcher upon the data (although a very 
different set of strategies is adopted in attempting to achieve the goal). This objective has 
two important dimensions; firstly to eliminate reactivity by subjects to the researcher’s 
personal qualities and his/her research techniques, and secondly to eschew the idiosyncratic 
imposition of the researchers own frame of reference upon data. In respect of the latter 
aspiration it has been illustrated in Chapters II and III that the quest for knowledge 
isomorphic with reality is a chimera primarily because of the role of the epistemic subject.
Inevitably normative and existential presuppositions, often expressed as tacit theory-laden 
assumptions, lie behind and filter apparently factual judgements. As has been shown in prior 
discussion of ethnomethology it would appear that it is impossible for a researcher to 
pragmatically discard these values, theories and assumptions in a research context, indeed
". . . searches for empirical bedrock of this kind are futile; all data involve 
theoretical assumptions" (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983, p. 14)
Therefore one of the supposed strengths of rigorous inductive ethnography - the avoidance 
of the imposition of previously constructed theoretical and value laden schemes upon data,
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appears impossible.
While these problems may be intractable, there are also related problems in regard to the 
former aspiration of some ethnographers because
. . we are part of the world we study . . . This is not a methodological 
commitment, it is an existential fact. There is no way we can escape the social 
world in order to study it; nor fortunately is that necessary. We cannot avoid 
. . . having an effect on the social phenomena we study."
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983, p. 14-15)
Therefore the often vaunted advantage of ethnography over alternative research procedures, 
-  that of greater ecological validity due to studying social phenomena in their "natural 
context" thereby reducing subjects’ reactivity to the researcher and his/her distinctive data 
collection procedures, becomes problematical because the very presence of the ethnographer, 
regardless of his/her field role, affects the "phenomena we study" in various ways. However, 
Hammersley and Atkinson perceive this "problem" as having important implications for the 
practice of ethnography, in t h a t . . .
". . . instead of treating reactivity merely as a source of bias, we can exploit 
it. How people react to the presence of the researcher may be as informative 
as how they react to other situations." (1983, p. 15)
Hence there is a need for the ethnographer to be "reflexive"; rather than to attempt to 
eliminate the effects of the researcher upon the phenomena under investigation, the 
researcher should attempt to understand his/her own effect upon, and role in, the research 
setting and utilise this knowledge to elicit data. Therefore the social and interactive nature 
of ethnographic research becomes clear . . .
"Once we abandon the idea that the social character of research can be 
standardised out, or avoided by becoming a "fly on the wall" or a "full 
participant", the role of the researcher as an active participant in the research 
process becomes clear. He or she is the research instrument par excellence. 
The fact that behaviour and attitudes are often not stable across contexts, and 
that the researcher may play an important part in shaping the context becomes 
central to the analysis. Indeed it is exploited for all its worth".
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983, p. 18).
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Thus
"Rather than seeking, by one means or another to eliminate reactivity, its 
effects should be monitored, and as far as possible brought under control. 
By systematically modifying one’s role in the field, different kinds of data 
may be collected whose comparisons may greatly enhance interpretations of 
the social processes under study."
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983, p. 104)
It follows that these prescriptions revolve around the need for the ethnographer to be 
"reflexive" - that is he/she should attempt to understand the effects of his/her own field role 
upon subjects in the research setting. The "problem" of reactivity is thus converted into a 
research "tool" - the researcher attempts to shape aspects of the social context in which 
interaction takes place by manipulating dimensions of his/her research role to promote 
"controlled" types of reactivity.
The foregoing considerations are also commensurable with the related but different position 
adopted by Agar (1986). Agar demonstrates how any ethnography is at its core a process of 
mediating "frames of meaning" (ibid., pp. 11-19) as it emerges from and is limited, though 
not determined by, the interaction of the "traditions" of the ethnographer with the subjects 
of the ethnography and the intended audience for whom the account is reconstituted. He 
appears to consider that ethnographies are "tradition" or "theory" laden yet limited by the 
tolerance of the reality that is investigated. As such ethnography
" . . .  no longer claims to describe a reality accessible by anyone using the right 
methods, independent of the historical or cultural context of the act of
describing On the other hand, there is no justification for . . .  relativism
. . . [it] . . . is neither subjective nor objective. It is interpretive, mediating 
two worlds through a third . . .".
(ibid., p. 19)
Thus armed with a considerably modified ethnographic approach as a guide, it is now 
necessary to consider in more detail the strategy and tactics of making the "problem" 
tractable.
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The Research Strategy: Analytic Induction Through Life History Interviews
So as to investigate the relevant aspects of senior shop stewards’ phenomenological worlds, 
in a reflexive manner congruent with the intent of developing "grounded theory", an amalgam 
of Analytic Induction and Life History Interviews was considered appropriate. I shall now 
proceed to review the rationale underlying this decision.
Life History research is generally regarded as having a primary concern with the . . .
". . . phenomenal role of lived experience, with the ways in which members
interpret their own lives and the world around them . . ."
(Plummer, 1983, p. 67)
For some scholars this interpretive perspective comes close to allowing access to how 
individuals "create and portray" (Jones, 1983, p. 147) their social worlds. Significantly Life 
History Interviews avoid the problems that beset the "brisk interview" (Bulmer, 1975, p. 164) 
in which respondents might become constrained or impelled, by the structured prompts of 
the interviewer, to make statements which although fitting into the conceptual and theoretical 
proforma of the research, give little opportunity for the respondent to articulate the ways in 
which he/she conceptualises and understands his/her own "world". Although these issues are 
important for this research, my epistemological orientation is rather at odds with the 
isomorphic (e.g. Phillipson, 1972) or consensual (e.g. Johnson, 1975) validity criteria aspired 
to in the orthodox use of Life History Interviews. Such aims are eschewed: firstly, because 
it is impossible to create a genuinely unstructured and open-ended interview -  inevitably the 
researcher has a covert or otherwise agenda of topics and themes for exploration, hence a 
conceptual and theoretical "grid" remains immanent; secondly, as previously argued, the 
researcher as epistemic subject mediates subjects’ elicited accounts through the processes of 
the "double hermeneutic" (Giddens, 1976, p. 161-2).
Hence ,as Agar (1986) has observed about ethnography in general, the Life History Interview 
is an outcome of the social interaction between participants. As Smith comments, each
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contributes to the outcome:
. . the very act of questioning makes the interview joint production, and 
the . . .  [outcome]. . .  depends upon who is asking the questions as well as who 
is answering.”
(Smith, in McShane, 1978, p. 270)
So perhaps as Smith claims, a different interviewer would therefore have produced a 
different book, since presumably different conceptual schema would have organised and 
interpreted Harry McShane’s account.
But what will make this research even more different from the usual use of Life History 
Interviewing, will be its combination with the theoretical concerns of Analytic Induction. 
Although the former can "provoke, suggest and anticipate later theorisations" (Plummer, 1983, 
p. 124) the latter formalises this process and explicitly introduces theoretical concerns during 
actual fieldwork. Moreover, as Analytic Induction usually entails sampling according to 
emergent theoretical criteria, so as to enable theory development through comparison, some 
degree of "depth" is necessarily "traded off". Essentially these overt theoretical objectives 
militate against a more orthodox use of Life History interviewing, as exemplified by Shaw 
(1966) or Bogdan (1974), in which the outcome is in the form of comprehensive biographies 
of single subjects. At the same time, burgeoning resource constraints in terms of finance, 
time and occupational commitments, might compound what some commentators might 
perceive as an heterodoxy, if not an illegitimacy. Yet this issue of "depth" might be eased 
by my intention to focus only upon those aspects of respondents’ "worlds" relevant to my 
theoretical concerns: that is to generate and document individual accounts of lived-in social 
realities, specifically in respect of the role of accounting information in Collective 
Bargaining. Analytic Induction will serve to formalise such accounts into a theoretical
/framework that allows exposition of causal antecedents. However the criterion used to asses /<  
the veracity of that framework, as well as the mediated accounts of subjects’ 
phenomenological worlds, will be one of practical adequacy. I shall return to this issue at an 
apposite juncture.
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Some potential criticism of any outcomes of an approach utilising Analytic Induction might 
derive from the notion that I had failed to demonstrate the "population validity" or typicality 
of the cases investigated through Life History Interviews.
For Mitchell (1983), such a criticism would betray a confusion between the procedures 
appropriate to making inferences from statistical data and those procedures appropriate to the 
study of
"an idiosyncratic combination of elements that constitute a case."
(p. 188)
In other words such criticism fails to understand the processes of inference upon which 
theoretical generalisations from single case studies are made, processes that are 
epistemologically independent of statistical inference.
Mitchell demonstrates how analytical thinking based upon quantitative procedures is based 
upon both statistical and logical (i.e. causal) inference, and how there is a tendency to elide 
the former with the latter in that
". . . the postulated causal connection among features in a sample may be 
assumed to exist in some parent population simply because the features may 
be inferred to co-exist in that population."
(p. 200)
He goes on to argue that the process of inference and extrapolation from case studies is 
logical inference and cannot be statistical in that we can
" . . .  infer that the features present in the case study will be related in a wider 
population not because the case is representative but because our analysis is 
unassailable . . ."
(p. 200)
Therefore, it is possible to extrapolate from case studies to like situations by logical inference 
based upon the demonstrated power of our theoretical model, i.e. such inference is based
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exclusively upon the theoretically necessary linkages among features in the case study(ies),
Znaniecki in his original formulation of Analytic Induction (1934) implies, that if well done, 
one study will suffice and no subsequent investigations are necessary into the same 
phenomenon (p. 249), in practice however
. .  any one set of data is likely to manifest only some (my emphasis) of the 
elements whose explication would contribute to a cogent theoretical 
interpretation of the processes involved. An indeterminant number of 
strategically selected (my emphasis) sets of events would need to be 
examined."
(Mitchell, 1983, p. 202)
In his attempt to make qualitative research more rigorous, Denzin (1970) elaborates upon the 
approach used by Cressey (1950) in his study of the criminal violation of financial trust. 
This approach manifests Mitchell’s prescription for the "strategic selection" of cases through 
the articulation of a "formal" model for a research strategy that
".. . forces the sociologist to formulate and state his theories in such a way as 
to indicate crucial tests of the theory and permit the explicit search for 
negative cases."
(ibid., p. 197)
In this version of Analytical Induction Denzin considers the method to involve six stages, 
which allow "fact", observation, concept, proposition and theory to become closely articulated 
and enables the researcher to move from substantive to formal theory. Denzin considers the 
method to involve six stages (ibid., p. 195):
1. A rough definition of the phenomena to be explained is formulated.
2. An hypothetical explanation of that phenomena is formulated.
3. One case is studied in the light of the hypothesis with the object of determining 
whether or not the hypothesis fits the facts in that case.
4. If the hypothesis does not fit the facts, either the hypothesis is reformulated or the 
phenomena to be explained is redefined so that the case is excluded.
5. Practical certainty may be obtained after a small number of cases have been 
examined, but the discovery of negative cases disproves the explanation and requires 
a reformulation.
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6. The procedure of examining cases, redefining the phenomenon, and reformulating the
hypothesis is continued until a universal relationship is established, each negative 
case calling for a redefinition or a reformulation.
By following this model, theory might be developed and elaborated through an exhaustive 
examination of strategically selected cases to develop Grounded Theory. Such cases must 
provide comparative observations that involve the search for a "decisive negative case" 
(Lindsmith 1952, p. 492, Becker 1966, p. XI) and thereby subject the theory to test 
(Hammersley and Atkinson 1983, p. 201-4). This enables modification to occur in two ways. 
As Robinson (1951) demonstrates, either the hypothesis itself is modified so that new 
observations may be embraced by it, or the range of application of the hypothesis is limited 
to exclude observations that defy explanation, thereby "limiting the universal" (Dubs quoted 
in Robinson 1951). In this fashion, a statement is slowly built up which is applicable to a 
number of cases and which constitutes a generalisation. How these cases are chosen is 
however dependent upon "theoretical sampling" which is based upon the relevant theoretical 
criteria which have evolved out of antecedent analyses. Although discussing a related but 
somewhat different qualitative methodology, Glaser and Strauss emphasise how, in order to 
achieve theoretical integration, the researcher must sample theoretically for his/her case 
histories
"This means that if he has a case history, and a theory to explain and 
interpret, it, then he can decide - on theoretical grounds - about other 
possible case histories which would provide good contrasts and comparisons."
(Glaser and Straussl967, p. 184)
Thus the basic logic followed in this type of research involves the scrutinisation of one case 
in detail and then the pursuit of further cases that enable modification of the emergent 
theory; cases strategically selected in terms of the theoretical criteria that have been 
developed out of prior investigation, and thus are selected because they are believed to 
exhibit some general principle(s) (Mitchell 1983), and thereby confront the theory with the 
patterning of social events under different circumstances. Such cases, Glaser and Strausjterm 
"case studies" as opposed to "case histories", as the latter’s emphasis upon description is 
subordinated to the abstract purpose of theory verification and generation (1967, p. 183).
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Although Denzin’s notion of "practical certainty" is as philosophically contentious as his blithe 
invocation of the "facts", since both imply some assumption of an isomorphism between the 
outcomes of observation and reality, the whole scheme has been heavily criticised by 
Robinson (ibid.). In his critique of Lindesmith (ibid.), Cressey (ibid) and Znaniecki (ibid), 
Robinson argues that in their version of Analytical Induction the procedures used remain 
inadequate because they result in
" . . .  only the necessary and not the sufficient conditions for the phenomenon 
to be explained." (p. 200)
For Robinson adequate explanations occur only when
" . . .  we have both necessary and sufficient conditions for the phenomenon to 
be explained."
(P. 201)
Robinson goes on to argue that enumerative induction, (as exemplified by statistical sampling 
procedures) by examining conditions which both lead to and do not lead to the phenomenon 
of interest, establish both necessary and sufficient conditions for the phenomenon to be 
explained (p. 200-1). Thus Analytical Induction as formulated and used by Znaniecki, 
Cressey, Lindesmith, and by implication Denzin, due to this neglect of statistical sampling 
procedures, although being useful in guiding research and hypothesis formulation, ultimately 
remains incomplete (p. 202). This is because it fails to analyse situations in which the 
phenomenon does not occur. Therefore, Robinson argues that if Analytic Induction is to 
provide "adequacy", it inevitably must rely upon statistical inference.
However Bloor (1976, 1978) effectively refutes Robinson’s argument. He develops an 
analytical framework which demonstrates how sufficient and necessary conditions may be 
differentiated in Analytic Induction without the resort to enumerative induction. In regard 
to Lindesmith’s and Cressey’s work Bloor points out that the
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. . main difficulty with both studies was that the researchers were unable 
to distinguish between the necessary and sufficient causes of addiction or 
embezzlement . . ."
(1978, p. 547)
This for Bloor was not because they had not used enumerative induction, but because
. . they lacked control groups in which necessary but not sufficient cases 
could be located. I was free of this difficulty because the cases in other . . . 
categories could stand as a control group for those cases in the . . . category 
I was analysing" (1978, p. 547)
Bloor’s approach thus has a major design implication relevant to this research. By identifying 
in the field shared features that necessarily lead to particular senior shop steward perceptions 
of accounting data, and identifying features that lead to alternative perceptions and hence 
orientations and strategies in disclosure scenarios, a control group will be created that meets 
Robinson’s notion of adequacy. It follows that this mode of further refining and developing 
theory does not therefore inevitably depend upon enumerative induction.
This, contained with search for exceptions or "negative cases" (Hamersley and Atkinson 1983, 
p. 204) neither of which depend on statistical inference, will enable this research to overcome 
the problems associated with the partiality of Analytical Induction that were identified by 
Robinson, a partiality that might threaten the "practical adequacy" of the resulting schemata. 
But this pragmatic criterion entails the avoidance of claims to "practical certainty" by 
recognition of the inevitable fallibility of any schemata particularly due to the action of the 
double hermeneutic.
From the foregoing review it is proposed that Bloor’s "modified Analytic Inductive technique" 
(1976, p. 45) constitutes an integrative logic for data collection through Life History 
Interviewing. The latter enables some degree of reconstruction of members’ subjectivity and 
elucidation of the typifications used in defining the realities towards which they orientate 
their actions. It also provides for access to data regarding potential influences upon members’ 
typifications in-use. Meanwhile the former provides a rationale enabling the generation of
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theory through allowing comparative analysis of the Life History Data. However unlike 
Glaser and Strauss1 rendition of "grounded theory" (1967), which seems to imply the 
possibility of "pure induction" in their demand that observers should, at l ^ t  initially, ignore 
the literature and theory extant in the substantive domain of interest so as to avoid 
"contamination" of emergent categories and theory; this application of Analytical Induction, 
due to the priorly established epistemological stance, eschews such implicit appeals to a 
theory-neutral observational language. Instead the interdependence of theory and 
observation is emphasised in a fashion similar to Pierce’s notion of abduction or retroduction. 
Retroduction, according to Hanson (1958), eschews invocation of a "tabula rasa" ideal as 
underpinning any research act, rather theory is taken as vital in making possible observation 
and categorisation of phenomena in the first place. The veracity of any account resulting in 
this research process will therefore be evaluated by a pragmatic criterion.
Thus in conclusion, by following and by somewhat modifying Bloor’s "template" (1976,1978) 
given differing epistemological considerations, as well as substantive and situational 
contingencies, it is possible to distinguish several interrelated phases to the strategy 
underlying the research process.
Phase I
This entails a reflexive and mediated ethnographic description, through Life History 
Interviews, of senior shop stewards’ perceptions of Accounting Information. In this, 
phenomenological commonalities and variations might be distinguishable. From such patterns 
senior shop stewards might be classified according to their shared perceptions. Henceforward 
these classifications shall be termed "Accounting Orientation Categories".
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Phase II
While this Phase is temporally concurrent with Phase I, it is analytically differentiable. It 
involves the accumulation of data that is not specific to accounting perceptions. It might 
include "personal" details as well as information regarding respondents’ perception of his/her 
role visa vis constituents, management, other shop stewards etc. Also potentially important 
might be information regarding the social imagery employed, perceptions of other 
organisational stakeholder groups, political dispositions etc. Whatever the information that 
emerges as important in the field, the objective of this phase is to produce a provisional "list" 
of "case features" common to each"accounting orientation category".
Phase III
Although merging with the later elements of Phase II this Phase entails the move to an overt 
explanatory and theoretical level of analysis through the development of an analytical 
framework. This entails the identification of any "deviant" cases that lack "case features" 
common to other cases in the same "accounting orientation category". These deviant cases 
will be examined so as to
a. modify the list of common "case features" so as to accommodate the 
otherwise deviant case;
b. modify the scheme for classifying senior shop stewards into "accounting 
orientation categories" so as to allow the inclusion of the deviant cases within 
a modified category thereby creating a new taxonomy of categories.




This involves comparing the "accounting orientation categories" by looking for those case 
features which are shared by more than one, and those that uniquely define the category. 
This is achieved by scrutinising a particular category and identifying "case features" common 
to all senior shop stewards in that category. Senior shop stewards in alternative categories are 
then scrutinised to discover which "case features" were shared with other cases outside the 
first category considered. Following Bloor (ibid) shared "case features" might be judged 
necessary rather than sufficient for a particular "accounting orientation", whereas unique 
features are "sufficient" in generating the "accounting orientation category". On the basis of 
these identified necessary and sufficient conditions or "case features" the influences upon 
different senior shop steward "accounting orientation categories" might be derived. Such 
features, it is proposed, mediate the effects of D.A.I. by influencing senior shop stewards’ 
orientations to accounting information. To operationalise stages III and IV it was necessary 
to conduct a second round of interviews with the original respondents.
Phase V
The veracity of the model(s) developed in IV will be determined through assessment of the 
extent to which they enable the successful engagement, by the researcher, with future 
subjects. This entails the selection of further subjects, then through the administration of 
Life History Interviews, subjects’ "case features" will be elucidated. Since such features 
constitute explanatory schemata for subjects’ "accounting orientation categories", they should 
generate expectations about the accounting orientation category adhered to by the relevant 
subjects.
Hence these expectations are compared with the actual accounting orientations that were 
elucidated by a further round of interviews. If these expectations are fulfilled then the 
model(s) pertaining to the influences upon senior shop stewards’ phenomenological worlds 
might be considered to be practically adequate.
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"Interpretation is not the art of construing but the art of constructing. 
Interpreters do not decode poems: they make them."
(Fish, 1980, p. 327)
Introduction
In the latter half of the previous chapter I was concerned to describe what might be termed 
my "grand strategy" (Douglas, 1985) for making the research problem methodologically 
tractable. This chapter chronologically follows on from that description by providing an 
account of three basic aspects of the fieldwork. Firstly, it involves an account of the "tactics" 
(ibid.) used in the implementation of that "grand strategy". Secondly, it contains "mediated" 
(Agar, 1986) or "second order" (Geertz, 1973) descriptions of aspects of subjects’ 
phenomenological worlds. In this aspect there is an "ethnogenic" emphasis (Harre and Secord, 
1972) upon studying the "models" of aspects of their social worlds, which subjects’ use to 
organise their behaviour, through the accounts that subjects are capable of giving. Out of 
this dialogue and interaction there is an elision, created through Analytic Induction, with the 
third identifiable aspect to this chapter, the generation of grounded theory regarding 
influences upon subjects’ phenomenological worlds.
Tactics
Gaining Access
My first attempt at gaining access to a sample of senior shop stewards was a dismal failure 
that resulted in some despondency. Rather naively I had approached a local full-tim e official 
of a major trade union expressing a desire to interview such shop stewards about how "useful" 
they found Accounting Information for Collective Bargaining. Although he initially 
appeared sympathetic to my desires and research interests it soon became apparent that this
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particular "gatekeeper" was not going to ease my access and even if I was eventually 
successful, there may have been constraints involved which could have potentially 
jeopardised the research.
Essentially he wanted to "vet" what I was going to ask "his lads" and in particular, he wished 
to "have a look at my questionnaire"; the contents of which would have to be sanctioned by 
the "district committee" before its distribution to shop stewards. In this he claimed that if  he 
approved of what I wanted to ask, there would be "no problem" with the district committee 
and he would then be able to "sort out" some "helpful stewards". It was not long after this 
point, and after suitable politenesses, that I made my excuses and left deciding that this 
avenue would not provide the quality of access that I desired.
Upon reflection I felt that I had been correct to extricate myself from this particular avenue 
of gaining access since this particular "gatekeeper" potentially presented a source of 
interference that would have been intolerable. Clearly, even if his sponsorship had been 
forthcoming, there was a danger that I would have become identified, in the perceptions of 
future subjects, with the particular organisational cabal with which he was associated. This 
could have lead to their attribution of particular characteristics to me, processes that would 
influence their responses in any future interaction (see: Miller, 1952; Trice, 1956).
In this respect two alternative possible scenarios could have occurred depending upon (at the 
time unknown) the quality of subjects’ relationships with this gatekeeper. Firstly they might 
have been such that they could have hampered the building of liking and trust (see: Douglas, 
1976, p. 136) between subjects and myself, something which I considered vital in facilitating 
the research process. Secondly, and more likely, I felt that it was possible that since his 
sponsorship would entail his maintenance of control over whom I was allowed access to, it 
was probable that informants would be limited to those he felt would be "helpful". This may 
have meant shop stewards who he considered to display "appropriate" attitudes and conducted 
their trade union duties in a "suitable" fashion. The possible obverse of this selection could 
have been the exclusion of those he perceived as deviant in some sense - the result, for me,
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would be a very partial group of subjects. It was primarily due to these reasons that I felt 
that the co-operation of this particular gatekeeper would be inimical to the conduct and 
development of the intended research in respect of its methodological and theoretical 
commitments. Indeed, I did not wish to end up in the position noted by Berreman, regarding 
his sponsor in Pahari village, that
". . . it was more in spite of his intercession than on account of it that we
ultimately managed to do a year’s research . . ."
(Berreman, 1962, p. 6)
Yet at the same time I also thought that I had been rather inept at handling the negotiations, 
particularly since I had found it almost impossible to explain, in "layman’s" terms, the 
reasoning behind my methodology and my desire not to conduct a questionnaire. Upon 
reflection I suspect that his virtual demand that it was a "questionnaire or nothing" derived 
from not only a common sense view that that was what social researchers do in research, but 
also that by channelling my research into that format it made it easier for him to know "what 
I was up to". Indeed as our negotiations "progressed" it became evident that this gatekeeper 
was highly suspicious of myself as an individual and as a member of an "ideologically 
unsound" Polytechnic Department. These factors lead me to suspect that despite his initial 
promise of help, I was in fact being "stonewalled" and access would not be eventually 
forthcoming.
In sum these considerations made me discard this particular attempt at access in favour of 
an alternative that presented itself through my own social network. Indeed this fortuitous 
alternative proved successful.
Initial contact with a selection of senior shop stewards was eventually facilitated by the 
endeavours of an acquaintance I had known from my membership of a major blue-collar 
trade union prior to my embarkation upon my present "academic career". A fter my failure 
at getting access through the "official" route I approached this friend for help. A great deal 
of goodwill remained between us and his promise of aid was immediate and incisive. In
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many respects this person was my equivalent of Whyte’s "Doc" in "Street Corner Society" 
(1955) as he acted as an intermediary and informal sponsor by mobilising an extant social 
network by introducing me to potential subjects and vouchsafed for me.
In this he unwittingly presented potential subjects with a somewhat fictitious description of 
my intentions and purposes since I had, to some extent, mislead him as to the actual nature 
of my research interests. During my approach to him I had vaguely claimed to be interested 
i n " . . .  talking to stewards about what was happening in plant-level industrial relations", with 
particular regard to ". . . how things had changed over the past few years". I had decided 
upon this ethically questionable deception for the following reasons.
Firstly my prior failure at getting access might have been due to the nature of my research 
interests. Perhaps D.A.I. in trade union "circles" was more controversial than I had assumed. 
Yet obviously I had to provide a plausible account of myself to prospective subjects that 
conveyed an impression that would ensure access, but avoid admitting my actual substantive 
concerns and still leave scope to move the discussion, during interviews, around to those 
concerns without explicitly violating any perceived psychological contract. Furthermore, I 
had begun to think that prior disclosure of those concerns to subjects might be inimical to the 
research effort since informant^ responses to my questioning may have been unduly 
influenced by that knowledge, even to the extent of limiting their responses to a"front work" 
(Goffman, 1969) of stock answers, or to what they thought I might want to hear based upon 
their knowledge and perceptions of me.
Moreover, through this ploy of "indirection" I thought that I might convince potential 
informants that I was not personally threatening to them since I would appear to be not 
directly concerned with them as individuals. According to Douglas such a tactic might ease 
access by convincing subjects that the researcher is . . .
". . . not really studying them . . .  he tries to show them that he is really
studying something else, with which they are . . . involved."
(1976, p. 170)
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At the same time I was also aware that, as Berreman (1962) and Hansen (1977) have 
illustrated, gatekeepers and sponsors can have a significant influence upon the conduct and 
outcomes of ethnography although they are often essential in enabling it in the first place. 
Particularly they can consciously or inadvertently direct the researcher into extant, culturally, 
ideologically and physically bounded, webs of social relationships.
By keeping my actual interests penumbranic perhaps I could avoid some of these problems 
and at the same time, once in the shop steward network, unilaterally cultivate a further 
network of informants through the social contacts I hoped I would develop.
Thus in this way access was gained with the "researcher" elements of my field role remaining 
overt to subjects from the outset, while the substantive area of interest remained hidden.
Setting the Scene
Important elements in my tactical implementation of the intended research strategy were 
deciding upon such issues as where should interviews take place, how should I present myself 
to subjects in respect of my appearance and introduction, how and to what extent should I 
attempt to structure proceedings?
In considering these issues I decided that an important objective would be to try to put 
people at their ease in my presence. To create that ambience I thought that it would be 
important to let them choose where they wished to meet; not only would this be more 
convenient for them, but also I considered that they would be more comfortable on their own 
"turP (see Lyman and Scott, 1970). So I assiduously avoided my own territory, with its 
possibly disconcerting trappings of academia, since it might have lead me to, in the 
perceptions of informants, unintentionally . . .
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. . lording i t . . . with conspicuous displays of status symbols . . 
(Douglas, 1985, p. 16)
Moreover I was determined to mask my membership of a Management Studies Department - 
a role that in the perceptions of informants might have invoked kinds of association and 
attribution - latent identities (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983, p. 120) which were best 
avoided since they might damage rapport. Hence, in practice, interviews took place in a 
variety of surroundings and ambiences varying from the "front parlours" of informants’ 
homes in the council estates of Sheffield and Barnsley, to their allotments and "locals".
During these occasions I was careful in my "presentation of self' and attempted to monitor 
my impression management for subjects. Liebow (1967, pp. 255-7), although using very 
different ethnographic techniques, stresses the importance of appropriate dress, speech and 
demeanour for both setting informants at ease and making the ethnographer feel comfortable 
in any particular setting. In regard to dress I found it problematic to predict what would be 
suitable. I therefore chose what I considered the middle range - a sports jacket and tie with 
trousers or jeans - neither "smart" nor "stuffy", an informality without laxity.
Although the initial compliance of respondents had been appropriated by the intercession of 
my sponsor, I was concerned to resolve any persisting anxieties or reservations regarding my 
intentions. So a further important element in my impression management was to try to make 
informants feel comfortable and gain their trust and confidence through an initial "interaction 
ritual" (Goffman, 1972) of "small talk". The intent behind this approach partially lay in it 
being a generally socially acceptable aspect of introducing oneself to a stranger, but also it 
enables the establishment of what Beynon (1983) calls feelings of "mutuality" between 
researcher and subject -  that they have something in common in terms of experience and 
interest. Since most respondents did or had worked in "heavy" or "light" engineering, I was 
able to exploit my own prior knowledge and experience of steelworks and steel working as 
a "way in". At other times a "way in" was occasioned through football or gardening, and in 
one instance, having established a mutual enjoyment of snooker, the remainder of the 
interview was conducted in the snooker room of a local working men’s club - which
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fortunately was relatively empty at the time in respect of my relative ineptitude with the cue 
and frequent procrastination because of the need to take notes!
Through such varied "interaction rituals" rapport was usually eased and gradually I was able 
to guide conversations around to the issue of their roles as senior shop stewards. Generally, 
through the prior felicity of my sponsor, informants had some vague idea about what I 
wished to talk to them about. I tended to reinforce this impression by informing them at a 
suitable juncture that I was interested in their experiences as senior shop stewards, since I 
was trying to develop a general understanding of their roles and how they might have 
changed recently. Essentially at this stage of intercourse I followed Douglas’s "principle of 
indirection" (1985, p. 137) by using rapport to indirectly encourage subjects’ self-disclosure 
and then to subtly manipulate dialogue towards my actual focus of interest - D.A.I.
Where it was possible and practical I had decided to interview each informant twice. The 
first "round" of interviews with a selection of senior shop stewards were essentially 
descriptive and exploratory since they were aimed at gaining the confidence of informants 
and identifying themes in their accounts that could be used to generate dimensions of 
similarity and contrast across the whole cohort (see Spradley, 1979). Following a preliminary 
analysis of the data thereby elicited, the second "round" of interviews were more concerned 
with theory generation and therefore entailed a move towards greater structure and direction. 
In these respects I relied upon my priorly accumulated knowledge about the informant to 
stimulate discussion of the particular themes which I had identified as important and through 
the ensuing dialogue "progressively focused" (see Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983, pp. 175- 
6) upon those emergent theoretical concerns. There follows an account of this fieldwork 
which largely follows the phases of Bloor’s (1976, 1978) modified approach to Analytic 




At a superficial level I have ordered this mediated account of senior shop stewards’ 
phenomenological words in a fashion that largely, although by no means entirely, corresponds 
with the chronological development of the fieldwork itself. However diverging from this 
temporal aspect are themes, data and theoretical reflections that did not emerge sequentially. 
These aspects have created a further textual ordering, emergent from my engagement with 
subjects, in terms of observer-identified themes and categories derived from informants’ 
accounts (see for example Agar, 1973) which were used as heuristic devices in theory 
generation.
For expository purposes the following account of my fieldwork reflects these temporal, 
thematic and theoretical aspects; as such it is divided into three sections, each section largely 
embraces a different phase of Analytic Induction, although there is an inevitable elision of 
some phases. These sections and their corresponding Phases are as follows:
a. Senior Shoo Stewards’ Accounting Orientations (Phase I of Analytic Induction)
b. Development of Case Features (Phases 2. 3 and 4 of Analytic Induction)
c. "Testing" of Theory (Phase 5 of Analytic Induction’!
This section is presented in the concluding chapter of this thesis.
a. Senior Shoo Stewards’ Accounting Orientations
As I have already stated, a major concern during the first round of interviews was to elicit 
informants perceptions of, and orientations towards, Accounting Information. In pursuit of 
this objective I initially attempted to document the perspectives, of each informant, which 
they brought to bear when thinking about Accounting Information in the context of their 
roles as senior shop stewards. In order to achieve this I had to guide conversation around to
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the pertinent issues through the use of various prompts and questions, the nature of which 
was contingent upon the "state of play" in the ongoing dialogue between myself and the 
particular informant as well as the language in use by, and intelligible to, the latter. 
Obviously this necessitated some degree of skill and intuition (not to mention luck) on my 
part, which varied between interviews particularly in regard to when I should remain silent, 
or whether to follow up some comment immediately, or leave it to later, and how to phrase 
questions and prompts in a way which allowed the informant to elaborate upon an issue 
without inadvertently fixing the terms in which he spoke,or the perspectives which he 
articulated. Naturally I sometimes felt that I had not been completely successful in 
maintaining such unobtrusive direction and I doubt that anyone could have been always 
completely successful, regardless of their degree of skill or familiarity with the situation. 
Especially during some of the earliest interviews I know that I made some blunders, yet from 
these mistakes I was able to learn how to more effectively and unobtrusively guide the 
informants to the issues of greatest interest to me at the particular stage of the fieldwork.
As I proceeded in this fallible fashion I regularly compared the informants* accounts, in my 
growing compendium, with one another. This process of comparison was undertaken with 
a view to identifying similarities and differences among the documented Accounting 
Orientations. Contemporaneously I was concerned to identify possible relationships between 
these orientations and other phenomena identifiable in their accounts, relationships which 
although tentative, might present lines of further exploration, during a second round of 
interviews, as they could have been possible "Case features". However the main focus at this 
stage remained the classification of discernible Accounting Orientations. This, combined with 
the still secondary concern (which grew in importance as analysis proceeded) to identify 
possible relationships with other phenomena, was similar to the process which Glaser and 
Strauss (1967) call the "constant comparative method", in that the analyst . . .
". . . starts thinking in terms of the full range of types of continua of the 
category, its dimensions, the conditions under which it is pronounced or 




This concern to identify similarities and differences in senior shop stewards’ accounts, so as 
to produce a taxonomy of Accounting Orientations, continued throughout the first round of 
interviews until no further discernible new Accounting Orientations emerged. A fter thirteen 
Life History Interviews I began to feel that I had constructed an initial taxonomy of 
Accounting Orientations, however I conducted a further three Life History Interviews so as 
to elucidate its exhaustiveness. So it was only after the completion of sixteen Life History 
Interviews that I felt confident that no further Accounting Orientations would emerge and 
therefore that the first round of such interviews with informants should cease with Phases 1 
and 2 of Analytic Induction completed.
So by largely following Loftland (1970, pp. 42-3) I had assembled material upon how 
accounting information was perceived by subjects: and, while staying within the limits of 
that data (Glaser, 1978), attempted to differentiate, classify and present to the reader 
variations in subjects’ orientation in terms of taxonomy of "observer-identified" (Loftland 
1971) categories. Thus it was possible to differentiate three Accounting orientations 
exhibited by senior shop stewards during interviewing. These I have termed the "Financial 
Realist" (6) the "Financial Sceptic" (8) and the "Financial Cynic" (2). I shall now proceed to 
delineate the themes and perspectives articulated by informants that meshed together to 
constitute each Accounting Orientation.
(i) ' The "Financial Realist" Accounting Orientation (6 Senior Shop Stewards)
As this particular Accounting Orientation emerged out of elicited informants’ accounts, it 
appeared to be constituted by several interlocking themes and perspectives. Most prominent 
among these was an apparent acceptance of the veracity of Accounting Information for 
arbitrating the financial exigencies faced by organisational members. Such a perspective is 
clearly articulated by Bill.
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"Today . . . you’ve got to accept financial facts . . . you’ve got to be realistic 
. . . .  there’s not point in trying to get out of management something that isn’t 
there . . . .  If they open the books we can see how the firm ’s doing . . .  we can 
see what’s in the kitty . . . there’s no point in pitching a claim that’s . . . 
unreasonable . . . the books tell us what’s reasonable . . . what the firm can 
afford . . ."
This search for "reasonableness" seems to be fostered by a fear of unemployment, as Bill 
continued,
". . . the bloody miners were stupid, they priced themselves out of a job and 
they’re all on the dole now . . . same with them at L***’s - I don’t want that 
to happen to my lads . . .  I just want what we deserve . . .  a fair crack o’ the 
whip . . .".
What is perceived as "reasonable" or "fair" within this orientation appears to be determined 
by the apparent financial performance of the organisation. In response to my inquiry as to 
how did he tell what a "fair crack of the whip" was, Bill reiterated . . .
"From the books . .  . they tell you what’s in the kitty, . . . how much profit’s 
been made or going to be made - they tell you how we’re doing - you have 
to know that so as to know what’s fair . . ."
In response to my question as to whether or not more of that kind of information would be 
useful he gave an affirmative and proceeded to say th a t . . .
". . . management are often a bit cagey about giving us the facts . . . and we 
need more detailed information so that we could judge better for ourselves . 
. .. We get all sorts of stuff . . . profit and loss figures, production figures, 
costs, sales -  all the information relevant to the value-added scheme . . .  it 
tells us what we’re due on the bonus . . .  that’s really why they started opening 
the books."
The view that Accounting Information provided an unchallengeable and accurate picture of 
organisational performance was also articulated by David, who had recently been made 
redundant from his job in the glass-making industry.
243
"Management didn’t have any choice but to shut my section down - it was 
obvious that we were making a loss . . . what the hell could we do . . . you 
can’t keep on making stuff nobody wants . .  . that’s a fact of life . .  . plastics 
had forced us out."
[Researcher: "How did you know that your section was making a loss?"]
". . . once we saw the figures it was bloody clear that we were producing too 
much for what market was left . . . nobody wanted our glass . . .  its too 
expensive compared with plastics . . . .  there wasn’t much we could negotiate 
about except redundancies . . . once the figures were on the table - if we 
hadn’t gone the whole firm could have gone bust. It was awful especially for 
those of us who were made redundant. .  . but there was no real alternative . 
. . .  God, I sound like Thatcher but it was true in our case . . .  what else could 
we have done . . ?"
So while Accounting Information might inform the "Financial Realist" about what is "fair", 
"reasonable" and "possible" since it conveys an uncontestable image of organisational 
performance, it also might be the harbinger of unpalatable "facts" that have to be confronted. 
Conversely such information defines what is stupid, unreasonable, "wild" and dangerous. 
These sentiments are illustrated by the following comments [by Jim]
"Some of these . . .  militants make me sick . . .  oh it was alright when Labour 
were in . . . they’d bail a firm out. This present shower - they’ve made us 
face the facts . . . now don’t get me wrong, I hate the bastards . . . I’m a 
Labour man, always have been . . .  but Thatcher’s shaken us up . . . made us 
realise that economic facts are . . . facts and you can’t get away from i t . . . 
if we’re not making anything then there’s nowt to pay us out with . . . you 
can’t get away from that and all the gobbing-off the militants do isn’t going 
to change th a t . . . "
[Researcher: "How can you tell if the firm is not making anything?"]
"From the figures - you know - on productivity, sales, costs, the cash that’s 
coming in . . . that sort of thing . . ."
[Researcher: "How do you get to see that sort of information.]
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. . usually from management . . . they lay the cards on the table and we 
negotiate what’s fair . . . we’re reasonable people you know, not hotheads . . 
. management realise this now . . . we’ve all had to grow up a bit, we’ve had 
to or we’ll all go down the road together . . . that’s all there is to i t . .
Similar sentiments were articulated by Keith, also a senior shop steward in the engineering 
industry
"Look I’m a rea lis t. . .  not like that daft bugger Scargill - you can’t fly in the 
face of economic facts . . .  if the firm’s not making any profit then all of us 
. . . management, staff, the shop floor . . . we’ll all be up to our necks in i t . 
. . If you want more we’ve got to make the money in the first place . . ."
In the foregoing accounts, informants articulated a view of accounting information that 
assumed it to be truthful; as presenting an objective record of their organisations’ 
performances from which definitions of what was "fair" and "reasonable" might be 
differentiated from definitions of what was "wild" or "daft". However enmeshed within these 
accounts are particular conceptualisations of those organisations in which informants worked 
and the management with whom they interacted. All the above senior shop stewards 
appeared to habitually refer to their organisations in unitary terms that invoked an image of 
there being an identity of interest between themselves and management. Bill was particularly 
explicit . . .
"These days we have to cooperate with m anagem ent. . .  if  we don’t we’ll all 
end up on the dole . . . after all we’re all in the same boat."
Similarly Jim claimed . . .
"I used to think that it was them against us . . . management versus worker . 
. .  but that’s stupid . . .  we all want the same things . . .  a healthy firm  so that 
jobs are secure and the pay’s good . . .  you’re not going to get that with a them 
and us view of the firm . . ."
However some "Financial Realists" did invoke a "them and us" view of their organisational 
experiences, but this was applied to external relations with competitors and not to internal 
relations with management. Indeed a unitary conceptualisation of the firm became all
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stronger in the face of the external threat. The following comments from Geof (a senior shop 
steward in engineering) are typical of this perspective.
"Our firm ’s up against both the Japs and the Americans . . .  its very cutthroat 
. . .  we’ve lost quite a few big orders . . .  If we don’t become more competitive 
we won’t survive . . . .  If you’re not competitive you won’t survive . . .  to do 
that you have to be sensible - the days of stupid pay claims are gone . . ."
[Researcher: How do you mean?]
"There’s some at our place who want to screw management for every penny 
. . . that’s not on, all they’re doing is screwing themselves . . . I’ve seen the 
fig u res ,. . .  costs are too high . . .  If we’re not sensible, this time it’ll be ‘Box 
Six West Street’* for the lot of us with no chance of any more work . . ."
(* The local Unemployment Benefit Office)
The perceived sources of external threat, that appeared to prompt such expositions of an 
identity of interest with management, were by no means limited to the actions of competitors. 
As Keith claimed . . .
". . . Management showed us the books . . . They have a tough job 
management - I wouldn’t like to do it -  they have to deal with those bastards 
a t ". . . Steels"* who are just after a hefty return on their investment - they 
don’t give a toss for the local community . . . but our management do, after 
all they do live here don’t th e y . . .  our’s care but they’re trapped - if  we don’t 
come up with w h a t". . . Steels"* want we’ll be shut down . . . I’m certain of 
th a t . . . we’re all trapped by the financial situation."
(*The Holding Company)
All of the "Financial Realists", to a greater or lesser extent, also perceived management in 
positive terms. Often in this they demonstrated a similar empathy with management’s 
organisational role, an empathy overlaid with the use of "them and us" perceptions in such a 
fashion that they were invoked exclusively to articulate perceived external threats from 
competitors, holding companies etc. Clearly by "us" these informants included management 
and shop floor. Keith was perhaps the most exp lic it. . .
"We’re a team management and shop floor . . .  we’ve all got our different jobs 
to do and often we’ll argue a b i t . . . but really we all win or loose together .
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(ii) The "Financial Sceptic" Accounting Orientation (8 senior shop stewards)
While the "Financial Realist" accepted the utility of accounting information for neutrally 
arbitrating the financial exigencies confronting organisational members; the "Financial 
Sceptic", as the nomenclature implies, appears to deny accounting’s veracity and its relevance 
in constructing a rational understanding of organisational processes and situations. Typical 
of this latter perspective was this following account articulated by Joe, also a senior shop 
steward in engineering . . .
"When we’re negotiating with management they always come up with some 
yarn to back up why they won’t get their hands down . . . Sometimes its . . 
. ‘things are O.K. this year but next year things are going to get worse’. Or 
. . . this year’s been a disaster - things might get better but we wouldn’t bet 
on it . . . Whatever they say it it’s always the same message - there’s not 
enough to give you what you w a n t. . . tighten your belts . . .  be co n ten t. . . 
at least you are still in work for the time being."
[Researcher: "Do they try to justify these messages?"]
". . . Yes . . . they usually back up what they say with figures and statistics 
which they’ve put together - you know balance sheets, market predictions, 
sales, production figures, profit levels . . .  all that bollocks . . ."
Paul, another senior shop steward in the engineering industry, perceived accounting 
information in a similar light. Similarly he articulated a distrust of anything management 
said, particularly he claimed that management always tried to give the impression that "things 
were tight". In response to my question regarding whether or not management tried to show 
that things were tight, Paul responded
"Of course they try . . .  but it doesn’t wash with me . . .  all this twaddle about 
how much profit they’re making, costs, overheads and so on . . .  They try to 
blind you with science . . . but I know they’ve got some prat with a sharp 
pencil to fiddle the books . . .  they only tell you what they want to and make 
up the re s t . . .  they must think we’re stupid . . .  Mind you, some are taken in
It
[Researcher: Who are taken in?]
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"Some of the other stewards . . .  they think its smart to talk like management 
. . .  they’ve been conned into thinking like management - profits, losses, sales, 
costs all that crap . . .  be reasonable . . . we’re all in this together . . .  all that 
sort of nonsense . . . that’s how some of them think . . . they’re collaborators 
...  once you start thinking like management you become their pawns . . .  you 
don’t look after your members then . . .  its a bloody dangerous game some of 
them play . . ."
[Researcher: Why is it dangerous?]
"Have you ever read 1984? . . .  Its like that bloody Newspeak . .  once you start 
talking like them you begin to think like them . . . .  then they’ve got you . . 
. you’re not a real steward any longer . . ."
Thus two persistent themes are readily apparent in the "Sceptics’" accounts of their 
organisational experiences - these themes clearly differentiate their orientations from that of 
a "Financial Realist" as they entail a pejorative view of both management and accounting 
information, the latter being perceived not as some neutral artefact but as being inextricable 
from managerial purposes. This high degree of distrust of management and anything 
associated with management was clearly articulated by Paul . . .
"The day I start trusting management or believing anything they come up with 
is the day I should be put out to grass . . .  Often I think that they think we’ve 
just fallen off the top of a Christmas Tree . . ."
The perceptual linkages between accounting information, accountants and management 
evident in the accounts of all the "Sceptics" is typically demonstrated by Joe
"I’m not taken in by this pleading poverty - I don’t care what the books say 
. . . they’ve probably got half a dozen sets -one for the tax man, one for the 
shareholders . . . and one set for us . . . they’re a bunch of fiddling sods . . . 
wouldn’t trust them or their tame accountants an inch."
[Researcher: "What do you mean by ‘tame accountants’"?]
"Well they’re all in it together . . .  they wouldn’t tell us what’s really going on 
if  we paid them - they just tell us what they like, to get us to do what they 
want us to do - accountants, managers they’re all the same . . .  con men with 
company cars out to screw us . . . Pansy bastards . . .  its not real work is it . 
.. they don’t actually make anything do they . . . bloody drones."
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It is evident from the foregoing accounts that members of this orientation perceive an 
identity between Accounting Information, Accountants and Management. There is little or 
no perceptual discrimination with the former being merely conceived as some kind of 
propagandising adjunct of management. In further contrast to the "Financial Realists" there 
is enmeshed in these perceptions a dichotomous view (see Ossowski, 1963; Lockwood, 1966)of 
intra-organisational relations; that is, the "them and us" environmental imagery of the 
"Financial Realist" is applied to the internal relationships with management in 
contradistinction to the "realists’" unitary conceptualisation. Herbert a senior shop steward in 
the engineering industry was particularly clear over these issues.
" . . .  They’re always saying that we might close, that we’re ineffic ien t. . .  not 
competitive . . .  that we need to be fitter and leaner. . .  that’s their latest, they 
must have got it from bloody Tory Headquarters . . .  Of course what it means 
is that we have to work harder while some of us take redundancy while 
they’re sat on their backsides with their company cars and expense accounts 
and private dining rooms - not one of them has ever done an honest day’s 
g ra f t . . .  they’ve never got their hands dirty . . .  what gives them the right to 
tell us to work harder or that we’re overpaid . . .? bloody nerve . . ."
[Researcher: "How do they justify that view?]
"They try . . . but I don’t bloody well believe them . . . I’ll give you an 
example . . .  they put this chart up of costs, how much wages made up those 
costs, and how much cash was coming in from sales . . . They had forecasts 
into next year and according to them the firm would be making a loss even 
if wages were limited to ‘what’s reasonable’ . . .  It was all very fancy, nice 
coloured diagrams and t h a t . . .  I told them to get stuffed . .  . not in so many 
words . . .  I told them that if sales were falling that’s their problem, not ours 
. . . that we worked . . . hard enough . . . and I wanted to know how they 
expected us to pay the rent and bus fares . . . without a decent rise?"
[Researcher: Who had drawn up the charts?]
"Probably some yuppie in the offices.. .  one of the management’s office boys 
. . . tfying to trick us into accepting less than what we need . . . they must 
think we’re daft if they think we’ll swallow that tripe . . .  I just don’t believe 
them or their figures . . . they just look at things from their point of view, 
not ours . . ."
In the above account there is introduced a further dimension to the "Sceptics" Accounting 
Orientation. This pertains to how they calculate, in collective bargaining, what an 
appropriate pay rise is. In the previous Accounting Orientation, accounting information in
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one form or another was considered appropriate for this task since it gave a "picture" of what 
the "firm" could afford. In contrast the "Sceptic" uses a very different set of calculative 
procedures. These procedures are articulated by Joe. Having dismissed accounting 
information as "bollocks" he proceeded to elaborate
". . . What does it mean anyway? It’s not real to me -so many million profit 
or loss - what does that mean to a working man - fuck all . . . What is 
important is whether I can pay the mortgage and the rates, if I can afford a 
holiday and keep the wife and kids happy - I don’t need some fucking 
bookkeeper to tell me that. That’s what we base a claim on - what we need 
to keep house and home together and if  those bastards won’t pay up they’ve 
got a fight on their hands - and they know it."
All the senior shop stewards in this Accounting Orientation demonstrated a propensity to 
calculate what they thought to be a "fair pay rise" in terms of what resources they needed 
to maintain or improve their standards of living. However this did not mean that they were 
uninterested in what they took to be the performance of their respective workplaces in 
formulating a pay claim. However how they determined that performance was very different 
to the calculative procedures and sources of data apprehended by "Financial Realists", and 
furthermore, the outcome of these particular calculations remained of secondary phenomenal 
importance when compared with standard of living calculations. Their distrust of what they 
perceived as management propaganda led this category of informants to allude to alternative 
sources of information in their apprehension of their workplaces’ performances. How these 
performances were gauged was typically articulated by Mark in his elaboration of who he 
means by "them" in his "them and us" view of intra-organisational relations.
". . . management and the pin-stripe suit brigade who work in the offices . .  
. who do as they’re told and give management the stuff that they come out 
with when we’re negotiating . . .  We don’t need their "facts" and figures to tell 
us what’s going on. . . you can see how the firm ’s doing by what orders are 
on the shop floor and what’s been through recently . . .  we can trust what we 
see with our own eyes rather than some high falutin gibberish put together by 
some pen-pusher who wouldn’t know a miller from a turner . . ."
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(iii) The "Financial Cynic" Accounting Orientation (2 Senior Shop Stewards')
When I first interviewed the respondents who I eventually categorised as "financial cynics", 
I initially associated them with the emergent "realist" accounting orientation. However as I 
accumulated more information and reviewed that jvhich was already assembled, I identified 
some important differences between the phenomenological worlds of the "realist" and those 
later categorised as "cynics".
Thus it began to be imperative to modify my taxonomy of accounting orientations so as to 
accommodate these apparently deviant cases. Unfortunately during fieldwork only a 
relatively small number of "cynics" were identified - two. While this comparative lack of 
data was unfortunate and causes me to have less confidence, relative to the other orientations, 
in my analysis, I feel that the"cynic" category did present extremely useful comparative data 
when I was investigating the influences upon shop stewards’ propensities to articulate 
"scepticism" and "realism". Moreover,the comparatively small number of "cynics" identified 
perhaps reflects the relative rarity of this perspective amongst senior shop stewards. However 
despite these problems it is possible to elucidate some of the main themes and parameters that 
constitute this distinctive orientation.
As with the "Financial Realist", a most prominent theme in this orientation was an apparent
acceptance of the veracity of Accounting Information for arbitrating the financial realities
confronting organisation members. Such a perspective was articulated by John when he
onclaimed that how much profit his firm had made was^ important influence upon how he 
"handled" management
" . . .  it tells you what’s going on . . .  it tells us what we can get out of them, 
what they’ve g o t . . . after all profit is p ro f i t . . . the figures can’t lie unlike 
m anagem ent. . ."
Similarly Fred, also a senior shop steward in engineering, considered that it was possible to 
discern how a firm was "doing" from its profits . . .
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"It’s important, there are other things as wel l . .  but its the best sign . . .  it tells 
us how much the bastards have in the bank. .."
However superimposed upon this theme are two conceptualisations that fundamentally 
differentiate this accounting orientation from that of the "realist" and which apparently lead 
to different collective bargaining strategies.
As perhaps might be discerned from the above quotes, the"cynic" shares with the "sceptic" a 
particularly pejorative view of management and perceives intra-organisational relationships 
with management through the conceptual "filter" of a dichotomous social imagery, i.e. "them 
and us". For instance Fred claimed . . .
". . . before I became a shop steward I didn’t really think much about 
management and what they did - I just thought they had a job to do and I had 
mine . . .  I thought they were stra igh t. . . now I know better . . . they wheel 
and d e a l . . . they never give you a straight answer, they’re always trying to 
lead you up the garden path . . .  One thing you must never do is trust them - 
If you do they’ve got you then."
John was even more exp lic it. . .
"They really are bastards . . .  its not proper work that they do . . .  their job is 
to sweat us to line the pockets of the shareholders . . . they don’t make 
anything, they’re just glorified mercenaries."
Thus a particularly pejorative view of management was associated with a derogatory view 
of white-collar work in general, a theme that was displayed consistently in the "cynics’" Life 
Histories. These factors appeared to lead the "cynic" to conceptualise all intra-organisational 
relationships, particularly those with management, from a non-unitary, them and us, 
perspective; yet unlike the "sceptic", accounting information was not seen to be some 
propagandising adjunct of management. This nexus of typifications and social imagery 
appeared to result in a much more "machiavellian" approach to disclosed accounting 
information. Particularly those senior shop stewards saw its practical use to be appropriate 
only when some tactical advantage might be gained in collective bargaining and joint
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consultation. An important backcloth to this "tactical use" was the "cynic’s" general approach 
to negotiations with management . . .
". . . you’ve got to be a wheeler-dealer yourself if you’re going to look after 
the lads . . . all’s fair in love, war and getting a rise . . .  I don’t like doing it 
but if  we don’t fight them with whatever we’ve got you’re not doing you job 
as steward . . . "
Fred continued . . .
". . . its all about power . . . you’ve got to use anything to increase your 
strength . . . when profits are down and management say there’s nowt in the 
coffers I tell them to piss-off, its not our problem . . .  if they can’t run the 
place properly why not get somebody who can in . . . its their responsibility 
not ours - why should we suffer, we do our jobs properly, why can’t they . 
. .  But, like last year, profits were up, so I argued that it was thanks to us, and 
despite them, and that we were entitled to a share . . ."
Fred later elaborated on these tactical ploys in negotiating
"You see you use whatever you can to back up what’s best for the lads . .  and 
you bloody well ignore anything that goes against what you want. . . you’ve 
got to be canny - you can be sure that the bastards across the table are . . . 
But you’ve got to be careful, its important to know how the firm is doing but 
if  its not doing very well you’ve got to ignore the books or else you could talk 
yourself into a corner - so when things are bad we concentrate on things like 
. costs of living and t h a t . . . whatever backs up what we want we’ll use . . ."
John articulated a very similar approach to negotiating with m anagem ent. . .
"From the books you can tell what’s really going on - you might not want to 
use it if its bad news, but its useful to know even if you can’t use i t . . . you 
then know what’s behind the bollocks management come out with, what they 
might be trying to hide from you and sometimes you can hit them over the 
head with it. . . you know that’s the mistake the miners made ... instead of 
all that stuff about saving jobs . . .  they should have argued that the pits were 
still profitable - Cortonwood was you know . . ."
John continued to say that while management might sometimes try to "fiddle" the books, this 
"fiddling" was marginal, so while
"financial facts are always there, sometimes its best ignore them and use 
something else to back up your case . . .  it all depends on what the books say."
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Thus both the senior shop stewards who articulated what might be defined as a "cynical" 
accounting orientation, did to some degree accept the accuracy and truthfulness of 
Accounting Information. But since this understanding of Accounting Information is 
enmeshed within a non-unitary ideology, that leads to a particular understanding of 
organisational relationships, and a pejorative view of the management with whom they 
interacted, these factors resulted in a very different approach to Accounting Information 
during negotiations with that management.
Essentially, while Accounting Information is perceived as neutrally arbitrating 
the financial realities faced by members, it is only overtly used during Collective Bargaining 
when some perceived advantage might be identified. If such an advantage is considered to 
be absent, or if indeed some tactical disadvantage is discerned, recourse to the appropriation 
of Accounting Information in negotiations is eschewed by the "cynic" and alternative 
calculative procedures are publically invoked.
These alternatives were very similar to those applied by the "sceptics", yet the status which 
they were accorded by the "cynics" relative to that attributed to accounting information was 
very different. Essentially accounting information appears to remain the ultimate arbiter of 
financial reality, but it was invoked during negotiations only when some perceived advantage 
was forthcoming. When such an advantage was absent, alternative calculative procedures 
were cynically marshalled in pursuit of a perceived set of interests; yet both "cynics" implied 
that this did not mean that the accounting information was no longer veracious - rather its 
"truth" was something that had to be ignored. This attitude and tactic was clearly articulated 
by John. He claimed . . .
". . .  really its the books that show what’s actually going on. . . but look it’s a 
dog-eat-dog world . . .  If I think that the books put us on a loser - sod them 
- I’ll ignore them . . .  what I’d then justify our claim on would be standards 
of living or average pay rises locally or nationally - whatever’s best - anything 
that supports the interests of my members I’ll use . . .  if management don’t 
like it its tough . . . my lads will back me and they know i t . . ."
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Therefore, although differing in many respects, the "cynic" appeared to share with the 
"sceptic" a combative and oppositional approach to negotiations with those who they 
perceived as "management" (it was only later that the full degree of difference became 
apparent).
The Development of Case Features (Stages 2-4 of Bloor’s modified Analytic Induction)
With the completion of the first round of interviews with respondents it was possible to 
classify these senior shop stewards according to variations in their ascribed Accounting 
Orientations. Some of the implications for D.A.I. in Collective Bargaining and Joint 
Consultation deriving from the tenure of each Accounting Orientation will be reviewed in 
the final chapter. However a further objective of this research was to attempt an 
investigation of the influences upon this identified variation in orientation amongst 
respondents and thereby move to another level of analysis in investigating the processes and 
implications of D.A.I.
Although the main focus of the first round of interviews had been to gather data pertaining 
to possible variability in orientation and thereby create a taxonomy of categories, there was 
also a secondary concern to provisionally elucidate aspects of the "case features" common to 
each category. It was hoped that from such information further lines of inquiry could be 
identified which would facilitate the development of an explanatory framework.
The pursuit of such further lines of inquiry entails movement down the "funnel structure" 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983, p. 175)of "progressive focusing" through a shift from a 
primary concern with description to the developing and testing of "grounded" theoretical 
explanations (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), or models (Glaser, 1978), of the pertinent social 
phenomena, i.e. the three accounting orientations. In accomplishing this task, I was in many 
respects entering what Becker (1970) has termed the "final sequential" stage of activity, in the 
field, which attempts to explain . . .
255
. . particular social facts by explicit reference to their involvement in a 
complex of inter-connected variables that the observer constructs as a 
theoretical model . . . which best explains the data . . . assembled.”
(ibid., p. 196)
However before proceeding to report these later stages of fieldwork, it is useful to attempt 
to summarise the outcomes of the initial stages. These first round interviews had accumulated 
data pertaining to the variability in these senior shop stewards’ accounting orientations. As 
previously stated, the effects of D.A.I. may be mediated by this variation and the main 





















In developing this taxonomy it became apparent that the social imagery employed by 
respondents, in making sense of the intra-organisational relations which they encountered, 
was an important factor in discriminating between different accounting orientations. This 
was particularly relevant for understanding differences in how respondents might publically 
and privately respond to D.A.I. during negotiations with other stakeholders. It became 
evident that these perceptions of self, and others, were important in distinguishing between 
the "cynic" and the "realist"; who share a similar perception of accounting yet due to their 
contrasting social imagery have remarkably different accounting orientations. Therefore in
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the development of the illustrated observer-identified respondent categories, a phenomenon 
which might have been applied to constitute a "case feature" became a necessary dimension 
of a model that could allow for discrimination between Accounting Orientations.
With the construction of this initial taxonomy it was then possible to move to the second level 
of analysis, that of identifying the phenomena that influence these senior shop stewards’ 
susceptibility for different Accounting Orientations and the dimensions that combine together 
to constitute them. From the information gleaned during the first round of interviews it was 
possible to construct a provisional list of phenomena which suggested conditions under which 
particular Accounting Orientations are pronounced or minimised (see Glaser and Strauss, 
1967 p. 106 for an example of this approach) and which also delineated further lines of 
inquiry for the second round of interviews with the original respondents. Through a 
comparison of Accounting Orientation categories it was further possible to identify which 
case features were unique to a category and which were shared by two or more.
Case Features
Following Bloor’s modified version of Analytic Induction (1976,1978), the case features 
shared by all three accounting orientations might be ruled out as influences upon their 
variability. Some of these commonalities were outcomes of the "sampling" strategy 
implemented for comparative purposes, while others were serendipitous and emerged during 
fieldwork; both types of commonality are described below.
All respondents were men who defined themselves as skilled manual workers who were, or 
had been, employed in private sector engineering. I considered it important to attempt to 
rule out potential influences upon respondents’ accounting orientations that perhaps might 
derive from aspects of variation in their employing organisations’ internal structure of 
industrial relations (see Clegg, 1979). That is, I wanted some degree of similarity regarding 
internal industrial relations structures for comparative purposes. However the only quick and
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simple way of attempting this was through the widely recognised contingent variable (Child 
and Mansfield, 1972) of size of employing organisation. Although this was far from 
satisfactory, such information was immediately available from respondents and did give some 
confidence regarding comparability without entailing the large amounts of, potentially 
wasted, fieldwork necessary for eliciting respondents’ accounts of the internal industrial 
relations structures within which they operated. Thus the size of respondents’ organisations 
varied from 600 to 1000 employees (with the one unemployed respondent having priorly 
worked in a manufacturing firm with 700 employees.)
Trade union membership varied within each accounting orientation with members of the 
A.E.U., G.M.B.A.T.U. and the T.G.W.U. to be found amongst both the "realists” and the 
"sceptics"; while of the two "cynics", one held membership of the A.E.U. with the other 
belonging to G.M.B.A.T.U.
I had also closely questioned respondents about the history of trade union organisation in 
their respective organisations. As far as I could ascertain all their organisations had a lengthy 
history of trade union organisation (in most cases stemming from prior to World War II) with 
management recognition often having been acquired only after protracted and attritious 
disputes. This led me to believe that it was unlikely that respondents belonged to 
managerially sponsored shop steward organisations (see Willman, 1980) and hence another 
potential influence upon accounting orientations was ruled out.
However all respondents defined themselves either as "lay" elected senior shop stewards or as 
"lay" elected workplace Branch Secretaries. This similarity in hierarchical role and status was 
an outcome of my "theoretical sampling" (see Glaser and Strauss, 1967); in this I had 
considered that an important selection criterion for respondents, for comparative purposes, 
was that they should hold similar positions of responsibility in their trade unions and that the 
strategic nature of these incumbencies be such that the likelihood of exposure to D.A.I. be 
high. Although the ages of respondents and the length of their tenure of office varied there 
appeared to be no discernible pattern in these elements regarding their distribution across
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accounting orientations.
Thus all respondents, although of varying age and experience, were employee representatives 
who were formally accredited by their respective trade unions and managements. As 
incumbents of very similar offices all were or had been involved, both informally and 
formally (usually through membership of a Joint Shop Stewards Committee), in significant 
areas of negotiation with management. Particularly, all respondents at some point had 
acquired the authority to negotiate domestic rates of pay (including piece-rates and bonuses) 
despite the presence of industry-wide agreements. Respondents tended to perceive the latter 
as being only significant as minima and safety nets. Moreover all the shop stewards had also 
been involved in a variety of collective bargaining and joint consultative processes such as 
changes in working practices and conditions of service, the introduction of new technology, 
redundancies, health and safety, various types of grievance handling, as well as the 
enforcement of collective agreements and custom and practice norms.
In undertaking the above activities, all respondents appear to have been exposed, to some 
extent, to D.A.I. During my fieldwork some respondents claimed not to have been exposed 
to accounting information, such individuals were therefore excluded from the eventual 
sample due to the analytical and comparative demands of this research. For those who had 
some experience of D.A.I. it was difficult to gauge and compare the quantitative and 
qualitative extent of that exposure for each respondent, but from their interviews there 
appears to be no significant variations between accounting orientations in the use of D.A.I. 
by respondents’ respective managements.
Clearly all respondents were familiar with "Employee Reports". Although these documents 
vary according to who produces them, they generally seemed to consist of glossy and 
colourful representations of companies’ activities. Usually, by using bar charts, pie charts, 
graphs and tables, these documents provided the reader with such things as a simplified 
balance sheet, a profit and loss account, often a value-added statement and some detail of the 
sources of the companies’ funds. Also included was a statement from representatives of
259
senior management which reviewed the recent performance of the firm and discussed the 
present and future scenarios that the organisation confronted.
However across all three accounting orientations all of the senior shop stewards had greater 
experience of D.A.I. than the provision of an Employee Report. Particularly, during 
Collective Bargaining negotiations, all respondents said that management provided more plant 
level disaggregated information. This included such things as output per worker (often 
juxtaposed with that of major competitors), plant operating accounts, costing information, 
state of the order book details and predictions of future plant and company performance.
In this context both Amernic (1985) and Jackson-Cox et al (1984) have noted the significance 
of management’s disclosure strategies in influencing the impact of D.A.I. Particularly the 
latter differentiate between "integrated" and "ad hoc" strategies (ibid., p. 257). An integrated 
strategy is signified by management’s concern to engender in employees and their 
representatives "identification" with the relevant segment of the enterprise and its activities 
through routine but selective provision of information, whereas the "ad hoc" approach is 
characterised by the piecemeal and intermittent provision of information in relation to 
specific events and issues.
By utilising Jackson-Cox’s identification of two types of disclosure strategy, information was 
elicited from all respondents pertaining to the regularity and concerns of management 
disclosure practices. Although it is problematic to directly relate subjects’ responses to that 
typology there did appear to be some variation amongst respondents as to how regularly and 
routinely information was disclosed to them. Roughly two-thirds felt that management 
regularly provided information pertaining to specific issues while the remainder felt that 
disclosure was temporally intermittent and substantively haphazard. But since there was no 
clear pattern, regarding these issues, between Accounting Orientations, with both strategies 
being experienced by respondents in all three orientations, I could only conclude that this 
phenomena was not a significant influence upon the orientations alluded to by respondents.
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Thus it would appear that members of each Accounting Orientation had been exposed to 
similar degrees of D.A.I. and hence such exposure itself could not explain the variation in 
Accounting Orientation. With respect to financial training, at first there appeared to be no 
clear relationship between articulated Accounting Orientation and the experience of some 
training. Virtually all respondents claimed to have undergone some financial training under 
the auspices of the Trade Union Congress Education Service, usually in connection with 
programmes that dealt with company information during negotiations. However the impact 
of this provision appeared minimal - most respondents were extremely vague regarding what 
it had involved or how long it had lasted. Essentially it seemed that financial issues had only 
been dealt with tangentially during formal shop steward training.
However a pattern amongst the accounting orientations did emerge when I questioned them 
about in-company financial training provision. While only one "sceptic" admitted to some in­
company financial training, both "cynics" and all of the "realists" claimed to have been 
involved in in-company financial training. Although it is difficult to assess the quality and 
extent of this training from respondents’ accounts certain common themes did emerge. 
Usually during working hours, companies had provided a series of seminars, sometimes 
employing external consultants, that were often attended by both shop stewards and 
supervisors and first-line managers. These seminars entailed the use of a variety of audio­
visual aids and discussions to look at aspects of profit and loss, balance sheets, value added, 
budgeting, inflation, depreciation, the stock market, interest rates, as well as issues such as 
departmental and/or divisional performance, marketing, job evaluation etc. Although the 
substantive nature of these programmes, according to respondents, appeared to somewhat 
vary, all respondents who had experienced such in-company training remembered the 
following emphases; included were discussions and talks about the purposes, missions and 
goals of the firm with a focus upon the current and future financial situation facing the 
company. Furthermore, all the relevant respondents alluded to an emphasis upon issues such 
as the need to invest in current and fixed assets, sources of investment and generating new 
sources of cash, and the general implications of these issues for the current and future 
financial management of the firm.
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At the commencement of this research I had assumed that the propensity to adhere to any 
discernible accounting orientation would not be capricious. I felt that if I was to investigate 
far enough patterns and regularities would appear, and in these phenomena I would be able 
to identify influences upon the propensity of respondents to articulate and act in accordance 
to particular dispositions. It was to the identification and analysis of these influences that 
I now turned.
As demonstrated, the influence of in-company financial training appeared to be very 
important as a potential case feature. But it seemed to be only relevant for members of two 
accounting orientations, both the; "cynics” and the "realists". It followed that by itself, this 
process of training could therefore not account for their apparent differences. I concluded 
that some other case feature must be exerting an influence to account for this differentiation 
between "cynic" and "realist" - but what?
From the initial round of interviews there appeared to be a possibly fruitful line of inquiry 
related to variation in aspects of the social imagery employed by respondents. Although out 
of necessity I had employed this concept to discriminate between patently different 
accounting orientations, I felt that this aspect also provided some explanation of the 
apparently variable response of "cynics" and "realists" to training. Meanwhile I felt that their 
lack of exposure to financial training and their social imagery might account for the 
differences between "sceptics" and the other orientations. However, I was fearful that such 
parsimony in analysis might constitute an over use of Ockham’s razor; so I decided that it 
might be wise to obey Glaser and Strauss’ (1967) injunction, regarding application of a 
"constant comparative method", to use the "library" to develop what Blumer (1954) has termed 
"sensitising concepts" or suggestions of "directions along which to look" (ibid., p. 7)
During fieldwork I began to suspect that aspects of the senior shop stewards’ role, 
particularly vis a vis constituents, might play some part in influencing their propensity for 
particular accounting orientations, and/or might be a factor that mediates the implications
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of D.A.I. by influencing aspects of the shop steward - constituent relationship. These 
suspicions developed out of, and were reinforced to some extent by, comments such as:
"I tell the lads the plain facts, ife then their decision as to what we should do 
. . .  its only right to be democratic . . ."
(Bill, a financial "realist")
At the same time I was aware of a considerable body of empirical research and ideal-type 
categorisations regarding shop stewards’ roles (e.g. Batsone, et al, 1977; Marchington and 
Armstrong, 1983; Partridge, 1977; Pedler, 1973; Poole, 1974; Willman, 1980). Therefore I 
proceeded to review this literature so as to further develop the embryonic sensitising concept 
of shop stewards’ roles.
Perhaps the importance of these issues is best summarised by Poole(ibid)when he alluded to 
how structural and behaviourial elements are mediated by shop stewards’ orientations. For 
Poole, a thorough going sociological analysis of the role of shop stewards cannot afford . . .
". . . to ignore the shop stewards’ orientations to their particular duties and 
responsibilities."
(ibid., p. 61)
A great deal of research pursued this insight (see above) but it was Batstone et al (ibid) who 
first not only presented a typology of shop stewards’ roles, but also attempted to explain that 
role variability in terms of other factors. This typology was an outcome of ethnographic 
fieldwork and it presented a two-dimensional model resulting in a four-fold classification 
of shop steward roles. As illustrated below (figure II) one dimension pertains to observed 
variability in the shop stewards’ relationships with constituents in decision making; while the 
second relates to the extent of a shop steward’s pursuit of "trade union principles", beyond 
a more "instrumentalism" (ibid., p. 37), as opposed to sectional membership interests.
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Figure II
Adapted from Batsone et al (1977. p. 34)
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However the discriminatory dimensions of this typology have since been subject to much 
criticism (e.g. Willman, ibid.). This has caused Marchington and Armstrong (ibid.), while 
preserving the basis of the original typology, to amend the two main axes so as to "tighten 
up" the framework and to remove some of the vagueness and ambiguities that they considered 
to have caused some empirical confusion.
Firstly, Marchington and Armstrong relabelled the original vertical dimension as "orientation 
and unionism"; subjects scoring highly in this were inclined to perceive the importance of 
collective organisation both at an intra and extra organisational level as well as valuing the 
principles of unity and solidarity. Conversely, low scorers conceived unionism at the level 
of their own constituents rather than in terms of any wider reference group. This dimension 
was then operationalised into a battery of five questions.1
Secondly, the representative-delegate axis was left relatively unchanged save for the removal 
of the original references to the shop steward network in decision making (see Batstone et al., 
ibid. p. 35). This Marchington and Armstrong felt to be inappropriate when attempting to 
isolate factors concerning shop stewards’ leadership of constituents. Hence this dimension 
now only focused upon the willingness and ability of the shop steward to lead his members,
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and in some instances control them, and set the agenda by preventing particular issues from 
being pursued. This dimension was then operationalised into a battery of three questions.2
These reconstructed dimensions are then combined to produce anew four-fold taxonomy of 
role "ideal types", as illustrated by figure III.
Figure III





Low WORK GROUP 
LEADER
POPULIST
According to Marchington and Armstrong the "leader-steward" is highly committed to trade 
unionism, espousing wider politicalaims such as socialism or workers control, and was willing 
and able to lead all the union membership. In contrast the "populist" is neither committed to 
trade unionism nor leading his members, rather he sees his role as the "mouthpiece" or 
"spokesman" of constituents. The "work group" leaders shared this parochialism, but they 
displayed strong leadership over constituents by agenda setting with reference to what he 
perceived as being in the best interests of his constituents. Hence they were keen to lead and 
protect their own members but they were not particularly concerned about others. Finally, 
the "cautious supporter" was a more transient role containing a variety of types of people who 
shared a commitment to the wider principles of trade unionism but were extremely cautious 
in this since they perceived themselves as being essentially a delegate mandated by 
constituents. Presumably the potential for role conflict and ambiguity entailed in such an 
incumbency made this ideal-type a "stopping off point" prior to a later move into the 
"populist" or "leader" roles.
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My suspicions that the shop steward’s role might be an important influence upon the 
propensity to adhere to particular accounting orientations were reinforced by the comment, 
by Marchington and Armstrong, that they found that
. . leaders were significantly different from other categories in political 
terms - more likely to be left-wing - and in their more radical conception of 
class."
(ibid., p. 38)
This, I considered might suggest some possible relationship between accounting orientation 
and shop steward role through the mediation of social imagery (although what Marchington 
and Armstrong mean by a "radical conception of class" remains unexplained); something I 
thought I should investigate during my return to the field.
Senior Shop Stewards re-visited
So I returned to the field with a list of issues, or "sensitising concepts", which I felt it was 
necessary to further explore during a second round of interviews with the same respondents. 
My intent was to develop the case features that had emerged out of the prior interviews, and 
the literature pertaining to shop stewards’ roles, through the implementation of stages 2,3 and 
4 of Bloor’s modified analytic induction. As stated this involved a move towards "progressive 
focusing" (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983, pp. 175-6) in two senses. Firstly there was a 
move from a substantive concern with describing subjects’ accounting orientations to a focus 
upon developing explanations of such phenomena; and secondly this shift entailed a move 
towards more structure during interaction with respondents, particularly through the use of 
more sharply focused questions, so as to direct dialogue towards the themes identified as 
potential case features. In accomplishing the above I was helped by the knowledge, of each 
respondent, that I had previously elicited in the first interviews. This not only aided the 
maintenance of rapport and "mutuality", but also it enabled me to refer back to specific 
comments individuals had made so as to stimulate further discussion of the issues relevant to
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the case features. I felt that this eased the transition to more direction and focus by anchoring 
rapport, at least initially, within the frame of reference and terminology of the respondent.
As I interviewed respondents for the second time, the increasing complexity of the 
comparative analysis of case features sometimes necessitated my reinterviewing respondents 
for a third time so as to check and develop elements of my emergent theoretical scheme. The 
following analysis attempts to document the role of, and interaction between, each case 
feature in influencing informants’ accounting orientation. In writing an account of this 
analysis, I have for expository purposes tried to arrange selected portions of data according 
to their relevance to each case feature.
Senior Shoo Stewards Roles
During the second (and in some cases the third) round of interviews, I attempted to 
encourage respondents to talk about their main duties and responsibilities, as they perceived 
them; as well as eliciting information pertaining to their commitments and orientations 
towards trade unionism.
In regard to the latter, despite the situation that all respondents were senior shop stewards or 
workplace Branch Secretaries, it emerged that relative to both the "cynics" and the "realists", 
the "sceptics" appeared to be much more highly committed to Trade Unionism. For instance, 
except for one, all the members of this accounting orientation articulated some commitment 
to unity and solidarity with "fellow workers" in other work places and industries. This was 
particularly illustrated by their views of the miners’ strike . . .
"It was terrible - we let them down. We should have come out in su p p o rt. .
. then they would have won . . .  a lot at my place thought it had nothing to do 
with us but of course it had . . . we’re all workers . . . miners, steel workers,
dockers . . .  we have to stick together otherwise we’ve had it."
(Paul)
267
"I blame that gutless bastard . . .  all he’s after is votes - he doesn’t
have any principles . . .  by not supporting the N.U.M. he sold trade unionism down the river."
(Mark)
"A few years ago we’d have taken the Tories on. . . we did at Saltley . . . the 
miners won in ’74 because we stood together . . . now people don’t give a 
damn about anything but themselves . . . but that’s stupid - you can’t look 
after yourself on your own, you need the support of others otherwise you’ll 
be crushed . . .  many can’t see that - I think that’s one of the most important 
affects of Thatcher’s policies - selfishness . . . sod you Jack, I’m alright" 
(Herbert)
While demonstrating a commitment to unity and solidarity many "sceptics" also demonstrated 
commitments to socialism and internationalism. These elements are typically illustrated by 
the following
"If the leadership of the Labour Party really were socialists they wouldn’t turn 
round and tell people to obey Tory laws . . . especially during strikes . . .  all 
they want is pow er. . .  I can’t see what’s the point in voting for them, they’ve 
moved so far to the right there’s hardly any difference between Labour and 
the Tory wets . . .  it would be like voting for Heath . . ."
(Paul)
"You’ve got to ask why are we in this game . . .  is it just to increase our 
members’ wage packets and improve conditions or what? Many stewards 
don’t think about these issues . . . some are just in it for themselves . . . Me, 
I’m a socialist, that’s why I’m a steward - without socialist principles all you 
do is oil the wheels for the bosses . . ."
(Herbert)
"Many of the lads can’t see beyond their own noses . . .  If they think 
something doesn’t directly affect them they’re not interested . . .  I think that 
being a socialist makes you realise that we’re all in this together . . .  us, the 
miners, nurses, teachers . . . we’re all workers . . .  I feel that I have more in 
common with a German steelworker or a French miner than I have with the 
plant manager and his cronies . . .  we share economic conditions, all I share 
with management is the English language . . . "
(Joe)
Perhaps given these commitments and orientations it is hardly surprising that all "sceptics" 
had a relatively greater emphasis upon jja "representative". All alluded to a more proactive 
role as protectors and leaders of their constituents in what they regarded as an ongoing 
struggle against the excesses and arbitrariness of managerial policies and actions. This 
appeared to entail a great deal of agenda setting, either by squashing issues raised by
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constituents and/or by raising issues themselves so as to protect and advance what they 
perceived as their members’ best interests. Hence the "sceptic" perceived himself as, and 
acted as, arbiter of constituents’ interests and of the appropriate tactics for securing those 
interests. This is most clearly illustrated by Keith
"I don’t want to seem a bighead, but some of the lads are not too bright . . . 
they read rubbish like the Sun and listen to Radio Hallam . .  . when it comes 
to knowing what’s best for themselves they need help . . . that’s my job . . . 
If I didn’t tell them what’s what and sometimes stop them from doing stupid 
things . .  . management would twist them around their little fingers . .  . most 
of the lads can’t see beyond page three . . ."
Thus "sceptics" saw themselves as protecting and advancing members’ interests which they 
were better at defining than the members themselves. Important in this process of defining 
"true" interest was an appeal to the principles of trade unionism and socialism.
In contrast to the "sceptic", both "cynics" and "realists" were relatively parochial in their 
orientations. Neither group tended to invoke the symbols of socialism or trade unionism in 
conceiving their duties and obligations. Rather they saw their duties and obligations to be 
limited to the direct concerns and interests of their own constituents rather than with wider 
interests. Again this is illustrated by how the miners strike was perceived:
"Although I felt sorry for the miners - nobody likes to see hardship - it didn’t 
really have much to do with us . . .  it was their problem not ours."
(Jim: a "realist")
Alternatively:
"During the 70s we were always getting picketed out . . .  if it wasn’t lorry 
drivers it was them from B.S.C.. . .  we were fed up with i t . .  . what the hell 
did it have to do with us?
(John: a "cynic")
"Perhaps one good think that Thatcher has done for industrial relations is to 
stop secondary picketing . . .  at one time my members were continually being 
prevented from working because of disputes elsewhere - things that had 
nothing to do with us."
(Geof: a "realist")
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"I’m sick of gesture politics . . .  all this stuff about solidarity with this and 
that, is crap . . . my job is to look after the lads . . . what happened in the 
miners strike or what’s happening in South Africa is bloody nasty if you’re a 
miner or a black South African - but its got nothing to do with me or the lads 
. . . in this world you have to look after yourselves - nobody else will." 
(Fred: a "cynic")
Thus while "cynics" and "realists" shared a rather parochial concern only with their specific 
constituents and what they understood as their constituents interests, what markedly 
differentiated the "cynic" from the "realist" were the processes by which "members interests" 
were arbitrated and defined.
As with the "sceptic", the "cynic" assumed a proactive representative role. They perceived 
themselves as the arbiters of what was best for their members and again this necessitated 
agenda setting. This is demonstrated by the following quotes:
"My members come first but often they make mistakes, they don’t think about 
the consequences of what they might want to do or say . . .  so I’ve got to be 
careful about what I let through and pursue . . . they just don’t have the 
experience to deal with some issues"
(Fred: a "cynic")
"When I don’t agree with what the lads say, I don’t support them . . .  a lot of 
them don’t really understand things . . . and if you let them they’d play 
straight into management’s hands . . . they just don’t understand what might 
be at stake . . . you have to be tough with them sometimes . . ."
(John: a "cynic")
However the "cynics", unlike the "sceptics", did not rely upon the principles and symbols of 
socialism or trade unionism in defining what they perceived as members’ interests. 
Essentially the perceptual yardstick which was invoked in arbitrating their constituents’ 
interests, and thereby implicit in agenda setting, was derived from a parochial understanding 
of the situation facing those members. Such sectionalism was voiced by John:
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"The lads trust me to do what’s right for them not anybody else - they know 
I’ll fight for them so they usually leave things up to me . . .  I know that some 
stewards seem to be more bothered about high ideals like solidarity, socialism, 
anti-racism, blacking work from *K****n’s etc., . . . what I do is think how 
will that affect my members - they come first, anything else is a luxury."
(* A local firm presently employing non-union labour after locking-out members of 
the A.E.U.)
A similar point was made by Fred but in reference to local union affairs:
"I’ll only support the J.S.S.C. when it doesn’t go against my members’ interests 
- I have to protect their interests sometimes even from other unions and 
sometimes even from our own union!"
As previously demonstrated, the "realists" showed the relative parochialism of the "cynic" in 
the sense of a low commitment to the broader principles of the trade unionism or any wider 
political aims. However what primarily differentiated "realists" from "cynics" and further 
distanced them from the "sceptics" was their relatively greater propensity to assume a 
"delegate" role vis a vis constitutions. In this, respondents of this type perceived their role 
as that of a spokesman for his constituents, passing on their views and concerns to 
management, and passing back management’s position to constituents. These elements are 
illustrated by the following quotes:
"I am totally against anything that’s anti-democratic . . . I’m no militant . . . 
my members must have the last wor':d on everything."
(Bill)
"They raise issues and grievances and its my job to put these to management 
as best I can . . . usually some compromise can bei found, after all we’re not 
at war though to listen to some stewards you’d think we were."
(Geof)
"I don’t try and tell the lads what they should do, rather I just give them the 
facts and let them decide . . .  I pass back the decision to m anagem ent. . .  I’m 
really just piggy-in-the-middle."
(Keith)
By applying Marchington and Armstrong’s typology (ibid) to these accounts, it was possible 
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Although by no means "perfect", a fairly clear pattern is demonstrated by the above. Leaders 
have a propensity to be "sceptics" while the populists defer to a "realist" accounting 
orientation. Although two accounting orientations appear to be possible for work group 
leaders, what is most notable is that both "cynics" feature in this quadrant. The apparent lack 
of cautious supporters is hardly surprising given that all respondents were highly experienced 
senior shop stewards, or branch secretaries, and the role of cautious supporter is generally 
considered to be a transient role often adopted by neophyte shop stewards. It is now 
necessary to explore the three main associations that are identifiable, in greater detail.
1. The Populist-Realist Association
At first this apparent relationship was quite surprising, given the nature of the accounting 
orientation and the "populist’s" predilection for delegacy, despite the "conservative" 
disposition of many "populists" in Marchington and Armstrong’s study (ibid., p. 43). 
However my perplexity began to dissipate once I began to review my prior analyses and 
field notes in an attempt to make sense of this association.
It occurred to me that this propensity for reactive mediation, the perception of self as 
spokesman and communicator combined with a lack of commitment to trade unionism, might 
exacerbate the individual’s susceptibility to accept accounting renditions of reality. Such
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apparently factual and objective data might provide the "populist" with a form of 
communication that appealed to their desire to transmit the "facts" to constituents and further 
abrogated them from any responsibility for taking unmandated decisions,or arbitrating the 
appropriateness of courses of action. Thus perhaps accounting information appealed to the 
"populist" by reinforcing his preferred role as delegate by ensuring an apparently rational 
body of information for communication to constituents. If members should wilfully decide 
to ignore the content of that information and thus adopt "irrational" courses of action, the 
"populist" in communicating such decisions to management was personally divorced from any 
responsibility in his role as mere delegate or messenger. Alternatively the relationship might 
be the reverse. That is, the "realists" assumption of the veracity of accounting information 
not only abrogated them from the responsibility of defining members’ interests in the many 
dealings with constituents and management, it also relegated their interaction with those 
parties to that of reactive mediator, since it constituted a neutral and immutable body of facts 
that had to be confronted regardless of their palatability. In other words their acceptance 
of the veracity of disclosed accounting information increased senior shop stewards propensity 
for adopting a "populist" role rather than visa versa.
However this latter possibility seemed unlikely since the same acceptance of the veracity of 
accounting information by "cynics" clearly was not associated with the reactive mediation of 
"populists". But I was concerned that the different social imageries of the "cynic" and the 
"realist" might be obfuscating the nature of this "realist"-"populist" relationship. The only 
way I could be sure that "populism" lead to "realism", rather than vice versa, was to 
investigate whether or not "realists" had been "populists" prior to their exposure to in­
company financial training. I felt that the latter appeared to be a significant case feature that 
differentiated "sceptics" from both "realists" and "cynics" in respect of how accounting 
information was perceived. But the varying appropriation and use of accounting information 
by "cynics" and "realists" implies the influence of some phenomena that created, in subjects, 
dispositions that led to such variable practices.
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So as to establish the nature of the "realist" - "populist" relationship I reinterviewed some of 
the realists so as to ask them, indirectly, about whether or not they had always adopted a 
more "populist" role, particularly in respect of delegacy, prior to their exposure to financial 
training. From their responses to my inquiries it appeared that populism preceded "realism", 
for instance:
"I’ve always thought that being democratic is important - that means that its 
the members’ wishes that I put to management, regardless."
(Bill)
"Ever since I was first elected as a steward I’ve tried to be fair with the lads 
. . . it’s what they want that’s important - not what I think . . . I’ve never 
forgotten that basic principle even when they do things or make demands that 
I know are wrong."
(Geof)
"How I see myself is a bit of a go-between for my members and management. 
At first I didn’t have much of an opinion about the messages . . .  but since I’ve 
gained more experience I think that sometimes the lads won’t face up to the 
financial facts that the company faces . . . they’re too greedy often . . 
(Keith)
From the above, it would appear that the role of "populist" increases the susceptibility of 
senior shop stewards for adopting a "realist" accounting orientation after having experienced 
financial training.
2. The Work Group Leader -  Cvnic Association
In contrast to the "realists", "cynics" appeared to adopt the role of "work group leader". In 
terms of Marchington and Armstrong’s typology this distinction arises out of a relatively 
greater emphasis upon representation as opposed to delegacy and a consequent predilection 
for proaction in defining members’ interests. Yet the "cynic" shares with the "realist" 
assumptions about the veracity of accounting information; but this acceptance does not 
appear to determine the former’s negotiating strategy, during collective bargaining, in the 
same fashion as that apparent in the latter. If this did happen, given the "cynics" preference
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for representation, the control implications, through the exercise of Lukes’ 2nd and 3rd 
dimensions of power (1974), might be significant since an important form of insidious control 
would be extant.
However this scenario does not appear to occur since the "cynic” pursues, in a Machiavellian 
fashion, what he has unilaterally defined as this constituents’ interests. For the cynic, 
accounting renditions of reality, although veracious, do not define constituents’ interests. 
Rather they are taken to be a lexicon that might be applied in the furtherance of those 
interests, or ignored when perceived as contradicting those overriding interests. In the latter 
case alternative calculative procedures that are seen as providing some advantage in the 
pursuit of constituents’ interests, are tactically invoked during negotiations. Indeed it would 
appear that the "cynic" acts out the role of Clegg’s (1979) "artful bargainer" - in that
". . . in order to achieve their bargaining objectives, managers and union 
representatives appeal to values which depend upon comparisons. The art of 
bargaining consists of selecting and highlighting advantageous comparisons".
(ibid., p. 445)
When considering Clegg’s description in the context of a "cynic’s" activities one should add
. . by applying calculative practices that are perceived as advantageous".
Now this raises the question as to why does this alternative apprehension and appropriation 
of disclosed accounting information, unique to the cynic, occur?
Although both the "cynic" and the "realist" share an ambivalence to trade unionism there are 
palpable differences in these attitudes. Primarily the "realists’" comprehension of intra- 
organisational relations is underpinned by a unitary understanding of his organisation in 
which differences of function occur according to different groups’ abilities, talents and 
credentials. In contrast to this essentially consensual world, the "cynic’s" understanding of 
intra-organisational relations is influenced by a dichotomous social imagery laden with both 
conflictual and oppositional sentiments, and a denegation of white collar work as effete and
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parasitic. Therefore the "us" in the "them and us" of the "realist" pertains to the gestalt of a 
unitary organisation, while the "them" refers to external objects of threat, such as the 
competitors, with whom the "us" struggles. But for the "cynic", his dichotomous perception 
of intra-organisational relations derives from a parochial definition of "us", limited to the 
members he represents, while the "them" pertains to anyone outside that immediate 
constituency.
It is in these case features, that differentiate the "cynic" from the "realist", that there lies 
their variable reception of the shared experience of in-company financial training. The 
eventual expressions of such mediation are their contrasting negotiating practices in collective 
bargaining and joint consultation.
It would appear that the "cynic’s" combative and oppositional perception of dichotomous 
intra-organisational relations creates a perceived need to defend constituents from the ever 
present threats and excesses of other organisational groups. This concern overrides the 
immanent implications for collective bargaining of the "cynic’s" acceptance of the neutrality 
and veracity of accounting information. Although such information might constitute the 
harbinger of an immutable financial reality, the intercession of the typifications derived 
from their social imagery prevents the translation of such unassailable truths into the 
practices evident in the "realist". Rather the "cynic’s" "war of all against all" leads to a 
machiavellian pursuit of perceived interest by any available means, regardless of their moral 
or ethical status in terms of the imperatives deriving from an accounting rendition of 
organisational reality. Moreover the "cynic’s" predilection for a representative role, as 
opposed to some mandated delegacy, enables the implementation of this strategy as it ensures 
some autonomy from the impediment of constituents’ sanction.
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3. The Leader - Sceptic Association
In the phenomenological world of the "cynic", excluded from their conception of "us" are 
other constituencies of trade unionists. Although these specific "others" are not necessarily 
or consistently perceived in the combative and oppositional light that guides the "cynics" 
understanding of other members of the "them" (e.g. management and white collar workers), 
they are perceived with an ambivalence that coincides with the "cynic’s" orientation towards 
the trade union principles of solidarity etc. As previously illustrated, the "cynics" parochial 
definition of "us" is limited to the senior shop steward’s immediate constituency. While in the 
case of the senior shop steward this might be a "broad church" of many members, it does not 
have the breadth of the more radical oppositional imagery of the "sceptic". The latter invokes 
solidarity with groups external to their immediate constituency, regardless of organisational, 
industrial or national boundaries, who are perceived as sharing similar social and economic 
conditions. Thus the social imagery of the "cynic" although oppositional, is not as "radical" 
as first impressions might suggest -while the "them" and "us" is conceived in terms of a "war", 
it is not the "class" war of the "sceptic". This has several important implications.
In particular, as with the "realist", there is an evident relationship between the social imagery 
referred to and the attitudes towards trade union principles displayed by respondents. These 
features in turn influence the type of role adopted by senior shop stewards and, importantly, 
influence how actors perceive and define constituents’ interests. In the cases of the "cynic" 
and the "sceptic", both are proactive in defining members’ interests; but the recipes of 
knowledge in-use and the symbols invoked in those processes, and the consequent courses of 
actions that are considered appropriate, vary because of the underlying social imageries that 
are brought to bear in making sense of their everyday organisational worlds.
However a further significant difference between the "cynic" and the "sceptic" is the latter’s 
lack of exposure to in-company financial training. Perhaps it is useful to look at this 
difference by conjecturing about the possible effects upon the "sceptic" if  he was to be 
exposed to such training. Unlike the "cynic", all "sceptics" deny the veracity of accounting 
information; meanwhile,the case features that differentiate the two accounting orientations 
pertain to social imagery/trade union principles and exposure to financial training. Hence
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which of those two features is most important in influencing and leading to different 
accounting orientations?
One could explore this issue by exposing "sceptic’s” to financial training and observing 
whether or not a re-orientation towards a more "cynical" accounting orientation ensued: if 
such a move did occur it was the incidence of financial training that was most important in 
discriminating between the two orientations, whereas if no reorientation was identifiable it 
would imply that "cynics" and "sceptics" were differentiated primarily by their social imagery. 
But such a quasi-experiment was not only beyond the resources of this research but also 
access for such an investigation would be problematic and the investigation itself ethically 
questionable. However some light was shed upon this issue by the case of one "sceptic" who 
had experienced some financial training. I carefully reanalysed the case and confirmed the 
accuracy of the original classification and the subjects’ exposure to in-company financial 
training. Unfortunately the respondent in question was unwilling to be interviewed for a 
third time, so I was left with the data I had priorly elicited and unable to investigate further. 
Thus I was left with the tentative conclusion that it was unlikely that the exposure of 
"sceptics" to financial training would provide a re-orientation towards the "cynic" category. 
Presumably elements of the more radical social imagery and tenure of trade union principles 
somehow prevented acceptance of the veracity of accounting renditions. Essentially the 
accounting seed spread through such financial training, would fail to germinate in those 
barren conditions; on the other hand, when spread amongst work group leaders and populists 
it did germinate, but what eventually grew in each case varied primarily because of the 
cognitive differences in how intra-organisational relations were perceived. This leads me to 
infer that in the case of the one "sceptic" who displayed a propensity for work group 
leadership, if  he was exposed to in-company financial training he may well "blossom" into a 
"cynic" prior to training and may constitute a fourth accounting orientation, that of "potential 
cynic"? Thus without that "seeding" it is possible to conjecture that it is somewhat unlikely 
that the "cynics" would be indiscernible from "sceptics". Although they would probably then 
share the "sceptics’" denial of the veracity of disclosed accounting information, their 
differential social imagery with its apparent parochialism and ambivalence to trade unionism
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would create a distinctive sub-group of sceptically orientated shop stewards whose "war of 
all against all" social imagery might signify the potentiality for the germination of the"cynic" 
when "seeded" through in-company financial training. In other words such training provides 
another weapon to the armoury deployable in the defence and furtherm ent of parochial 
interest.
Conclusion
Following Mead (1934), if  people are to anticipate and plan their actions, as well as reflect 
upon past conduct, they must be able to look upon themselves in the same way they look 
upon any other object. This human capacity for self-consciousness, for "objectifying self", 
depends upon the ability of the individual to take the same attitude towards him /herself as 
others (see Young, 1971; Cohen, 1972). The "significant others" important in this process may 
be the reference group whose . . .
". . . presumed perspective is used by an actor as the frame of reference for 
his perceptual field . . ."
(Shibutani, 1962, p. 132)
But the "significant others" which an actor may adopt as a reference group may not 
necessarily derive from a group in which s/he has overt membership since people
". . . frequently orientate themselves to a group other than their own in 
shaping their behaviour and evaluations . . ." (Merton, 1962, p. 234)
Despite the "realists’" predilection for delegacy and their protestations of democratic 
mandation; it is evident that in Kelman’s (1961) terms their public performance of their 
incumbencies entailed compliance rather than conforming in the sense of internalisation of, 
or identification with, their constituents’ preferences and mores. For instance; although at 
the level of public testimony the realist invariably acted as spokesman, he was often privately 
disparaging about the wishes and demands which he articulated during negotiations. This
279
disparagement appeared to express an evaluation of these demands that implied the 
application of moral imperatives deriving from the constellation of meanings of "significant 
others” outside the constituency. The psychic ramifications arising from this incapacity to 
act in terms of the directives stemming from an assumed ontological and moral privilege are 
beyond the substantive concerns of this research; instead it is necessary to consider the nature 
of these "significant others" in the phenomenological world of the "realist".
In Mead’s (ibid) terms, within the perceptual world of the "realist", management have 
assumed the role of phenomenologically referent "significant others". Thus their presumed 
perspective has become prepotent and dominant as a frame of reference for ordering and 
constructing the social reality of organisations; albeit not always translated fully into 
negotiating practices and perhaps often remains a phenomenal "ghost at the banquet" which 
causes the"realist" role conflict. The realist’s unitary social imagery of intra-organisational 
relations might either have enabled, or be a result of, management’s usurpation of referent 
significant other. Yet regardless of this "chicken and egg" chronology, management as 
"significant others" constitute, in Schutz’s terminology (1960), a "we-relationship" with the 
"realist". In this the "realist" is phenomenologically confronted by the experienced "significant 
others" who bring to his psychic world a whole stock of previously constituted recipes of 
knowledge and frames of reference. An important aspect of this stock of knowledge is an 
accountancy construction of reality imparted through in-company training and D.A.I. For 
Schutz (ibid), it is from this "we-relationship" that derives knowledge of the social world 
which serves as a basis for subsequent encounters, even though the "significant others" may 
be absent from these interactions thus becoming a latent or aspirant reference group, as in 
the interview context of this research or in dealing with constituents. In the perceptual 
horizons of the "realist" management have thus assumed the status of "consociate" -  people 
who he knows in their unique individuality struggling to guide "the organisation" through the 
exigencies of a market economy - the status of the knowledge transmitted by these 
consociates is assumed to be unproblematic and veracious. Meanwhile the "others" excluded 
from the "we-relationship" remain,or are relegated,to the status of "contemporaries" (Schutz, 
ibid.). That is, those outside the "we-relationship", through anonymisation and reification
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(the processes of typification), are excluded from the consocial intersubjectivity with 
management and despatched into culturally prescribed categories embodied in, and expressed 
by, current language in-use; e.g. "militant", "stupid", "unreasonable", "competitors".
Thus, perhaps through the processes of training and D.A.I. falling upon "fertile ground", 
accounting has come to play a significant part in providing the "realist" with a means of 
making sense of his environment even though it does not usually come to be expressed in the 
public domain, since role commitments limit it to what may normally be private sentiments, 
save for the transmission of the "facts" to constituents. But this role of "go-between" 
and"spokesman" allows the "realist" to report to constituents unmediated accounting derived 
renditions of reality. His belief in the latter’s veracity and his probable consequent public 
attribution of authoritativeness will have implications for constituents’ reception. Perhaps the 
nature of that reception may be an outcome of the quality of the "realists" relationship with 
those constituents, particularly in terms of how they perceive him. Thus the broader 
implications for control through D.A.I. in this specific context ultimately may depend upon 
aspects of the constituency group - its culture and its relationship with its representatives. 
At a more individualistic level, it would appear that accounting recipes of knowledge have 
been internalised by the realist and as such constitute psychological discipline. It is 
interesting to conjecture that this may be in the sense that Kanter’s (1968) notion of 
"surrender" has occurred. This involves . . .
". . . the attachment of a person’s decision making prerogative to a greater 
power, total involvement with a larger system of authority which gives both 
meaning and direction . . .  so that carrying out system demands becomes a 
moral necessity for the maintenance of the self . . ."
(ibid., pp. 513-4)
If such a state of affairs has occurred, the "realist’s" commitment to democratic mandation 
will be problematic, and/or when the demands of the accounting system are frustrated by the 
apparent wilfulness of constituents, there must be some significant psychological 
ramifications for the realist.
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Again, by following the insights of both Schutz (ibid) and Mead (ibid) the case of the 
"sceptic" appears as a situation in which phenomenologically significant others are constituted 
by subjects’ who construct their worlds by a reliance upon the principles unity, solidarity, 
socialism etc. and who express a radical and oppositional dichotomous social imagery when 
making sense of intra-organisational relationships. Although the specific identity of these 
significant others remains penumbranic in subjects’ accounts, it was evident that, unlike the 
"realist" or the "cynic", "sceptics" shared a very positive view of fellow members of J.S.S.C.’s, 
branch committees, trades councils and the other subsidiaries that go together to create the 
trade union movement. Now Newcomb (1966) suggests that the individual’s evaluation of 
possible reference groups is an important factor in the acceptance or rejection of such groups, 
that is . . .
" . . .  in a membership group in which certain attitudes are approved, 
individuals acquire approved attitudes to the extent that the membership 
group (particularly as symbolised by leaders and dominant sub-groups) serves 
as a positive point of reference"
(ibid., p. 262)
It follows that it is possible to tentatively infer that the "sceptics" attachment to these 
principles and social imageries may be intimately enmeshed with their positive evaluation of 
the above potential significant others. It may be that it is these actors who have come to 
constitute the consociates of the "we-relationship"; whose frame of reference and recipes of 
knowledge - their "cultural paradigm" (Schein, 1984) - create the barren ground for a 
contemporaneous management to seed through D.A.I. or potentially through in-company 
financial training. A reference group which may also inculcate culturally approved modes 
of leading constituents and arbitrating their interests.
Finally, it is even more difficult to conjecture about the reference group of the "cynic". 
Having noted the problematic and contentious nature of this endeavour it is possible to 
exclude from consideration both "management" and the subsidiaries of the trade union 
movement. It would appear that this leaves one potential group of consociates in cynics’ 
accounts: the individuals and groups who make up the cynics’ constituents.
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At first sight, given the "cynics" predilection for representation, this must be an ambiguous 
relationship. Yet from  their accounts, "cynics" do seem to perceive their constituents, or at 
least particular sub-groups of their constituents, in terms of a "we-relationship" and apply 
contem poraneous typifications to outsiders. This leads one to conjecture that the"cynic’s" 
perform ance of the role of representative and their expression and pursuit of parochial 
sentim ents, are culturally prescribed modes of engagement sanctioned by constituents. An 
elem ent of this approval pertains to the expectation of, and obligation for, the incum bent to 
at times act unilaterally in the accomplishment of his role. Thus perhaps "cynicism" arises 
out of a particular, and it would appear unusual, conjunction of values, norms and mores 
that may be ultim ately enmeshed in the group’s "history" of organisational experiences 
pertaining to pragm atic problem -solving and anxiety reduction (see Schein, 1984).
In conclusion, the social phenom ena and processes that have been identified  in this fieldw ork 
as influencing subjects’ propensity to refer to particular accounting orientations m ight be 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER VII
These questions were as follows:
(a) Do you consider that J.S.S.C. or combines are of any im portance to the union 
movement?
(b) It is often said that "a shop steward should support J.S.C.C. resolutions even 
if on occasions these are against his own mem bers’ interests".
(c) How often do you go to Branch meetings?
(d) What do you think are the main union principles?
(e) What do you think of the statem ent that "generally you can’t work according 
to union principles - they don’t feed the family"? (M archington and 
A rm strong, 1983, pp. 40-41)
These questions were as follows:
(a) What are your feelings towards this statement: "A Steward is a representative 
but he is also a leader; sometimes he has to tell his mem bers they’re not on, 
sometimes stir them into action."
(b) Do you often have to amend, change or squash issues raised by members?
(c) Do you just pursue issues the members raise or do you do a fa ir b it o f issue-
raising yourself?
(M archington and Arm strong, 1983, p. 41)
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CONCLUSIONS. REFLECTIONS. AND SPECULATIONS
"Cultural analysis is (or should be) guessing at meai^s, assessing the guesses, and drawing explanatory conclusions from the better guesses, not discovering the Continent o f M eaning . . (Geertz, 1973, p. 20)
Introduction
The culm ination of the fieldw ork and analyses presented in C hapter VII represents the 
form ulation of an explanatory and descriptive scheme that might be understood as a 
coalescence of G eertz’s "guesses". This coalescence has been enabled and guided by the 
"modified" version of analytic induction that was articulated in Chapter VI and, m oreover, 
the substantive "guesses" themselves were outcomes of an approach to fieldw ork that was 
com m itted to Hammersley and A tkinson’s notion of a "reflexive ethnography" (1983) that in 
this instance utilised, as a vehicle for eliciting inform ation from  respondents, the "life history 
interview" (see Plum m er, 1983).
With reference to the methodology I developed in Chapter III, I have now established a 
"methodologically corroborated" theory-laden account. But in terms of that methodology this 
fieldw ork is unfinished. Essentially my deference to the "pragmatic criterion" requires that 
such an account must be translated into a guide for practical action in some form . Indeed it 
is only through an intervention into the social world that its veracity and fallibility  - its 
practical adequacy - m ight be established. A lthough this desire is prim arily necessitated by 
the injunctions of my pragm atist epistemology, it also serves another, but related, purpose.
As I have tried to consistently argue, the recognition of the proactive and projective role of 
the epistemic subject in the apprehension and construction of reality necessitates the 
invocation of the "pragmatic criterion" in the evaluation of resultant accounts. This 
com m itm ent serves to confront such theory-laden knowledge, in a fallibilistic m anner, with 
the tolerance of "reality in-itself". However as this approach serves to confront that
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knowledge that has been "formally" encoded into schemata, it also serves to implicitly 
confront the "tacit knowledge" that I must have brought to bear in doing the research. As 
Polanyi (1967) claims, "tacit knowledge" is by definition inarticulable, it cannot be 
communicated to an audience. However, as he implies, such knowledge is displayed and 
"tested" through its enablement of the accomplishment of practical tasks and the successful 
management of everyday life. So my commitment to the injunctions of the "pragmatic 
criterion" not only enables the confrontation of the "formally" articulated elements of my 
fieldwork, as represented by the scheme at the end of Chapter VII, it also allows for the 
implicit confrontation of the "tacit knowledge" that latently underpins the construction of that 
"formalised" knowledge.
A "Practical*1 Intervention
In this thesis I have developed an ontological and epistemological orientation that leads one 
to consider that what people have been able to find out about their social and natural 
environments depends upon their pragmatic intercourse with one another, and with nature, 
in terms of tackling and settling practical problems in a fallibilistic manner. It is out of the 
interaction of these social, political and practical processes that the edifice of knowledge, 
often reified and attributed privilege and mystique, arises. Within this web of complex 
interactions; ideas, beliefs, values and theories are implicitly evaluated by their translation 
into interest-laden activities. Such activities are undertaken on the basis of, and under the 
auspices of, the expectations of the actors involved. It is their sense of continuing 
satisfactory fulfilment, or their perceived violation, of these guiding expectations that 
influences whether or not the ideas etc. upon which these expectations are based become 
established, or remain established, as legitimate recipes of knowledge, or "corrected" and 
reformulated, or discarded as illusory. Once a body of knowledge is accepted by a social 
group as legitimate, its eventual fate in terms of societal status, diffusion and 
institutionalisation is in many respects intimately tied to the actions and fate(s) of the carrier 
group(s).
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Given this understanding of the significance of the "pragmatic criterion" in the social 
evaluation of ideas; how can I translate the coalescence of "guesses", about senior shop 
stewards’ propensity to defer to particular observer-identified accounting orientations, into 
a set of practical interventions and activities which generate expectations whose violation or 
fulfilment allows for an evaluation of the practical adequacy that coalescence? Although it 
was apparent that there were numerous ways in which this agenda could be accomplished, 
it was equally apparent that it was important to consider their feasibility with regard to the 
resources available and their moral and ethical acceptability from my personal standpoint.
For instance, one possibility would have been to secure access to a suitable work 
organisation and make recommendations to management about the importance of in-company 
financial training to senior shop stewards. Assuming that access would be forthcoming^) it 
would then be possible to conduct action research. The first stage of this would be to collect 
data upon subjects along the dimensions of the case features identified in Chapter VII. The 
result of this fieldwork would be the identification of potential "cynics", "sceptics" and 
"realists". Next would be the construction of necessary "control groups" and the "experimental 
treatment" of other groups of potential "cynics", "sceptics" and "realists" with an in-company 
financial training programme. Upon the completion of the "training intervention", 
information would then be collected so as to evaluate the fulfilment or non-fulfilm ent of the 
expectations generated from the model developed at the end of Chapter VII; i.e. would the 
"cynic" and "realist" accounting orientation develop where expected and conversely would the 
"sceptic" orientation persist?
Although I would suggest that such a design, despite its evident need for refinement, would 
be ultimately possible; I ruled it out as a possibility upon ethical grounds rather than upon 
methodological criteria. Essentially it entailed attempting to create what could be permanent 
change in a group of subjects in regard to how they understood their organisational worlds; 
changes that could have many implications for their personal well-being and that of their 
constituents. So while from the vantage of my personal ethical and moral code, I perceived
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this potential in research to be unacceptable, such feelings were exacerbated by my 
consideration that that type of fieldwork would entail the need to seek the sanction of a 
managerial stakeholder group, at least by making my research and interventions rationally 
accountable, - a group whose objectives and agenda, in this context, I may find morally 
reprehensible and whose demands upon the research programme might result in myself 
becoming yet another "servant of power". So with these concerns in mind, despite their 
possibly Chimerical aspect, I had to develop alternatives that were methodologically and 
ethically more robust, even if the explicit translation of my original model into sets of 
practical interventions was inhibited.
The alternative that I eventually pursued constituted a practical intervention in the sense that 
I attempted to use the model of the social phenomena and processes that appeared to 
influence subjects’ propensity to defer to particular observer-identified "Accounting 
Orientations" to practically guide my social interaction with, and communicative 
understanding of, a new cohort of respondents. In other words I was guided by elements of 
that theoretical model to elicit from subjects their experiences of, and perspectives towards, 
the phenomena that were linked to the creation of propensities for particular "Accounting 
Orientations". From such accounts I was then able to generate expectations about the types 
of "Accounting Orientations" subjects would defer to when presented with disclosed 
accounting information during collective bargaining and joint consultation. Since I would 
be probably unable to actually observe subjects’ behaviour in that organisational context, I 
decided that it was instead necessary to collect information regarding their "Accounting 
Orientations" in a separate and ensuing round of interviews. This would allow identification 
of whether or not the priorly generated expectations were violated or fulfilled -  whether or 
not a "breakdown" had occurred (Agar, 1986).
This research process is diagrammatically represented by figure I below:
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Figure 1
1st Round of Interviews with new cohort of subjects
1. Information elicited regarding the experiences and perspectives of subjects which 
according to the model endow propensities for particular Accounting Orientations.
2. Guided by the model, an analysis of subjects’ accounts generates expectations 
regarding their particular Accounting Orientations.
2nd Round of Interviews
1. Information gathered pertaining to subjects’ Accounting Orientations.
2. Consequent fulfilment or violation of my expectations.
3. Consideration of implications for the practical adequacy of the model developed in
Chapter VII.
In "actioning" this plan, due to the various resource constraints I was experiencing, as well as 
the increasing difficulties I was experiencing in getting access, this new cohort was limited 
to six new senior shop stewards. Prior to my initial contact with them, I generated from the 
model a list of topics - that had to be investigated so as to generate the necessary expectations 
regarding Accounting Orientations. I saw that this list had to include the following issues:
1. Subjects’ understanding of intra-organisational relationships, particularly vis a vis 
management;
2. Subjects’ orientations and commitments towards trade unionism, and groups beyond 
their constituencies;
3. Subjects’ relationship(s) with constituents in terms of delegacy vs. representation;
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4. Subjects’ exposure to in-company financial training.
Furthermore I had to initially ensure that members of this second cohort were comparable 
with those of the first in terms of issues such as the size of their employing organisation, 
gender, occupational status, trade union membership, union office, involvement in collective 
bargaining, and their exposure to D.A.I. etc. Indeed that final issue caused me to politely 
"withdraw” from interactions with two respondents, and find replacements, due to their lack 
of exposure to D.A.I. in Collective Bargaining.
So with this rather different agenda for fieldwork, but deploying tactics similar to those used 
previously (e.g. "indirection") I gained access to six new respondents.
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The 1st Round of Interviews
For the sake of brevity and incisiveness, I shall limit this account to a summarisation of the 
findings and the expectations that ensued. These findings might be represented by the flow 
diagram below:
Figure II
:OHORT OF 6 SENIOR SHOP STEWARDS
(Peter, John, Stuart, Iain)1
4 Subjects -
dichotomous, combative 
social imageryI(Peter, John, Stuart)
3 subjects:
































Some experience of 
in-company financial 
training
As is illustrated above, the first point of departure for differentiating between members of 
this cohort of respondents related to variation in their conceptualisation of intra- 
organisational relationships. Basically four of the cohort (Peter, John, Stuart and Iain) 
appeared to habitually invoke a dichotomous social imagery when articulating their versions 
of the organisational reality they confronted as senior shop stewards. In this "us and them"
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world all four demonstrated a pejorative view of the "them” and a combative zero-sum 
understanding of their interactions with the "them". In this all four located management in 
the "them"; but only with three subjects (Peter, John and Stuart) was this social imagery 
overlaid by a radical class imagery with a consequent articulation of sentiments and 
symbolism appertaining to trade unionism, socialism and internationalism. The exception, 
Iain, instead articulated a parochial understanding of his constituents interests, thereby 
invoking a much narrower perception of the "us" in a "war of all against all", and eschewed 
any significant reliance upon the symbolism and codes of socialism and trade unionism in 
making sense of his organisation, or the interests and affairs of his constituents. This low 
commitment to trade unionism, or any wider political agenda, was shared by George and Tom 
who had been originally differentiated according to their apparently unitary, consensual and 
co-operative conception of intra-organisational relationships, particularly with management. 
For the latter, intra-organisational relations were characterised by a functional inter­
dependence, and as a non zero-sum context for the pursuit of collective goals in an hostile 
and competitive environment. The result was a markedly more positive perception of 
management and the groups they associated with management.
Where Iain again parted company with George and Tom and thus "phenomenologically 
rejoined" Peter, John and Stuart was with respect to his orientation towards his role as senior 
shop steward vis a vis constituents. Relative to the other four subjects, George and Tom 
normatively understood their role to be one of "spokesman" or "delegate" - as essentially 
reactive mediators between management and constituents. In contrast, Peter, John, Stuart and 
Iain perceived themselves, relatively, much more as representatives, proactively setting 
agendas to defend and further what they'Qefined as constituents best interests - it was around 
how these interests were substantively conceptualised, and thereby how those agendas were 
constructed, that Iain in his parochialism departed from the Weltanschauung of Peter, John 
and Stuart.
Thus according to Marchington and Armstrong’s taxonomy (1983) Peter, John, and Stuart 
might be classified as "Leaders", while Iain appears to be a "Work Group Leader", and George
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and Tom might be consigned to the category of "Populist".
With each subject the final case feature that was investigated entailed clarification of the 
extent to which subjects had any experience of financial training. Although determining the 
extent and quality of any such exposure is extremely difficult, certain patterns did emerge. 
As with the original cohort, all respondents claimed to have had some experience of financial 
training under the auspices of the educational facilities of the trade union movement. But 
again their account of its content were vague and penumbranic - indeed, they appeared to 
have little recollection of the substantive issues covered. This leads me to infer that such 
training provision is at least minimal and its impact upon the phenomenological worlds of 
recipients somewhat muted. The reasons for this, from this research, are difficult to discern; 
it might be that quite simply financial training has little significance, or had little 
significance, in trade union curricula. However, both George and Tom alluded to some 
experience of in-company financial training similar in content and presentation to that 
provided to the relevant respondents in the original cohort. In contrast, none of the other 
four respondents admitted to this kind of experience - either it had not happened or they 
could not recollect such an event occurring. The exception to this was Stuart; he claimed that 
management had arranged for the provision of "accounts classes" for Supervisors which shop 
stewards had been encouraged to attend. But he "hadn’t bothered" since at the time he was 
"too busy with important things, like watching paint dry!" So as far as I could infer , it was 
only George and Tom who appeared to have a significant degree of exposure to financial 
training relative to that experienced by the remaining four respondents.
So from an analysis of these findings, that was guided by the model developed in Chapter
VII, I was able to generate expectations regarding subjects’ accounting orientations. For
\
Peter, John and Stuart this seemed relatively unproblematic. I expected that given their 
location on the relevant case features they "should" defer to a "sceptical" "Accounting 
Orientation". Equally apparent from the fieldwork and analysis was that George and Tom 
"should" demonstrate a propensity for "financial realism". However, from his accounts, Iain 
was the most problematic with respect to generating a confident expectation. What I could
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infer was that Iain displayed the characteristics of a potential "cynic" who had not yet been 
(effectively) "seeded" by financial training - a person whose Machiavellian propensities had 
not yet been provided with another weapon for deployment in his role as "artful bargainer". 
Thus the potential for "cynicism" lay within his phenomenological world, but it had not yet 
come into fruition. Thus in effect I expected that his espoused "Accounting Orientation" 
would be similar to that of the "sceptic" in that at present it would entail a denial of the 
veracity of disclosed accounting information. But it was clear that his parochialism and 
ambivalence to trade unionism would set him apart from the Weltanschauung of a "full­
blown" sceptic and engendered at least a potential for "cynicism" if  in the future he was 
exposed to (further) financial training.
The 2nd Round of Interviews
Armed with these expectations I returned to the field so as to ascertain their fulfilment or 
violation and thereby elucidate the practical adequacy of the model that had generated those 
expectations. The following are transcriptions of selected aspects of each interview; selected 
due to their relevance to subjects’ "Accounting Orientations" and elicited during discussions 
about how subjects approached collective bargaining and joint consultation, in their 
particular organisations.
A. Expected "Financial Realists"
[Researcher: "How do you determine that an offer is "fair" when you are negotiating with 
management?]
George: "You’ve got to look at how well we’ve done recently . . . "
[Researcher: "How do you do that?"]
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George: "By looking at the firm’s accounts . . . unlike many managements our’s are
quite open about our financial perform ance So the books show how much
profit has been made . . .  how much we can afford to pay ourselves . . .  there’s 
no point in trying to get what’s not there is there? . . .. Most of the lads 
understand that . . . they’re not a bunch of reds . . . they realise that you’ve 
got to be practical about those things."
Similar sentiments and perspectives were also articulated by the second "expected realist", 
Tom, during our discussion of his recent experience of negotiating the terms and conditions 
of 150 redundancies at the organisation at which he was a senior shop steward.
Tom: "I couldn’t face going through that again . . .  many good friends were made redundant
. . . quite few of them are still unemployed . . .  its grim for them and their families 
but what choice was there? . . .  It was obvious that if we didn’t rationalise, if we 
didn’t increase productivity and cut costs, the whole damned place would close and 
all of us would be on the dole . . .  at least we saved nearly 800 jobs . . ."
[Researcher: "How did you know that the firm was so uncompetitive?"]
Tom: "Well we didn’t just take management’s word for it, we looked at the facts . . .  it was
clear that we were losing customers because we were too expensive . . .  our costs were 
too high and productivity was too low . . . there was no other option . . .  the firm is 
safer now . . ."
[Researcher: "How is it safer?"]
Tom: ". . . we’re making a profit now . . . we’ll get our first good rise for two years if  we
keep it up . . ."
From the above transcripts it is evident that both respondents articulated, in their different 
ways, perspectives and sentiments similar to subjects who have been previously categorised 
as "financial realists". This is particularly in the sense that their assumption of the objectivity 
and veracity of disclosed accounting information means that it has become an important 
resource in their sense-making activities. Thus their articulated accounting orientations 
fulfilled the model-derived expectations. A similar conjunction between my expectations 
and subject’s articulations was also found with respect to Peter, John and Stuart.
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B. Expected "Sceptics”
"I don’t believe all this stuff about profit and loss or different types of costs 
and all that . . .  I know that if you get a dozen accountants working on the 
same set of books you’ll get a dozen different figures . . . obviously 
management can then tell you what-ever suits them . . .  one set of figures for 
us as a sob story and another set when they’re off to the city with their hands 
o u t . . .  so how can you trust them when they claim things are financially bad 
. . . ife backed up by . . . creative accounting.”
So how do you put together a claim?]
"For me the only safe way is to look at industry averages, cost of living and 
such like . .  then I add 10% for good measure but be prepared to settle for a 
bit less over the odds . . .  There’s no risk that we’ll be conned then and we’ve 
got some leeway . . ."
The second expected "sceptic", John, also articulated similar sentiments and tactics. He did 
however elaborate further.
John: "Management always try it on . . .  they love their figures . . .  so many million
this and that, so much profit, return, c o s t. . . they might as well be talking 
Chinese for all I know or care. A II  they’re trying to do is work a fast one 
when they come out with that crap . . .  they must think we’re d a f t . . . .  If you 
get sucked into that sort of thing you accept their way of thinking . . . that’s 
not our job . . .  we’re shop stewards, we’re there to look after the lads and you 
don’t do that if you start thinking like a manager . . ."
*
Similar views were also expressed by Stuart, but he was even more forthright when he
expressed his view of accountants and the role of accounting information.
Stuart: "Accountants make me laugh . . .  boring sods who talk a load of bollocks that
nobody understands I don’t think our managers understand what the fuck
the accountants are on about most of the time - they only pretend they do to 
save face. The only accountant I have any time for is the "turf" one down at 
William Hills! . . .. You mustn’t take the gobbledygook that they come out 
with seriously . . .  all accounting is for is to look after the shareholder - that’s 
why it was invented . . .  so if you start believing that their stuff is important 
you accept their agenda . . .  But I’m not a shareholder, I’m a steward and my 
job’s to make the bastards pay up enough to make things better for the lads 
. . .  its their standard of living that is important not a load of unintelligible 





From the five subjects’ accounts, from which the above selections were drawn, it is evident 
that in the case of both the "realists" and the "sceptics" my expectations appeared, to me, to 
have been satisfactorily fulfilled. This was unfortunately not so readily apparent with the 
final case.
C. Expected "Sceptic'Vpotential "Cvnic"
Iain: "You have to look after yourself in this world . . .  if you don’t nobody else is going
to . . .  but part of that is looking the blokes who elected me -  those who I work with 
and represent. . .  I make sure that we get treated fairly and I don’t care how I do that 
- the ends justifies the means . .  .. You’ve got to be careful when management start 
going on about all that accountancy stuff, you know, when they open the books . . . .  
You see I don’t understand it, none of us do . . ."
[Researcher: "So what do you do in that kind of situation?"]
Iain: "I try to ignore i t . . .  my maxim is that if you don’t know the rules you don’t play the
game . . .  if  you try you’ll get hammered . . .  so you change the game to one that you 
know the rules for . . . something that you understand . . .  so when I’m negotiating 
with management over pay, or whatever, that means that I ignore their figures and 
statistics and stick to the things that I understand and which you know backs up 
giving us a good d e a l. . ."
[Researcher: "Such as?"]
Iain: "Such as the retail price index, or suitable comparables that have been settled in other
firms . . . anything that you know backs up your case . . . .  If something doesn’t or 
you are not sure what it means my advice is ignore it and find something else . . .  if 
you don’t management will piss all over you and you deserve it."
[Researcher: "If you did understand what the accounts meant, if you felt that what they
told you reinforced your case, would you use them?"]
Iain: "Yes . . .  I should think s o , . . .  as I’ve said if I know the rules of the game and there’s
a good chance of winning that particular game, I take the bastards on . . . but if I 
think I might loose I’ll change the game and try some other tactic . . .. My job is to 
get the best for the lads, that’s why they elected me and I do virtually anything to do 
t h a t . . .  it might seem selfish but we live in a selfish worlds - what does Thatcher call 
it - "market forces" - I call it looking after yourself and your own . . ."
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[Researcher: "As a shop steward, who are ‘your own’?"]
Iain: "Them that elected me to the job in the first place, and just them . .
From Iain’s account it seems that some of my model-derived expectations were indeed 
fulfilled. Specifically he does appear to articulate many of the elements that I conjectured 
would be present in a "potential cynic". Particularly it seems that if  he experienced some 
financial training that in his view allowed him to understand the "rules" of that particular 
"game", another weapon would indeed be available, in his armoury, for his role as "artful 
bargainer"; a weapon to be utilised when he judged that some bargaining advantage would 
be available in his pursuit of sectional interest.
So perhaps I was correct to expect a Weltanschauung distinctive to that of the "sceptic", but 
it was the expected degree of difference that was violated. I had mistakenly thought that 
there would be more similarity especially around their perceptions of the veracity of 
accounting information. Rather Iain appears to demonstrate an almost "wait and see" position 
regarding such information - nowhere did he question its veracity rather all he said was that 
he didn’t understand and would therefore ignore it while this gap in knowledge persisted. 
This constitutes an orientation very different to that of the "sceptic" whose perspectives 
overtly question accounting information’s objectivity and thereby consign it to the realm of 
managerial or shareholder ideology and consider the act of disclosure as attempted 
legerdemain. In contrast Iain only questions its utility because he doesn’t understand it. If 
he felt that he did understand it, he would use such accounting information where he
iconsidered such a "game" was appropriate - just as a "cynic" would. Therefore, in conclusion,
Iain’s violation of some of my expectations does not overly damage my model, rather his 
chdistinctive weltanjauung elaborates that model by generating what might be considered as a 
new, previously only tentatively identified Accounting Orientation - the "embryonic cynic". 
So the feedback elicited from the "tolerance of reality" during this fieldwork enables some 
evaluation of the pragmatic success of the cognitive "system" developed in Chapter VII.
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Since most of the expectations generated were fulfilled, this suggests that this "system" guides 
and enables satisfactory interventions in, and interaction with, aspects of the social world. 
As such it might be considered to be veracious in a practically adequate sense despite its 
inevitable fallibility in ways this fieldwork was not able to discern. As regards making 
inferences from the 22 senior shop stewards involved in all this research to new "cases" (this 
issue of population validity was considered in Chapter VI) might I remind the reader of 
Mitchell’s argument that:
". . . extrapolation is in fact based on the validity of the analysis rather than 
the representativeness of the events . .
(1983, p. 190)
Now it is necessary to turn to the implications of this research for the D.A.I. debate reviewed 
in Chapter I.
D.A.I, reconsidered
Although Jackson-Cox et al (1984) conclude that disclosed accounting information might be 
mobilised behind managerial or trade union objectives, they note how the attitudes of senior 
shop stewards might mediate the effects of an organisation’s disclosure strategy (ibid, pp. 
268-9). While it is unnecessary, at this immediate juncture, to reiterate my objections to 
their implicit attribution of neutrality to accounting information by that assumption of the 
possibility of its service to any interest group; my own research supports their observation of 
the significance of senior shop steward attitudes. But it also goes much further. For instance 
nowhere in their empirical investigation of the use of accounting information in collective 
bargaining, where it is either an "established" or an "emergent" feature (ibid., pp. 254-5), do 
Jackson-Cox and her colleagues report any coherent attempt to explore any variability in 
senior shop stewards’ orientations; nor do they consider how particular conjunctions of 
phenomena in turn influence that cultural differentiation. Instead their consideration of 
those incumbents’ orientations towards accounting information is limited to various comments
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about a lack of "trust" - a phenomena they associate with a lack of "expertise". Moreover 
they ambiguously claim that it is only through a transformation of those attitudes and 
expectations, by the development of "relevant institutions", that trade unions might be able 
to challenge managerial prerogative and eschew attempts at engendering "employee 
identification" through the disclosure of accounting information(ibid., pp. 269-72).
In stark contrast, the research presented in this thesis has attempted to explore the variability 
of senior shop stewards’ orientations towards accounting information and tries to explain that 
diversity in terms of various cultural and experiential conjunctions. This concern originated 
in a perception, articulated in Chapter I, that among other problems a significant lacuna in 
the published D.A.I. research was a failure to consider how recipients’ subjectivity might 
mediate the processes and effects of such a strategy in industrial relations contexts. Despite 
the existence of a few notable exceptions, this lacuna appeared to be a result of the 
predominance of a deterministically orientated "policy science" approach to research that at 
best reduced such cultural phenomena to "manipulable emanations" (Rubinstein, 1986) 
correctable through the "attitudinal restructuring" (Foley and Maunders, 1984) engendered 
by disclosure. Hence much of the research approached its domain of interest with a 
proforma that in effect assigned to the sense-making activities of the "readership" (Burrell, 
1987) the status of a dependent variable that was often in need of remedial treatment through 
training, and/or the development of appropriate institutions, so as to remove any vestiges of 
irrationality. Problems that Jackson-Cox et al (1984, 1987), despite their awareness of the 
significance of cultural mediation, have done little to correct.
In contradistinction to this dominant perspective, I have argued for the need to assert the 
formative and proactive status of the cultural realm through consideration of how the 
"readership’s" sense-making activities might mediate the effects of D.A.I. and any 
accompanying "remedial" treatments. Involved in this re-establishment of the integrity of 
culture was the necessary consideration of who were the recipients of D.A.I., who by 
implication, would be the proper focus for fieldwork? My answer to this vexed question led 
to the foregoing analysis of two cohorts of senior shop stewards. Indeed one result of that
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fieldwork is a demonstration of how different constellations of meanings, values and beliefs 
lead to variable mediations of D.A.I. strategies and endow differential susceptibilities to any 
accompanying "remedial" treatments - varying from the robust cultural integrity of the 
"sceptic", to the Machiavellianism of the "cynic", to the "realists" "surrender" to the rationalist 
message. Obviously these findings could be applied to a reconstruction of Craft’s 
"contingency perspective" (1981) through the adumbration of recipients’ cultural variation as 
a contextual variable(s) for analysis prior to management’s decision whether or not to develop 
a disclosure strategy.
However a significant aspect of the theoretical context in which this fieldwork occurred, and 
also an important element in discerning the implications of D.A.I., was a concern to eschew 
any managerialist problematic as well as to deny any attribution of ontological privilege to 
accounting information or the accountancy profession. This latter element was developed by 
an examination of the epistemological status of modern accountancy which in turn was 
dependent upon the prior consideration of the status of knowledge/science in general. My 
conclusion to those investigations was that accounting was not a mere assembly of calculative 
techniques and routines which neutrally arbitrated reality. On the contrary, I concluded that 
accounting might be construed as a powerful, but partial, means of social and economic 
management which allows for the pursuit of particular interests, through the subordination 
of other interests, by enabling and constraining visibility and discourse through the 
proliferation of a particular cognitive and symbolic order.
Thus from the model developed regarding senior shop steward "Accounting Orientations"; and 
from my prior analysis of the interest-laden nature of the information disclosed during 
D.A.I.; it is now possible to proceed to attempt to come to some conclusions regarding the 
implications of D.A.I. in industrial relations contexts. While it is important to note that these 
conclusions might be appropriated by a managerialist "policy science" problematic, such a 
problematic is alien to the orientation and spirit of this work. Instead, having delineated 
those implications, it will be my concern to conjecture about the possibility of developing
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"employee-orientated" modes of engagement that might counter the orthodoxy encoded into 
D.A.I..
The implications of the "Realist Cultural Conjunction"
From this fieldwork certain implications regarding the effects of D.A.I. in collective
bargaining and joint consultation become apparent. In regard to the "Financial Realists" the
imagery and symbolic order generated by Accounting Information have, to all intents and
purposes, become a means by which these senior shop stewards make aspects of their
organisational lives intelligible. They assume that Accounting Information provides an
immutable and veracious representation of aspects of organisational reality while being
unable to challenge the complex and esoteric computations upon which apparently objective
financial statements are based. By accepting D.A.I. as being a body of neutral facts that must
be confronted, regardless of their palatability, these employee representatives willingly
engage in the partial "agenda" or "gaze" encoded in accounting’s conventions. The outcome
is a web of perceptions and cognitions that in practice articulate a particular mode of
rationality that condones particular judgements and self-understandings as it excludes from
consideration alternatives which are debunked as "unreasonable", "daft" or "wild". This
Weltanschauung leads us to accept, perhaps unwittingly, many of the value and interest laden
aassumptions that underpin modern accountancy, e.g. the "relists" implicitly and explicitly 
accept accounting’s treatment of labour as a cost of production, a cost that given particular 
market conditions, may have to be reduced through increases in productivity and/or 
redundancies.
Given my prior analysis of the interest-laden nature of accountancy, it appears that the 
"realist" adopts, or has been socialised into, a set of value premises which when applied in 
making sense of experience, or in decision making, become a vehicle for ideological 
incorporation into the phenomenologic worlds and "moral order" of the interests that have 
socio-historically constituted accounting knowledge. Though their acceptance of the facticity
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of D.A.I. "realists" inadvertently draw upon the conventions of accountancy in their 
construction of aspects of organisational reality. In this way they appropriate, internalise, 
articulate and reproduce those interests that have been priorly encoded into the generative 
rules and resources of Accountancy. In this way these senior shop stewards become 
vulnerable to enmeshing themselves in, and extending, dyadic aspects of the exercise of 
power in their workplaces, through internalising a psychologically disciplining definition of 
reality. Such insidious (Blau and Schoenherr, 1971) self-control (Hopwood, 1974) through 
psychological discipline serves to supplement and expand the more conventional batteries of 
control technology that are available in organisations so as to make labour tractable. As 
Martin and Fryer point out, in a different context, they have effectively become committed 
to a "moral order which legitimises their own subordination" (1975, p. 98)
So, to paraphrase Burrell (1987), it appears that in the case of the "realist" the "power play" 
of the accountant’s transmission of an encoded message does indeed result in this particular 
group of recipients becoming "more controlled" in the sense that they have come to rely upon 
elements of an accounting lexicon in their sense-making of organisational events and 
processes. Through that subscription, accounting has become an important cultural resource 
which the "realist" utilises in his everyday negotiation of organisational affairs thus 
propagating particular partisan values and purposes.
However there is an important caveat to this scenario that arises due to the apparent
relationship between "realism" and "populism". The "populism" that is so intimately enmeshed
within the "realist" phenomenological world appears to impel the "realist" to maintain a
"spokesman" status and therefore present constituents’ wishes to management during collective 
«*bargaining, regardless of his own opinions. Thus the co-existence of "populism" might 
enforce public compliance (rather than conformity) to constituents’ preferences and mores 
even when those predilections contravene the imperatives that derive from his private 
phenomenological world, in which management constitute the "significant other" in the "we- 
relationship". Conversely his populist role of "go-between" might also allow the realist to 
transmit, from management to constituents, an unmediated accounting derived rendition of
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organisational reality to which he might attribute immutability and authority due to his 
apparent "surrender” to an accounting "system of authority" (Kanter, 1968). In either case, 
whether it be constituent’s transmission of a message or their decoding of a message, it 
appears that it is their phenomenological worlds (and in particular in the latter case, their 
perception of a messenger) that might become prepotent in mediating the effects of D.A.I.
So it is possible to infer that the prior condition of "populism" in the case of the "realist" may 
act as a potential check upon those control implications that were elaborated previously. 
Paradoxically the very preference for "reactive mediation" in the "realist’s" phenomenological 
world might prevent his active pursuit of the moral imperatives arising from co-existing 
aspects of that world. From this one can conjecture that it is the nature of the culture 
dominant amongst constituents, and how this is articulated and enforced upon the "realist", 
that in this instance probably mediates the effects of D.A.I. in industrial relations contexts, 
and which constitutes an important avenue for further research.
The Implications of the "Sceptic Cultural Conjunction'’
It is evident that the above processes do not occur in other senior shop steward audiences. 
Such audiences are distinguishable from the "realist" in terms of the substantive nature of 
their articulated accounting orientations, and their preference for representation as opposed 
to delegacy. In the cases of both the "sceptic" and the "cynic" the definitions of reality 
proffered by D.A.I. were met with different forms of resistance which entailed varying 
processes, conceptualisations and strategies.
In contrast to the "realist", the "sceptic" did not accept financial statements as being credible 
representations of aspects of the daily experience as senior shop stewards and employees. 
Rather, during the interviews, those senior shop stewards later categorised as "sceptics" 
refuted the legitimacy of the accounting "voice of reason" and instead appropriated 
alternative "gazes" in making sense of organisational events and processes. Thus, in
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comparison to the "realist", this category of subjects invoked a very different set of 
calculative procedures in identifying and evaluating courses of action as well as in defining 
what was "fair" and "reasonable" in negotiations. As demonstrated by the prior selections 
from interviews within this category of informants, the calculative procedures in-use 
eschewed any reliance upon disclosed accounting information. Indeed such information was 
relegated to the status of managerial propaganda. Rather, during bargaining and joint 
consultation, the "sceptic" appears to rely upon calculations that assess the financial resources 
necessary for maintaining and improving constituents’ standards of living; and to a lesser 
extent, calculations that review the performance of an employing organisations in terms of 
the physically visible throughput of goods and services.
The cultural dimension that appears to be crucial in ensuring the development of this 
propensity appears to be the "sceptics’" identification with a code of principles that invoke 
and emphasise symbols of solidarity and socialism; elements that are interwoven with a 
radical and oppositional social imagery. Perhaps it is this nature and dynamics of subjects’ 
relationship to the carriers of this culture that could provide the focus for further research. 
It appears that his conjunction of values, beliefs, attitudes and mores serve to instill at least 
an antipathy towards the intra- and extra- organisational groups, as well as towards any 
cultural phenomena and artefacts perceived as emanating from those groups, who are 
excluded from the "sceptics’" conceptualisation of the "us" in their combative and 
dichotomous version of reality; groups who by that exclusion are consigned to the 
contemporaneity of the "them". These aspects of the "sceptic’s" phenomenological world, 
together with an associated commitment to a proactive or "leader’s" role during interactions 
with constituents, mediate the effects of D.A.I. by creating a very barren ground for such a 
strategy. Indeed the much vaunted "attitudinal restructuring" created by D.A.I. that 
"improves" organisational "ecology" and thereby creates the basis for "integrative bargaining", 
seems to be anhighly unlikely event in such circumstances.
To sum up, the "sceptic" seems to apply and act upon a "mode of engagement" that is distinct 
from that invoked by the "realist" in their sense-making activities. The result in collective
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bargaining and joint consultation is an attempt at invoking a completely different agenda for 
discourse and decision making. Because of these factors one could argue that the "power 
play" of the psychologically disciplining message encoded into D.A.I. failed to ideologically 
incorporate the "sceptic" due to the mediation of the sceptic’s accounting orientation. This 
accounting orientation is such that it "insulates" adherents from the control implications of 
the psychological discipline inherent within an accounting derived rendition of organisational 
reality - Burrells "power play" failed.
The Implications of the "Cvnic Cultural Conjunction
In contrast to the "sceptic", the "cynic" accepts the veracity of accounting information for 
arbitrating the financial exigencies that confront members. But their appropriation and use 
of an accounting derived mode of engagement, at the public level of testimony during 
collective bargaining and joint consultation, was much more selective and Machiavellian than 
in the case of the "realist". Essentially such overt and public appropriations only occurred 
when the "cynic" could identify some advantage in doing so; that is when the information was 
perceived to be supportive of what was considered to be their own, and their constituents’ 
interests and objectives. Importantly, such interests and objectives were perceived as distinct 
from, and antagonistic to, those of other stakeholder groups, particularly management. Thus 
the unitary understanding of intra-organisational relations so paramount amongst "realists" 
was eschewed in favour of a more dichotomous social imagery similar to, but much more 
parochial than, that of the "sceptic". Thus when accounting information was considered to 
proffer a picture of the financial exigencies that contravened these perceived parochial 
interests and objectives, the cynic, although still accepting its veracity, tactically discarded 
and ignored such information during negotiations. Indeed alternative calculative procedures 
were publically adopted, these alternatives were similar to those habitually employed by the 
"sceptics" in their sense making activities.
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Therefore the "cynic" was prepared to engage in an accounting derived agenda and discourse 
when some perceived advantage was apprehensible; but when such an advantage was 
considered to be absent, the "cynic" would publically attempt to invoke alternative agendas 
and discourses apparently more coincidental with their perceived interests. This duplicity 
leaves the "cynic" in a curious position regarding the control implications of D.A.I. As the 
"cynic’s" accounting orientation embraces elements of both the "sceptic’s" and the "realist’s", 
it might appear that the control implications are a similar mixture of those associable with 
with latter two orientations. Although the veracity of Accounting Information remains 
unchallenged at a cognitive level, this might not render the "cynic" as vulnerable to the 
control ramifications of psychological discipline that are so apparent in the case of the 
"realist".
It seems that certain cultural factors phenomenologically intervene to prevent the fruition of 
a potential for vulnerability. Perhaps crucial in this intervention is the dichotomous social 
imagery the "cynic" applies in understanding intra-organisational relations. Although 
accounting renditions of organisational reality remain perceptually disassociated from the 
resultant pejorative view of management, that dichotomous social imagery leads to a more 
antagonistic and combative orientation towards collective bargaining and joint consultation, 
relative to the approach adopted by the more unitary "realist". This "war" of "us and them" 
justifies for the "cynic" the duplicitous gambit of invoking whatever mode of engagement and 
associated discourses and agenda that appear to most support their own perceived interests. 
Thus particular cultural phenomena intervene in such a way so as to influence in practice the 
ploys used in negotiations with other stakeholders. Potentially this process reduces the 
vulnerability to psychological discipline associable with the acceptance of the credibility of 
accounting information. Clearly for the "cynic", while that information might present a 
veracious portrayal of what is happening or has happened in an organisation, it is only 
publically invoked in negotiations when that picture is considered commensurable with what 
the "cynic" understands as his constituents’ interests.
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But it is around the understanding of those interests where the "cynic" is very clearly 
differentiated from the "sceptic". The "sceptic’s" perception of the constituents’ interests is 
derived from a broader class-based construction of the "us" which is replaced by the "cynics" 
parochial definition in terms of the immediate constituents for whom he provides leadership. 
This espoused sectionalism, although still imbued with combative predilections, creates a 
markedly different social imagery to that invoked by the "sceptic" in constructing an 
understanding of events. It is the source of that imagery that would constitute a necessary 
focus for further research, i.e. does it derive from the culture of their constituents, or not? 
Essentially it is an imagery purged of the trade union symbolism alluded to by the "sceptic". 
Instead, although adopting a similarity representative role in the fulfilment of his 
incumbency, the "cynic’s" negotiations strategy is imbued with a definition of the "us" that 
results in a very sectionalist conception of constituents’ interests - the "sceptics" broader 
class-based view of interest and the pursuit of interest through solidarity, is eschewed and 
replaced by a thoroughgoing parochial view of self-interest, in a "warcf all against all".
However this particular conjunction of beliefs and values, and the preference for proactivity 
and unilateralism in the discharge of the shop steward’s duties, does not mean that the "cynic" 
is immune to the psychologically disciplining aspects of accounting information. At least 
three sources of vulnerability might be discerned. Firstly the "cynic’s" potential for 
vulnerability lies within the processes of calculation and evaluation that occur when 
assessments of interest are compared with an assessment of the message encoded into 
accounting information. Their possible inability to penetrate the esoteric mathematical and 
statistical calculations upon which financial statements are based might lea4to the mistaken 
assumption of an identity between their perceived interests and the apparent financial 
message. Furthermore, it is in that very assessment of an accounting portrayal in which lies 
a second potential source of vulnerability. During this assessment the "cynic" will inevitably 
enact a private accounting derived discourse and agenda thereby creating the potential for an 
ensuing psychological discipline which might not be so tactically discardable as implied by 
the "cynics" during the interviews.
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Finally, even if the financial statements are seen as supportive of their perceived interests,the 
"cynics" will unwittingly enter a public discourse with other stakeholders in which the 
parameters and agenda for negotiation are derived from,via accountancy, interests which do 
not coincide with those of the "cynic’s" constituents. Further, once embroiled in such a 
discourse it seems difficult to see how future negotiations might be tactically extricated by 
the "cynic" from accounting based agenda, even when the "cynic’s" private assessments point 
to avoidance of accounting "realities" and the necessary employment of alternative gambits.
Thus while the "cynic’s" vulnerability to psychological discipline might vary considerably, and 
might be seen as of a lower order than that identifiable in the "realist", they play what might 
be a "dangerous game". Because the "sceptic" completely dismisses the credibility of the 
accounting "gaze" as a representation of "reality" in both private and public discourse, they 
construct an effective barrier to this particular source of psychological discipline - in this 
way their vulnerability is less than that of the "cynic". But, as I shall explore at a later 
juncture, does the position of the "sceptic" leave them trapped in a "Catch 22" position - a 
scenario in which they cannot effectively challenge accounting hegemony without entering 
a psychologically disciplinary discourse?
D.A.I. Reconsidered: A Summary
This fieldwork has demonstrated, in the cases of 22 Senior Shop Stewards, how the various 
Accounting Orientations to which these "knowledgeable agents" defer are significant 
dimensions of the common sense knowledge which they invoke, when interpreting 
organisational reality, as they undertake aspects of their incumbencies. During those 
performances it is evident that many of the respondents appeared to act as "gatekeepers" in 
the communication structures existing in their work organisations; a role t h a t . . .
". . . contains the possibility of not only opening and closing communication
channels but also of collecting and reformulating information . . ."
(Pettigrew, 1973, p. 232)
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Thus various aspects of the senior shop stewards’ phenomenological worlds influenced how 
they performed this strategic role and hence mediated the effects of D.A.I. through their 
differential interpretation and use of that information,and other sources of information.
As such, the particular constellation of beliefs, values, mores and sentiments that mesh 
together to constitute an Accounting Orientation, constrain and enable those projective and 
creative sense making constructions out of which subjects’ meaningful action, with its 
plethora of intended and unintended consequences, arises. In this process each Accounting 
Orientation that was identified in the field might be construed as a web of "common sense 
typifications" (Knorr-Cetina, 1981) that does mot merely remain as a set of private thought 
categories or coherence conditions (Law and Lodge, 1984), rather it becomes embodied in 
action. This occurs particularly in the respect that an Accounting Orientation becomes 
represented and expressed in a range of rules, procedures, schemes, formulae and everyday 
practices that identify what constitutes rational and sensible behaviour in particular social 
settings and towards particular social phenomena. Moreover, the embodiment of an 
Accounting Orientation in action also occurs in the respect that it is projective - it constitutes 
aspects of those social settings and phenomena. This projective dynamic has been elaborated 
by Cicourel (1972) in a different context. Essentially he claims (ibid., p. 61) that any 
typification, or "descriptive vocabulary", is reflexive in that they are used by actors to 
understand bodies of information and activities, and concurrently those "descriptive 
vocabularies" themselves become a constituent part of the experiences or activities being 
described. That is they "index" the experience but simultaneously the experience acquires 
elements of the descriptive vocabulary. In this way the Accounting Orientations employed 
by actors in their subjective construction of their organisation reality simultaneously 
reproduce the factual and anonymous character of the world (see Berger and Luckman, 1967).
So an Accounting Orientation might be conceived as a linguistic and symbolic framework 
composed of typifications, vocabularies and coherence conditions that influences what is 
knowable and accessible to the subject; thereby an Accounting Orientation is instrumental in
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constituting an apparently factual and anonymous externality that confronts the subject in 
his construction of action. In these respects they are commensurable with any observation 
language: as Hanson points out . . .
. . the logical and grammatical tracts of our several scientific languages, 
notations and symbolic clusters may affect how we see the world, or what we 
understand to be the facts about the world. . . "
(1969, p. 183)
Thus the Accounting Orientation derived constructions through which aspects of 
organisational "reality" are apprehended have become embedded in subsequent agency and 
thereby recursively enable and constrain that agency. So by employing varying anonymous 
and abstract speech categories, different senior shop stewards construe various impressions 
of external factual reality - "givens" that are utilised or confronted as they pervade their 
common sense worlds and lead to "practices that are intelligible in and through those concepts 
that inform them" (Harris, 1980, p. 29). However, some of the consequences of the ensuing 
human conduct are unintended (Giddens, 1984, pp. 298-304) and themselves might become 
a constraint and enablement to future agency. For instance the "realists" and the "cynics" 
differential propensity for apprehending organisational "reality" via an "accounting gaze" 
during their everyday practices leads them to unintentionally draw upon and reproduce the 
generative rules and resources of the "accounting system" (see Roberts and Scapens, 1985, pp. 
447-8). In this way they enmesh themselves in the acceptance of, and become complicit in 
the constitution of, a partisan moral order that recursively enables and constrains further 
social action. In contrast the behaviour of the "sceptics" helps to reproduce, again perhaps 
in an unintended manner, the wider "Trade Union" culture which they draw upon in being 
"sceptics". However this agency of the "sceptics" also leads to what might be a "catch 22" 
situation. Although they avoid the particular dyadic aspects of power that are encountered 
by the other senior shop steward categories, they remain incapable of challenging accounting 
hegemony without exposure to a latent ideological conditioning arising through their 
invocation of an accounting derived discourse. While this might constitute an enablement in 
the sense that it produces a framework within which they realise being "sceptics" vis a vis 
"others", it also serves as a constraint to their ensuing practice.
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Now at this juncture it is important to emphasise that Accounting Orientations are probably 
neither static nor immutable phenomena. Indeed aspects of the foregoing fieldwork 
demonstrate their mutability. So it is possible to infer that they will evolve and change over 
time. Perhaps an important line of future inquiry would be to investigate such processes in 
terms of how and why? To some extent this research has already cast some light upon those 
issues. But some of this tentative illumination is more in the sense of identifying avenues 
down which research would be fruitless, as well as pertaining to avenues that might constitute 
fruitful courses for future research.
In respect of the former, my fieldwork allows one to eschew the determinism that 
characterises much of the literature, reviewed in Chapter I, which implicitly and explicitly 
rendered actors’ subjectivity to a manipulable dependent variable: a policy science tendency 
that also appears to be the current vogue in much of the research that utilises a culture 
"metaphor" (e.g. Burke, 1982; Peters and Waterman, 1982; Sproull, 1979; Tichy, 1982). In 
essence, with the exception of particular educational programmes, my fieldwork found no 
discernible covariance between managerial policies and practices and the culture espoused 
by senior shop stewards. Thus I feel that one might infer that, in the case of senior shop 
stewards, Brown is wrong to suggest t h a t . . .
" . . .  in the long run, management itself is the most important influence in
shaping the behaviour of shop stewards . . ."
(1973, p. 157)
Although Brown and other commentators (e.g. Purcell, 1979) are correct to point to how 
managerially derived organisational structures and practices impact upon the formal 
organisation of shop stewards, this does not necessarily mean that this has a direct influence 
upon subsequent senior shop steward behaviour. Management "modus vivendi" (Batstone, 
1978) might influence the context(s) in which senior shop stewards carry out their 
incumbencies, but there is a disjuncture between that context and the everyday behaviour 
entered into by senior shop stewards. Culture acts as an intervening or mediating element
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as it provides the senior shop steward with an internal logic and rationale through which such 
managerial actions are interpreted. However there are certain caveats that must be placed 
upon the above assertion of the integrity of senior shop stewards’ culture(s). From my 
fieldwork it is evident that there is some degree of variability in the extent to which various 
Accounting Orientations leave the holders susceptible to manipulation by managerial 
practices. Although the largest category of senior shop stewards, the "sceptics", defer to a 
culture that largely creates an autonomy from managerial machinations; the remaining two 
cultures identified in the field, the "cynic" and particularly the "realist", both appear to endow 
upon members a degree of susceptibility to the influence of managerial practices. The key 
influence upon the extent of this propensity, seems to be aspects of the cultures themselves, 
particularly the nature of the particular collectives with whom senior shop stewards 
articulated a moral identification and the related conceptualisation of intra organisational 
relations. Of course this observation raises the issue as to why were "cynics" and "sceptics" 
closed off from Trade Union symbolism and social imagery in making sense of their worlds 
and instead alluded to various kinds of parochialism, with attendant unitary or sectionalist 
understandings of their organisations; which in the case of the "realist" made them readily 
susceptible to "cultural management" (Nord, 1985). Meanwhile, the cultural attributes of the 
"cynic’s" lebenswelt, despite their Machiavellianism, created a significant propensity for 
ideological recruitment and manipulation through their acceptance of the veracity of D.A.I. 
Conversely one must also pose the question as to why have "sceptics" remained open to 
identification with that Trade Union symbolism and thereby remain resistant to the siren­
like overtures of management,accomplished through practices like D.A.I.?
Here I am raising more questions that it is possible for this research to answer. Although 
these questions portent possibilities for further research, it is possible to conjecture about the 
processes through which the different senior shop steward cultures arose, conjectures that 
also suggest moments by which they might change.
As I have argued in regard to science/knowledge in general, Accounting Orientations as 
cultural artefacts may be perceived as arising out of members’ pragmatic problem resolution
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and as such become stabilised and accepted as legitimate when the activities undertaken 
under their auspices continue to meet with perceived success. When that success is 
considered to be no longer forthcoming, concern and dissatisfaction are generated. These 
events might lead to an implicit reevaluation of, and inquiry into, the veracity of knowledge 
in-use (see Schein, 1984; Lundberg, 1985). So how the three identified Accounting 
Orientations have arisen, and how they might change, might be linked to how successfully 
previous and current praxis meets adherents* expectations. Thus the knowledge that these 
agents defer to and which they invoke when making sense of their environments leads to 
particular courses of action that have intended and unintended consequences. It is the 
relationship between such consequences and prior expectations, and the latters’ fulfilment or 
violation, that might lead to future, and account for past, changes in culture. However 
subjects’ pragmatic evaluation of success/failure is complicated by the sources of the criteria 
they apply in apprehending that quality since they appear to be linked to the mores and 
values dominant in the phenomenologically referent collectivities of significant others. This 
may mean that perceived changes in significant others’ mores and values might promote 
cultural change in senior shop stewards.
Clearly the above dynamics and webs of relationship proffer domains for further research. 
However at this juncture I feel that it is important to emphasise that the desire to undertake 
further research does not arise merely out of "academic” interest. Nor does it derive from a 
concern to improve managerial practice in regard to these affairs. This would be to 
misunderstand the "sociology of radical change" (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, pp. 10-19) 
perspective that underpins my own mode of engagement. So this concern to undertake 
further research arises instead out of a concern to aid the development of new modes of 
engagement for Trade Unionists and employees in general; cultures that would enable their 
practical pursuit of their own aims and objectives and counter the diaspora of accounting in 
Industrial Relations contexts. Ironically this concern to undertake research pertaining to 
these processes returns me to a consideration of a phenom ena,that in particular cases, 
appeared to have some impact upon the cultural resources that senior shop stewards used in 
making sense of their organisational realities - educational or training programmes.
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Towards a New Pedagogy
Traditional accounting education programmes that are based upon the transmission of current 
accounting orthodoxy, whether orientated towards an audience composed of neophyte 
accountants or the trade unionists who have participated in this research, appear to be 
characterised by a pedagogy aimed at inculcating a mode of engagement that has subliminally 
encoded a lexicon that re-presents reality from the perspective of the shareholder interest. 
Despite this inherent partiality, much of the appeal and authority of this knowledge arises 
through the sublimation of that partisan character by reification, and thus it appears as an 
objective and immutable means of apprehending the financial reality confronting 
stakeholders that impels particular courses of rational action.
From my research it appears that, given particular conjunctions of cultural elements, when 
certain senior shop stewards are exposed to such a training programme the effect is their 
unproblematical appropriation of the "gaze” encoded into that accounting knowledge, what 
ensues is the "realist’s" apprehension of aspects of his organisational worlds through the 
perceptual filters provided by an accounting derived agenda and discourse. In this way such 
subjects become complicit in their own subordination, by, to paraphrase Freire (1972a, p. 
169), reinforcement of the "oppressor within the oppressed".
While alternative cultural conjunctions similarly increase subjects’ propensity to accept the 
veracity of accounting derived renditions, certain distinctive elements within those "cynics’" 
cultural paradigm intervene so as to encourage them to tactically use or discard such "gazes" 
as bargaining ploys during interactions with management. So the full effects of accounting 
pedagogy depend upon the particular constellations of beliefs and values prepotent in the 
phenomenological worlds of the "objects" of the transmitted message. Indeed this cultural 
realm might consist of beliefs and mores that effectively provide a barrier to that "power 
play" to the extent that an accounting "gaze" is dismissed as deceit (e.g. "sceptics").
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My prior analysis of the interest-laden partiality of modern accounting conventions suggests 
that it is the latter situation^above,that is the most effective for avoiding the potentiality for 
"ideological recruitment" and consequent control through an accounting determination of the 
value-premises of senior shop stewards’ decision making. But this raises the issue as to where 
does this leave those "sceptics" regarding collective bargaining tactics. In particular, might 
their very rejection of accounting information as propaganda make them disadvantaged in 
a bargaining context since they become incapable of countering, or evaluating, the accounting 
derived justifications invoked by management to support the logic of their propositions? 
Indeed are "sceptics" confronted with a "catch-22" situation in that if they were to pursue the 
alternative - their use of disclosed accounting information - might they also become exposed 
to a latent ideological conditioning by entering into a rationale and discourse emanating from 
the shareholder interest?
Perhaps so as to avoid either scenario, and to retain the integrity of their own objectives and 
interests, "sceptics", trade unionists, and employees generally need to develop coherent 
alternative modes of engagement for apprehending organisational realities - a rationale that 
might counter the hegemony of modern accountancy. Somewhat paradoxically this brings 
me to the consideration of alternative forms of "accounting" knowledge and pedagogy.
The above considerations imply the need to develop through education, what constitutes an 
heterodoxy -  an alternative mode of engagement by which trade unionists and employees 
might understand their organisations and through which they are capable of countering and 
demystifying current accounting orthodoxy. Now at this juncture it is important to make the 
following three points. Firstly I do not have the requisite skill and knowledge to prescribe 
specifications as to the substantive content of this heterodoxy. Indeed it might be more 
appropriate to talk of heterodoxies specific to subjects’ variable organisation circumstances, 
objectives and needs. Secondly, such a normative proclamation, inevitably grounded upon 
the attempted assumption and imposition of ontological privilege, would be illegitimate. 
Finally, what is possible to consider is a pedagogy, and its parameters, that would enable the
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development by subjects, of this (these) heterodoxy(ies).
The second and third points above largely follow Friere’s view (1972a, 1972b) that in order 
for education to be liberating it must eschew the traditional passivity that is assigned to the 
learner when the teacher assumes and imposes ontological privilege. In that traditional 
context the teachers are the subject of the learning process and students the object: teachers 
decide what shall be taught, how it will be taught and students become passive assimilators. 
Underpinning such educational practices is a "digestive" concept of knowledge in which the 
undernourished illiterates are fed with words as if their consciousnesses were "empty space" 
(Friere, 1972b, pp. 23-26). In this fashion
"the word . . . must be deposited, not born of the creative effort of the 
learners. As understood in this concept, man is a passive being, the object of 
the process of learning . . . and not its subject".
(Friere ibid., p. 24)
For Friere, the passivity created by such "education for domestication" fails to engender the 
development of a critical consciousness (1972a, p. 46). When considered in the light of these 
observations by Friere, the current practices pertaining to shop steward financial training that 
were experienced by some of the respondents who co-operated in this research, are not only 
revealed as attempts at ideological recruitm ent. . .
" . . .  the introjection by the dominated of the cultural myths of the dominator
M
(Friere ibid., p. 59)
through the transmission of a particular substantive content, but also the very pedagogical 
format for this transmission might be interpreted as engendering a passivity amongst 
recipients.
In contrast Friere argues that the necessary prerequisites for the development of a "critical 
consciousness", that dismantles the current hegemonic constructions of vested interest, are not 
only the recognition by actors of their present oppression through that hegemony; but also
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the understanding that a liberating education programme must eschew a pre-processed 
prescriptive character and is only constitutable through an authentic dialogue with the 
educator, in which both educators and learners are "equally knowing subjects" (1972b, p. 31). 
This dialogue requires the co-investigation by the teacher/educator/facilitator and the taught, 
rather than the authoritarian deposition of putatively privileged recipes of knowledge, by a 
pedagog, into passive learners.
In following the implications of these prerequisites, Friere develops his "problem-posing" 
model of pedagogy for the "oppressed" in which the educator’s role . . .
" . . .  is to propose problems about the codified existential situations in order 
to help the learners arrive at an increasingly critical view of their reality."
(1972 b, p. 36) (". . . codification refers alternatively to the imaging, or the 
image itself, of some significant aspect of the learner’s concrete reality . .  .")
(ibid, p. 32)
So this "educative" programme conceives relations between "teacher" and "student" as dialogic 
in the sense that the content of the programme is based upon the student’s own experience. 
Friere sees such a programme as an educative and therapeutic catalyst in the respect that the 
intent is to engender,through reflection,new (theory-laden) self-understandings and thereby 
enable people to attache new meanings to the social practices that they encounter and thus 
begin to understand those practices as conventional and hence mutable. Therefore through 
what amounts to a de-reification of social practices, a "subversion of over determination", 
Friere claims that "conscientiza9oa" arises: a liberated phenomenological world that might be 
utilised to identify and pursue alternative practices, dispositions and ends that results in 
"socially transformative" actions which, in pragmatist terms, are commensurable with 
subjects’ self-interest and thereby liberates them from the dyadic aspects of power relations. 
In this fashion Frieres argues that one cannot "fill" students with knowledge about how things 
work - such dogmatism would merely provoke resistance to that knowledge - rather 
education must develop subjects’ ability to assess their circumstances critically through 
developing a self-conception in which they are epistemic subjects able to determine and 
change their situation, as opposed to mere powerless objects determined by an immutable
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situation. Essentially if an education programme is about developing knowledge that allows 
subjects’ pursuit of their interests and objectives, those subjects must co-determine and co- 
develop the substantive basis of that knowledge so that their interests and objectives are 
encoded into its lexicon. It follows that ostensibly well-intentioned approaches (e.g. Cooper 
and Essex, 1977; Gold et al, 1979), that attempt to externally specify employee and employee 
representative information needs without their prior involvement, must be avoided. Instead 
of adopting such an "expert" approach to pedagogy, the role of teacher must be one 
facilitating subjects’ ability to comprehend themselves and their problems in new ways and 
from that learning develop new strategies for coping with and solving those problems: a 
pedagogical role almost analogous to Schein’s notion of "process consultation" (1969). In this 
Schein emphasises how process consultation is a set of activities whereby a consultant helps 
a client, in a non-expert fashion, to understand and act upon events that occur in the client’s 
environment. A key assumption is that the client m u s t . . .
". . . learn to see the problem for himself, to share in the diagnosis, and to be 
actively involved in generating a remedy. The process consultant may play 
a key role in helping to sharpen the diagnosis and in providing alternative 
remedies . . .  he encourages the client to make the ultimate decision as to what 
remedy to apply . . ."
(ibid., p. 7)
Of course the question remains who are the "clients" in this pedagogical process? To some 
extent Gramsci’s notion of an "organic intellectual" (1971) illuminates this issue. Basically 
Gramsci (ibid) argues that critical awareness neither emerges automatically out of the 
experience of productive relations nor out of economic crisis. Rather it develops out of the 
emergence of a powerful counter-hegemonic force that is capable of disseminating an 
alternative world-view (ibid., p. 199). The catalyst for this consciousness transformation lay 
in the role of those whom Gramsci termed "organic intellectuals" who to be effective must be 
part of an "organic" community. So in his concern to avoid what he saw as the Jacobin 
authoritarianism of Leninism, Gramsci saw such "organic intellectuals" as members of the 
everyday lives of the working class. As such, new forms of consciousness were not to be 
propagandised by oration as an extraneous input into working class culture, instead they 
would be a part of the very fabric of that culture (ibid., pp. 325-339). This would ensure
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that the foundations of an authentic subjectivity lay in popular consciousness itself.
So part of the process by which employees might develop their own practically adequate 
modes of engagement entails the prior elaboration of their own ''organic" intellectuals; 
members who would constitute the subjects of an educative dialogue with a "pedagog", or 
''process consultant”, or "facilitator".
Whether such<m educative programme could be achieved in the context of T.U.C. sponsorship 
is debateable. Particularly it might be made problematic by Hyman’s observation (1979) that 
many T.U.C. sponsored shop steward training courses were orientated towards propagating 
a consensual approach towards management by emphasising "negotiating expertise" and 
"orderly procedure" rather than "membership mobilisation". For Hyman, such an agenda 
demonstrates a proclivity for "incorporation" that facilitates managerial ends at the expense 
of constituents’ interests (see also Terry, 1978). If that proclivity does exist, T.U.C. 
sponsorship is unlikely to provide a suitable environment for the development of what would 
constitute, in many respects, a counter-culture.
So inevitably there would be immense practical problems in initiating an "educative" 
programme that embraces the parameters devised by Friere. Yet it is equally evident that 
there is a need for a "deconditioning" heterodoxy that counters the diaspora of orthodox 
accounting in industrial relation contexts and society in general; an orthodoxy that has been 
introjected by many of the participants in this research, resulting in their internalisation of 
a value-laden mode of engagement whose premises and recipes of knowledge are practically 
adequate for the pursuit of stakeholder interests that are alien to those of the employee. A 
necessary point of departure for this heterodoxy, so as to enable the practically adequate 
pursuit of interest, must be the realisation by subjects of the mutable and partisan character 
of modern accounting systems. It is only out of this initial level of understanding that trade 
unionists, and employees in general, can begin to develop and appropriate for themselves 
alternative employee orientated modes of engagement (see Wilson and Nichol, 1977) - a 
liberating and empowering antithesis to modern accounting’s thesis derived from prior
325
recognition of present oppression (Frierft,1972a).
So the aims of this new pedagogy would be to enable learners to read and express their own 
organisational reality in new ways through their creation of their own text: a text that would 
become the object of analysis and the simultaneous and inseparable basis for critically 
reflective transformative action that,through the "inversion”, of praxis reciprocally re-writes 
aspects of that text. An aspect of these achievements may be neither the passive acceptance 
or reactive dismissal of any disclosed orthodoxy, rather it may entail the ultimate 
development of employee-interest-laden information systems (see Moore et al., 1981; Cooper, 
1984) which would influence the legitimate terms and priorities of debate with other 
stakeholders. As such they would constitute an ensemble of new cognitive processes and 
reference points for employee sense-making activities, that create, sustain and communicate 
new images of organisational reality that encourage transformative action commensurable 
with the constructors’ interests. Through this new "gaze", employees would be empowered 
to counter the technocratic interpretive lens proffered by the orthodox accounting "reality 
constructors" (Morgan, 1986, p. 132) through the socialisation (Berger and Luckmann, 1967, 
p. 137) and ideological colonisation processes engendered by D.A.I.. Moreover, by enabling 
the creation of new forms of social audit those information systems might allow for the 
articulation of alternative corporate strategies (see Coates, 1978) that constitute the 
coalescences of new modes of agency. So such new information systems might enable (and 
constrain) new sets of capabilities for knowledgeable agents by creating new structuring 
properties, institutional practices, rules and resources that bind time-space (Giddens, 1984, 
p. 17) which they draw upon in the production and reproduction of social action which 
"recursively" is constitutive of a new "accounting system" (Roberts and Scapens, 1985, pp. 
447-8) and "moral order".
Indeed the development and enactment of this kind of "educative" programme, the processes 
and tribulations of the construction of employee centred information systems and their 
eventual confrontation with accounting orthodoxy, all constitute intriguing domains and 
vehicles for future research: elements that portent a research format that obeys Fay’s
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injunction (1975, 1987) for a "critical" social science to be interconnected ^ ith  social 
practices.
Conclusion
In conclusion to this thesis I would like to consider an issue that the prior section raises and 
which returns me to a consideration of a theme that runs throughout this thesis - the 
commensurability of paradigms and the pragmatic criterion.
In the previous section I argued for the need for employees to develop their own interest­
laden modes of engagement: essentially these artefacts would constitute new paradigms 
through which epistemic subjects might apprehend organisational reality. This raises the 
question as to whether or not such an heterodoxy would be able to enter into a meaningful 
dialogue with the current orthodoxy of accounting derived renditions upon the arrival of 
their inevitable confrontation during collective bargaining. Although it is only possible to 
speculate about such an event, a source of aid in this endeavour might derive from a return 
to a philosophical discussion of the commensurability of paradigms and the impact of the 
pragmatic criterion upon this vexed issue.
At first sight the possibility of dialogue appears to be unlikely for as Kuhn (1962) claims, two 
paradigms cannot be compared in terms of each other since each one "carves the universe up" 
in different ways, indeed "the proponents of competing paradigms practice their trades in 
different worlds . . ." (ibid, p. 150). A similar thesis regarding this issue is put forward by 
both Feyerabend (1978) and Burrell and Morgan (1979). The latter argue that social theory 
can be conceived in terms of a 2 by 2 paradigmatic matrix based upon different sets of 
"metatheoretical assumptions" about the nature of social science and the nature of society 
(ibid p. X). In this they propose that these four key paradigms are derived from mutually 
exclusive views of the world, each standing in its own right and generating distinctive 
analyses of social life. Indeed for Burrell and Morgan each paradigm generates perspectives
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which are in fundamental opposition to those generated in other paradigms. As such they are 
incommensurable - that is . . .
" . . .  a synthesis is not possible since in their pure form they are contradictory, 
being based on at least one set of opposing metatheoretical assumptions . . . 
accepting the assumptions of one, we defy the assumptions of all others."(ibid., p. 25)
In a recent critique of Kuhn, Barnes (1985) illustrates how some commentators have 
mistakenly taken Kuhn’s thesis to mean that since different communities of scientists live in, 
and cognitively construct, different worlds (i.e. multiple realities) scientists can therefore 
"pick and choose" what is to count as knowledge (ibid., pp. 94-7). While I feel that Barnes
• 11 IIis correct to demonstrate how such  an interpretation is misleading, particularly given the 
existence of epistemological rules embedded within a paradigm; the notion of paradigmatic 
incommensurability does njse two related issues pertinent to the position developed in this 
thesis.
Firstly, Reed (1985) claims that one result of the view that paradigms are mutually exclusive 
is the.logical advocation of paradigmatic "closure" (ibid., p. 183): the intellectual, social and 
moral isolation of paradigms. In concluding this research I feel that the potentiality for 
"closure" must be reviewed together with the second implication of the incommensurability 
thesis - the "spectre" of relativism. That is, as Kuhn and Burrell and Morgan imply, if 
paradigms are incommensurable and therefore so disparate that "mutually rational discourse" 
derived from a framework of independent evaluative criteria is impossible, then the 
accusation of relativism (e.g. Chua, 1986b) is only too apparent and as I have argued 
elsewhere, relativism presents the paradox that it cannot cope with its own critique.
Essentially my argument will be that relativism and "closure" might be eschewed through an 
appeal to the "pragmatic criterion"; while at the same time this appeal does not necessarily 
open up the embryonic and innovative paradigms, such as those of radical social theory, to
H IIthe swamping by the intellectual hegemony of functionalism - a concern correctly articulated 
by Burrell (1980). Moreover, I shall argue that the "pragmatic criterion", since it allows some
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degree of intersubjectivity between paradigms, eschews the relativism of the 
incommensurability thesis yet protects the heterodox from the hegemony of the orthodox.
In their different ways, Kuhn, Feyerabend and Burrell and Morgan might be seen to be 
emphasising how different communities of epistemic subjects cognitively and socially 
construct knowledge by their projection of theoretical and metatheoretical assumptions onto 
various substantive domains. Their resultant conceptualisation of scientific endeavour, with 
its rejection of ontological privilege, is one with which I sympathise; but this is a sympathy 
tempered with a concern to avoid the relativism that is often associated with such 
"Hansonism". Part of my attempted escape from the incoherence of relativism necessarily 
entails an argument against the incommensurability thesis that is alluded to by the above 
scholars and which might also be found in Wittgenstein’s notion of "language-games" (1968) 
and in Winch’s work regarding "cultures" (1967).
As I have stated, the incommensurability thesis (correctly) emphasises the role of subjects’ 
interpretive and projective activities in the production of knowledge - that "there is more to 
seeing than meets the eyeball" (Hanson, 1958, p. 7); but to claim that the resultant 
constructions, when produced by the "filters" of different paradigms, are incommensurable, 
implies that in order for commensurability to be available (and hence inter-paradigm 
intersubjectivity, discourse and evaluation) some epistemological consensus must be extent. 
Alternatively in order for scientists to shift from paradigm to paradigm some cognitive 
transformation must occur in their webs of metatheoretical assumptions. So for mutually 
intelligible dialogue to occur, some consensus about the interpretive and projective 
conventions in-use must exist. Without that consensus intersubjectivity and dialogue is 
impossible.
Now the contention of incommensurability has been challenged upon various grounds. 
Particularly Scheffler (1967) and Toulmin (1971) have claimed that although paradigms do 
differ, many possess common elements at the higher levels of abstraction which ensure that 
they overlap and hence a channel for intersubjectivity remains available. Alternatively
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Newton-Smith (1981) has argued that if two paradigms are indeed incommensurable they 
cannot be "rivals” and therefore a person is at liberty to accept both without self- 
contradiction.
However I wish to pursue an alternative argument that contends that paradigmatic 
intersubjectivity can be available without demanding prior cognitive eclecticism or 
coincidence on the part of communities of epistemic subjects. This channel for 
communication lies with the epistemological invocation of the "pragmatic criterion". In the 
consideration of their distinctive contributions to our knowledge of natural and social affairs, 
this criterion allows for the evaluation of different and ostensibly mutually exclusive 
paradigms in terms of how successfully their various recipes of knowledge allow for our 
interest-laden practical intervention into, and interaction with, our worlds. The possibility 
of such a channel for discourse perhaps lies in the distinctive derivation of the "pragmatic 
criterion" in that it has arisen out of a shared and primordial human concern to interact 
successfully with our human and natural environments (Arbib and Hesse, 1986) in the 
resolution of our interest-laden problems. Indeed some scholars appear to go as far to 
hypostatise such a phenomena as a species-universal characteristic of rationality since . . .
". . . rationality consists at the very least of learning from experience and
especially from mistakes . . ."
(Javie, 1970, p. 238)
So the "pragmatic criterion" demands the translation of the theoretical discourse of different 
communities of scientists into schemes of practical actions or interventions (Fay, 1975, pp. 
94-5). These bodies of knowledge may then be evaluated in terms of how successfully those 
schemes aid the "settling" of human affairs while explicitly recognising the interest-laden 
nature of the various contributions and thereby evaluating each in terms of its ideological 
knowledge-constituting context and political agenda. In this fashion a channel for inter- 
paradigm discourse is opened - something that would be impossible if correspondence or 
consensus criteria of "truth" were invoked; and something that avoids the relativistic 
implications of incommensurability.
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Concurrently the heterodox and the innovative might be protected from the intellectual 
hegemony of the established orthodoxy, not by "closure" (Reed, 1985, p. 183) but by an 
overtly political and pragmatic discourse which establishes intersubjectivity while protecting 
the metatheoretical constitutive cores of competing paradigms. Of course in order for this i 
channel to be operable,the potential communicators must be prepared to adopt the "pragmatic 
criterion" as an epistemological "lingua franca" - an event about which one must not be 
naively optimistic. But if that "lingua franca" were to be adopted, the ideological 
imperialism of the orthodox would at least be hampered since the very act of adopting that 
mode of intersubjectivity entails the necessary discardment of claims to ontological privilege 
beyond that demonstrable through the practical settling of interest-laden human affairs.
Thus my attempted resolution of the problems deriving from the incommensurability thesis 
is distinct from Reed’s (ibid., p. 199) advocation of a "pluralist strategy". Particularly it does. 
not suggest the possibility of a "joint search for improved understanding and enlightenment" 
(ibid., p. 202). Neither does it demand any "grand synthesis" as portended by an 
"integrationist strategy" (ibid., p. 175-9). Either strategy ignores the role of conflict between 
different, as yet subliminated, political agendas. Instead what is tentatively suggested is 
much closer to Reed’s notion of an "isolationist strategy" - but it is isolation not in terms of 
"closure" but of independent development with channels for communication (and protection) 
afforded by the "lingua franca" of the pragmatic criterion. Without that "lingua franca" the 
alternative might be closure, incommensurability and ultimately relativism.
So it would appear that meaningful dialogue, between the conjectured heterodoxy of 
employee accounting systems and the modern accounting orthodoxy, might only be possible 
through the intervention of a pragmatic "lingua franca". But given the probably conflictual 
industrial relations contexts in which their confrontation might occur, the willingness of 
parties to communicate through that mode seems unlikely, and even if they did, the effects 
might be stalemate albeit a mutually intelligible stalemate. The eventual outcome of these 
scenarios would thus probably depend upon the extent to which alternative power resources
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might be mobilised by competing parties in pursuit of their preferences. However in this, 
through the prior development of a heterodoxy with its equally partisan "gaze", employees 
and their representatives will have effectively undermined an important aspect of dyadic 
power. Moreover, the propaganda utility of their new mode of engagement may be 
considerable. But as I have demonstrated in this thesis with respect to the historical 
development of modern accounting, the fate of this heterodoxy will be intimately tied to the 
social fate of its carrier group(s); and as Max Planck somewhat cryptically implies, the fate 
of its opponents in t h a t . . .
" . . .  a new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and 
making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die and 
a new generation grows up that is familiar with it."
(Quoted in Kuhn, 1962, p. 151.)
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